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k3,3TRACT 
. 
The thesis is concerned -.. -ith establishing theoretical 
and en-pirical links bet-ween music as a r., iode of symbolic 
mediation and the world sense of the society in -., hich the -. music 
occurs. The principal aim is to demonstrate hoi-ir Trusic, as a 
tial symabolic mode, can be viewed as .1 uotally non-referent, aing 
forh 
part of the ongoingly constructed realities of different grou-ps 
and societies and how, as'a result, it might be possible to 
relate the analysis of a musical lanrmage to the analysis of 
other aspects of the relevant Group or society. 
In order to realise these aims it has been necessary to 
assume a. theoretical perspective of symbolic mediation -wide 
enouGh to accomodate music, but which) at the same time2 would 
not preclude the application of similar principles to other 
forms of art or to other symbolic nodes. The main problem 
encountered is that the traditionally visual-tactile world sense 
of modern industrial man precludes the easy adoption of a frame 
of reference which will allow for the non-rof e rent! al aspects of 
the social symbology. It is difficult, for example, to 
conceive of music -as having 'meaning' beyond the usual verbal 
or iconic connotations of that -,, -ord; the suggestion that wo: -k-s 
of literature and representational works of art are iiibued with 
'social' meaning is not nearly as contentious as the sugGestion 
that milsic has 'social' meaning. 
Constructing a frame of reference of sufficient depth to 
include music has therefore necessitated examining some of the 
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assumptions that underly modern industrial societies, an 
ex-amination that is carried out in Iýart I of tile -thesis. The 
position adopted is that the media man extuernalises in order 
to collectively construct social realities play - fundamental 
role in the structuring of bo-kh inAividual consciousnesses and 
societies as a whole. u In 10--rticular, the visual bi as of 
industrial man may be-traced to--the phenomena of phonetic- 
literacy and typography. By reference to existing literature 
in the sociology and aesthetics of music it is then demonstrated 
exactly how the assumptions generated by literacy and typography 
prevent a 'full' or 'adequate' appreciation of the musical 
process* 
Part I of the thesis concludes by constructing a view of 
the world -which allwus for both non-referential symbologies and 
the fact of creativity. Because of its highly developed 
division of labour modern industrial society has tended to 
rele, gate creativity to the realms of artistic and, to a lesser 
extent, academic activity. Since social theorists have largely 
ignored artistic activity as a facet of modern industrial life, 
most social theory fails to adequately cope with the phenomenon 
of creativity. Clearly, any attempt to consider the artistic 
function as part of people's life and experience needs to 
incorporate creativity as a major aspect of its conceptual 
approach. 
The second part of the thesis bears out the theoretical 
approach of Part I by comparing the musics mid world senses of 
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certain societies. The comparisons ma-de are bet-ýýeen: 
1) the General characteristics of pre-literate musics and 
1rhat, may reasonably be t--'-, en to be the General 
characteristics of pre-literate -worlc' senses. 
2) the structure of plainchant and classic feudalism. 
3) the structure of tonality and post-Renaissance 
European society. 
-As a result of the theoretical and empirical evidence presented 
in the'thesis, i-t is argued that musical lan6-uages, in being 
culture-specific to different societies and to different groups 
1vithin societies, have social signi. Liczmce. This is of Great 
relevance for the value-laden stances adopted in our own 
society with regard to different types of music. 
The thesis concludes with a consideration of the 
legitimacy of writing about music. How justifiable is it to 
use the very medium which has prejudiced a "Lull' appreciation 
of the musical process in order to Itranslatel and explain that 
same experience? 
V 
IliTRODUCTION 
It is customary, in the Introduction to a thesis, to 
indicate -the relationship that thesis has with other -work in the 
same field. This kind of. Introduction assumes that -the general 
background and frameýworlk in terms of which -v; ork in a discipline 
pro, i; resses areboth generally understood and agreed upon. --- 
Because this thesis is concerned with a discussion of some of 
the fýindamental premises underlying musicology (rather than with 
any specific substantive'area within the discipline)y such an 
Introduction is not possible. Indeed, the relation of. the 
arguments and evidence presented in this thesis to other work in 
musicology (and, to a much lesser extent, aesthetics) can only 
become fully apparent as the t hesis progresses. To this end, 
both Parts of the thesis, together with most individual chapters, 
contain their own'brief Introductions, -which make the 
relationship of their contents to overall lines of argument as 
clear as possible. 
The contribution this thesis seeks to make may best be 
introduced by referring to the way in which it was conceived. 
The significance of analysis (that is, the question of what 
conclusions may legitimately be drawn from analysing a piece of 
music) is a subject on which there is unlikely to be total 
agreement when. that subject is being considered for itself. But 
on a day-to-day basis it does not seem that musiciaiis find the 
analysis of functional tonality inherently problematic. The 
analysis of a Bach fugue or a Beethoven sonata as often as not 
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seems self-evident in its siGnificance, and is not something 
-. rhose loGical status or legitimp-cy is thereby brought into 
question. ITo-ever, there are other kinds of music i-, here 
analysis is more problematic. T-Tork"on this thesis began as a 
result of difficulties experienced in analysing the music of 
Delius. This music quite cleazly makes reference to isolated 
se6-ments of functional tonal syntax. Yet analytical tools 
derivq, d from that syntax become hopelessly inadequate when 
applied to Delius's music as an 'organic entity'. Initiallyy 
such inadequacy raises the question as to what the correct 
analytical, tools should be. 
_ 
But this question inevitably leads 
to othersq for if analysis itself becomes problematic then so 
does the formulation of any conclusions ýuhich might be drawn 
from that analysis. The significance of analysis is not 
something that can be divorced from matters of analytic method. 
Ultimately, the entire question of the basis, legitimacy and 
significance of analysis, seemingly unproblematic in the case of 
functional tonality2 once again comes into court. 
The central problem with which this thesis deals may thus 
be summarised as follo-,, ýS- On the one hand, there is little doubt 
that much analysis successfully parallels the a-esthetic 
experience. On the other, it is not at all clear hoi-, - this 
parallel couies about. There are, in other words9 two broad lines 
of thought within musicology, the analytic and the aesthetic, 
which are far from incomDatible, but vrhose precise relationship 
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remains something of a nystery. One of -the -ourposes of this 
thesis is to throw some light on that mystery. 
Solutions to problems *somet-imes come fro-a unexpected 
quarters. In this case, an insight into the solutio,, j of the 
above Droblem resulted from the reading of two books (The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas S. Kuhn, and The 
Social Construction of Reality by Peter L-. - Berger and'ThOM-AS 
Luckmann) which, on the face of it, have absolutely iiothing to 
do with music. The im-portance of these t-wo books is extensively 
discussed in -Appendix I. Briefly, Kuhn's book describes how the 
occurrence of intransigent problems in science can often give 
rise to fundamental reorientations in the outlook of a 
scientific community. One such problem, that of the observed 
velocity of light, gave rise to Einstein's two theories of 
relativity -which in turn instigated a major reorientation in 
scientific tho-! 4ght. It would seem that a resolution of the 
dichotomous state of musicology indicated above could only core 
about-as the result of a similar fundamental reorientation. 
111c)-izever, although Xulin uras able to document instances of 
scientific revolutions7 and although lie was able to ar6ue 
persuasively that such revolutions i7ere essentially non- 
scientific in their origins, lie was unable to satisfactorily 
locate these origins. 
A i-Tay round this difficulty was suggested through a 
reading of BerGer and Luckmann's book. It may be verging on the 
tautologous to say that all 1-tc-nowledg7e is a result of human 
viii 
creativity. Yet the consequences of this fact are frequently 
ignored or for-gotten. It appeared that this kind of obvia-tion 
was responsible for the difficulty experienced by Kuhn. In 
short, scientific revolutions occur no-C just a. s the result of 
debates within the scientific community, but as a reflection of 
wid contribution to the wider social reality within -which 
scientific-iTork is carried out. 
These lines of thought immediately suggested three 
consequences of relevance for musicology. Firstly, if the 
dichotomy indicated above i-Tas. as genuinely problematic as it 
seemed, then such intransigence could probably be traced to the 
-vider social reality in terms of i-rhich traditional -approaches 
to the understanding of music are formulated. Secondly, they 
suggested that a solution of this problem could only be achieved 
through a change in our socially constructed outlook on the 
-world. But finally2 and most importantly, the lines of thought 
themselves indicated i, ihat the nature of this reorientation should 
be. For if reality is taken to be a social construct, then to' 
treat music 
(which surely constitutes a part of our reality) as 
something other than a social construct would seem to be somewhat 
perverse. The fact that musicology hds studiously avoided a 
serious consideration of this possibility was encouracrement 
enou! ---h to pursue it in some deDth. The central issues of the 
thesis therefore became, on the one hand, the relationship 
between musicological theory and underlying social reality, and, 
on the other, the relaUionship between musical languagesand the 
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wider'soci. al realities of which they form an integral aspect. 
The possibility that music could forn one aspect of a 
wider social reality is not one to have escaped sociologists, 
hol..., ever. . 
One of the founding father.. of the discipline, 1.1ax. 
'Teber, -wrote a treatise on that 'very subject (it was published 
after. his death)'-- But sociologists have always faced a------- 
difficulty with music, - and that is how to translate analyses of 
such an 'abstract' mode of communication into terms of social 
significance. The problem, in other words, remains that of 
'how is music significant'. A conundrum is therefore reached, 
for the suggested solution which sociology is able to offer 
musicology for its problem is by virtue of that very problem 
problematic for sociology. And because musicians have 
traditionally been suspicious and sceptical of sociology, little 
progress has been made. 
This thesis is an attempt to bridge that gap. Such an 
alltempt, howeverý is fraught with difficulties. In the first 
place, the implications of*discussing this particular area are 
very far reaching. There is hardly an aspect of musicoloLýZrj or 
presumablyý ethnamusicology, which at least in principle could 
not be affected by this kind of undertaking. Conversely, there-, 
is hardly an article or book written on the aesthetics, theory, 
sociology or anthropology of music which vould not be relevant 
to it. Consequently, exhaustive discussions of these areas 
could not be attempted within the scope of this thesis. Instead, 
in criticising traditional concepts in aesthetic and theory, 
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recourse was had (respectively) to the work of Susanne Langer 
and Leonard B. Meyer. This was not only because these figures 
have commanded the centre of the stage for some time in their 
own particular areas2 but also because their work provides good 
(although not, of course, exclusive) exanples of the way in 
which predominant Ipsycholog-Istic' assumptions have found 
expression. ' - Again, writings' -by sociologists. 'onmusic 'are only- 
considered when they have a direct bearing on the cdntral 
issues of the thesis. Because work in the sociology of music 
seldom addresses itself to these issues, it was not felt 
necessary to engage in an exhaustive survey. Consequently, 
publications which are of direct relevance to the arguments 
presented in the thesis are to be found at the end of each 
chapter. For reasons outlined above, the compilation of a 
complete bibliography would clearly have been a ma=oth task 
a-yid has thus not been attempted. 
The attempt to create a bridge between music and 
sociology is also liable to create as many problems as it 
solves. Kuhn has noted this tendency in the early stages of 
many scientific revolutions. For this reason the thesis must 
be regarded as the culmination of the first stage in a 
continuing project. From a theoretical viewpoint this 
culmination is reached in Chapter Seven with the discussion of 
the implicitz-explicit paradigm. From the point of view of 
actual musical analysis, the culmination occurs at a rather more 
basic level. For within the context of this thesis, it has 
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only been possible to discuss what 111ans Keller would refer to 
as Iba-ckEroundIq that is, the 'deep structure' of musical 
1-angua-ges, and not the different ways in which individual 
composers articulate and comment upon those structures. Quite 
clearly, the difference between a Dittersdorf and-a Mozart lies 
in the facf that whereas a Dittersdort -will do little more than 
reproduce the. musical (and social) status ouo, ozart w 
have something. of fundamental importance to say about it. That 
is perhaps why less 'grea-tI. composers might iiýell be more 
symptomatic of their oini generation. The theory put forward in 
this thesis has not as yet been developed. in enough detail'to 
I. ake account of this difference, nor, indeed, o: C-the substantial 
differencesin style to be found within given musical languages. 
The same kind of limitation applies to the sociological 
arguments put forward. The emphasis has been to describe, in 
ideal-typical fashion, broad underlying trends in different 
societies. It is evident that such descriptions must precede 
more detailedanalyses of the way these trends act back. on and 
occasionally contradict one another. Further, detailed local 
analysis which is not cross-culturally grounded frequently fails 
to see the wood for the trees. 
Without denying that localised analysis might give rise 
,o difficulties aund problems requiring modification of the basic 
concept put forward in the thesis2 it would seem unlikely that 
this kind of modification would lead to a fundamental re- 
orientation. If the concept does not hold good at the greatest 
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level of generality thon it appears logically impossible that 
it could hold good at a more localised level. If, for example, 
it C-anno t be-successfully established that functional tonality 
both encodes and creatively articulates the structure of life 
and experience fo"r educated post-Ronaissance. man, then it seems 
unlikely th-at an inherent social significance could be 
- clemonsý. rated for the music, say2 of lyLozaxt. - Refinement- of the 
theory would thus appear to require time rather than any major 
new theoretical departure. 
Nevertheless, a thesis such as this undoubtedly lays 
itself more open to criticism precisely because of the subject 
matter it discusses. This subject matter is general and does 
not admit of certain or incontrovertible answers. In the 
opinion of Leonard B. Meyer, however, such undert, -e<ings are 
none the less valuable for that. Speculation is a necessary 
pre-recluisite for understanding: 
Disheartenbd and perhaps dismayed by the speculative 
uncertainties of theory, criticism and, one should add, 
history as distinct from chronicle, too many humanists, 
particularly those in music, have tended to follow the 
well-worn path of safe scholarship. But to choose 
prospective certainty over. present insight is both 
mistaken and misguided. It is mistaaen because the 
search for final, definitive answers is an unattainable 
goal for those disciplines concerned with understanding 
and exDlanation. For, since the future is open and 
influential, it can change our understanding both of past 
comDositions and of past historical events. It is 
misguided - paradoxically so - because the enduring 
monuments of scholarship, which have shaped men's minds 
and beliefs, far from being cautious and circumspect, 
have been those which illuminated a relationship, a work 
of-. art, or a past epoch through a bold, encompassing 
hypothesis. Though in all probability they will 
subsequently be revised, or even rejected, such works 
and theories endure because they are exciting and seminal: 
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they lead to new discoveries and further formulations, 
and thereby continue to affect lahguaEcl-thought, 
and behaviour. 
; Thilst not claiming that this thesis i's necessarily exciting I 
or, indeed, seminall it is to be Iloped that it -,. -iill be taken as 
a serious attem'Ot to link t"o disciplines -v. -hose cross- 
fei-tilisation cannot be anything but productive. 
The general scheme of the thesis is as follows. - The 
first four chapters of Part I show how prevailing social reality 
has given rise to a musicological dichotomyy and why this 
reality makes the alternative view suggested by sociology a 
difficult one for musicology to take seriously. ChaDter Five 
then nuts forward a different outlook on the world (that is, a 
different social reality) which allo-vrs for a social theory of 
music, thus superseding the dichotomy. Chapter Six concludes 
Part I by considering the implications that traditional and 
radical approaches hold for the process of '-writing about 
music'. Part II then attem-ots-'. to translate the predominantly 
sociological and aesthetic discussions of Part I into musical 
terra. s. Pre-literate, sacred medieval and functional tonal 
music are considered in relation to the wider social reality of 
which they form an integral aspect. In this regard it should 
be noted that the discussions of different social realities to 
be found in Part I serve two purposes: firstly, they underpin 
the criticism of traditional theory which take place in that t 
Part; secondly, they-*: form tile bac': '-Iground against Part II seeks 
to elucidate the inherent social significance of music. The 
thesis concludesy in Chapter Thirteen, with a brief assessment 
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of the im-olications that it holds for future possible 
orientations within musicoloa. 
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PART I 
THE PROBLE"M AND ITS SOLUTION 
-1- 
INTRODUCTION 
- The central assumption of this tI I iesis is that any 
significance assigned to rhusic must ultimately and necessarily be 
located in the commonly agreed meanings of the. group or society 
in which the particular music is created. This assumption, in 
the final analysisq can neither be proved nor disproved. 
However, it will be the principal purpose of Chapters Two, Three 
and Four to argue that prevalent 'a-social' views of music are 
inherently problematic, and that these views form an integral. 
aspect not only of industrial man's outlook on the world, but of 
the political structures within which he lives and which he 
largely takes for granted. Chapter Five will then put forward a 
view Of the social process which eliminates the problems referred 
to, and allows for a vital and acceptable social theory for music. 
Finally, Chapter Six demonstrates how prevalent modes of writing 
about music both encode and articulate the outlook and structures 
indicated in Chapter Three. 
This Part of the thesis begins, however, with a brief 
discussion of the two fundamental propositions which underlie the 
entire work. 
NOTE ; 
1. The logical status of competing theories and their underlying 
assumptions is fully discussed in Appendix I. 
- 
CHAPTIM OITE 
BASIC PROPOSITIONS 
-3- 
THE AESTBETIC PERSPECTIVE 
Implicit in the central assumption of this thesis is the 
view that the meaning of music is somehow located in its function 
as a social symbol. It is the word 'meaning' which creates the 
&eatest problem in ýhis context. For most peoble a symbol has 
meaning because it refers to something outside itself. Pictures 
have meaning because they refer to something in physical reality, 
and words have meaning because they refer to concepts and ideas. 
But to suggest that a piece of music has meaning because of extra- 
musical references is, at the least, highly contentious. The 
logical alternative has thus been to look for the tm6aning' of 
music within the structure of individual pieces2 an alternative 
whose strictest formulationg as Leonard B. Meyer indicates (19562 
P. 33), is to be found in the attitude of the absolutists: 
The absolutists have contended that the meaning of 
music lies specifically, and some would assert exclusively, 
in the musical processe. s themselves. For them musical 
meaning is non-designative. But in what sense these 
processes are meaningful ... they have been unable to 
state with either clarity or precision .... This failure has led some critics to assert that musical 
meaning is a thing apart, different in some unexplained 
way from all other kinds of meaning. This is simply an 
evasion of the real issue. 
The real issue can be stated in terms of the following comparison. 
Because their meaning is 'located outside themIq words and 
pictures may be thought of as Icarryingt their meaning and 
tgiving' it to the recipient. The symbol, in other wordsý 
survives the divulgence of its message. If, on the other hand, 
musical meaning is acknowledged to lie within the musical process 
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itself, then in 'giving awayl that meaning, a piece seemingly 
compromises the very being or essence responsible for the meaning 
in the first place. As Susanne Langer (1960, p. 236) has put it, 
the absolutists "seem to : ýeel that if musica-1 structures should 
really be found to have significance, to relate to anything beyond 
themselves, those structures would forthwith cease to be musical". 
This difficulty results from confusing a symbol which has 
no referent in the world of objects and ideas with-one which is 
informationally a closed system. Music certainly falls within the 
former but not, as the absolutists imply, the latter category. it 
is this distinction which facilitates the theories of Meyer and 
Langer. Broadly, both authors locate musical significance in 
"psychological constants" (Ideyer, 19731 P-14) or "psychological 
laws of 'rightness' 11 (Langer, 1960, p. 240). That is, since all 
music originates in the minds of individual people, and since all 
minds are assumed to possess similar psychological characteristicsq 
it is taken that there will be a certain conformity of patterning 
or structure between all music and all minds. Consequenuly, all 
minds are presumed to be suitably predisposed for the 
superimposition of the particular structure that constitutes a 
piece, and there is no longer'any need to have recourse to the 
notion of symbols which divest themselves of externally 
referential meanings. tInformation' is conveyed by another method. 
On the surface, this might seem to be a, suitable and 
adequate explanation of musical process. It is ultimately 
compromised, however, by resulting from exactly the same mode of 
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thought responsible for the original difficulty. In order to 
understand this anomaly and the failure of aestheticians and music 
theorists to circumvent it by invoking a social theory of music, 
it is necessary to make UTo basic assumptions. The first is that 
the collective reality of any society is mutually constructed by 
its memb ers rather than being externally given,. and the second 
that the form the reality of any particular society takes is 
pervasively influenced by the medium of communication prevalent in 
that society. 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
An approach to the understanding of the social 
construction of reality may best be made through a consideration 
of the role played in that process by symbols. A symbol may be 
thought of as any occurrence in the world, whether or not produced 
by man, which carries a generally agreed meaning for the members 
of a particular group or society. 
Societies can only arise and continue to exist through 
communication, that is, the creation and exchange of symbols 
2 
Symbols are not self-contained phenomena. They are not God- 
given, but created by people to cope with the many varied 
situations in which they find themselves. The meanings of 
symbols and sets of symbols are originally derived from. specific 
and real situations. But there is another side to the coin. 
Once a symbol or set, of symbols has been created in response to a 
new situation these symbols, in retrospect, colour that situation. 
-6- 
When people look back at a series of events they do so by means 
of and through the symbols created to define it. Furthermore, 
the new symbols may be used in other situations. Since the 
symbols are not specifically created for these other situations 
they bring to them meanings which although not necessarily 
irrelevant or wrong, -are obviously coloured by previous usage. 
The reverse, of course, is equally true, for new situations modify 
the meanings of the already existing symbols used to denote such 
situations. In other words, situations and symbols have a 
mutually interdependent7 but not determinant3, relationship 
crucial to the constantly changing dynamics oj- the social process. 
This relationship is most easily understood with regard to 
words, which constitute man's most important symbolic mode. Not 
only do the meanings which arise in social situations give rise to 
words and continually modify the meanings of pre-existing words, 
but words and complete symbolic languages bring pre-conceived 
meanings to bear on our everyday sense of the world. Indeed, any 
new situation and/or symbol is mediated to an extent by pre- 
existing adjacent meanings. The world we live in has meaning for 
us only because we symbolically mediate the events that take place 
in it with other people, and we do this primarily with words. 
Reality - often conceived as an objective fact which cannot be 
changed, but only misconstrued - is thus constructed by people 
through the mutual agreement by words and other symbols on 
experiences undergone by individual people: 
"World-view" is an elusive term, but when we speak 
of someone's world view in any sense, we do not mean simply 
the world impressing itself upon his passive receptorsq 
sensory or intellectual. A person does not receive a 
world view, but rather takes or adopts one. A world view 
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is not a datumv a donn but something the individual 
himselfq and the culture he shares partly constructs; 
it is the person's way of organising from within himself 
the data of actuality coming from without and within (Ong, 
1969, p. 634). 
For the purpose of clear understandingý a theoretical 
distinction may be drai-m between environment and everyday reality: 
, environment is the uziqualified situation (reality as we might 
imagine it to be as objective fact) in which a person finds 
himself; everyday reality is the result of that person's inter- 
action with the environment and the interaction of this 
subjectivity with other subjects. In practice, the distinction 
is invalid for two related reasons: firstlyq no person finds 
himself without society and therefore pre-existing cultural 
support; and secondly, subjectivities and ensuing inter- 
subjectivitics become legitimated or integrated into a world 
sense 
4 through 1, Thich the environment is mediated to people. 
Society is thus quintessentially symbolic. That is to 
say, world senses and the legitir. qa-ti ng structures that integrate 
inter-subjectivities into a world sense - the meanings of 
society - are created and maintained in and through people's 
collective externalisations. Every perception made and every 
symbol externalised is done so as a contribution to and in the 
context of the symbolically mediated and, since new situations are 
constantly arising, dialectic field of meaning peculiar to any 
group or society. To put it another way, people's consciousness 
both of themselves and the world they live in is mediat ed by and 
through an all-encompassing man-made filter whose influence is 
utterly inescapable. 
-8- 
Any culture-specific field of meaning is predicated upon 
assumptions, which evolve as a result of the inter-subjective V 
legitimations of perceptions, events and situations that 
articulate that field. These assumptions may be regarded as the 
paradigmatic framework or structure upon which all sensory or 
intellectual interaction is unconsciously grounded. The 
realisation of the existence of such assumptions does not negate 
the dialectic concept of society (one might conclude that it 
encouraged people to perceive the nature of all perceptions, 
thoughts and externalisations as mechanically determined). 
Assumptions serve, on the contrary, to mediate, process and in some 
cases repress socially efficacious information in one way rather 
than in any other. Society is not a one-level mono-linear cause 
and effect sequence, but a mosaic of simultaneously interacting and 
complementary fields of action and influence. It must be further 
emphasised that assumptions are implicitly agreed upon inter- 
subjectively, and as such are themselves, at times of great stress 
and rapid or fundamental change, subject to change through the 
dialectic processes of society. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF 113DIA 
The principal line of argument in the three succeeding 
chapters is that the assumntions underlying the world 
I 
sense of 
industrial man are ultimately -responsible for current difficulties 
in music aesthetics. The form the assumptions or world sense of 
a particular society takes would most obviously seem to de. end, 
-9- 
perhaps, on the way the symbols of that society depict, denote and 
categorise what might be imagined as a previously undifferentiated 
world. Many people have had the experience of trying to under- 
stand, even in closely related European languages, words for which 
there are no direct equivalents in Dnglish. A true understanding 
bf these words invol-ýes a change in their outlo6k on the world, 
however slight. What is about to be suggested here, on the other 
hand, is rather different. That isq that the way people 
communicate in constructing their reality (whether the face-to-face 
oral-aural situation of spoken discourset the visuality of hand- 
writing and printing or the aural-visual immediacy of electronic 
forms of communication) affects their outlook on the world at a 
very deep 16vel. It is not so much what is conveyed that is 
important, but how it is conveyed. 
The view that media are highly influential in the 
structuring both of individual psyches and entire civilisations 
has most notably been put forward by Marshall McLuhan. His 
arguments have tended to be ignored by the academic -vTorld5l and 
when taken account of have received a considerabl. o amount of 
6 
frequently pertinent criticism While it seems reasonable to 
conclude that many of McLuhants arguments are over-stated and ill- 
founded it would also seem that the criticism they have received 
has caused other scholars in the field to be overly cautious. 
Kathleen Gough (1968, P. 84), for example, puts forward the following 
considered opinion concerning the influence of writing on complex 
societies: 
Writingg like other communication media, is 
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problematic because it forms part of both the 
technological and ideological heritage of complex 
societies, as well as being intricately involved with 
their social structures. Difficulties arise because 
it is hard to disentangle the implicrations of literacy 
from those of other t, echniques (for example, plough 
agriculture, settled cultivation, rapid transport or 
power industry), or'of other institutions (for example, 
specialized priesthoods or powerful governments) 
commonly found in advanced societies. Literacy appears 
to be, above all', an enabling factor, permitting large- 
scale organization, the critical accumulationg storage 
and retrieval of knowledge, the systematic use of logic, 
the pursuit of science and elaboration of the arts. 
Whether, and with what emphases, these developments will 
occur seems to depend less on the intrinsic Imowledge of 
writing than on the overall development of the society's 
technology and social structure, and perhaps, also, on 
the character of its relation with other societies. if 
they occur, however, there seems little doubt of 
contention that the use of writing as a dominant 
communication medium will impose certain broad forms on 
their emergence, of which syllogistic reasoning and 
linear codifications of reality may be examples. 
Most media philosophers would seem to assume, as Gough does 
hereý that the creation and influence of media constitute integral 
aspects of any society's development. Yet it has perhaps been a 
central weakness of media philosophy that the implications of this 
assumption have never been fully explored in any theoretical 
fashion. Indeed, it was not until 1969 that the clear connection 
between the sociology of knowledge and media philosophy as areas 
of academic enquiry was made by Walter J. Ong7. In Gough's case, 
for example, lack of a theoretical framework appears to result in a 
paradox. For although2 at the beginning of her statement, Cough 
seems to acknowledge the dialectic relationship of media to all 
other aspects of the social processi she later implies something 
quite'different. Namely, that if a social structure is pre- 
disposed to develop in a certain way, then the presence of the 
appropriate media will permit or facilitate that development. In 
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this senseý the influence of media can only be*said to be. passive or 
negative2 this latter if the appropriate media is not in 
existence. There is little question of media having a dialectic 
and therefore active influence on the future development of a 
society. 
Because it w6uld require a deeper consideration of the 
social construction of reality than is appropriate to the main body 
of the thesis, discussion of the relationship between media and the 
social process is carried out in the first half of Appendix H. 
As this discussion concludes, at a theoretical level, that media 
are liable to be more pervasive in their influence on the structures 
of different social realities than any other aspect of the social 
process, it seems reasonable to adopt a more positive attitude 
than Gough. The position taken in this thesis, therefore, is that 
different media not only facilitate but actively encourage the 
development of certain modes of cognition2 thought and social 
organization. The legitimacy of this position would seem to be 
borne out by the substantive discussions of the two succeeding 
chapters. 
But this does not mean, as I-TcLuhan often infers2 that there 
is a determinant relationship between media and certain modes of 
cognition, thought and social organization, nor that the 
influence of media is exclusive. The fact that there has been 
anything but a smooth and even transition from pre-literate to 
industrial social structures in different areas of the world 
attests to the influence brought to bear by other facets of social 
development. Indeed, as the fall of the Roman Empire so strikingly 
- 12 - 
demonstrates, the transition has not uncommonly been in the reverse 
directiong despite the survival of different forms of literacy. 
Before proceeding to a di6cussion of the way writing and 
typography have engendered certain fundamental categories of 
analysis in the industrial world sense incompatible with an 
adequate understanding of the musical process, it is necessary to 
indicate why such a discussion should involve a consideration of 
pre-literate society. 
Sociology is concerned with the study of human relatedness 
in society - in practice mostly modern industrial society. It is 
apparent that if a sociologist wishes to understand the 
relationships people enter into in an area of society in which he 
is interested thený to produce a description or explanation that is 
as meaningful as possible, he must attempt to lay bare the 
assumptions upon which. the structure of the relationshipsis 
grounded. If the sociologist does not attempt this, he may well 
fall prey to two related dangers. Firstly, if the society is 
other than his own, he may see the workings of the other society 
in terms of the unspoken assumptions prevalent in his own. This 
would serve to render his description or analysis useless. The 
avoidance of this danger not only involves the sociologist in the 
process of exposing the assumptions of the other society, but also 
in making clear the underlying implications of his own position, 
which are part and parcel of his own existence. Secondly, if the 
society under examination is his own, the sociologist, by 
explaining human relationships in terms of the unspoken 
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assumptions common to himself and his societyg achieves little else 
but a reinforcement of those assumptions and, consequently, of the 
status quo. The workings of his own society, in other words9 
remain a mystery towards ilhich he has contributed, a process which 
hardly adds to the understanding of that society. IThether the 
society is his own or not, therefore, the sociologist must 
constantly question his own position. In this particular case, 
the questioning will be achieved by making a comparison with a 
vastly different world sense, that of pre-literate man. 
Because the focus of attention in the following two 
chapters is that of music aesthetics and not media philosophyq the 
discussion of the influence of different media in specific 
societies will be restricted in the main to an idealttypical scheme 
involving pre-literate societies on the one hand and phonetically 
literate societies on the other. It must not be thought, however, 
that this distinction is as clear out as the contents of succeeding 
chapters might imply. In the first place, there are many types of 
literacy which are not fully phonetic or even phonetic at all. 
Furthermore, societies which are completely pre-literate or which 
are universally literate are rare in the extreme. Some of the 
great variety of development to be found between complete non- 
literacy and typographically phonetic literacy is briefly 
indicated in the second half of Appendix II. 
- 14 - 
NOTES: 
The discussion in this section owes much to the work of Berger 
and Luckmann (1971), and Cicourel (1973). 
2. This PrOPOsition is argued by Duncan (1968, PP-44-46). 
The necessity for thisýindeterminacy or creativity is argued 
below in Chapter Five. 
The term "world sense" is used in preference to the term "world 
view", since "world view" betrays the strong visual 
orientation of modern industrial man and so encourages the same 
culture-specific concepts that Chapter Five attempts to 
transcend. III-Torld sense", on the other hand, continually 
underlines a social construction of knowledge which is mediated 
by the effect of all media on the balance of the senses. The 
distinction will become clear during the course of Chapter Two. 
Reasons for this are put foniard in Chapter Three. See the 
sub-section entitled 'In Defence of 1., IcLuhan'. 
See, for example, Miller (1971)- 
7- See Ong (1969). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INADEQUACY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORI3D 
- 17 - 
INTRODUCTION 
Against the background provided by a discussion of the 
comparative outlooks oj- pre-literate and phonetically literate 
p6ople, this chapter arguep that psychologically based theories 
for the significance of music as typified in the works of Langer 
and Meyer are anomalous and inadequate. 
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THE ORAL-AURAL WORLD OF PRE-LITERATE Ml 
Practically all communication in pre-literate societies 
takes place in face-to-face situations. And it is because souýid 
thus takes on a great importance in pro-literate man's world 
1 that, 
in order to understand the way this world is structured, it is 
necessary to understand the inherent qualities of sound as a 
perceived nhenomenon. For sound has certain qualities not 
generally associated with the other phenomena that impinge on our 
senses. 
Sound is evanescent. It can only exist as it is going out C) 
of existence. It is never static and can only be considered 
. sequential by the application of discontirmus analytic thought to 
its existence. A sight, on the other handq can generally be more 
easily isolated in its ongoing effect and examined without 
destroying the inherent quality of the experience to anything like 
the same extent. The-only way a sound can be so examined is by 
repeating it in its entirety if, indeed, the circumstances of its 
creation allow this. 
Sound is thus more symptomatic of the flow of time than any 
other phenomena that impinge on our senses. Although all other 
phenomena occur within a stream of time, the fact that they may be 
generally isolated and examined at leisure demonstrates that,. Rs 
far as the influence on the arrmangement of man's sensorium is 
concerned, they are not so inexorably tied to that stream as sound 
is. 
Sound evokes a sense of space very different from that 
evoked by other phenomena. A person can only look in one direction 
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at a time, and can easily rid himself of an unpleasant sight by 
closing his eyes or turning away. Taste is very much a sense of 
acceptance and rejectiong end the power to escape a tactile stimulus 
is obvious. Smell, althdugh it has something of sound's all- 
encompassing quality, may still be avoided by holding one's nose or 
moving away. In all. these cases avoidance involves the parameter 
of visual space. The sound of the world, on the other hand, 
impinges on our ears from all directions and all distances at once, 
and the ability to totally cut out or ignore sound is severely 
limited: 
Auditory space has no point of favoured focus. It's a 
sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing 
itself, not space containing the thing. It is not 
pictorial spaceg boxed in, but dyn, -Tnicg always in flux, 
creating its own dimensions moment by moment. It has no 
fixed boundaries; it is indifferent to background. The 
eye focuses, pinpoints, abstracts, locating each object in 
physical space, against a background; the ear howeverý 
favours sound from any direction. We hear equally well from 
right or left, front or back, above or below. if we lie 
down, it makes no difference, whereas in visual space the 
entire spectacle is altered. We can shut out the visual 
field by simply closing our eyes, but we are always 
triggered to respond to sound. (Carpenter and McLuhanj 
1970, p. 67). 
Sound is symptomatic of energy. Something has to be going 
on for sound to be generated, and with sound that is not 
electronically conveyed (if we treat the loudspeaker as a 
translation device), the source usually occurs within a 
geographical -range 
that means it can have an immediate effect upon 
the listener. Total staticity and the generation of sound is very 
rare. An example of this aspect of sound is given by Ong (1967, 
-o. 112) when he points out that "a primitive hunter can see, feel, 
smell and taste an elephant when the animal is quite dead". Uhen, 
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howevbr, "he hears an clephant trumpeting or merely shuffling its 
feet, he had better watch out. Something is going on. Force 
is operating". 
Sound is thereford dynamic. It requires a mo7e immediate 
response, and does not allow so much time or the space necessary 
for initial avoidance, subsequentg cooler exposure, and considered 
xationalisation. 
Pre-literate man thus sees himself as being at the centre 
of a sound universe, which is dynamic and bounding with energy. 
Furthermore, since the paradigm of sound for people is the human 
voice, he imputes power and influence to the physical phenomena 
th6t. surround his existence as he would impute it to the human 
voice. This orientation of pre-literate man to his iTorld is noted 
by Mary Douglas (1970, pp-103-104): 
In all the cosmologies mentioned so far, the lot of 
individual humans is thought to be affected by po-wer 
inhering in themselves or in other humans. The cosmos 
is turned in, as it were, on man. Its transforming 
energy is threaded on to the lives of individuals so that 
nothing happens in the way of stOrMS, sickness, blights 
or droughts except in virtue of these personal links. So 
the universe is man-centred in the sense that it must be 
interpreted by reference to humans. 
The world of pre-literate man is a revelationary and relatively un- 
predictable world over which he exercises comparatively little 
conceptual control. This lack of control over environment is 
reflected in, and partly caused by, a lack of control over 
knowledge, which again relates back to pre-literate men's orality. 
There is thus much impetus for the creation of a firm and 
comparatively unyielding legitimating structure: 
Man knows what he can recall - all else is so 
ephemeral as to be negligible. In an oral culture this 
- 21 - 
means he knows what is cast in fixed thematic fornulatory 
pattqrns. Anything else will seem unroal, nonIcnoiTledge, - 
reprehensible and dangerous. This is the noetic 
foundation for the traditionalism stemming from oral 
cultures. What is non-traditional ... is dangerous 
because it is slippery and unmanageable. Oral-aural man 
does not like the nofi-traditional because, beyond his 
limited means of control, it advertises the tenuousness 
of his hold on rationality (Ong, 1969, p. 640). 
The hermetic-and revelationary world of-oral-aural maný 
with its tight grip on the supporting mythological structures, 
militates against the easy acceptance of change in pre-litbrate 
societies. Freshly perceived phenomena tend to be contained by 
and mediated through. the rock certainty of orally accretive 
legitimations. This does not mean that the legitimating structures 
in pre-literate societies do not change in a manner that would 
prove historically contradictory, but merely that pre-literate man, 
because of his orality, is unlikely to realise the contradictory 
nature of successive legitimations, a fact illustrated by Goody and 
Watt (1963, P-309): 
Early British administrators among the Tiv of Nigeria 
were aware of the*great im-portaiice attached to ... 
genealogies which were continually discussed in court cases 
where the right and duties of one man towards another were 
in dispute. Consequently they took the trouble to write 
down the long list of names and preserve them for posterityg 
so that future administrators might refer to them in giving 
judgment. Forty years later, when the Bohannans carried 
out anthropological field work in the areaq their successors 
were still using the same genealogies ... However, these 
written pedigrees now gave rise to many disagreementsg the 
Tiv maintained that they iTere incorrect, while the officials 
regarded them as statements oL fact, a record of what had 
actually happenedý and could not agree that the unlettered 
indigines Could be better informed about the past than their 
literate predecessors. 'Uhat neither party recognised was 
that in any society of this kind changes take place which 
require a constant readjustment in the genealogies if they 
are to continue to carry out their functions as mnemonics of 
social relationships. 
Neither does the orality of pre-literate man's noetic foundation 
mean that relatively sudden breaks in the legitimating structures 
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that are quick enough to impinge on his consciousness do not occur. 
But unless the break was occasioned by a literate society, it would 
seem more than likely that the new world sense would quickly assume 
the features already described. Change in pze-literate societies, 
then, tends to-be continual and gradual rather than infrequent and 
radical, and something of which pre-literate mail is not obviously 
conscious. 
Pro-literate man's attitude and relationship to change is 
symptomatic of his sense of time. Just as he exists in a man- 
centred world where events in space are threaded onto the lives of 
himself and significant others, so events in the past and potential 
occurrences in the future are mediated by him in terms of the 
present. This is evidenced by Goody and Watt's story concerning 
the Tiv of Nigeria. In this sense pre-literate man lives within 
time. And against the background of industrial mants spatialised 
and objective concept of time, with its sense of the pastness of 
the pastý and the futurity of the future, it is not being merely 
redundant to say thaty for pre-literate mam, all past and potential 
events are irrevocably tied to the present. 
Living within time and therefore having little consciousness 
of time as we conceive it, pre-literate man may not be said to have 
any abstract temporal sense. Time unfolds and is revealed to him 
through specific events which recur and which are of great importance 
2 for the ordering of his existence Such events, as Edmund Leach 
3 has pointed out , are most likely to be seasonal changes of some 
sort. It must be emphasised, hoi-, -ever2 that these recurring events 
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are not used as a means oll dividing up abstract continuous time 
4 into a mech, -alical succession of separate segments or instants 
As A. I. Hallowell put it (19379 p. 660) in discussing the time 
concept of the Saulteaux Indians, "the 'moon' is not a division of 
continuous time, it is a recurrent eventll* 
Experiencing time in a concrete and cyclical fashioný there- 
fore, pre-literate man does not conceive of time as regressing or 
progressing into the vanishing points of past or future infinity. 
Although pre-literate man undoubtedly has a sense of the past, it 
is seldom lineal and quickly melts into the contemporary 
simultaneity of mythology: 
On the wholeg theng events that are believed to have 
taken place tlong ago' are not systematically correlated 
with each other in any well-defined temporal schemata. 
There are discrete happenings, often unconnected and 
sometimes contradictory. Yet the past and present are 
part of a whole because they are bound together by the 
persistence and*contem-oorary reality of mythological 
characters not even grown old (Hallowell, 1937, p. 668). 
Corrobation of this feature of pre-literate time is to be found in 
Dorothy Lee's (1970) description of Trobriand time concepts. 
All t. hesc aspects of pre-literate time are, of course, 
closely inter-relatedg and are best summarised by Edmund Leach 
(19549 P-114): 
Primitive time can be regarded as a recurring cycle. Certain 
events repeat themselves in definite sequence. This 
sequence is a continuity without beginning or end, and thus 
without any clear distinction between past and present. The 
most imnortant time-seauences are seasonal activities and 
the passage of human life. Both these cycles are conceived 
as of the same kind. For such thinking there is no 
chronology, and time is not measurable. 
For pre-literate man, then, time is a revelationary circumiacence 
of concretely recurring events, which is constantly in flux, and 
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over which, in Western terms, he exercises relatively little control. 
This 'lack of controlt is also evidenced in pre-literate 
man's concept of space. His ordering of space results from the 
particular and immediate ýonfiguration of objects and not from a 
preconceived abstract framework. With Iffestern man space is an empty 
hopper made up of ho3Hzontal and vertical dimennions into which 
objects are placed with direct relevance to the visual relationship 
that an observer has with these objects. This is reflected in art 
during and after the Renaissance. In this artq "everything is 
dominated by the eye of the beholder". There is "a space 
conception that is graphically depicted by the perspective 
projection of long level vistas upon a plane surface" (Giedion, 
19701 P974). And within this unified and centrally-oriented 
perspective there is a lineal ordering of objects which presupposes 
and reinforces sequentially segmented time. Pre-literate art 
completely denies any such abstraction however: 
It is this manner of seeing things without any "relation 
to myself" that distinguishes primeval art from all later 
art. It is not disorder but a different order that is being 
followed - an order to which ife, in our sophistication, have 
lost the key (Giedion, 19709 P-78). 
Not surprisingly, perhapsq a vital characteristic of this 
different order is a total lack of emphasis on a vertical- 
horizontal framework or background: 
The distinguishing mark, of the space conception of 
primeval art is the complete independence and freedom of its 
vision, which has never again been attained in later 
periods. In our sense there is no above and no below, no 
clear distinction of separateness from an intermingling, and 
also, certainly, no rules of proportional size .**a 
Primeval art never Dlaces objects in an immediate 
surrounding. Primeval art has no background .... This 
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is inherent in the prehistoric conception of sp2ce: all 
linear directions have equal right and likewise all 
surfaces, Whether they be regular or irregular. They can 
be tilted at any angle with the horizontal throughout the 
entire 360 degree range. To the eye of primeval niang 
animals that to us al? pear to be standing on their heads7 
do not appear inverted to him because they exist, as it 
were, in space free : ft-om the forces of Gravity. Primeval 
art has no background (Giedion, 1970, pp. 85-87). 
With its condrete situation in specific'objects, its lack 
of concern with fixed boundaries and backgTounds7 its easy 
acceptance of intermingling and consequent lack of concern with 
separateness, pre-literate space is essentially auditory in 
nature5. And just as the visual bias of industrial man links his 
temporal and spatial orientations, so are those of pre-literate man 
linked through his oral-aural bias. This is most easily 
demonstrated with regard to the lack of concern for spatial 
separateness: 
All is within the continual present, the perpetual flow 
of today, yesterday and tomorrow ... Whenever possible 
previous lines are not destroyed, but the lines of both 
earlier and later works intermingle till they sometimes - 
but only to our eyes - appear inextricable. It was 
recognised quite early that this superimposition was not due 
to idle chance but to an deliberate reluctance to destroy the 
past (Giedioný 1970, pp. 85-86). 
The juxtaposition of past and-imminent events in the ongoing 
present, in other words9 requires a spatial sense that transcends 
the mutual separation of all objects in visual space. As - 
industrial man has tended to spatialise time, it could equally well 
be said that pre-literate man temporalizes space* 
From whichever angle it is approached, thereforeq the 
world of pre-literate man displays an instancy and immediacy which 
industrial man7 given his rational control over the events of the 
world, finds it difficult to empathize with. It is dynamic, in 
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a constant state of flux5 and at all times pregnant with 
happenings. It is a vrorld whose encroaching massivity is 
constantly requiring responseo 
TIM, FORIVC01IT31TT DICIIOTOMY 
I 
Literate man possesses the ability of storing the 
information of his socially constructed reality, which then attains 
a permanency and safety not before possible.. Within this 
innovation lies the potential for preserving inviolate 
discrepancies between succeeding legitimations, and so for the 
emergence of an historically based dialectic and the concomitant 
growth of a comparatively based rather than mythologically mediated 
critical method. The keeping of records therefore makes possible 
a sense of the pastness of the past, of historical perspective, and 
so lays the foundation for the separation of history from myth. 
As well as encouraging an historical and analytic 
perspective, literacy also emphasised the visual at the expense of 
the auditory. And whereas sound underlines the d amic immediacy 
of the environment, visual stimuli underline the distancing and 
seDarateness of events and objects both from each other and 
individual ueople. As sound underlines immediacy in time, so 
vision underlines distancing in space. Purther, since literacy 
facilitates the safe and permanent storage of information aparýt from 
people's consciousness, it also induces a psychic spatiality. This 
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psychic spatiality is, as we shall see, closely inte: b-rolated Trith 
the physical distancing just indicated. 
Literacy may be broadly divided into two categories: 
ideogrammic and phonetic. I-Thereas phonetic literacy encodes the 
sounds people make in speaking, ideograms directly encode the 
objects and concepts'about which people speak. , Ideograms therefore 
require a knowledge/acceptance of the ideas they ideally repre sent, 
becauseq in terms of the already existing set of ideograms, there 
is no way in iiffiich the ideas may be critically discussed. This 
aspect of ideogrammic literacy has considerable political 
consequences, as will be made clear in Chapter Three. The Doint at 
issue here, however, is that the world sense of an ideogrammic 
culture can only be transcended with great difficulty, because the 
ideograms are only capable of encoding that world sense, and not 
what people say in it, or about it. And since orally ., mediated 
knOlTledge is, as we have seený slippery and elusive, its power to 
avoid assimilation of important aspects of ideas encoded 
ideogrammically (which are more manageable, permanent, and therefore 
influential) is very limited. The power of literacy to radically 
alter orally mediated knowledge is so all-embracing and massive 
compared with the ability of oral people to influence literately 
encoded kno-.,, Tledge that, when a literate and oral society come into 
contact, the thought patterns of the former always tend to be super- 
imposed on those of the latter. Any meaningful or consequential 
questioning of ideogrammic intellection is thus severely 
circumscribed. 
When the sounds of words are encoded in written words, 
., 
of visually encoded ideas may itself be however, oral questionin., o 
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encoded visually in terms of already existing symbols. Criticism 
which was originally oral may more easily influence knowledge which 
was literately encoded at the time the original criticism was made. 
In this way sound and siglýt provide mutual yardsticks of comparison 
and criticism. Not only may the written word be questioned in 
terms of the sDoken word, therefore, but the efficacy of the spoken 
word becomes such that questioning it in terms of the written -, Tord 
is deemed to be a continuing necessity. As well as questioning 
what people meant in contradistinction to what they 'a--tuallyt 
wrote, then, one may also question what people meant in contra- 
distinction to what they 'actually' said. Theword is no longer 
restricted to face-to-face communication, and the idea may be 
prised out of its pictorial prison. 
In thus facilitating a divorce between meaning and symbol, 
phonetic literacy creates an epistemological dichotomy, that 
between content and form, Which has been extremely pervasive in the 
thinking of modern I-Testern mang and which is clearly of the greatest 
importance to any discussion of music aesthetics. Of more 
importance to the present line of thought, however, is the manner 
in which the divorce between meaning and symbol encourages a 
comparative-and analytic, rather tham mythological dialectic, and 
so aids the growth of historical dialecticism implicit in any 
literate society. One concomitant of this growing historical/ 
analytic approach is the ability a phonetically literate person may 
develop to-put a great, deal o. L temporal/spatial distance between 
himself and the phenomena or knowledge he is examining. Initially, 
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of course, this ability derives from the permanent storage of 
information in a place entirely removed from human consciousness. 
Graduallyq howeverý -the possibility of critically examining the 
spoken word in a manner similar to the written word leads to the 
distancin principle being applied to face-to-face communication. 
The distinction betvTQen meaning mid symbol, content and form, and 
the distancing involved have become so pervasive in industrial 
mants cognitive and intellectual orientation, that it is extremely 
difficult for him to understand the immediate power words possess 
for pre-literate man. Indeed2 without a conscious realisation of 
how this distinction and distancing arose) any meaningful insight 
into the role played by language in pre-literate societies is 
almost impossible. 
Because the spoken word in pre-literate societies cannot be 
divorced from its everyday use in face-to-f-ace communication, and 
because of the indissoluble links that exist in those societies 
between mang the universe and soundq words come to have an immediacy 
and power unknoi-m in industrial society. And because of the 
imposing massivity of pro-literate man's world, there is no way in 
which this immediacy and power can be diluted or questioned. I-lords 
and referents are inextricably interti-Tined2 a phenomenon illustrated 
by J. C. Carothers (1959, P-309) through reference to his non- 
literate son: 
Some years ago ray little son said: "Is there a word 
'pirates', Daddy? " -, Uhen I reDlied in the affirmative, he 
asked. "Are there pirates? " I said, '1.11oý not noi-, -, there 
used to be". Ile asked, "Is there a word 'pira-tes' now? " 
'When I said, "Yes", he replied, "Then there must be pirates 
11. This conversat now s tion, which might have come straight 
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from Parmenides' doctrine of twenty-four centuries earlier, 
is a reminder that, for a child, a thing exists by virtue 
of its name; that -the spoken or even imaganed word must 
connote something in the outer world 
6. 
As J. W. Carey has put it. (1967, p. 10), words in pre-literate 
societies "become icons, they do not represent things, they are 
themselves things". They are instrumental in all their aspects, 
and certainly efficacious over and above any hard information that 
we, industrial men, might distill from them. There is no attempt 
on the part of pre-literate man to separate meaning from symbol, 
content from form, and then to relegate symbol or form to a 
position of neutral insignificance. As sound the word is dynamic 
an d preý, gnant with consequence 
THE IMITER/OUTI-M DICHOT01,11Y 
In view of this com-oarison of'the diffei-ent kinds of 
significance assigned to words in pre-literate and industrial 
societies it may be concluded thatý firstly, the distinction 
between content and form that we talke so much for granted is in 
fact specific to phonetically literate societies and that, 
secondly, the conundrum the absolutists find themselves in is in- 
extricably linked to that distinction. That is, if the form of 
music is its contentq howcan. it have any content (or significance) 
at all? 
8 
What is not so clear is that there is a second distinctioný 
interdependent with that just indicated, on which the theories of 
Langer and Meyer are predicated. Because this second distinction 
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is interdependent with the first, the significoxice assigned to 
music by Langer and Meyer is largely spuriousý and the positions 
they adopt are not very far removed from that of tho absolutists. 
This distinction, its int6rdeDendency, and the consequences that 
interdependency have for the -theories of Langer and Meyer will now 
be described. 
The distancing inherent in the meaning/symbol dichotomy of 
phonetic literacy greatly reinforces the emphasis on visual space 
that results with any form of literacy. This reinforcement has 
important consequences for man's i-elationship to himself, to others, 
and to the physical environment. The inter-subjective designation 
of self no longer exclusively requires the presence of the 
tsignificant other', since socially efficacious information may be 
received in writing. If one thinks of consciousness, which is 
socially mediated through communication with others, as 
communication with self, then it follows that the reception of 
written information, which originates with others, but whose 
perusal (silent or oral) is essentially communication with self, 
induces a shift of emphasis to self. Literate man can put others 
at a distance and in so doing becomes self-conscious to a degree 
not possibly with -ore-literate man. 
In the same way that literate man may put others at a 
distance he may also put the environment at a distance. The 
analytic method inherent in phonetic literacy serves to reduce pre- 
literate man's lack of conce-otual control over his man-centred 
universe9. Not only does literacy enable comparisons through time 
of environmental events, but, in enabling man to be increasingly 
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conscious and analytic of self and others, also permits the energy 
and events of the environment, to be unravelled from the lives of 
people. In other wordsý as phonetically literate man 
distinguished symbol from'meaningg so he began to dralT a line 
between himself (the, words he uttered) and the external world, 
-(the things to iThich-the words referred). A vital distinction 
between the physical and the mental thus grell WO, in marked 
contrast to oral societiesq where the difference between physical 
and mentalg non-humc-in and human, 'outer' and 'inner' is of 
relatively little significance. 
The spatiality and distancing of literacy provides the 
essential link, between increased self-consciousness tand 
'objectivity'. Thi! ough the provision of a surrogate other, 
literate man possesses the capability of becoming conscious of his 
consciousness, and of his position in the wniverse - of partially 
stepping outside himself andq in a move formalised by Copernicus, 
of vacating his centralq orally-envoloped position in the cosmos. 
This, as we have seen, is simply an impossibility for pre-literate 
man: "for early =11 the world was something he only participated 
in, not an object to be manipulated in his consciousness" (Ong 
1969, p. 635)- 
This 'objectivity' is closely liffl, -ed with industrial man's 
sense of-time. The historical perspective (distancing) possible 
with literacy leads to a straight-line or linearly sequential 
sense of tinie: 
In our culture, the line is so basic that we talke it 
- 33 - 
for granted, as given in reality. We see it in visible 
nature, betiTeen material pointsý and ire see it between 
metaphorical points such as days or acts. It underlies 
not only our thinking, but also our aesthetic -apprehension 
of the given; it is basic to the emotional climax, Which 
has so much value for us, and, in factito the meaning of 
life itself. In oui thinking about personality and 
character, wo have aspumed the line as axiomatic (Lee, 
1970, P-142). 
Furthermareq through -his ability t6 record events and through his 
sense of the pastness of the past, literate man can halt the events 
of time in their ongoing flow and soý in effect, halt time. 
Coupled with the development of hi6 analytic ability, therefore, 
literate man also developed a tendency to examine timeý as it wereý 
from the outside, a tendency which reached full fruition with the 
Renaissance: 
With the end of the Renaissance the feeling of 
spontaneous intercommunication in all individual activity 
within the cosmic becoming has also disappeared. Human 
thought no longer feels itself a part of things. it 
distinguishes itself from them in order to reflect upon 
them, and is thus no longer upheld by their own power of 
enduring. From the motion of bodies which inexplicably 
and incessantly modifies itý human thought feels itself 
to be disengaged by the very act of thinking, for in this 
act it places itself outside the motion which is its 
object (Poulet, 1956, P. 13). 
Literate man therefore. exists outside time in the same way as he 
can partially exist apart from himself and his society2 and in the 
same way as his self-consciousness and 'objectivity' allow him to 
unravel the events of the environment from a human-like volition. 
But in becoming conscious of his consciousness literate man also 
becomes as conscious of his o-em temporal flow from which he cannot 
totally escape2 -as he does of the events of the environment which 
he can now fix in a sequential linear order. There thus rises 
up in Nestern thought a distinction between time concepts as 
relating to the physical world and to the mental: 
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When Hermann I-ley! claims that, the objective world is 
and does not become, he has -to admit that -at least our 
"blindfolded consciousness" creens along the world line of 
its oim body into the area of the universe called "future", 
or when it is said that iTe meet the pro-existing future 
events on our way to the future, we concede that even if 
the 
-future 
is com-)letod7 our way to the future is still 
, going on .9*. Thus arises an absurd dualism of the 
timeless physical woild and temporal consciousness, that 
is, a dualism- of two altogether disparate realms whose 
correlation becomes completely unintelligible (Capek, 1961, 
p. 165)- 
This "absurd dualism" clearly underpins the human/non-human, 
mental/physical, inner/outer) subjective/objective epistemblogical 
split already noted. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TIMORIES RE CONSIDORED 
It is now possible to understand why neither Meyer nor 
Langer transcend the limitations of their oim intellectual 
tradition. For by restricting musical significance to the innemý 
emotional and subjective side of this split, they have in reality 
failed to transcend the first, interdependent form-and-content 
dichotomy. 'By restricting music to the inner and mental worlds, 
in other words, they are in fact still denying music any 
substantial significance beyond its 'mere existence' as form. 
Indeed, a nurely psychological significance can only be assigned 
to music - alid the difficulty of the absolutists' position thereby 
overcome - by unjustifiably denvinre, the interdependency of the two 
dichotomies. 
This criticism implies that the significance attached to 
music by these two authors is largely spurious. Symptomatically, 
Langer claims music to express "the Unspeakable" (1960, p. 235)10, 
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N 
and goes on to assign such significance a low rational priority: 
Music is a limited idiom, like on artificial language, 
only even less successful; for music at its hir ýhestj 
though clearl a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol. 
Articulation is its 1' ife, U-uTt--ýio-ta-sseTtion; expressiveness, 
not expression. 
' 
The actual function of meaning, which 
calls for permanent contents, is not fulfilled; 
(1960, p. 240). 
Because she assigns sUch a low rational priority to musical 
significance, Langer's stance seems-to come perilously close to 
that of the absolutists. Meyer, on the other h and, allows -Lor a 
much more explicit significance through his emphasis on rigorous 
analysis. Yet it is again symptomatic that this analysis, by 
Meyer's oira admission, ultimately fails as a method of elucidating 
that significance. He tells us that ethetic relationships - which 
constitute the "kinesthetic sensing of the ethos and character of a 
musical event" (1973, p. 242) - "are unquestionably important ... 
but ... hard to analyse with rigor and precision" 
(1973, 
pp. 245-246), that "there is an absence of an adequate theory of 
ethetic change and transformation" (1973, p. 246), and finallyy 
that "the rigorous analysis of ethetic relationships is beyond my 
knowledge and sk-ill" (19,73, p. 267)- 
At this stage in the argument, the reader may think that 
Meyer's difficulties can be traced to the fact that music does 
indeed encode that which is genuinely "unspeakable" or unutterable. 
It might be thought, for example, that because music refers outside 
itself to psychological contents, the inner-outer distinction has 
been truly transcended. But as a symbol may only have meaning in 
relation to something outside itself, so a thought or feelin, 3 may 
only exist because it too relates to something in the outside world. 
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More specifically, there exists wi equivalence between the inner- 
outer distinction as it applies to both symbols and consciousness: 
a symbol may only refer outside itself to something because a 
thought (itself having the same external referent) gave that symbol 
its meaning; conversely, a thought may only exist because it 
possesses an external: referent implanted by a s2ýmbol (itself having 
the same external referent). This point will become clearer in 
the light of arguments presented in bhapter Four. 
Now -although there is little doubt that. people possess deep- 
seated desires which are geneticalýy proGrammed5 there is equally 
f little doubt that a high proporition o. the way i. e relate to the 
world results (as already argued) from symbolic interaction with 
other people. As far as each of us is concerned, these other 
people exist 'out there' in lobjective reality'. If, therefore, 
it is maintained that there is no need to transcend the inner- 
outer distinction as it applies to-the mind (because all psychological 
constants or psychological laws. of rightness are genetically 
programmed, thereby making reference to the outside world un- 
necessary), then that is something. the aesthetician or music 
theorist needs. to argue in some detail., Symptomaticallyý neither 
LanGer nor Meyer undertalke this argument. 
Meyer does, however, paradoxically indicate the possible 
-. 
n ties by concluding that it is impossible to solution to his diP. Liculu- 
distinguish between psychological constants and the conventions of 
a particular musical language: 
In theory it is possible to distinguish between 
archetypal patterns and schemata. The former would be 
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those patterns which arise as the result of physiological 
constants presumed innate in human behaviour. The 
latter would be those norms which were the result of 
learning. But the distinction breaks down in practice. 
For most traditionally established norms have some basis 
in innate constants# and on the other hand, patterns 
derived from innate constants become part of tradition 
(19739 p. 214)- 
If this is the caseq why does Heyer not seek týe basis of ethetic 
relationships in these different and identifiable norms? To 
pose a parallel question, if Langer can reach the conclusion that 
"what music ... actually reflects is only the morphology 2f 
feeling" (1960, p. 238) why does she not further enquire into the 
origins of that morphology? Why does she implicitly doubt9 with 
Meyer, "that the explanation of musical practice needs to be pushed 
back this far" (Heyer, 1973, p. 8), and thereby effectively ignore 
the entire sociological tradition? 
11 
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NOTES: 
The reader may have difficulty in gaining an insight to this 
importance. It may help, thereLore7 to draw -,. comparison 
with ty-pographical civilisations where the printed word tends 
to take on an authority and importance that is not always 
warranted. In a different way, messages conveyed in and 
through sound have an equal kind of authority avid importance 
for pro-literate'man. 
2. See Hallowell (1937, p. 669). 
See Leach (1954, PP-115-120). 
4. The contrast between industrial man's spatialised concept of 
time, and pre-literate man's intuitive processual understanding 
is reinforced through the structure of their respective 
languages. See Nhorf (1971, PP-142-143). 
See above p, 2.0. 
6. Further subst2ntiation of this 'sense' of the word for non- 
literates is given by Riesman (19701 PP-109-110). 
Another way of approaching this rather difficult subject is to 
realise that, in a pre-literate society, everything that is, 
is mediated in terms of the present and that -there are no 
words which do not (in terms of their recurring use) occur in 
the here-and-now. Pre-literate man cannot therefore put any 
temDoral distance between a word and its referent. An object 
cannot exist which has no name and neither can a word survive 
the eclipse of its referent in the collective consciousness oJL 
such a society. And because pre-literate man finds it 
extremely difficult to think of words and referents as totally 
separate entities, he is unlikely to think of a word as having 
a meaning 'located outside itt iffiich can then be 'varied' and 
'given' to a recipient. Words cannot be brought out of cold- 
storage in a dictionary-like fashion. They quite literally 
evoke a dynamic world and are therefore powerful. 
See above -op-i--5 - 
9. See Ong (1967, P-45). 
10. Langer is here referring to a statement by Nagner in Opera, and 
Drama. that "orchestral language expresses just what is 
unspeakable in verbal language, and what, viewed from our 
rationalistic standpoint, may therefore be called simply. 1he 
U. -isneakable". 
For a more detailed application of this line of thought to 
Meyer's most recent (1973) publication, see Shepherd (1976, 
pp. +Z--f3). This review is included as Appendix III. 
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CHAPTER TMES 
THE INDUSTRIAL ITORLD 
- 42 - 
INTRODUCTION 
Answers to the question posed at the end of the preceeding 
chapter only emerge in the light of an understanding both of 
industrial man's world. sense, and of the highly pervasive political 
structure which is a dialectic correlate of that world sense. 
These two aspects of industrial man's world are discussed 
respectively in the two sections of this chapter. Aggainst the 
background parenthetically provided by this discussion, Chapter Four 
will then set put a number of answers to the question posed at the 
end of Chapter Ti-ro. 
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STRUCTURAL AMBIGUITY 
Literate man's ability to view timc as a lineal sequence 
of discrete instants 
1 
gradually fed back upon his understanding .' of 
language until all language, whether spoken or written, was 
conceived in terms of the sequential and segmented nature of the 
written word. One discrete iTord, in other words, was thought of 
as following another in set order to give a specific meaning. Pre- 
literate man, by contrast, did not think interms of the discrete 
homogeneous -. -Tord, but raAlher in terms of utterances relevant to the 
face-to-face situation in which meaning was to be conveyed: 
Man without writing thinks in terms of sound groups 
and not in words, and the two do not necessarily coincide. 
When asked what a word is, he will reply that he does not 
know, or he will give a sound group which may vary in 
length from what we call a word to an entire line of poetry, 
or even an entire song. The word for "ITOrd" means an 
"utterance". When a singer is pressed to say what a line 
is, he, whose chief claim to fame is that he traffics in 
lines of poetry, will be entirely baffled by the 
question ... (Lord, 1964, p. 25)-Iý 
It'was the concepts of lineal segmented sequentiality and 
arrested time that made possible the invention of movable type 
printing; the visuality of chirography acted back upon itself and 
created the potential for mentally arresting and splitting up the 
action of scribing. . 
Furthermore, the difference inherent in 
phonetic literacy between word and meaning2 form and content7 
enabled man to conceive of the blank page as a container into irhich 
could be poured meaning in the shape of interchangeable bits of 
-type, linearly and sequentially arranged. Finally, consciousness 
of linearly segmented processes itself facilitated the invention 
of the actual process of movable type printing, which involves a 
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3 
number of different steps, sequentially arranged 
It was undoubtedly the invention of movable type printing 
which both facilitated and actively encouraged the formulation of 
Western man's epistemology in its most extreme and crystalline 
form. Although manuscript literacy permitted the rise of all the 
visual concepts mentioned in the preceeding chapter, it, could not 
allow for the r ise of uniformity (homogeneity) and repeatability 
to the extent possible in post-Renaissance society. Manuscripts 
of the same 'article' or lbookli were copied at different times by 
different people with different handwriting. Quite clearly, a 
copy made by one person would, in all probability,. jook quite 
different to a copy made by another, and there was no guarantee 
that the wording of one 
Furthermoreý the number 
was obviously limited. 
made possible the produl 
were identical. 
copy would be identical with the next4. 
of copies that could be made by this method 
Movable type printing, on the other hand, 
3tion of hundreds of copies all of which 
This development o. 'L uniform outlook may be said to have two 
aspects, one physical7 the other mental. Firstly, the extreme 
visuality and segmentation encouraged by printingý together with 
the regularity and repeatabaity of the printed page2 instigated the 
concept of a unified functional space. The encroaching immediacy 
and tangibility of pre-literate mants environment, his disunified, 
multidimensional but "uniquely structured. spaces and times" 
(MoLuhan, 1962,, P-178) were eventually syncretized into the depth 
of a single three dimensional space. The visual stress of 
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printing thus gave a focal point to the distancing and spatiality 
of phoneýic literacy. 
But this development of a single physical point of vieIT 
has an intellectual analogueg as Goldschmidt indicates (1943, 
P-113): 
It cannot be doubted that for many medieval irriters 
the exact point at which they ceased to be 'scribes' and 
became tauthors' is not at all clear .... Ne are 
guilty of an anachronism if ire imagine that the medieval 
student regarded the contents of the books he read as the 
expression of another man's personality and opinion. He 
looked upon them as part of that great and total body of 
knowledge, the scientia, de oruiia scibili, which had once 
been the property of the ancient wages. I 
The organic wholeness of knowledge is split into segmented and 
individual points of view2 a development that Ilarshall McLuhan 
links to the advent of silent reading5 (1962, p. 125): "The reader 
of print ... stands in an utterly different relation to the 
writer from the reader of manuscripý. Print gradually made reading 
aloud pointless and accelerated the act of reading till the reader 
could feel tin the hands oft his author. " But it was not only the 
reader who reacted to this desire for uniformity of feeling: 
Individual writers throughout the 16th Century varied 
tone sentence by sentenceg even phrase by phraseý with all 
the oral freedom-and flexibility of pre-print, days. Not 
until the 17th Century did it become apparent that print 
called for a stylistic revolution. The speeding eye of 
the new reader favoured not shifting tones but steadily 
maintained toneý page by page, throughout the volume .... 
By the 18th Century the reader could depend on a writer 
controlling the purr of his sentences and giving him a swift 
smooth ride. Prose became urbane, macadamized. The 
plun-gingg rearing horses of 16th Century journalese were 
more like a rodeo (I-IcLuhan, 1970, p. 129). 
Instead of partaking of the dialectically ongoing scientia de omni,,. 
scibili therefore, typographic man internalized a segmented, 
6 
permanent, finished and individuallY propagated niece of 11mowledge 
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In the same way that historical dialecticism inculcated a 
lineal sense of the past, so the predictable repeatabDity of the 
printed page reinforced the lineality of the future. This 
reinforced sense of lineal futurity found its clearest expression 
in the concept of applied knowledge: "The Medieval Book of Nature 
was for'2c2onjtenplatio like the Bibel. The Renaissance Book of 
Nature Was for applicatio and use like movable type" (MlcLuhan, 1962, 
p. 185). The analytic method inherent in p honetic literacy and 
historical dialecticism coupled with the concept of repeatability 
gave typographical man the idea of projecting the analytically 
examined causes and effects of past events into the future. 
tcience as we have understood it since the Renaissance grew out of 
this one level (the single point of view)y linealy mono-causal 
epistemology. And the acid test of the accuracy of scientific 
prediction lies in the visual observance of repeatability, an 
approach unknown before the Renaissance. As McLuha_n (1962, p. 184) 
points out. in referring to the work of Nef (1958 9 p. 27): 
Observation and experiment were not new. What was new 
was insistence on tangibleg repeatable visible proof. Nef 
writes .... "Such insistance on tangible proof hardly 
goes back beyond the times of William Gilbert of, Colchester, 
who was born in 1544. In his De mapnete, published in 
16002 Gilbert wrote that there was-no description or 
explanation in the book that he had not verified 'with his 
own eyes' ". But before printing had had a century and more 
to build up the assumptions of uniformity, continuity and 
repeatability, such an impulse as Gilbert felt or such a 
Proof as he offers would have attracted little interest. 
Indeed2 nowhere is the epistemology of modern industrial 
man so clearly evidenced as in the NeiTtonian/Laplacian view of the 
universe. As words are locked into the homogeneous printed page, 
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so the universe is viewed as homogeneous empty space peopled by 
discrete and ultimately immutable units of matter. The in- 
destructa-bility of matter is itself a concept analagous to the 
idea of permanence engendered by the keeping of written records, 
and the juxtaposition and motion of matter in space may be 
predicted by invoking laws derived from the past observation of 
matter in space. Future events may thus be determined and 
ultimately controlledq and the increased control of knowledge 
resulting from the distancing and tobjectivityf of phonetic 
literacy may be said to have reached its highest pitch. 
The Newtonian/Laplacian view of the universe, in being 
induced by an epistemology generated by phonetic literacy and 
typography, in turn reinforced that epistemology to the extent 
that modern Nestern mar. failed to differentiate between what was 
legitimately -predictable and controllable in terms of Newtonian 
mechanics and what lay outside the field of those laws. The 
crucial step in formulating this all-inclusive cosmology is the 
unfounded assumption that all reality consists in the material. 
This assumption derives from conceiving matter, which is, not 
maintained by people, in the image of eternal unchanging type, which 
is maintained as such by people. In this way matter was assigned 
a spurious eternity and immutability which encouraged people to 
think of it as somehow basic or fundamental to the operations of the 
universe. As a result the concent of matter tended to obscure all 
else: "For psychological reasons7 , the concept of matter sometimes 
obscured the concept of void or both concepts obscured that of 
motion; and nearly always the concepts of space, matter and motion 
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tended to obscure that of time" (Capek, 1961, r-. 135). It was this 
assumption that all reality vas ultimately grounded in the material 
that both facilitated and encouraged the hegemony of scientific 
thought in modern Nestern culture: 
Science is, of course, the unquestioned source of 
authoritative knowledge in the modern world. Scientific 
myths enjoy the claim of being factually true even if they 
are in no way demonstrable, even if they must be taken on 
faith, even if they attempt to answer what are,. after all, 
unanswerable questions. Scientific rayths have the great 
advantage in this ser-ýconscious society of not appearing 
as myths at all but as truths, verified or capable of 
being verified by the inscrutable methods of the scientist 
(Carey3 1967, P-38). 
This hegemony was in many ways inevitableg because not to support 
it would have necessarily resulted in a questioning of the single 
unified pictorial space upon which Newtonian physics is predicated, 
a questioning hardly likely to be undertaken in view of the 
enormous practical benefit"s derived therefrom. In this way the 
seduction became complete, and typographical man assumed that the 
behaviour of all phenomena could ultimately be explained and 
predicted in mechanical terms. As Helmholtz put it, "To under- 
stand a phenomenon means nothing else than to reduce it to the 
Newtonian laws" (Quoted, Hanson, 19651 P-91)- 
8 
A similar, if paradoxical I process occurred with the more 
Imentalt aspects of industrial man's world sense. As people 
gradually filtered out experiences which did not conform to the 
order of matter in space, so they began to filter out the 
inflectionally coded information of spoken discourse: 
Inflectional complexity, in written form, is not only 
burdensome for the ear; it is also in conflict with the 
spatial order that the scanning eye finds natural. To the 
eye, inflections are not part of the simultaneous order of 
linguistic variations, which they are for the ear. The 
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reader's- eye not only -prefers one soinid, one tone, in 
isolation; it prefers one meaning at a time. 
Simultaneities like puns and anbirsuities - the life of 
spoken discourse - became, in writing, affronts to 
taste2 floutings of efficacy (1-,! cLuhan 1970, p. 125)- 
Because of this_inherently paradoxical parallel with industrial 
mants approach to the material ii-orld, it is important to make 
perfectly clear the relationship between the Newtonian/Laplacian 
view of the universe and the more general Imaterial-factuall mode 
of thought intimated by McLuhan. For2 from the -point of y4eir of 
the analysis of industrial ideologr, the Newtonian/La-placian world 
view is no more than a particularly lucid-expression of that 
ideology. The ideology also finds expression in the analysis of 
other spheres of activity which, on the face of it2 have little to 
do with classical physics. But so seductive is the Nei-ftoniaii/ 
Laplacian i.., orld viewq andso strong is scientific mythology that 
some people, such as Helmholtz, believe that, at least in theory, 
every phenomenon can be reduced to its constituent material Darts 
and satisfactorily explained through classical physical theories, 
All that such people will usually admit is that in many cases this 
procedure is prohibitively complex and detailed. This constitutes 
the strictest formulation of the industrial world sense. A 
further, less strict, formulation remains possible'-without, 
however, resurrecting those aspects of experience filtered out 
through the approach under discussion. That is, -that although all 
phenomena may theoretically be reducible to their constituent 
material parts, a completely adeqUate explanation of these phenomena 
according to materiall-factual modes of thought does not require 
this. This latter po sition is the one that has been unconsciously 
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adopted by many people in Buropaan civilizations since the 
Renaissance. For them everything is rationally explicable whon 
reduced to the appropriate analytic constituents. Anything which 
cannot be so reduced and which therefore c2-nnot be made visually 
explicit, immcdiately becomes non-knowledge: 
The inflectional suggests, rather than expresses or 
spells outq relations. Technology is explicitness. 
1-Triting was a huge technological advance in this respect. 
It expressed, it made explicit, many relations that were 
implicit, sug-ested in inflectional language structures. 
And what writing couldn't make explicit quickly got lost. 
Par more than writing, printing was a technological means 
of explicitness and explanation. But those auditory 
inflections and relations which could not be made 
visually explicit by print were soon lost to the 
language .... 
(McLuhan, 1970, p. 132). 
This is not to say that the power of this mode of thought has not 
varied considerably over the last five hundred years9. At no time, 
howeverg was it as pervasive as during the Enlightenment: 
Seeing the beautiful demonstrations of Descartes and 
Newton as they explained the heavens with their co- 
ordinates7 the great classical minds sought to rival this 
perfection and simplicity on earth. Philosophers used 
the geometric method to arrive at moral and religious 
truth; social scientists reduced government to mechanics; 
the tragic muse imitated the tight deductive gate of 
Euclid; and I am not merely playing with words when I say 
that poetry itself adopted one common meter as if 
scientific accuracy depended on it. In all the 
imponderables of life, conduct, and art, the -test was no 
longer the flexible, "Is it good, true or beautiful for 
such and such a purpose? " but "Is it correct?! ' (Barzun, 
1943, P-40). 
The paradox indicated at the beginning of the previous 
paragraph occurs because the epistemological dichotomy of industrial 
man is capable of acting back on itself at more than one level. In 
other words, the tendency described in the previous two paragraphs 
for industrial man to suppress the inner, mental, subjective and 
emotional side of the dichotomy and emphasise the outer, physical 
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objective and intellectual, opeTa-tes in both the physical and 
mental (oral) aspects of his world sense. This paradox thus 
points up the central ambiguity of the world sense, an ambiguity 
already indicated in respect of industrial man's temporal sense 
10 
For although industrial man tends to think that all phenomena are 
susceptible to material-factual modes of thought, he cannot, if 
pressed, deny the temporal flow of his own consciousness. 
Unfortunately, because world senses are processual phenomena to be 
lived in rather than examinedg industrial man is seldom pressed. 
His consequent inability to differentiate between what is 
genuinely material-factual in the universe and what isn't has thus 
led to an unfounded assumption of total objectivity. He has, in 
other words, unconsciously slid into the position of thinking 
himself to be totally outside time and ultimately totally capable 
of knowing about everything, including himself (a proposition which 
is inherently schizophrenic). Industrial m an tends to see 
existence projected before him on one long flat and colourless 
vista. 
It isq however2 important to stress that this approach to 
reality does only constitute a tendency, albeit a strong one. For 
if the above exposition of the industrial world sense is strictly 
interpreted, two contrasting and mutually exclusive epistemologies 
emerge. For convenience these epistemologies may be labelled the 
'universalt and the Idichotomoust. The dichotomous asserts that 
any particular phenomenon may be understood either in terms of- the 
physical, outer objective worldq or in terms of the inner, mental 
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subjective world. This is the epistemology that, for obvious 
reasons., most musicians implicitly support. The universal, in 
repressing this latter side of the dichotomy asserts that all 
phenomena -are explicable in terms of the physical, outer and 
objective world. 
It should be understood that this rigorous formulation of 
the industrial world sense is only possible in the light of the 
knowledge of how that world sense came into being. For people 
who do not question the assumptions upon which their sense of the 
world is founded and. who consequently live largely unconsciously 
within the industrial world sense, the categories of understanding 
derived therefrom do not appear nearly so clearly formulated. 
Rather there is an uneasy and nebulous vacillation taround' and 
'between' the two epistemologies that passes for one homogeneous 
epistemology appropriate to the common understanding of the world. 
This third, vaguer, epistemology is best referred to as the 
lepiphenomenalt. According to its precepts, if it were shown that 
a phenomenon is not an integral aspect of the material or objective 
world, it would be possible to avoid assigning it exclusively to 
the world of subjective emotion by asserting that it was 
lepiphenomenalt to the objective world. That isq, the phenomenon 
could be conceived as being beyond the realms of purely material- 
factual activity, but a phenomenon which nonetheless remains no 
more than a secondary symptom or manifestation of some material- 
factual process within the universe. For reasons to be made 
apparent in the next chapter, this is the epistemology to which 
most sociologists and music theorists are driven when required to 
consider explicitly the relationship between music and society. 
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In D-efonce of IlcLuhan 
Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter, it 
is useful to briefly indicate why Marshall McLuhan's theories 
have met with such a tentative and negative response in many 
quarters. It will be remembered -that one of the corollaries of 
the meaning/symbol split was a concentration on what somebody 
'. actually' meant2 in contradistinctionto -uhat they may have 
spoken or written. The result of this process is a desire to fix 
the hard information from the uncertain flux of the original 
utterance. In this sense content may be thought of -as the 
significant matter which may be poured into the empty foram provided 
by the spoken, written or printed word. As 11cLuhan has so 
succinctly put it (1962, p. 252): "The effects of the phonetic 
alphabet in translating the audile-tactile world into the visual 
world was both in physics and literature to create the fallacy of 
'content' Since content has been equated with the side of tile 
epistemological dichotomy traditionally assigned the higher 
realityg it is not surprising that, for typographical man: media, 
the forms into -which meaningful content is pour-edq are 
inconsequentialg neutral and certainly not, in thepiselves5 
constitutive of knowledge 
As already suggested, this 'view' of media is fallacious. 
Yedia influence the balance of the very sensory processes that 
people use to filter the information coining to them from the 
environment. In the worlds of the croiming licLuhEuiism: "The 
11 
medium is the message" C my emphasis3 
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'OCIAL STRUCTUR M, MEDIA AND 'i 
This section seeks to situate modern industrial man's 
social structuring both historically and across the boundaries of 
the class stratifications which are symptomatic of it. The 
historical perspective serves to emphasise'the necessarily culture- 
specific nature of any structuring,, while the concern with anti- 
classical political movements within the structure serves to 
demonstrate that despite shifts in power between social classes, 
and despite an increasing degree of democracy, the overall structure 
remains essentially the same. Anti-classical movements, in other 
words7 tend to be articulated in terms of classical structures, and 
are seen to be all the more dangerous because of it. 
Social structures are primarily the result of the inter- 
subjective legitimations of nolitical-economic power groups 
dialectically mediated through the influence exerted by media on 
man's sensory and cognitive faculties. Because of this influence, 
it should immediately be stressed that all social structures are 
dialectic correlates of the respective world sense on which they 
are ultimately predicated. 
- The process of legitimation - whether achieved by all the 
members of a society turning their attention to the process at one 
time2 or by specific members appointed-by society who do little 
else - involves encompassing the entirety or a part of everyday 
reality, and putting its imposing massivity, within which everyday 
tasks are carried out, at a distance. The automatic 
acceptability of everyday reality is potentially suspended2 and the 
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legitimators voluntarily place themselvos in a position where they 
are more exposed to the impact and implications of fresh phenomena 
and events. The recession from everyday reality that is inherent 
to*legitimation thus results in an intensification of individual 
awarenessi the degree to which this awareness may progress being 
determined ultimately by the means of communication and media 
available to a society. 
So, for reasons already discussed 
12 
, increased awareness in 
a pre-literate society cannothelp but be re-integrated or 
sublimated into the collective ego during the ritual that 
symbolises legitimation. The potential for divergent opinions 
which impinge closely on the assumptional framework of these 
societies is lowq as the political-economic power group is, to a 
large extent, constituted by the entire society. 
Ideogramic 
.. 
literacyq however, encourages the formation of 
a distinct group of legitimators who align themselves with the 
-ruling elite in a society. Ideogrammic_ languages usually 
entail a vast number of signs (some 507000 in Chinese, of which 
3,000 are necessary for a reasonable degree of literacyl3) which 
can thus only be learn'LO and manipulated by a small group of 
specialists, a phenomenon which in itself brings about an emergent 
division of labour. Because of the vast potential contained in 
any form of literacy for the improvement of the administrative and 
commercial activities of a society2 these specialists were of great 
importance*to rulers. There thus existed a natural pro-Density for 
scribe and ruler to act together in common purpose. As a result 
of this propensity, and the fact that ideograms do not code 
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sounds , the only information coded is that relevant to the ruling 
elite; 'to become literate is to unavoidably acquire both the 
outlook and the ideas of the ruling class, ideas which are of 
little use or relevance to the ruled oral classes. Goody and 
Watt have noted the emergence of these characteristics in ancient 
Oriental civilizations (1963, P-314): 
*a* it is a striking fact that .-. in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia2 as in China, a literate elite of religious, 
administrative and commercial experts emerged and 
maintained itself as a centralised governing bureaucracy 
00& Their various social and intellectual 
achievements were, of course2 enormous, but as regards 
the participation of the society as a whole in the 
written culture, a wide gan existed between the esoteric 
literate culture and the exoteric oral one2 a gap which 
the literate were interested in maintaining. Among the 
Sumerians and Akllcadiansý writing was the pursuit of scribes 
and preserved as a I'mystery'12 a "secret treasure". 
Unlike the various forms of ideogrammic literacy2 phonetic 
literacy is relatively easy to learn, the number of symbols 
involved usually varying between twenty and forty. Also, as it is 
possible for phonetic literacy to encode the spoken language of the 
entire, society, it does not-inherently militate against the 
interests of any particular group in that society. Phonetic 
literacy could thus be viewed as a potential democratizing 
influence on a previously autocratic regime. 'Whether or not this 
influence held sway in any particular society depended on other 
factors which are not directly germane to the concerns of this 
chapterl5o 
There can be little doubt, howeVer, that phonetic literacy 
also aided the incipient division of labour facilitated by 
ideogrammic literacy (that is, a basic split between mental and 
physical tasks). As the concepts of spatialismg segmentation, 
- 57 - 
sequentiality and control developed from the influence of phonetic 
literacy, so that literate elite -were more and more exposed to the 
conceptual parameters within iThich it was possible to conceive 'he 
idea of fragmenting the individual processes of a physical task, and 
assigning them to different persons. Once this stage had been 
reached, it was then possible to conceive of tasks which could not 
be completed by one man, or by a very 'Lew men working according to 
the principles of a relatively unsophisticated division of labour, 
but which, for reasons of time or skill, would necessarily require, 
the efforts of several men workcing in succession. This principle, 
as will be shortly indicated, can then be applied to the -whole 
existence of a society, so that its different activities can be 
achieved with the maximum of skill and ef-E 'iciency. Consequently, 
not only is the role of the legitimator entrenched by the division 
of labour, but the division itself, facilitated by the 
legitimator's intellectual orientation, allows for the growth of 
class and enables the ruling classes to utilize the services of the 
legitimator in preserving the status auo. As instigator and as 
part of the division of labourý the legitimator tends to have a 
ves ted interest in its preservation. Until at least the end of 
the eighteenth century, therefore, a literate elite governed the 
'civilized' world in autocratic Jashion. 
Typography is as eaually a double-edged weapon for 
encouraging democracy as phonetic literacy. On the one hand, the 
typographical process, in which individual bits of type can be 
changed around to form the desired page, engendered the projection 
of organized mechanization and regimentation throughout society. 
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As uniform printing gave rise to the mechanistic view of space and 
matter,. so it gave rise to the idea of using men like the 
mechanically interacting parts of a machine. Man has become, in 
the industrial processý the inýter-changeablc atomistid parts of a 
mono-causal lineal process, and, as the interchanGeable cog in the 
nation's machinery, he became necessarily homogeneous. The 
division of labour reached a new peak in efficiency. 
The homogeneity of industrial society was achieved through 
the destruction of the 'mutuality' of feudal society. No longer 
did a person play a universally understood and specific role in his 
local society. Through increasing urbanisation he became a de- 
personalised source of labour to be slotted into a huge 
centralised scheme. McLuhan describes the transformation in tha 
following way (1962, p. 162): "The feudal system was based or. oral 
culture, and a self-contained system of centres without 
margins .... This structure was translated by visual, 
quantitative means into Great centre-margin systemsof a nationalist 
mercantile kind ... As the simultaneously divergent 
viewnoints 
16 
and time-spacesl7 OL medieval man were snapped into 
three-dimensional focusq so the disparate functioning of feudal 
units were unified into a single national point of view. But as 
society changed from one of centres without margins to one of a 
centre with margins, so did man. Formerly a Icentret whose - 
activities were mediated by the oral immediacy of other Icentres', 
industrial man floats comparatively rootless in a constantly 
changing social milieu. No longer is the rationale of social 
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existence to be located in an immediate self-contained society, 
but ina remote centre - that of nationalism. - 
** 
the development of irriting and print ultimately ; 
ostered the breakuD of feudal societies @Aid the rise of 
individualism. Writing and print created the isolated 
thinker, the man with the book and doi-mgraded the net-"Tork 
of personal loyalties which oral cultures favour as 
matrices of communication and as principles of social 
unity (Ong, 1967, P-54). 
Industrial man, in other words, must provide his own margins, a 
process increasingly Lacilitated through the advent of literacy, 
that 'surrogate' other. The alienation of homogeneous atomistic 
individuality essentially constitutes the agony of post- 
Renaissance 'objective' self-consciousness. 
Besides being encouraged by the uniformity of function 
induced through the homogeneity and repeatbM3, ity of print, the 
growth of nationalism was also aided by the improved control at a 
distance made possible by the easier production and propagation of 
knowledge. Clearly, this control yet again helped to entrench a 
high division of labour. 1-iloreover, since the market potential . 
for printed books was greater than could be satisfied by a clerical 
elite reading in Latin, an increasing number of books were published 
in the vernacular. Ethnic groups thus became more conscious of 
their oi-m national identity because they could, in a very literal 
sense, see themselves. 
Buts as suggested earliers typography may also act as a 
force for 'democracy'. This possibility - and hence the tdouble- 
edged' nature of both phonetic literacy and typography - ultimately 
exists because of the central ambiguity inherent in the industrial 
world sense. The nationalism just described, for example, both 
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contains apd ispredicated upon the suppressed distinction of physical 
and mental time indicated above. For while homogeneous 
individuality is a necessary adjunct of nationalism, in that men 
with self-contained 'margins' are required to actu interdependently 
for the centrally d ictated aims of the nation, those same unen, 
increasingly more literate and critical, come to be more conscious 
of the self and its relationship to others, and so gained an 
increased possibility for formulating and voicing anti-classical 
opinions: "individualism, whether in the passive atomistic sense of 
drilled uniformed soldiery or in the active aggressive sense of 
private initiative and self-expression, alike assumes a prior 
technology of homogeneous citizens" (McLuhanj 1962, p. 209). The 
growth of self-expressive individuality fostered and was in turn re- 
inforced by the emergence of the concept of authorship in post- 
Renaissance Europe, a concept, as noted, that is uncommon in the 
Middle Ages. 
The possibility inheren t in phonetic literacy for an 
analytic approach towards the discrepant bodies of knowledge that 
may be stored in a society thus approached something like full cwý 
fruition during the Renaissance, and the phenomenon of cultural lag 
consequently becomes of importance in examining the entire body of 
knowledge in modern society. The vast dissemination of books and 
knowledge that has resulted from printing has encouraged divergent 
opinions simply because the actual body of knoi-. -ledge a person may 
be exposed to could well be2 and probably is, different in every 
case. No one man can now know 'everything'. As Goody c! nd Watt 
have pointed out (1962, p. 324): "the content of the cultural 
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tradition grovs continually, and in so far as it affects any 
particular individual he beCbmes a palimpsest composed of layers 
of beliefs and attitudes belonging to different stages in 
historical time". In literate societies, thereforeq where the 
legitimator, as assignor of values, constitutes the class of person 
most intimately exposed to discrepancies and contradictions, there 
exists the potential for the legitimator's high degree of self- 
consciousness to be at variance iiith his role as maintainer of the 
established social symbology. I-Thich direction he takes will largely 
depend on whether he. has a vested interest in a status quo or is 
indifferent or hostile to it. Those legitimators who choose to 
erect new symbolic structures act as catalysts and initiators in the 
process of change or 'progress', a process which figures 
prominently in the consciousness of modern Ifestern man. 
The role played by printing in creating the intellectual 
fervour of the Renaissance need not be recounted. However, it was 
not until the late eighteenth century that anti-classical movements 
took on a strong class orientation. Raymond I-Tilliams (1961ý P-50) 
tells us that "from the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth 
century there had been growing up a large new middle-class reading 
public, the ... rise 
in which corresponds very closely with the rise 
to power and influence of the same class". Because oi- this 
increased market, the author no longer needed to work for a patron 
but could make his money in the open marketplace. As Dr. Johnson 
indicates (writing in 1750), a change of subject matter results: 
The task of our present. writers is very different; it 
requires, together with that learning which is to be gained 
from books, that experience which can never be attained by 
solitary diligence, but must arise fzom general converse 
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and accurate observation of the living world. Their 
performances have, as Horace expresses it, -, -)lus oneris 
puMtum veniae minus, little indulgence, and therefore 
much difficulty. They are engaged in portraits of which 
everyone lalows the oririnal, and can detect any deviation, 
from exactness of resemblance. Other writings -are safe 
except from the malice of learning, but these are in 
danger from every common reader .... 
(Quoted, McLuhan, 
19629 pl). 273-274). 
The result was thatq in reading material produced for. them and 
about them, the middle classes began to gain a consciousness of 
their political position and of its desirability. This 
consciousness gradually spread to the working classes during the 
nineteenth century 
18 
. 
Increasing class consciousness was 
developments, such as the mechanisation of 
the--close proximity of the working classes 
areas, both of which can be related to the 
nationalism. Consciousness led to and wei 
aided by other 
transport systems and 
in the emerging urban 
growth of industrial 
rit hand in hand with a 
demand for increasing educationý until the foundations were laid 
for a continuing critical, political and economic dialectic. The 
legitimator in societyj instead of exclusively aligning himself 
with a ruling elite who have. a. vested interest in class 
stratification, may no-. T be found as the representative of 
practically any class or group, 
Phonetic literacy and typography have thus been heavily 
instrumental in generating a class dialectic, but -, rTithin the frame- 
work of political and economic nationalism. From the situation 
where individual feudal units vrere very much the people that 
constituted them, industrial society has moved to a situation . -rhere 
Uhe nation state has become a big hopper in which occupants car. be 
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placed and shifted in a highly mobile fashion. Nationalism is 
founded. upon the 2allacy of form: and content; it is not of the 
people because it contains them. It is permanent while people are 
mortal. And as the nation is not constituted of 'specific' 
individuals it has appeared as a pre-existine and generally un- 
questioned fact of life: "Because the national state does not belonS 
to the citizens of any particular generation, it must not be 
revolutionized" (McLuhan, 1962, p. 221). 
Class dialogue has thus been overwhelmingly concerned in 
practice, if not in theory, with who shall wield the centralised 
poTrer of nationalism and to what effect. Only very recently have 
there been signs of a general ai-Tareness of the inherent paradoxes 
of industrial man's social and intellectual organisa-tion, and a 
general xealisation that perhaps only a fundamental restructuring 
19 
of that organisation will remove some of its major problems Tn 
a parallel fashion anti-classical legitimating structures have 
generally been conceived within the intellectual, political and 
20 
economic frameworks outlined in this section I and so grounded 
very much on'the noetic structures induced through phonetic 
literacy and typography. Literate legitimatorsq in other words2 
in self-reflexively receding from the immediacy of, everyday reality2 
have had great difficulty in recognising the consequences of their 
oirn literacy. 
*** 
Having discussed the principal characteristics of industrial 
man's world sense and social structuring, Chapter Four will now 
proceed to describe the major barriers which militate against the 
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adoption of a social theory for the siGnificance of music. The 
description, of course, will be carried out -against the background 
provided by this chapter. 
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NOTES: 
1. This view results both from industrial man's ability to 1halt' 
time in its continual flow and from the importance the line 
plays in his mode of thought. 
2. The transition indicated in this paragraph wasq of course, 
extremely slowq and one which went through many stages. One 
such stage is represented by the way in which 'words' were 
frequently 'joined up' in the writing of antiquity. Oral flowq 
in other words, still permeated some chirographic literacy. 
See Goody and Watt (1963, P-319) and Kenyon (1937, P-35)- 
3. See Ong (19679 P-48). 
4- See Chaytor (1970s p. 123). This difference in look meant that 
recognition of a particular 'article' or 'book' was as much 
aural as visualq a fact whic ,h again underlines 
the gradual 
nature of the shift from oral-aural to visual culture (of. n. 2 
above). Further evidence of this gradual change is provided 
by the comparative difficulty that medieval and ancient 
civilisations experienced in reading (see Chaytor, 1970, P-117 
and p. 122) and by the way in which reading aloud persisted as 
the norm until well into the Renaissance (see Ong 1967, p. 211 
P-55 and P-58). 
5. of. ru-4 aboveg especially Ong (1967) P-58). 
6. This move towards uniformity and the single point of view is 
reflected in the standardisation of spelling and of the meaning 
of words. In this latter regard McLuhan (1,0709 p. 129) comments 
that "even no-,, radays a medieval dictionary would be impossible, 
since individual writers assumed that they were free to define 
and develop any given term as their thought proceeded". 
7- Capek (19619 P-135) makes a direct connection between these 
psychological reasons (which correspond very closely to the 
arrangement of industrial man's sensorium) and the reDression 
of certain aspects of experience he is indicating: "In the 
classical model physical reality was constituted by four 
fundamental entities: spaceq time, matter and motion. All other 
concepts, including that of energy and momentumq were derived 
ones; similarlyy attempts to reduce the number of basic 
entities to fewer than four were not successful .... Tactile 
sensations disclosed the reality of matterg visual sensations 
the reality of space. Since visual and kinesthetic 
sensations disclosed the reality of motiong motioný too was a 
sensory datum. But to what sensory datum did the reality of 
time corresnond? It can neither be touched nor seen; it 
manifests itself most conspicuously in the auditory sensations 
which since the time of the ancient atomists have been 
excluded from physical reality; or in the emotional 
introspective qualities which by definition do not belong to 
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the physical world. It is true that in the sensory 
perception of motion 'vie concretely experience succession 
that the concept of motion presupposes the concept of time; 
but it is psychologically understandable that this logical 
order was forgotten and, as motion in the form of spatial 
displacement was more accessible to perception and 
imagination, it Was made the very basis of the concent of 
time in the relational theory". 
This paradox is explained in the subsequent paragraph. 
Generally speakingg it may be thought of as gradually 
increasing unuil the Enlightenment, and then decreasing. until 
the beginning of the present century, when changes of a rather 
different nature began to take place. Although pervasive, 
the mode of thought never went unchallenged, even at its 
'or example, of the eighteenth century height. One can think, i 
satire oL the book, or Blake's opposition to Newtonian thought. 
10. cf. above p. 3+. 
This brief defence of McLuhan's central thesis is not meant to 
imply that there are not substantial parts of his Work, which 
invite pertinent criticism. It is meant to highlight the 
likelihood that even if McLuhan and his critics ifere to agree 
on their facts, there would still remain a fundamental and 
incommensurable philosophical difference of opinion. Reasons 
for such differences are given in Appendix I. 
12. of. above ppjq-27. More specifically (see Carothers, 1959, 
P-308), pre-literate man is relatively unable to partially step 
outside himself and be re-flexive or lintellectualt where his 
own reactions to events are concerned. The facility for 
discussing a problem internally with 'self' is severely 
restricted, and so the problem is acted out externally with 
others.. Ong (1967, pp-132-133) relates an incident which 
supports this analysis: "The riots in the Republic of the 
Congo at the achievement of independence a few years ago 
perhaps provided more recent evidence of oral-aural anxiety 
syndromes. I recall in particular the press report of a 
Congolese officer whose comment when he was asked about the 
riots was quite simply, 'Uhat did you expect? '. That is to 
say 'Don't armies everywhere riot this way from time to time 
when the pressure builds up? 111 
13. See Goody and Watt (19639 P-313). 
14- cf. above pp. 28-29. The ossifying influence of hieroglyphic 
literacy is referred to by Goody and Watt (1963, P-313): "-Ar-Y 
system of writing which malkes the sign stand directly for the 
object must be extremely complex. It can extend its 
vocabulary by generalisation or association of ideasq that isý 
by making the sign stand either for a more general class of 
objects, or for other referents connected with the original 
picture by an association of meanings which may be related to 
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another either in a continuous or discontinuous manner. 
Either process of semantic extension is to some extent 
arbitrary or esoteric, and as a result the interpretation of 
these signs is neither easy nor explicit". Again (P-315): 
"the conservative and antiquarian bias of hieroglyphic 
societies can perhaps be best appreciated by contrasting it 
with fully phonetic writing; for phonetic writing, by 
imitating human discourse, is in fact symbolising, not the 
objects of the social and natural order, but the very process 
of human interaction in speech: the verb is as easy to express 
as the noun; and the written vocabulary can be easily and 
unambiguously expanded. Phonetic systems are therefore 
adapted to expressing every nuance of individual thought, to 
recording personal reactions as -dell as items of major 
importance 11 [my emphasis] . 
15. . The different degree to which phonetic literacy aided or 
hindered the growth of democracy in Ancient Greek and Roman 
civilisations, for example, is discussed by Fisher (1936, P-44) 
Goody and vTatt (1963, P-318 and P. 322), Kitto (1951, p. 66), 
McLuhan (1962, p. 61), and Ong (1967, P-34). 
16. Marshall McLuhan, for example (1962, p. 136) has pointed out 
that: "it was disturbing to scholars to discover in recent 
years that Chaucer's personal pronoun or his tpoetic selft as 
narrator was not a consistent persona. The ITI of medieval 
narrative did not provide a point of view so much as immediacy 
of effect. In the same way grammatical tenses and syntax 
were managed by medieval i-Tritersq not with an idea to sequence 
in time or space, but to indicate importance of stress". 
17- Georges Poulet (1956, P-7) tells us that: "For the man of the 
Middle Ages .... there was not one duration only. There 
were durations, r, --riked one above another, and not only in the 
universality of the exterior world but within himself, in his 
own nature, in his own hunan existence". Furtherýmedieval 
man's concept of matter has clear implications lor his concept 
of space (since space is ultimately articulated or 'marked out' 
by matter): "To change was to pass from potentiality to 
actuality. But this transition had nothing about it 
necessarily temporal. By virtue of the Christian doctrine of 
omnipotence, it could have a temporal quality only if there 
were some cause which did not allow the immediate 
transformation by divine action of the potentiality into the 
act. And this cause which required that time be involved in 
the change was a certain defect of matter ... From this 
-point of view, matter was nothing other than a resistance which, 
manifesting itself in the substance of an thing, hindered that 
thing*from assuming instantly the fullness of being which its 
. 
form would confer unon it; a resistance which introduced 
distance and tardiness, multiplicity and delay, where everything, 
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it seemed, should have happened simultaneously and at once" 
(Poulet, 1956, PP-4-5). This high degree of interdependency 
between matter and different 'times' or durations necessarily 
involves a diversity of different ? spaces' or extensions. 
18. This growing consciousness 
meaning with words such as 
Williams (1961, PP-14-15)- 
is evidenced in the change of 
'class' and 'democracy'. See 
19. This awareness has become possible because-the media of our 
communication are again in the process of altering "' the 
arrangement of our sensorium, and the orientation of our noetic 
foundations. Electrical lorms. of communication are 
restoring the immediacy and simultaneity of our awareness of 
world events-. See McLuhan (1964). 
20. Marx is probably the first thinker to have broken from these 
frameworks and dispensed with the fallacy that knowledge is 
somehow absoluteg permanent and ultimately 'discoverable'. In 
'turning Hegel on his head', he and Engels provided a theory 
of historical and economic processes that saw these processes 
as manifestations of human constructs acting back upon them- 
selves. And there is little doubt that media DhilosoDhers, 
in extending such an approach to the very language that 
mediates our existence, have vastly expanded the scope of the 
critical sociological tradition that. began with 11arx. 
- 69 - 
R=13RENCES : 
BARZUNI J. (1943). Classic, Romantic and I-lodern. Doubleday 
and Co. 
CAPEK, M. (1961). PhiloOO'Ohical Inpact of Contemno-rnr-. V Physics. 
D. Van Nostrand Company Inc. 
CAREY, J. W. (1967)- "Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan". 
The Antioch Review (XXVII). 
CAROTHERS, J. C. (1959)- "Culture Psychiatry and the i1ritten Word". 
Psychiatry (XXII). 
CHAYTOR, H. J. (1970). "Reading and Writing", in Carpenter, B., and 
1--IcLuhan, M. (eds. ), Explorationsin Communication. Jonathan Cape. 
PISHER7 H. A. L. (1936). A History of Ejurope. E-18dward Arnold. 
GOLDSCMIDT, S. P. (1943). Medieval Texts amd their First 
A2pearances in Print. Oxford University Press. 
GOODY7 J. and ITATT, 1. (1963). "The Consequences of Literacy". 
Comparative Studies in Society and History (V). 
HANSON, N. R. (1965). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge University 
Press. 
KEITY01T, F. C. (1937). Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome. 
The Clarendon Press. 
KITTO, H. D. F. (1951). The Greeks. Penguin Books Ltd. 
LORD, A. B. (1964). The Singer of Tales. Harva-rd University Press. 
McLUHAW, 11. (1962). The Gutenberg Galaxy. Oxford University 
Press. 
McLUHANj 11. (1964). Understanding Media. The New American 
Library of Canada Ltd. 
McLUIIANI, M. (1970). "The Effect of the Printed Book on Language 
in the Sixteenth Century", in Carpenter, E., and I! cLuhan7 M. 
(eds. ), Explorationsin Communication. Jonathan Cape. 
ITEF, J-V- (1958). Cultural Foundations in Industrial 
Civilization. Cambridge University Press. 
ONG2 W. J. (1967). The Presence of the Nord. Yale University 
Press. 
- 70 - 
POULET, G. (1959)- Studies in Human Time, Colemang E. (trcais. ). 
The John Hopkins Press. 
WILLIMIS, R. (1961). Culture and Societz 1780 - 1950. Penguin Books Ltd. 
- 71 - 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BLOCKS AGAINST A SOCIAL THEORY 
- 72 - 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapte r is to show how the world 
sense and prevailing social structure of industrial man have 
jointly militated against the ac'ceptance of a valid social theory 
for the significance of music. The arguments put forward in 
this chapter ultimately rely on the background provided in the 
previous chapter. 
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MUSIC AND THE CENTRALISED SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
The intellectual correlate of the social structure 
described in the previous chapter is not difficult to identify. 
Due to the high division of labour, hierarchical class structure 
and centralism of nationalism, the legitimator, in all spheres of 
society, remains very much in the position of producing and 
defining knowledge for other people. ' This trend was noted in the 
eighteenth century by Ada-m Smith when he said that: 
In opulent and commercial societies to think or to reason 
comes to be, like every other employment2 a particular 
business, which is carried on by a very few people, who 
furnish the public with all the thought and reason possessed 
by the vast multitudes that labour (Quoted, Williams, 1961, 
P-52). 
For the centralised dissemination of knoTTledge to remain 
intact in the face of challenge, it is necessary that knoTTledge is 
'arbitrarily' conceived. This larbitrarinesst is closely inter- 
related with the notions oflobjectivityl, and Iformt and tcontent' 
described in the previous chapter: form and content because the 
matter of a message is removed from the soci al location of its 
commwnication, and objectivity because reality is thought of as 
given rather than socially constructed. The supremacy of. this 
independent and objective knowledge over that resulting from social 
mediation was first symbolically asserted through Platots 
expulsion of the poets: 
Platots banishment of the uoets and his doctrine of 
ideas are two sides of the same coin. In banishing the 
-poets from his Republic, Plato was telling his ca-mpatriots 
that it was fo h to imagine that the intellectual needs 
of life in Greek society could still be met by memorizing 
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Homer. Rather than deal in this verbaalisationý so much 
of a piece with the non-verbal lifo-world, one needed to 
ask more truly abstract questions (Ong, 1967, pp-33-34). 
Thought, and action, mind and body, self and physical environment 
were separated to such a degree that a considerable amount of 
importance was able to be given to the cerebrally derived at the 
expense of the socially experienced: 
In classic Hegelian thesis-antithesis fashion Plato's 
ideas, the "really real", were polarized at the maximum 
distance from the old oral-, --ura-l human life-uorld. Spoken 
words are events engaged in time and indeed in the present. 
Plato's ideas were the polar opposite: not events at all but 
motionless "objective" existenceý impersonal and out of 
ýýime (Ong, 1967,9.34)-- 
Meaning is thus isolated from its social context and comes to be 
grounded in a scheme of absolutes: 
In oral culture words - and especially words like 
"God", "Justicelly "Soul'17 "Good", - may hardly be conceived 
of as separate entities, divorced both from the rest of the 
sentence and its social contoxt. But once given the 
physical reality of writing, they take on a life of their 
own; and much Greek thought Was concerned with attempting 
to explain their meanings satisfactorily, and to relate 
these meanings to some ultimate principle of rational order 
in the universe, to the logos (Goody and Watt, 1963ý P-330). 
It is precisely With this type of absolute and arbitrary 
conce-ot that art has traditionally concerned itself since the time 
of the Ancient Greel, -, s. As far as the modern world is concerned 
ire are told by Williams (1961, P-56) that the argument that "an 
artist's precepts were ... the 'universals' 
(in Aristotle's 
terms) or permanent realities" is one which "had been completed in 
the irritings of the Renaissance". And as the same author goes on 
to point out, it is also an argument which united the otherwise 
disparate creeds of Classicism and Romanticism: 
The tendency of Romanticism is toirards a vehement 
rejection of dogmas of method in art, but it is also very 
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clearly, towards a claim which all good classical theory 
Would have recognised: the claim that the artist's 
business is to 'read the open secrets of the universe'. 
A 'romantic' critic like Ruskin, for example, bases his 
whole theory of art on just this tolassicist' doctrine. 
The artist perceives and represents Essential Reality, 
and lie does so by virtue of his master faculty 
Imagination. In fact the doctrines of tthe genius' (the 
autonomous creative artist) and the 'superior reality of 
art' (penetration to a sphere of universal -truth) were in 
Romantic thinking two sides of the same claim. Both 
Romanticism and Classicism are in -this sense idealist 
theories of art; ... 
(1961, P-56). 
This concern with truth as the ultimate aim of art and culture has 
persisted into the twentieth century, albeit in rather less explicit 
forms. In his book, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, for 
example, T. S. E-Eliot argues that diversity of cultural activity is 
essential to the maintenance of a valid spiritual life. Dialectic 
is a necessary pre-requisite for truth: 
As in the relation between the social classes, and as in 
U the relation of the several regions of a country to each 
other and to the central power; it i-Tould seem that a 
constant struggle betiieen the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces is desirable .... there should be an endless 
conflict betl-Teen ideas - Jor it is only by the struggle 
against constantly appearing false ideas that truth is 
enlarged and clarified, and in the conflict with heresy 
that orthodoxy is developed to meet the needs of the 
time; ... 
(1948, p. 82). 
It could be argued that the first notable challenge to the 
centralised definition and dissemination of knowledge did not occur 
until the late eighteenth century, with the rise to power and 
influence of the middle classes. But it was precisely because 
this anti-classicall political movement was articulated in terms of 
classical structures that it appeared such a threat to the. status 
quo, and thus occasioned an explicit retrenchment in lines of 
2 thought already irnplicit in an elitist view of art It was at 
- 76 - 
this time, for example, that the notion of art as an approach to 
essential reality "received significant additional emphases" 
(Ifilliamsq 19619 pp. 60-61). Faced with a deviant cultural realityg 
in other words, writers and artists were forced back on the notion 
that all culture attains to one, indivisible, essential truth. 
But this is only the first step in the line of defenceý 
because it is equally possible for the perpetrators of a deviant 
cultural reality to claim that they too have access to the 
essential nature of truth. Further, they may claim that the-; -- art- 
forms interpret this essential reality more successfully than the 
traditional art-forms with which they vie. Those who Droduce 
such traditional art-florms are therefore driven firstly to claim 
that it is their art-forms which best reveal the inner nature of 
essential reality2 and then to maintain that it is only a limited 
number of highly-tuned minds (such as themselves) who are capable 
of appreciating this reality in an unaided fashion. F. R. Lea-vis 
(1948, P-143) puts this view most explicitly: 
In any period it is upon a very small minority that 
the discerning appreciation of art and literature depends: 
it is (apart from cases of the simple and familiar) only 
a few who are capable of unprompted, first-hand 
judgement. They are still a minority, though a larger 
one, who are capable of endorsing such first-hand 
judgement by genuine personal response. The accepted 
valuations are a kind of paper currency based upon a very 
small proportion of gold. To the state of such a currency 
the possibilities of fine living at any time bear a close 
relation. 
The reverse side of the coin, of course, is a disdain for the 
critical abilities of the culturally untutored. Although such 
disdain is necessarily implicit in the very notion of a centrally 
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defined culturey it is again interesting to note that the attitude 
became more deeply entrenched at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century: 
Writers had, of courseq often expressed, before this time, 
a feeling of dissatisfaction with the lpubliclý but in 
the early nineteenth'- 
, 
century this feeling became acute 
and general. One finds it in Keats: 'I have not the 
slightest feel of humýlity touards the Publict; in 
Shelley: 'Accept no counsel from the simnle-minded. 
Time reverses the judgement of the foolish croud. 
Contemporary criticism is no more than the sum of the folly 
with which genius has to wrestlet. - One finds it, most 
noticeably and most extensively2 in ITordsworth (Williams, 
1961, P-51)- 
Coupled with the belief th. at art reveals higher truths 
fathomable only by a minority of superior minds is the idea that 
these minds are thus responsible for preservinp, the cultural values 
of a society. This idea is as prevalent in the twentieth century 
as it was in the nineteenth. The early nineteenth-century writer, 
we are told, continued: 
@*. to insist, in fact, on an Idea7 a standard of 
excellence, the 'embodied spirit' oj- a People's knowledge, 
as something superior to the actual run of the market. 
This insistence. it is 
, 
worth emphasizing, is one of the 
primary sources of the idea of Culture. Culture, the 
ternbodied spirit of a Peoplet, the true standard of 
excellenceý became available, in the progress of the 
century, as the court of appeal in which real values were 
determined .. 99 
(ITilliams, 1961, P-52). 
over a century later, F. R. Leavis (1943, pp-144-145) states that: 
Upon this minority depends our power of profiting by the 
finest human experience of the past; they keep alive the 
subtlest and most nerishable narts of tradition. Upon 
them depend the implicit standards that order the finer 
living of an age, the sense that this is worth more than 
that, this rather than that is the direction in which to 
go, that, the centre is here rather than there. 
It is this last line of thought in the complex under discussion 
that is most obviously allied to the central dissemination of 
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knowledge in industrial society. Yet it is importlant to 
understand that this line of thought cannot be adequately maintained 
without the nresence of the other two. In other words, unless 
there are a set of objective values and standards against which all 
cultural activity can ultimately be judged, and unless it is the 
case that only a minority are capable of perceiving the essential 
truth underlying those values, then the legitimacy of the role 
played by that minority quickly comes into question. 
It is further interesting to note that this elitist attitude 
towards culture is based on the questionable promise that society 
is divided between those who have inherently superiorý and those 
who have inherently inferior intellects. This promise in turn 
gives birth to a circular or self-maintaining view of cultural 
apprehension: it is only those with superior minds who can fathom 
the ultimate realities of art, yet it is those who can fathom these 
realities who by definition have superior minds; equally those with 
inferior minds cannot fathom the ultimate realities of art) yet it 
is precisely those who cannot fathom these realities who by 
definition have inferior minds. This circularity is implicitly 
acknowledged by T. S. Eliot (1948ý P-107) when he says that: "It 
is an essential condition of the preservation of the quality of 
the culture of the minority, that it should be a minority culturellý 
and through Arnold Schoenberg's famous aphorism that: "If it is 
art it is not-for all, and if it is for allý it is not art". 
Not surprisingly, the attitudes so far described in this 
section are to be found in the musical as well as the literary 
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worlds. The idea that the composer mediates between 'the open 
secrets of the universe' and the music he writes finds classical 
expression in the work of Victor Zuckerkandl. For ZuckeVxcandl, 
musical significance is located in laws uhich may only be 
-ive reality: discovered by the composer in object 
It is not that the mind of the creative artist 
expresses itself in tonesl. wordsq coloursý and forms as its 
medium; on the contrary, tone, Lord, colour, form express 
themselves through the medium of the creative mind. The 
finer that medium the better tone, word, colour, form can 
exDress themselves. The greater the genius, the less it 
speaks itself, the more it lends its voice to the tones, 
the words, the colours, the forms. In this sense, then, 
music does write itself - neither more nor less, by the 
way, tha-ri physics does. The law of falling bodies is no 
invention of the genius of Galileo. The work of the 
genius consists in bringing the mind, through years of 
practice, so into harmony with things, that things can 
express their laws through him (1956, pp. 222-223). 
A similar view has more recently been expressed by Ruth Gipps. 
For her, music is a mystic experience founded on truth: 
I know that from one God comes music and all musical 
Gifts. Some of us were composers from the beginning 
of our lives; we had no choice in the matter, only a 
life-long duty to make the most of a Given talent. 
This talent may be large or small, but without it a 
person is not a composer ... 0 My own conception of 
God is of a limitless contrapuntal mind; perhaps this 
concept lacks humanity, 
' 
but that is my own business. 
From personal experience I know that mysticism is 
founded on truth .... 
(1975ý P-13). 
Consequently, 
*o. no human being has ever created anything. The 
most that a composer can do is to present to other 
people, in comprehensible form, music that already 
existed. Bach wrote IS. D. G. ' at the end of works. 
None of his music was a product of the cleverness of 
J. S. Bach (19751 P-13). 
The idea that a minority of people are imbued with a 
special gift of musicality which may subsequently be cultivated 
into genius is a commonplace in many people's thinIcing about music2 
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and needs no further comment in the present context. But such 
belief in the other-worldly nature of musical inspiration, and the 
ability of only a minority to exploit it in turn leads to the 
concept of an objective aesthetic. That is; it is assumed that 
there are a fixed set of musical criteria against which all music 
can ultimately be judged. Not surprisingly, these criteria tend 
to be rooted in the musical language of the ruling classes 
3. 
Leonard B. Meyer, for example, has spent a large part of his 
working life attempting to extrapolate a universally applicable 
theory of music from. albeit insightful analyses of tonality. Again ga 
not surprisingly, pre-literate music does not fair very well: 
The differentia between art music and primitive 
music lies in speed of tendency gratification. The 
primitive seeks almost immediate gratification of his 
tendencies whether these be biological or musical. Nor 
can he tolerate uncertainty. And it is because distant 
departures from the certainty and repose of the tonic 
note and lengthy delays in gratification are insufferable 
to him that the tonal repertory of the primitive is 
limited, not because he cannot think of the other tones. 
It is not his mentality that is limited, it is his 
maturity (Meyer, 1967, P-32). 
The tendency to judge all music in terms of tonality finds its 
clearest expression at the hands of Ruth Gipps (1975, P-14): 
The corollary of the truth that all real music comes 
from inspiration is that all so-called music w-ritten 
without inspiration is not music at a119 and the people 
who write it are not comDosers. Ranging from the super- 
intellectual to the wildest and woolliest lunatic fringeg 
we have for years been given performance of worthless 
nonsense, while real composers have been labelled backward- 
looking, unenterprisingg or 'unwilling to experiment'. 
The extremes of the avant-garde eventually meet the 
extremes of amDlified 'no-oil which leads young people 
through sheer volume and physical excitement of an 
unhealthy kind ... to total selfishness .... 
Opinions of this sort are not infrequently backed up with arguments 
of a technical or analytic nature. Marshall Stearns, for exampleý 
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reports the following conversation with a friend about jazz: 
- "Jazz", he told me one evening, "is unnatural, 
abnormal and just plain unhealthy. " I knou of no 
effective way to answer -this sort of pronouncement on any 
human activity. When pressed for reasons, however, he 
fell back on more rational assertions: "the harmonies of 
jazz are childish, the melodies are a series of cliches, 
and the rhythms are monotonously simple. " Here is 
something technical and specific. What is more these 
criticisms are reasonably typical and comprehensive. 
Since my friend (mid others like him) occupies an 
important position in the world of music on the strength 
of his unquestioned merits, his comments should be taken 
seriously (1956, p. 183). 
It is not essential to the present line of discussion to 
establish that such criticisms are invalid, (although it is 
certainly the view of this writer that they are)i only that they 
are made in the way in which they are. It is worth noting, 
however, that Schuller, who is probably the greatest author. ity on 
the subject (and a classically-trained musician as well), devotes 
the first chapter of his book on jazz to spelling out Uhe preciser 
musical differences between early jazz and the classical 
tradition4. Further, it is a corollary of the attitude being 
described that i.., hereas most jazz and rock musicians are quite happy 
to concede th at classical or serious music operates according to 
a set of criteria which are simply irrelevant to their musical 
requirements, many classical musicians, in their firm belief that 
they are in a position to judge other types of music, simply end 
up exposing their ignorance to those who actually create and 
perform these other types. Peter Townsend of -'The Uhol, for 
examDle, has stated that: 
I'm sure it will surprise a lot of people when I tell 
you that I can read music and I Imow-how to arranE,; e it; 
I also know about counternoint. But as soon as I had 
learned all the theory, I realised that it was utterly 
useless to me. All it allowed me to do was to understand 
what other composers were trying to dog and once you've 
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understood you've got to go and use today's terms to 
produce new music) ... 
(Quoted, Palmerl'1970, P-131). 
But conversely the black jazz musician Cecil Taylor reports that: 
I've spent years in school learning about European 
music and its traditions, but those cats don't knoir a 
thing about Harlem except that itts there. Right away, 
when they talk about music they talk in terms of what 
music is to them. They never subject therdselves to, like, 
what are LouisArmstrong's criteria for beauty and until 
they do that, then I'm not interostcd in what they say. 
Because they simply don't recognize the criteria. 
(Quoted, Spellman, 1970, P-34). 
The Head of Music in a technical college has put this point rather 
more forcefully with regard to tpopi music. Most music teachers' 
view of 'popt, he maintainsg 
issimply based on sheer ignorance; they've just got no 
idea what sort of music today's kids listen to. if I 
had some of these teachers here for two days playing the 
records from our collection they i-i-ould soon have to change 
their ideas concerning 'pop' music (Reported, Vulliamy, 
19723 P-95). 
Since, as Pleasants -outs it, the musical "Establishment is 
concerned with the pres. e. rvation of what it regards, sincerely7 i 
thinkg as immutable cultural criteria" (1969, p. 118), its criticism 
of music which does not conform to pre-ordained technical or 
analytic criteria frequently carries an accompanying moralistic 
component. This tendency in the denunciation-. Of various forms of 
jazz, rock and Ipopt music is so well known that it hardly requires 
substantiation. One need only refer, for exampleg to Merriam's 
cataloguing of the tirade launched against jazz in the United 
States between the 1920's and 1940's 
5, 
or, as far as 'pop' is 
concerned, to the unfailing Ruth Gipps: 
In fact, the pop craze has done much serious harm to 
thousands. Every time a misguided teacher uses commercial 
pop in school the children concerned are being led away 
from the good and spiritual in their natures towards the 
evil and hypoaatical - (and fors-ensitive children who have 
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naturally good taste the enforced listening to this 
rubbish must be agony). It is the equivalent of a 
teacher of literature instructing a class to write dirty 
words on a lavatory wall, or of a-priest teaching novices 
to defile their church ... 
(1976, P-17). 
This moralistic attitude carries an opposing perspective. For 
whereas the music establishment see it as their task to preserve 
and maintain standards, those who are in receipt of such criticism 
view it as an attempt to destroy their own, perfectly valid 
culture. This opposing perspective is piquantly expressed by 
Cecil Taylor: 
I've known Negro musicians wholve gotten grants, but it's 
very interesting that no Negro jazz musician ever gotten 
a grant. If you're a black- pianist who wants to learn 
to play Beethoven, you have a pretty good chance of getting 
a grant. That's that fucked-up liberal idea of uplifting 
the black man by destroying his culture. But if you want 
to enlarge on culture, forget it; your m oney will have to 
come from bars and,, thaý cutthroat record industry (Quoted, 
Spellman, 1970, P. 
It is now possible to indicate why aestheticians and music 
theorists are unlikely to assign music (by which they almost 
without exception mean 'serious' music) an inherently social 
significance. For if the significance of music is taken to be 
socially locatedý then it must be understood to form an aspect of 
the socially constructed reality of the group of society 
responsible for producing the music in question. In other words, 
the music can only be legitimately understood in terms of the 
categories of analysis which themselves form an aspect of the 
reality of that particular gToup or society, and there can 
consequently be no question of recourse to the notion that musical 
significance is derived from the 'open secrets of the universe' or 
some form of mystical, other-worldly truth. 
It is at this point that the pedigree of Langer's and 
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Meyer's theories becomes fully apparent. Quitle clearly, the 
elitist view of music depends on a unidirectional information flow 
from essential realitY7 through the genius of the individual 
composer to society at large. As just indicated2 there can be no 
question of a reverse information flow by which society informs 
the composer. Rather, the mass of people are informed, edified 
and improved through the composer's insights into truth. Now 
neither Langer nor Ileyer make any explicit reference to essential 
reality or a higher truth. But they maintain the unidirectional 
information flow by locating the significance of music in the 
"psychological constants" or "psychological 'laws of rightness' 
which are common to ail mon2 but which only the composer is able 
to interpret -with any degree of insight. To this extent Langer's 
and Ileyer's theories remain implicitly elitist. While, therefore, 
they are able to distinguish between a symbol which has no referent 
in the world of objects and ideas on the one handý and one which is 
nevertheless an informationally open 
I system on the other7 I they are 
still constrained to restrict the degree of that openness. It is 
this restriction which is ultimately responsible for the 
contradiction outlined in Chapter Twoý because although it is 
admitted that music may refer 'outside itself' to the psychological 
world, it is implicitly denied that it can refer 'outside itself' to 
the symbolic interaction which is arguably responsible for a large 
measure of that world. This point is taken up again in the next 
chapter. 
It quickly becomes apparent that once the significance of 
music is taken to be socially located, the circle of argument 
predicated on the notion of inherently superior and inferior minds 
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is broken. Difference in cultural values is due not so much to 
questions of inherent intelligence as to the existence of socially 
constructed and different cultural criteria which not infrequently 
display a mutual incompatability 
8. 
With this central pillar of 
the elitist position removed, the right of the institutionalised 
musician or aesthetician in industrial society to approach all 
music9 in terms of certain arbitrarily defined categories thus 
comes into serious question. Conseque ntlyg the propensity for 
such musicians and aestheticians to attempt to impose a certain 
kind of musical knouledge on the rest of society would also come 
into question. 
The fact that an acceptance of the social mediation of 
music might result in a weakening of role-security is significant, 
but is perhaps not the most telling point against such acceptance. 
Quite clearlyq. Ea assertion that the reality or knowledge of a 
society is socially constructed 
10 
not only brings into question 
Llhe notion of absolutely and objectively conceived knowledgeý buý 
thereby questions the right of one group in society to use that 
notion in order to attempt a centralised manipulation and control 
of knowledge and values for all other groups. Because 
centralised social structures ultimately depend for their 
survival on such modes of cognitive manipulation and control, 
qiiestioning of the sort indicated would ultimately result in the 
scrutiny of the entire centralised structure of nationalism. 
The connection may to some people seem a distant one2 but 
there can be little doubt that the lack of a disposition on the 
part of musicians and aestheticians to accept the significance of 
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serious music as. socially located is due to the fact that such 
acceptance would implicitly require a questioning o. L the social 
and political structure within which they live. Not only would 
it mean accepting that the various forms of jazz, rock and 'pop, 
music are equally as 'good' as serious forms, but it would also 
mean -accepting the social and moral relativity of the deviant 
r9alities they have come to represent. Against these trends the 
institutionalized musician is constantly driven back to a search for 
objective standards o. 1- value, as this statement by Leonard Meyer 
so graphically illustrates: 
At this voint some of our social scientist friends, 
whose blood -Dressure has been steadily mounting, will throw 
up their hands in relativistic horror and cry: "You can't 
do this! You can't compare balked alaska with roast beef. 
Each work is good of its kind and there's an end of it". 
Now granted both that we can enjoy a particular work for a 
variety of reasons and also that the enjoyment of one kind 
of music does not preclude the enjoyment of others ... 
this does not mean that they are equally good. Nor does 
it mean that all modes of musical enjoyment are equally 
valuable. In fact, when you come right doiTa to it, the 
statement that Ileach'is good of. its kind", is an evasion 
of the problem, not a solution of it. And so we are 
driven to ask: are all kind eaually good? (1967, pp-34-35). 
It is, of course, an essential part of the elitist's case that 
all types oflnon-serious' music should be taken to form an integral 
aspect of the group or society in which they occur. For in 
allowing that these other types of music might be inherently 'a- 
social', the elitist would open the wazy for the suggestion that 
they too have some kind of meaningful relationship to essential 
reality, and are therefore on some kind of equal footing with 
serious types of music. It is not essential, however, that 
absolutely no relationship be taken to exist between different 
forms of tnon-serious' music and essential reality, only that these 
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forms are so greatly influenced by the social content of their 
creation that the revelation of inner truth that might otherwise 
occur is distorted and blurred beyond recoggnition. Consequently, 
it is of 'ton a distinguishing feature of 'non-serious' musics that 
they are taken to be socially significant, and that such 
significance is taken to be a mark of disapprobation. 
MUSIC AND THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD SENSE 
a 
as was argued earlier, social structures are dialectic 
correlates of the respective world senses on which they are 
ultimately -predicated, then the relationship of traditional views V 
of music to the industrial world sense should display two related 
features. On the one hand, that world sense should at least allow 
for the 'a-social' iulderstanding of serious music (and high culture 
in general) which is so essential to the elitist's position. On 
the- other, in order that the centralised structure of industrial 
society should not come under close scrutiny,. it should also 
actively militate against the formulation of any social theory for 
the significance of music. 
It is evident from discussion in the nrevious section that 
the elitist's position der3nds on a strict differentiation between 
cultural and social processes. In turn, this differentiation is 
predicated on the dichotomous epistemology set out -at the end of 
the first section of Chapter ThrEy-- Quite simply, the elitist 
divides the entire social process between those elements which are 
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'material', that is, the people and -trio environment on which they 
do-Dend,. and those i-Thich are Imentall, that is, the meanings 
conveyed through symbolic exchange. This distinction between 
the Isocio-econoiflic' and Iculturalf aspects of the social process 
depends on a multi-level interpretation or transformation of the 
dichotomous epistemology. In the first place, as we have seen, 
the 'matter' (or content) of a message is given a higher rational 
priority than the medium (or form) of its conveyance. But 
precisely because the Imatterl of a message is divorced from the 
materiality of its lunconsequentiall conveyancing meditmi (all 
symbolic traiisfer involves some articulation of the material 
universe), it appears as thoroughly metaphysical in comparison with 
the materiality of people and the goods they manufacture. (1-Tere 
the materiality of symbolic transfer not discounted in this 
fashion, such division of the social process would be impossible. ) 
Having made this division, therefore, the elitist is 
obliged to restrict the notion of the social process to the 
material half of his split, and that of cultural process to the 
mental. For were he to suggest that society and culture were 
somehow immanent 'in' each other (which for political reasons he 
is not disposed to do), he would be suggesting that both society 
and culture were explicable in terms of both halves of the 
dichotomous epistemology. This, of course, would be to transgress 
the fundamental condition of the dichotomy, namely, that any 
parti-cular'Dhenomenon or process may only be understood either in 
terms of the physical, outer, objective -.; orld2 or in terms of the 
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innerý mental and subjective world. In this fashion the 
metaphysics of high culture come'to be totally inaccessible to 
the material-factual modes of thought which underlie mass 
industrial society 
11 
. 
This division of the social process is difficult to 
establish categorically, since all culture presupposes some 
manipulation of the physical environment, and all actions are 
incipiently symbolic and therefore 'culturall. It should be 
remembered, however, that this particular application of the 
dichotomous epistemology merely facilitates an 'a-socialt view of L 
culture (and therefore serious music), and was, in all probability, 
not as instrumental in the active creation of that view as the 
emergence of a heavily centralised social structure. Further, it 
should be reiterated that because industrial man lives very much 
within his world sense, the categories of understlanding specific 
to that sense are not as clearly or consistently interpreted as 
post hoc analysis might seem to require that they should be. 
One pertinent illustration of this lack of consistency is 
to be found in the elitist's idea that 'non-serious' forms of 
music (or, to put it more generally, different forms of mass 
culture) contain an essential social element. On the one hand, 
the elitist cannot completely consign these tinferior forms of 
culture' to the material-factual world of mass society. If he did 
so, he would be admitting that they were generically different 
phenomena to his own forms of culture, and there would be no point 
in making any value judgement concerning them. On the other hand, 
- go - 
the elitist cannot make a clear distinction bOtIToen mass culture 
and its social content. Apart from the political considerations 
mentioned at the end of the preceeding soctiong such a distinction 
would contravene the fundamental condition of the dichotomous 
epistemology. While the elitist's view of high culture must be 
based on this dichotomous epistemology therefore, his view of mass 
culture cannot help but be predicated on the epiphencmenal. Ton- 
serious' musics cannot be completely explained in terms of the 
material-factual modes of thought which underlie mass industrial 
society, yet they nevertheless remain secondary symptoms or 
manifestations of those same modes. This point is taken up again 
in the next section. 
In his article, "The Politics of Popular Culture", Bryn 
Jones has observed that "the field of cultural analysis is 
currently] dominated by four major tendencies" (1974, p. 25)- 
The first two of these, which Jones refers to as the 'conservative' 
and the tliberal-humanist' correspond in their essentials to the 
12 
elitist position already de'scribed The remaining, the 
'technical-rationalist' and the 'vulgar-marxist', are predicated 
respectively on the universal and epiphenomenal epistemologies, 
and between them actively militate against the acceptance of a 
social theory for the significance of music. 
The 'technical-rationalist' approach to cultural analysis 
finds expression in: 
positivistic sociology and social psychology Cand] 
introduces a supposedly scientific quality to its 
research. It has liberal aims, notably in the sphere 
of social policy, and employs scientific terms. Its 
classic study is the scientific analysis of the effects 
of mass media on the audience. The cultural object is 
reduced to its quantifiable elements by content analysis; 
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the participants are reduced to their socio-economic 
categories or -ranged along various axes of sociological 
variables by such techniques as audience research; and 
the activities are reduced to clinically isolated 
simple communication flow models such as those developed 
in psychology. It has an absent theoretical heart, its 
place taken by a set of routinised research practices. 
Its social engineering and reformist outlook imply an 
unquestioned adherence to consensual aims founded on 
myths of democratic decision making (Jones, 
19747 p. 26). 
Whether or not other forms of culture and art are amenable to' 
such analysis must remain an open question in the present context. 
Music2 howeverg poses a considerable problem. This is not so 
much because of the central aesthetic difficulty involved in 
attempting a content analysis of music. Indeedq because his out- 
look is firmly rooted in the universal epistemology, the 'technical- 
rationalist' is constrained to deny the epistemological dichotomies 
of form and content, symbol and meaning, and subjectivity and 
objectivity around which traditional concepts of musical 
significance vacillate. He is forced rather to seek the 
significance of music in the technical-rational processes taken to 
be. identical with the unidirectional informa: tion flows involving 
society, people and music. This line of thought parallels that 
used by Meyer to overcome the absolutistts position, with the 
exception that tpsychological constants' are now replaced with 
psychological characteristics determined by the rational social 
processl3. And since this line of thought negates all 
epistemological dichotomies, it is impossible to bring the same 
charges of inconsistent interpretation that were earlier laid 
against the theories of Langer and Meyer. The central -oroblem 
with this line of thought, then, is that technical-rational 
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analysis can never successfully elucidate musical si6nificance. 
This lack of success is, of course, admitted by 1,1eyer in his 
discussion of ethetic relationships. Howeverg Victor Zuckerkandl 
brings to bear an argument which puts the matter beyond all 
reasonable doubt. 
Zuckerkandl points out that there exists an important 
difference between a series of tones which are musical nonsense 
and a series of tones which go to mýake up a melody. In the latter 
i 
case the series of tones may be said to convey some sort of 
'meaning' which is totally lacking in the former. The melody 
clearly 'has something' that the random series of notes does not. 
Zuckerkandl then goes on to argue that what the tones of a melody 
$possess' that the isolated tones or tones of a meaningless series 
do not is a dynamic quality. They create a feeling over and above 
their simple existence which reveals a great deal about their 
relationship to other tones in the melody. It is precisely this 
dynamic quality which cannot be described or quantified in purely 
material or physical terms. A physical description of a tone is 
the same whether the tone is isolated from other tonesq part of a 
random meaningless serieS2 or part of a meaningful melody. 
Because of this, it must be accented that the musical quality of a 
tone is beyond the realms of explanation in physical reductionist 
terms: 
Among the qualities that belong to the tone as an 
acoustical Dhenomenon there is none that is not 
determined by a particular elenent of the physical 
process and only cho-ziges, and always changes, if 
something changes in the physical process. Nothing 
in the physical event corresponds to the tone as a 
musical event (Zuckerkandl, 1956, p. 22). 
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'"When we hear a melody" q therefore, "we hoar things that have no 
counterpart in physical nature" (1956, p. 23)14. lathough the 
physical properties of a tone may be made perfectly explicit in 
15 
a visual fashioný music seems to present us with 'something' not 
16 
accessible to material-factual modes of thought 
This is precisely the difficulty encountered by Alphons 
Silbermann in his book, The SociolofCr of Music. With its emphasis 
on a thoroughly scientific method, and its concern with the social 
determinants of music, the structure, function and behaviour of 
socio-musical groups-, and the need for soci. 6-musical planningý the 
book conforms to Jones's description of the 'technical-rationalist, 
approach to an almost embarrassing degree. It is the scientific 
which most concern-, us here, however. For Silbermann, 
society and its study (and this includes music) can only exist 
insomuch as they are explicitly rooted in the material-factual world: 
Sociology is the study of social life as such, of its 
forms and origins, its processes and aims; and it 
studies the social uherever it may directly be perceived 
and grasped. Thus, for instance, everything contained 
in the concept tsocietyt is perceptible and tangible. 
Under this heading comes every type and degree of hume-n 
relationship, whether organized or unorganized, 
conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect. Culture - 
for our purposes music - with all its modes of 
effectiveness, may also be grasped directly, and the 
study of culture is thus the study of a social force 
(19639 P-37). 
Human affairs should furthermore be investigated in a scientific 
and objective fashion, and every effort should be made to avoid 
speculation about the nature and origin of the social 'facts' 
fundamental to such an investigation: 
Since ours will be an approach in which disDutes 
over methodology will be left aside and practical and 
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applicable sociology will be pursued, we shall be less 
concerned to define the sociology of music in itself 
than to describe its tasks through penetration into the 
matter itself. Ne shall therefore employ concrete 
results of research vrithout yielding to the temptation 
to indulge in philosophical speculation about them; 
although this might well give an impression of subtlety, 
it would also stand in direct contradiction to that 
principle of sociolorj which enjoins us to study human 
affairs dispassionately and objectively. The sociologist 
of music must ever be ready to take up a scientifically 
objective attitude to socio-musical facts, to observe 
them independently of his own desires and interests, and 
to steer clear of any kind of religious, racial, national 
or class prejudice (1963, p. 46). 
It goes without saying, of course, that Silb. ermann thinks of 
musical experience as a 'social phenomen'. But in so doing, he 
inevitably runs into the problem just outlined. Por although sound 
and, therefore, in one sense, music - is directly perceptible and, 
within the broader sense. of the word, 'tangible', it is extremely 
doubtful whether musical experience can be so described. Yet it is 
precisely because Silbermann thinks of musical experience as a 
'social phenomenon' that he cannot relegate it7 as Langer and Meyer 
do, exclusively to the rearlm of inner psychology. At the very 
least, musical experience of the inner world must have correlates 
in the external world. 
Silbermann gets round this difficulty-lby means of the 
epistemological vacillation mentioned at the end of the first 
section in Chapter Three. On the one hand he invoII: es the 
dichotomous epistemology in asserting the validity of emotion in 
music: "The countless possibilities of emotional experience have 
in many cases been wilfully suppressed, and it is with such 
negative attitudes as these that we must take issue in the strongest 
possible manner" (1963, P-74). On the other, he maintains the 
universal by strongly implying that emotional experience is 
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ultimately dependent on the perceptible and tangible phenomena 
which 'exclusively' constitute Isocialf life. Although lie does 
not go so far as to say that "the arts are merely 'the designs 
embossed upon the textile of social lifet " (1963, P-58)ý and 
' "a reciprocal action between the musical although he admits oi 
experience and the group s which consume it" (19639 P-77)y the 
great emphasis placed by Silbermann on the 'social determinants' 
of musical experience leads one to think that the reciprocaal action 
is. only possible because of the initial dependency just mentioned: 
'In what way is the musical ex-oerience socially determined? ' 
and 'In uhat i,., ay does the musical experience socially 
determine other elements? '; to the treatment of these 
fundamental questions, the words of Romain Rolland are 
very relevant: "Art is not influenced by art alone, nor 
by thought alone, but by everything which surrounds us 
people, things, gestures, movements, lines and light'. 
In fact, the musical experience is dependent upon so many 
factors that the attempt to grasp and describe them some- 
times leads to despair (19637 p. 83). 
The validity of imputing this epiphenomenal line of thought to 
Silbermann is underlined when he claims that "sociological analysis 
of music as such Eis] extremely difficult, if not impossible": 
Hence then the failure of those pseudo-sociologists 
who, in spite of frequent warnings, persist in undertaking 
the impossible: in trying to analyse music as such 
sociologically. Music,. as the inner concern of the 
composer, the musician or even of the whistling amateur, 
has not the slightest value as ýeality. Only when this 
inner concern becomec objecti-Cied, when it talkes on concrete 
expression, has it value as a social reality, only then does 
it express the tsomething', (I use the word deliberately) 
which must be understood or which will call forth a social 
effect (1963, p. 68). 
The notion that "music ... has not the slightest value 
as reality" seems essentially to be at odds with the earlier 
statement that "culture - for our purposes music with all its 
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moder, of effectiveness, may be grasped directly ... ." 
(emphasis 
mine]17, And this disparity in turn points to the extreme 
difficulty of attempting to analyse -the musical experience 
according to the canons of a positivistic soci7ology. Indeed, the 
only means by which positivistic sociology can accommodate the 
musical experience is by momentarily adopting the infrastructure- 
superstructure mode of thought usually associated with Marxism. 
That is, because music is viewed as a secondary symptom or 
manifestation of the rational social process, there is no longer 
any need for musical. ex-perience to be analysable in terms of the 
material-factual modes of thought which are taken, to underlie that 
process. It is this infrastructure-suberstructure mode of thought 
which constitutes Bryn Jones's fourth and final tendency in 
cultural analysis: 
The conventional -wisdom of orthodox Marxism has consistently 
devalued the significance of culture, seeing it, in the 
main, as simply the reflection of the base, the economic 
infrastructure of society. So culture is produced by the 
e6onomic relations in a fairly direct i-Tay, and is thus 
mere illusion or delusion, bourgeois ideology or false 
consciousness. This economist version of Marxism has its 
roots-in-some of the more positivistic assertions by Marx 
about the place of ideology. IThat is left out, hoi-Tever$ 
is any sense of the relative autonomy of the superstructureý 
of the reciprocal determination o. L the base by the 
superstructure i-Thich precludes any such undialectical 
analysis as that conducted by vulgar Marxism (1974, pp. 26-27). 
This tendency in cultural analysis is undoubtedly predicated on 
the epiphenomenal epistemology described above. By asserting 
that culture is a secondary symptom or manifestation of the 
material processes of society, in other words, and by acknowledging 
that the bourgeois elitist invokes a strict society-culture 
dichotomy in order to pass moral judgments on society as a whole) 
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the Marxist is able to claim that the bourgeois concept of art is 
an illusion and therefore one aspect of its ideology. Yet2 at 
the same time, many Marxists seem unable to accept that symbols 
act back on society in any other sense than that they reflect and 
reinforce a pre-existing social reality. 
But the'infrastructure-superstructiire mode of thought need 
not be restricted to the critical tradition of Marxism. It is, 
as we have seen (and this is the main point towards which this 
section has been moving), the only remaining mode of thought 
founded on the industrial world sense by which music may be assigned 
any sort of social significance. In other words, if the 
traditional aesthetician or music theorist is forced to seriously 
consider the notion that the significance of music is in some way 
social, then this is the mode of thought that will inevitably come 
into play. However) to the traditional aesthetician. or music 
theorist, this mode of thought in turn paradoxically guarantees 
the a-social nature of music. For it is nothing if not synonymous 
with the view that a symbol has meaning because it refers to 
something outside itself, in this instance some process in the 
infrastructure. The music theorist or historian who wishes to 
acknowledge a social influence on musical style is thus placed in 
a dilemma. On the one hand, he may be all too aware that 
fundamental stylistic changes frequently correspond with fundamental 
social change. Organum, for exampleý began to develop with the 
breakdown of classic feudalism, and functional tonality emerged 
during and after the great changes wrought by the Renaissance. On 
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the other, lie is prevented from situating the significance of 
music in its full social context because such situation iTould 
again invoke the notion of extra-musical concepts. This dilemma 
is fully reflected in 1.1eyer's attitude towards the subject: V 
Yet the emplanations furnished by reference. to politiczalý 
social and cultural history tell only part Of the 
story. For stylistic changes and developments are 
continually taking place which appear to be largely 
independent of such extr. -nusical events. -Uthough an important interaction takes place between the political, 
social and intellectual forces at work in a given epoch, 
on the one hand, alid stylistic developments on the other, 
there is also a strong tendency for a style to develop 
in its 01-m way. If this is the case, then the causes 
of these changes must be looked for in the nature of 
aesthetic experience, since for composer and listener 
style is simply the vehicle for such an eXperience 
(MeYery 1956, p. 65). 
Once again, the music theorist is caught on the horns of 
industrial man's epistemological dichotomy. 
IMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
So far this chapter has been concemed with showing how Cý 
the predominating world sense and social structure of industrial 
man have prevented the adoption of an adequate social theory for 
the significance of music. But while the world sense and its 
concomitant social structure constitute necessary conditions for 
the maintenance of implicitly 'a-sociall-views, they are not in 
themselves sufficient. If the proposition that the significance 
of music is inherently social is correct5 then there must be some 
feature of the relationship between 'serious' music and other 
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activities in industrial society "Thich prevents that inherent 
sociality from boing self-evident. This feature may best be 
highlighted by considering the different situations of music in 
pre-literate and industrial society. 
It should first be noted that the potential for the 
develonment of role-snecific knowledge in industrial society is 
far higher thazi that in pre-literate societies. Reasons for this 
difference in notential may be traced to the varying z3Cbilities that 
pre-literate and industrial people have both to recede Irom the 
imposing massivity of everyday reality and uo develop a high 
division of labour. In pre-literate societies the division of 
'ic knouledge is predicated 
18 tends to labour upon iThich role-specif 
occur largely along lines of age and sex and may thus be said to 
19 be relatively underdeveloped Consequently, the amount of 
distancing and separation that may occur in pro-literate societies 
between different bodies of role-specific knowledge and the 
universally shared knowledge appropriate to everyday reality is 
minimal. This lack of distancing is consistent with, and a 
dialectic correlate of, the view that pre-literate man's potential 
to recede from everyday reality is circumscribed by the 
predominantly oral-aural nature of his com-munications 
20 
Industrial societyq on the other hand, is characterized by an 
extremely high division of labour. Thus, although there exists 
a sizeable body of Imowledge which may be thought of as common to CD 
the everyday reality of the vast majority of people, role-specific 
bodies of knowledge in industrial society tend to be hermetically 
conceived and articulated, and so to have the minimal of 
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relationships ITith each other and the central core of %nowledgo 
approprialte to everyday reality. Again, this distancing and 
separation is a dialectic correlate of the possibility inherent 
in phonetic literacy for industrial man to mentally recede to a 
substantial extent from everyday reality. 
,, hted by The distinction being drawn here may be hiGhli- 
reference to Berger and Luckmann's discussion of ideal-typical 
extremes as regards the scone and modes oL institutionalisation 
in different societies. On the one hand: 
It is possible to conceive of a society in which 
institutionalisation is total. In such a society, all 
problems are common, all solutions to these problems 
are socially objectivated and all social actions are 
institutionalized. The institutional order embraces 
the totality of social life, which resembles the 
continuous performance of a complex, highly styli-zed 
liturgy. There is no role-specific luiouledge, or 
nearly none, since all modes are peri. Ormed with 
situations of equal relevance to all actors (1971, pp-97-98). 
On the other hand: 
The opposite extreme would be a society in which there 
is only one common problem, and the institutionalization 
occurs only with respect to actions concerned with this 
problem. In such a society there would be almost no 
common stock of knowledge. Almost all kno-, iledge would 
be role-specific (19719 P-98). 
Examples of such societies do not exist. Hoirever, Berger and 
Luckmann feel able to conclude that "primitive societies 
approximate the [: Cirsý type to a much higher degree than 
civilized ones" '(1971, P-98). Further, "it may even be said 
that in the development of archaic civilizations there is a 
progressive movement away from this type" (1971, P-98)- 
Secondly, it is necessary to understand that there are 
quite probably very different attitudes, tOITI-rds creativity in Dre- 
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literate and industrial societies. In Chapter Tiiro it was argued 
that because pre-literate man's knowledge is mediated in a 
predominantly oral-aural fashion, his control over that knowledge, 
and hence over his environment, is slippery and elusive. Thus 
although pre-literate man dislikes the non-traditionalý he must 
constantly be ready to react to a World which is essentially 
dynamic and unpredictable. To this extent he mWI be said 
intuitively to accept as necessary and-even faintly desirable 
21 
activities which we label as 'creative' or 'deviant' 
The situation in industrial society is very different, 
however. First of all creativity, which involves the spontaneous 
coming into being of something that was both unprenediated and un- 
predictable, is clearly incompatible with the. supremacy of a 
reductionist and deterministic epistemology. A unified field of 
cause and effect cannot possibly tolerate the capriciousness of 
the genuinely creative event. Further, because industrial man has 
such a comparatively good control over the events of his world, he 
might be said to find creativity not only unnecessary, but a threat 
to the rationally ordered status quo. Againý the unity and 
conformity essential to a centralised social structure does notý 
as we have seen 
22 
1 easily tolerate radical acts for their oim 
inherent value. 
Because of the 'underdevelopment' of the division of labour 
and, consequently, of role-specific knowledge in pre-literate 
societies, the degree to which any activity can be distanced from 
the central core of everyday reality is severely circumscribed. 
Moreover; because creativity has a high degree of intuitive 
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acceptance, there is no desire to remove activities which we 
might label as creative from the central concerns of society. 
Pre-literate man7 therefore, relates to music in its full social 
context. In industrial society, on the other hand, the high 
development of role-specific knowledge allows different activities 
to be removed to a considerable distance from the central core of 
everyday reality. Furtherg because creativity is so incompatible 
with the deterministic rationality which constitutes the over- 
riding mythology of industrial society, the temptation has been to 
institutionalize the creative element of the social process on the 
periphery of predominant social concerns in artistic and, to a 
lesser extent2 academic activities. As one of the arts, music 
in general has tended to suffer this fate. This assignation of a 
socially peripheral role to music is consistent with the traditional 
assignation of a higher rational priority to the material-factual 
side of industrial mants epistemological dichotomy. 
Now although few people today would say that any type of 
music in industrial society is of fundamental social significance, 
there is an undoubted tendency to think that I-populart forms of 
music are of more social relevance than 'serious' forms. Reasons 
for this attitude, together with the modes of thought which 
facilitate it, have already been discussed. In order to under- 
stand how the organization of industrial society further permits 
this attitudeý however, it is necessary to refer back to the 
phenomenon of cultural lag mentioned in the previous chapter. This 
phenomenon2 it will be remembered, results from the ability of 
literate man to commit new ideas to Daner at various times in 
history. (In pre-literate societies, on the other handq where all 
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knowledge must necessarily be mediated in the ongoing present of 
face-to-face situations, the possibilities for cultural lag are 
minimal). Coupled with highly-developed role-specific 
knowledge, Ahe consequence of this phenomenon in industrial 
society is that a new -piece of ro 1 e-spe cifi c-kno-wl edge may take a 
long time to filter through to the core of everyday reality if, 
indeed, it ever filters through at all. 
But the 'historical time' to which such knowledge belongs 
need not, from the point of view of the common stock of knowledgeý 
be in the past. Indeed, the more 'advanced' or 'consciously 
creative' a piece of knowledge is with regard to that common stocký 
the more likely it is to lbelong to the future' and to be 
seemingly irrelevant as far as the majority of people.,. are concerned. 
This kind of relationship certainly seems to exist between high 
culture and the populace in generalq as Marshall McLuhan indicates 
(1964, pp-7b-71): 
The percussed victims of the new technology have 
invariably muttered cliches about the impracticality of 
artists and their fanciful preferences. But in the 
past century it has come to be gene-rally aelmowledged 
of T that, in the words Wyndham Lewis, "The artist is 
always engaged in writing a detailed history of the 
future because he is the only person aware of the 
present" .... The ability of the artist to sidestep the bully blow of new technology in any ageg and to 
parry such violence with full awarenessý is age-old. 
Equally age-old is the inability of the percussed 
victims, 
, 
who cannot sidestep- the new violence, to 
Tecognise their need of the artist .... The artist 
is. -the man in any field, scientific or humanisticý who 
grasps the implications of his actions and of new 
knowledge in his own time. He is the man of integral 
awareness. 
This same trend has been appaxent in 1serioust music since at least 
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-the beginning of the nineteenth century, and is clearly in ; evidence 
today. - The latest technique in electronic or serial composition, 
for example, is a lot less likely to impinge on the collective 
consciousness than, say, the sort of music played on Radio One. 
To say this, howeverý is not to admit absolute and 
'arbitrary' cultural values by the back door. The distancing or 
lack of distancing here being described is, of course, very closely 
associated with the existence of differing cultural realities which 
cannot admit of one, universal set of cultural criteria. It is 
the traditional elitist view which utilises this difference in 
degree of distancing to maintain and reinforce its own position, as 
we shall see in a moment. It should further be noted that the 
difference in degree of distancing does not coincide in all 
instances with traditional. cat-egories of 'popular' and 'serious' 
music. It could be argued, for example, that artists such as Bob 
Dylan distance themselves from the central core of everyday reality 
much more than some tpopulart classical com posers (for example 
Malcolm Arnold), and are therefore just as much 'men of integral 
awareness' as many, more Iseriousf. classical. composers. However, 
it is the general coincidence of degrees of distancing with 
traditional categories of tserioust and 'popular' music which 
allows the elitist to hold the position being described in this 
section. 
The fact that2 at any time in historyy tserious' music 
tends to be'-placed on the periphery of social concerns does not 
mean that its lines of communication with the remainder of society 
are cut, nor, consequently, that its significance is inherently 
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'a-social'. Yet it is precisely because 'serious' music has this 
extreme peripheral status with regard to the central core of 
everyday reality that aestheticians and music theorists have been 
able, as it were, to slide surreptitiously into the position of 
thinking it 'a-sociall, and so of maintaining successfully that 
its significance is ultimately located in an essential and mystical 
reality. Equally, 'popular' forms of music are seen as retaining 
a social significance, not only because their position vis_-al-vis 
core reality is less peripheral, but also, of courseq because their 
'inferior value as music' precludes them from revealing tinner 
truths'. These correlations are nicely indicated by Francis 
Routh (1972, pp. x-xi): 
The term music is taken to include as many aspects of the 
composer's work as fall under the heading art-work. An 
art-work is one which makes some claim on our serious 
attention. This implies a creative2 unique purpose on 
the part of the composer, and an active response on the 
part of the listener; it implies that the composer 
possesses and uses both vision and techniq ej and that iu 
the listener in return is expected to bring to bear his 
full intelligence. This excludes non-art music, such as 
pop music, whose purpose is chiefly, if not entirely 
commercial. Pop groups are big business; they are 
socially significant; there is no question that they form 
a remarIkable contemporary phenomenon - but this does not 
make the result into an art-work, and to consider it as 
if it were is an illogical affectation. 
CONCLUSION 
It should now be abundantly clear why music theorists and 
aestheticians cannot possibly locate musical significance as an 
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aspect of socially constructed reality. For not only does such 
location go against any possible interpretation of the industrial 
world sense, but it also ultimately brings under scrutiny the 
entire centralised social-intellectual structure of industrial 
society. No music aesthetician is likely to even implicitly 
begin such a scTutiny, for as an institutionalised academic he has 
an unconscious vested interest in that structure. In other words, 
if a musician or aesthetician questions not only what he says 
about music, but in so doing his right to speak exclusively to and 
on behalf oL other people, he potentially puts himself in the un- 
enviable position of questioning the legitimacy of his own 
socially designated Tole. The vorkings of the musical process 
tend to be conceived as absolute, permanent and ultimately 
discoverable beyond the vagaries of human thought and perception 
because such an approach aids mystification and so role-security. 
To ignore the social nature of music is thus to articulate the 
social-intellectual structure of industrial society. 
The tendencies described in the previous paragraph do not 
arise from any conscious political motive. There can be no 
question of an 'autocratic conspiracy'. They result rather from 
the unconsciously7seated inability of musicians and aestheticians 
to-. follow through the logical implications arising from the 
related aethetic and political problems surrounding the 'meaning' 
of music. And given the particular characteristics of the 
industrial world sense and the inter-related social structure of 
industrial society, there can be little doubt that these problems 
have been extremely intransigent. Because of its inherent nature2 
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music, perhaps more than any other -phenomenon to impinge on our 
sensory and cognitive faculties, has highlighted the assumptions 
and deficiencies both of our social organisation, and of our 
traditional outlook on -the world. 
In this respect, one final point can be made. At the 
beginning of Chapter One it was stated that the question of 
meaning in the representational arts is not necessarily problematic. 
Meaning in these arts can be ladequatelyt located in tcontentt. 
Consequently, analysis in social terms becomes easier and, 
moreover, of little danger to the traditional social structure, 
because it is carried out in terms of the categories interdependent 
with that structure (that is, the categories of 'form' and 'content'). 
What is said within a structure is of little consequence to the 
structure unless it actively questions the assumptions upon which 
the structure is grounded.. It is precisely the ver. y pgý: eat 
difficulty of coming to grips with the lmeaninpl of music in terms 
of Iforml. and 'content' that has paradoxically made arbitrary and 
central definition with regLrd to music so very easy 2Edý in some 
cases, so very extreme 
23 
To put it another way, there can be two possible responses 
to the difficulty of the 'meaning' of music. One is to avoid the 
difficulty. In this case, because traditional ways of looking a: t 
the world are totally unsuited for an adequate understanding of 
music, it becomes extremely difficult to use the categories of that 
world sense to question any central and arbitrary theories 
24. The 
other response is to conýront the difficulty, and construct a sense 
of the world which alloi., -s for an adequate understanding of the 
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musical process. This is the purpose of the following chapter. 
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ITOTIE'S: 
Dissension among and between members and groups in nation 
states is not evidence of conflicting and different social- 
intellectual structures, because the dissension generally 
arises frorii the essential structural paradox of nationalism 
and so pervasively articulates that very structure. 
Legitimators still centrally define Imowledge for their 
group, even if that Imowledge conflicts i-,, ith the Imowledge of 
other groups, Whether at the sane or a 10TTer or higher level 
in the overall hierarchic structure. 
2. The lines of thought which became so prevalent among artists 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century were, of course, 
ultimately taken over by the middle classes as they became 
the more powerful element in society. This ado-Dtion could 
not be viewed as being complete until well into the twentieth 
century, however. The 'art for art's sa[cel movement of the 
late nineteenth century, for example, was essentially a 
reaction on the -oart of writers and artists against those who 
refused to accept the values they propagated. 
3. There would seem little doubt that functional tonality still 
represents the established musical norm for those with power 
in the rpolitical and educational systems. The 1975-1976 
Arts Council expenditure on music for exampleý breaks down as 
follows (see the 31st Annual Report and Accounts of the Arts 
Council, pp. A 10 -A 11): 
Royal Opera House: Z3,4102000. 
English National Opera: SZ1,8487000. OUher Grants: 1 Z27589ý127- 
Of these other grants, only about _526,000 irent to music of an 
Afro-American origin, in this case jazz. Thus less than-3L of 
1% of the total music budget was spent on jazz, while rock 
music received no subsidies at all. In this respect, the 
notion that rock music and pop music are 'commercial' and 'imposed from above thus exploiting the musical tastes and 
emotions of young peoplel is criticised at length in Vulliamy 
and Lee ( 1976). Similarly) only about 244,000 was spent on 
experimental or avant-garde music. Againý it should be noted 
that the curriculum of the public examination system in music 
is taken almost exclusively from the tradition of functional 
tonality. Only in music colleges and university departments 
of music is a minority of attention paid to contemporary music 
and, even more occasionally, jazz and rock. 
As reflected through its music budgetý the attitude of the 
Arts Council is more generally stated by its chairman, Lord 
Gibson: "There is, howeverý a new creed emerging, to which we 
are totally opposed. This is the belief that because standards 
have been set by the traditional arts and because those arts 
are little enjoyed by the broad mass of people the concept of 
quality is 'irrelevant'. The term cultural democracy has been 
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invoked by those who think in this gay, to describe a policy 
which rejects discrimination between good and bad and cherishes 
the romantic notion that there is -- 'cultural dynamism' in 
the people which will emerge if only they can be liberated 
from the cultural values hitherto accepted by an elite and 
from what one European 'cultural expert' has recently called 
'the cultural colonialism. of the middle classes' 11. (31st 
Annual Report and Accounts of the Arts Council 1975-19f6-, P. 7). 
4. See Schuller (1968) pp-3-62. Schullerts concluding remwýks 
to this first chapter are particularly pertinent (1968, p. 62): 
"It is thus evident that many more aspects of jazz derived 
directly from African musical-social traditions than has been 
assumed. Very few discussions of the pre-history of jazz 
have gone beyond the simplistic generalizations that jazz 
rhythm came from Africa but jazz melody and harmony from 
Europe. The analytic study in this chapter shows that every 
musical element - rhythm, harmony, melody, timbre, and the 
basic forms of jazz - is essentially African in background and 
derivation". 
See mmrriam (1964), pp-241-242. 
6. For further substantiation of the attitudes described in this 
section with xegard to rausic, see Vulliamy (1972). 
of. above, p. g. 
8. Although, of courseq it should not be forgotten that the 
different realities exist because of the growth of a cultural 
elite traditionally associated iTith those who hold political 
and economic power in society. It is, therefore, rather 
hypocritical of this elite to criticise the cultural values of 
dispossessed gr6ups, because it is ultinately through the growth 
of this elite that those values came into existence in the 
first -Dlace. In short, an elite of necessity implies the 
existence of dispossessed groups. 
9. This trend has recently become a lot less marked in relation 
to'pre-literate musics. Yet it is interesting to note that 
while musicians are more disposed to recomise the relative 
musical and cultural worth of Dre-literate musics, they still 
feel unable to extend the same courtesy to different musical 
traditions i-. -ithin their oim society. Fran? ois-Bernard Mache 
achieves the most explicit of contradictions in the same 
article, for example. In one breath we are told that "sound 
recording ... brought to ears which were ... willing -to 
hear ... the voices of other musical civilizations, thus 
calling to mind the relativity of aesthetic dogmall (1-12-Rche, 
'19732 p. 108); and in another that the output of 'serious' music 
"is almost insignificant ... as comDared with the vast mass 
of sonorous banality liberated by the advent of the music 
industries" (1973, P-101). 
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10. cf. above, pp. 6 -9 , and also Appendix I. 
As-we have seen, the emphasis -was exactly the reverse. It 
was precisely because the roots of hi-h culture were taken to 
have little or nothing to do with the processes of mass 
society that high culture itself could provide a better 
alternative to the conditions of that society. Raymond 
Uilliams hiffhlights these two inter-related aspects of culture 
as they began to emerge at the beeinning of the nineteenth 
century: "I wish to show the emergence of bulture as an 
abstraction and -an absolute: an emergence whic1q, in a very 
complex way, merges two Eeneral responses - first the 
recognition of the -practical separation of certain moral and 
intellectual activities from the driven impetus of a new kind 
of society; second, the emphasis of these activities, as a court 
of human appeal, to be set over the processes of practical 
social judgement and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and 
rallying alternative. But in both these senses, culture i-Tas 
not a. response to the new raothods of production, the ne,.. T 
IndustEy, alone. It was concerned, beyond these, with the new 
kinds of personal and social relationship: again, both as a 
recognition of practical separation and as an emphasis of 
alternatives. The idea of culture would be simpler if it had 
been a response to industrialism aloneg but it was also, quite 
evidently, a response to the new political and social 
developmentsý to Democracy" (1-Tilliams, 19612 P-17)- 
12. The conservative ideology: "is implicit in the oldest form of 
cultural analysis, which I call pessimistic cultural criticism. 
Here the only real and authentic culture is art, against which 
everything else is set. Theoretically it explains the current 
state of supposed cultural decline and malaise by a mass 
society thesis, in which the valued civilized culture of -an. 
elite minority is constantly under attack from a majority or 
mass culture which is inauthentic and a denial of. life... Its 
main task in analysis is evaluation and discrimination, a 
search for the true values of civilization, comnonly to be found 
in the organic communitYi the cou: r1tryside, Renaissance art, the 
great nineteenth century novels and so on" (Jones, 1974, 
. pp. 
25-226). The Iliberal-humanist' tendency: "is essentially 
not much different from the conservative view of culture, 
-except that culture is now positively rather than negatively 
valued. The criteria for evaluation draw on the same source, 
high art. Similarly, it approaches popular culture in the same 
way as it does art, in order to appreciate it and usually the 
appreciation has a sentimental character. So mass culture is 
now not all bad, or alternatively mass culture is bad but there 
is some good popular culture or folk culture. At a more 
theoreýical levelý its analysis is founded on liberal myths of 
pluralism, of change through liberal education and so on. 
Since the analysis begins and ends in evaluation7 culture 
occupies a space in which history, politics, economics and 
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social context aze abs-ent" (Jonesý 19741 p. 26). Both approaches, 
therefore, maintain absolute and a-social cultural criteria 
against which all cultural manifestations must ultimately be 
judged. 
13. This view of musical significance assumes the identity theory 
of mind, namely, that all mental events are one and the same 
thing as the neurophysiological events ii-ith iThich they are at 
least irrevocably associated. The implication here is that 
the rational social process is the su-n of all symbolic inter- 
action between minds. As azi expression of one of those 
minds, a piece of music has a technical formulation i-, rhich will 
occasion similar neurophysiological responses in all minds 
within 
' 
the given society. In other words2 the positivistic 
sociologist posits a strict cause and effect chain of which 
neurophysiological events constitute a generative link. 
14. The use of the words 'corresponds' and 'counterpart' in 
ZuckerkandlIs statements is not completely satisfactory. As 
the discussion in n. 16 below illustrates, there is a very 
real sense in which dynamic qualities have counterDarts in 
physical nature. ZuckerkandlIs thought may be formulated 
more precisely by saying that dynamic qualities have no 
counterparts in physical nature which are axiy different from 
mere acoustic events, and which might therefore be said to 
correspond to dynamic qualities alone. Dynamic qualities 
thus have absolutely no status in the material world. 
15. The classic example of this is provided by the display of 
sound waves on an oscilloscope. 
16. The objection might be raised against Zuckerkandl's argument 
that although no single note can be responsible for the 
dynamic auality which accomnanies it, all the notes of a piece 
acting together produce all the accompanying dynamic 
qualities. Any piece of music is constituted by a unique 
configuration of notes and it could be that unique 
configuration i-Thich, produces the precise seaýience of dynamic 
qualities. The objection does not succeed 2 however, since it 
still remains the case that the dynamic quality has no counter- 
part in physical nature which alone corresponds to that 
quality. 
. 17- It is just conceivable that Silbermann's statements could be 
, hout. construed as being consistently epiphenomenal throug One 
would have to take note of his initial assertion that 
sociolop, y "studies the social wherever it may be directly 
perceived and grasped" - with its implication that there are 
those*aspects of the social which cannot be directly perceived 
and grasped - and then assign the word 'music' in the page 37 
quote a rather different significance to the one it later 
takes on (p. 68). But even if this interpretation is correct, 
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it still remains the case that Silbermann has highlighted 
the impossibility of understanding musical siFnificance 
according to the canons of a truly positivistic sociology. 
A degree of epi-Phenomenalism becomes essential. 
18. Berger and Luckmann indicate the connection between the 
division of labour and role-specific knowledge in discussing 
secondary socialization (1971, P-158): "Secondary 
socialization is the internalization of institutional or 
institution-based Isub--worlds'. Its extent and character 
are therefore determined by the complexity of the division of 
labour and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge. 
Of courseq generally relevant knowledge, too, may be socially 
distributed for exampleg in the form of class-based 
'versions' but iThat, we have in mind here is the social 
distribution of Ispecial knoi-, rledget - knowledge that arises as C_ý 
a result of the division of labour wndi-Those carriers are 
institutionally defined. Forgetting for a moment its other 
dimensions, we may say that secondary socialization is the 
acquisition of role-specific knowledge, the roles being 
directly or indirectly rooted in the division of labour". 
19. Dvans-Pritchard, for oxampleg would define 'primitive' 
societies in terms of the comparative 'simplicity' of their 
social organization: "It suffices to say ... that when 
anthropologists use [the terra tprimitive society] they do 
so in reference to those societies which are small in scale 
with regard to numbers, territory, and range of social 
contacts, and which have by comparison with more advanced 
societies a simple technology and economy and little 
specialization of social function" (1951, p. 8). 
20. cf. above, p. 156 . Berger end Luckmann also note that 
"Maximal success in socialization is likely to occur in 
societies with very simple division of labour and minimal 
distribution of knowledge. Socialization under such 
conditions produces ide4titios that are socially predefined 
and profiled to a high degree. Since every individual is 
confronted with essentially the same institutional programme 
for his life in the society, the total forces of the 
institutional order is brought to bear with more or less equal 
-weight on each individual, producing a compelling massivity 
for the objective reality to be internalized" (19712 
PP-183-184). 
21. cf. below in Chapter Eight, the discussion of ambivalent 
attitudes in some pre-literate socioties towards the deviant 
behaviour of musicians. 
22. cf. above, pp. -71-8+, the discussion of the attitude of the 
musical establishment touards the deviant cultural reality of 
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jazzq rock2 'Pop' and experimental music. 
23. Not infrequently, jazzq rock and 'pop, music have been 
referred to -as 'non-music', for example. In this respect 
see Gipps (1975, P-14). 
24. The situation is aggravated of course by the fact that the 
teentrall and 'arbitrary' theories are themselves grounded 
in the categories of the industrial i. rorld. sense. If they 
are questioned interms of these same catedories, they will 
necessarily be confirmed, cf. above, pp. 13 -14-9 the brief 
discussion of sociological method. 
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CHAPTER PIVE 
THE TEANINGI OP MUSIC 
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IN ODUCTION 
It is evident from previoua discussion that the music 
theorist or aesthetioian who wishes to assign music a social 
significance faces two related problems. On the one hand, the 
suggestion that music has meaning because of extra-musical 
references is generally agreed to be inadmissable. Yet, on the 
other, the only major trend of cultural analysis which in all 
other respects allows for a social significance for music (the 
infrastructure-superstructure trend) itself seemingly invokes the 
very same notion of extra-musical reference# This chapter seeks 
to overcome these two related problems by transcending the 
dichotomous and interdependent categories of analysis which are 
iNmdamental to both of them. 
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SYMBOLOGIES 
It was argued in Chapter Three that the positive 
feedback operating in post-Renaissance societies between visual 
stress and written language has been responsible for repressing 
important facets of life and experience to the collective 
unconscious. As a consequence of this process educated industrial 
man has tended to relate to the world solely in material and 
reified terms - terms which he has not unnaturally equated with 
the 'rational objectivity' of typography. This outlook has acted 
back on language so that in all its forms even the spoken form 
responsible for the vastly different world sense of pre-literate 
man - it is ultimately conceived in terms ofq and measured 
against the norm of 'rational objectivity' . The oral and 
emotional (that is, those aspects of reality which cannot be so 
successfully mediated in a visual form) both in life and language 
has at best been relegate4to a position of secondary importance. 
It was also argued in Chapte= One that society can only 
arise and continue to exist through symbols externalised by 
members of society, and that although words constitute the most 
obvious and important symbolic modeq they do not constitute an 
exclusive symbology. The emphasis placed by industrial man on 
Irational verbal objectivitylg however2 has led him to relegate 
in significance the realisations of any symbolic mode which 
implicitly challenge his world sense. The unspoken - or more 
appositely, 'unwritten' - assumption is that everything that is 
real can be expressed in 'objective rational' language and its 
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extensional, and that reality as embodied in the rational word is 
somehow thigher' than2 or ontologically prior to any other 
evidence of reality accruing from other sources. But although 
language constitutes the most important symbolic mode from the 
point of view of maintaining the technically highly developed 
oivilisations of industrial man, it does not follow that the 
reality comprehended through language is more real than that 
articulated by other modes, nor, concomitantlyt does it follow 
that language is potentially an texolusivel mode in the sense of 
all other non-verbally coded experience being reducible to verbal 
terms. 
Whilst it remains true that the different symbolic modes . 
emphasisoldifferent aspects of reality by reason of their different 
media, it must not be thought that language and other symbolic 
modes additively contribute their different realities to the total 
field of meaning in a society. For the sake of discussion, it is 
convenient to think of the meanings of society as displaying two 
different aspectst those of'relata and relationships. These 
terms are explained by Hugh Dalziel Duncan (1968, P-46): 
It has long been realised that any mode of social - 
analysis will produce at least two types of entity: first, 
analytical elements called 'social facts' which can be 
observed easily enough, and second, the entities (not so 
easily observed) that arise in a system because analysis 
was made in the particular way in which it was made. 
In more specific terminology the easily observed elements 
are called relatal while the elements 'underlying' the 
system are called relationships of those relata. 
Structures in society are revealed to people through the relata 
(other people and symbols) that they perceive, but the structures 
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would not exist as such unless the relata were maintained in 
certain' relationships that people cannot directly perceive but 
can only sense in consciousness through the individual 
constructions made possible by the transfer of symbols. The 
symbolic mode of language as conceived by industrial man has 
emphasised the relata of society at the expense of the 
relationships because the relata of society display a materiality 
coýsanguinous with the objects of the material universe - 
objects, however, which are not necessarily maintained in 
structural relationships. It was this emphasis that induced 
industrial man to apply a materialist and reductionist philosophy 
to human existence, an application which, as we have seen, still 
finds expression in the positivistic social sciences. Yet it can 
be understood from the present discussion that language does not 
simply signify objects and reified concepts9 as its rational 
written form might lead. us to think. Ratherg objects and reified 
concepts are the word-embodied 'materials' or relata by and 
through which cultural constructs are articulated. Further, it 
is of crucial importance for an understanding of how music 
functions to realise that it has a tendency to emphasise 
relationships at the expense of relatal since its own relata are 
non-material and non-referential. Different symbolic modes, 
therefore, are quite capable of encoding similar structures but 
may, because of their method of encoding, stress different aspects 
of these structures. 
As it affects individual consciousnesses the transfer of 
symbols in society presents two aspects. Firstly, as already 
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indicated, there axe the constructions instigated by the reception 
of socially efficacious symbols. Secondly, there are those 
constructions which : result in socially efficacious utterances and 
externalisations. It is essential for a full comprehension of 
the concepts put forward in this chapter to emphasise that the 
dialectic process of consciousness indicated here cannot function 
without an element of creativity. By creativity is meant, in any 
specific situation2 the formulation of a structure in 
consciousness which is both facilitated and, to a greater or lesser 
extent2 pre-conditioned by the structures of previous symbolic 
transfer, but whose precise configuration could not have been 
predicted at the deterministic level of materiality appropriate to 
2 
symbols themselves Such creativity may be efficacious at any 
level of generality, whether that of a comparatively inconsequential 
situation in everyday life, or that of the largely unconscious 
3 
articulation of a group or society's assumptional framework it, 
is the process of creativity at this greater level that is of most 
relevance for this chapter. 
The possibility for oreativity as described here is 
indicated by Levi-Strauss (1968, P-79)s 
... between culture and language there cannot be 
-mo relations at allq and there cannot be 100 percent ; 'orrelation either. Both situations are impossible to 
conceive. If there were no relations at all that would 
lead us to assume that the human mind is a kind of 
jumble - that there is no connection at all between what 
the mind is doing on one level, and what the mind is 
doing on another level. But, on the other hand, if the 
correlation were 100 per cent, then certainly we should 
-know about it, and we should not be here to disouss 
whether it exists or not. 
The latter part of Levi-Strauss's argument may be extended, for if 
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the correlation between 'culture' and symbol were 100 per cent, 
then society would be reduced to the determinism and prediction 
of the industrial world sense. The extreme rigidity of such a 
society would make dialcoticism a logical impossibility, and it 
ýs very difficult to see how society could either come into 
existence or survive under such circumstances. The creative 
element of individual minds is thus as necessary a pre-condition 
of structural changes in society as the flexibility of human 
behaviour in the face of environmental changes (social or 
physical) is for the survival of human individuals as biological 
organisms. 
The position adopted, then$ is that all symbolio modes are 
permeated by all-pervasive social symbolic constructs which are 
dialectically and therefore creatively articulated by and through 
specific consciousnesses and symbols. As a consequence of this 
positiony it is impossible to conceive of 'society' as somehow 
basic or fundamental to the 'culture' or symbols of that society. 
For the inclination to regard the kinship/political/economic 
sphere of society as the sphere in which rests all primary 
causation for symbolic activity implicitly denies the efficacy of 
all symbols as potential instigators and pre-oonditioners for 
-subsequent utterances and externalisations. Further, the concept 
under discussion reifies society, for what is society if not the 
totality of mutually efficacious and dialectically related 
individual consciousnesses and symbols? In this context it is 
again useful to emphasise that society can only arise and continue 
to exist by and through the symbols externalised by members of that 
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society. Pinally, it is not difficult to realise that both 
reifioation and the notion of 'primary causation' are themselves 
symptomatic of the reductionisty determinist and materialist 
industrial world sense which it was necessaxy to elucidate in order 
to arrive at the position here adopted. 
The fallacies of this concept of primary oausation as a 
mode. of social analysis may be parenthetically illustrated by 
reference to the attitude of politician's towards music during the 
development of early Soviet Russia. For some years after the 
October Revolutiony politicians were generally of the view that art 
would be influenced by political-economic events and that, 
consequent ly, there was not or should not be any need for political 
interference. Trotsky2 for examplef did not believe it was 
possible for a truly Soviet culture to emerge until the period of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat had ended, and Soviet society 
had become truly classlesss 
The cultural reconstruction which will begin when 
the need of the iron clutch of a dictatorship ... will 
have disappeared will no' have a class charaoter. This , IV 11 
seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no 
proletarian culture and-that there will never be any, 
and in fact there is no reason to regret this (quoted 
in Krebs, 19701 P-34). 
If the true Soviet culture is to emerge naturally from the 
synthesis of all classes, then state interference would merely be 
detrimental to this development: "Art must make its own wayt and 
by its own means. The Marxian methods are not the same as the 
artistic. The Party leads the proletariat but not the historical 
processes of history" (quoted in Krebs, 1970, P-35). Lunacharsiqr, 
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who was the first Commissar of Education and Enlightenment, 
formulated an analysiB of the relationship between the socio- 
economic situation of a class and the underlying nature of its 
artistic production which supported a liberal view of the arts. 
We are told that "... the logic of his aesthetic categories 
showed the logiot if not the letter of Marxism$ and since Marxist 
logic was inevitable, then a liberal view encouraging a dialectic 
development should be adopted" (Krebs, 1970, p-38). As 
Commissary Lunaroharsky did everything possible to encourage any 
serious artistic enterprise. It may be concluded then, that at 
least until 1927: 
The Marxist-Leninist view on culture and art ... 
was that they formed a part of the superstructure of 
whatever historical mode prevailed. The implication 
... was that the superstructure changed automatically 
with the change of the material basis of society. 
Although this concept was later shattered by Stalin it 
meant now that the State's sole leverage on the arts 
was through manipulation of the social mode (Krebsý 
1970, P-46). 
It is essential for an understanding of subsequent events in 
Russian musical life to realise that this apparently liberal 
attitude towards the arts was accompanied by a strain of 
conservatism. In other words, although artists wer a given a free 
handy artistic production was expected to develop within certain 
guidelines* Although Lenint for exampley acknowledged that 
"every artist takes it as his right to create freelyq according to 
his ideal) whether it is good or not", he clearly felt that there 
were limits which should not be transgresseds "But of course we 
are Communists. We must not drop our hands into our laps and allow 
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the chaos to ferment as it chooses. We must try consciously to 
guide this development and mould and determine the results" (Klara 
Zetkinj quoted in Schwarz, 1972, p. 19). in the same vain 
Trotsky felt it necessary "to destroy any tendency in art ... 
which threatens the revolution ... or [which] arouses the 
internal force of revolution ... proletariaty peasantry and 
intelligentsia to a hostile opposition to one another" (Krebs, 
1970, P-35)- We are also told that "Lunarcharsky fought one 
manifestation throughout his yearst the perversion and destructio a 
of the classical tradition" (Krebs, 1970, P-38). 
]BY the late 1920s and early 1930s it became clear to those 
in power that music was not progressing within the basically tonal 
and classical guidelines required. The liberal line of thinking 
was thus abandoned and the more conservative strain was dra-. fn on 
to ensure that the Iculturally safe' classical tradition was not 
threatened. In 1927s when Stalin had succeeded Lening the 
progressive Association of Contemporary Musicians was absorbed by 
the more reactionary Russiah Association of Proletarian 
Musicians. In 1936 this orga; isation was replaced by the Union of 
Soviet Composersq an official organ of the Ministry of Culture. 
And in 1936, following the first All-Union Congress of Soviet 
Writers of 19349 came the criticism of Shostakovitoh's L§ýJZ Macbeth 
of Mtserik-. Finallyý in 1946 came the crushing general criticism 
of the oountry's leading composers4. 
The point for the present line of argument is the disoovery 
on the part of the Russian authorities that the dialectio 
Processes of society do not involve a slavish imitation of the 
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material basis of society by a symbolio superstructurey but rather 
the potentia-ly creative formulation of symbols through whichy n 
anX social realm, heretical structures may be articulated. 
Although the political-economic realm had come under more 
determinant control in Soviet Russia it was hardly surprising that 
the creative element inevitable in the dialectic processes of 
society should, however, continue to find expression in the 
unrestricted arts. 
The initially paradoxical attitudo of the Russian 
authorities towards music is symptomatic of an interesting 
contradiction within Marxist thought2 that is, the contradiction 
between a dialectic7 and a 'scientific' or determinist and 
materialist approach to the social process. This contradiction 
situates the Russian-Marxist movement firmly in its nineteenth 
century context. It was the essential condition of Romanticism 
that it attempted to transcend the capitalistic and industrial 
world sense in terms of the categories produced by that very same 
world sense. Similarly, the October Revolution sought to replace 
the old capitalistic order with a new Communistic one, but the 
attempt was compromised throughout by recourse to methods of 
rationaly determinant control. It therefore became a Revolution 
which, in some sensey involved Irelatal rather than relationshiPs 
and structure, one system of centralised control, that of the 
Tisarsq being replaced by another. 
It is in terms of this attempt by the Russian system to 
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halt any creative dialectic in the social process and replace it 
with rational control that Lenin's attitude to the arts2 his 
combining of "revolution in the social sphere with reaction in the 
spiritual" -(Berdraevq quoted in Krebs, 1970t P-31) becomes clear. 
Forp as is argued below, traditionally tonal classical music 
both encodes and articulates the structure of a centralised 
political-economio system, and so was entirely appropriate to the 
'new' order of things in Russia. Given this affinity, it was 
hardly likely that music articulating competing structures would be 
tolerated. This goes a large part of the way to explaining why 
the music of Tchaikovsky and Scriabing which some Marxists might 
feel expressed aspects of bourgeois decadenceg were toleratedt 
while the clearer, more vigorous language of Prokofiev has often 
been castigated. 
It may be arguedq thereforeq that the concept of 
'dialectical materialism' as applied in Russia provides an implioit 
contradiction in terms, for to strictly interpret Marx's statement 
that "it is not the consoiousneBB of men that determines their 
existence butg on the contrary, their social existence which 
determines their consciousness" is to emphasise one aspect of the 
social process at the expense of the other. Moreoverg it is to 
imply a unidrectional and sequentially determinant process where, 
as this section has attempted to illuatrate2 none can be 
unquestionably establishe d. Political-economio and kinship 
structures are most probably no less symbolic or epiphenomenal 
than those of language, music or artf and any implicit 
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catogorisation of the social Process into physical and spiritual, 
or objective and subjective realmsý in being predicated upon the 
restricted world sense of industrial man, is of little use for 
understanding the essentially symbolic and dialectic nature of 
society. 
The position adopted above may now be expanded. Insomuch 
as evidence of the existence of society or culture is revealed to 
us only through the symbols WO perceive52 culture and society can 
only be regarded as being immanent 'in' the potentially creative 
articulations of specific symbols, no matter to which realm of 
social activity they pertain. Furthermore, since these 
articulations originate from and are only efficacious twithin' 
individual minds, society must also be regarded as being immanent 
'in' individual consciousnesses. Society, in other words, as a 
process of order-in-changel is immanent 'in' and 'through' the 
dialectic interaction of people and symbols. 
THE 'MEANING' OF MUSIC 
It is the theme of this ohapter that the meanings of 
society are encoded and creatively articulated by music to an 
extent that denies the assumptional assignation of a higher 
rational priority to both verbally encoded meanings and to the 
political-eoonomic infrastructure of society. Music has meaning 
only insomuch as the inner-outer, mental-physical dichotomy of 
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verbally referential meaning is transcended by the immanence 'in' 
music of what we may conceive of as an abstracted social structure, 
and by the articulation of social meaning in individual pieces of 
music. In this respect music stands in the same relationship to 
society as does consciousnesss society is creatively 'in' each 
piece of music and articulated by it. 
As we have seen in Chapter Oneq any meaning that may be 
assigned to music does not and cannot result or depend on the 
existence of physically external referents.. In this sense music 
is its own meaning. But this does not imply, as Susanne Langer 
would have its that music is an "unconsummated symbol" 
62 
for the 
presence of permanent contents that -. . Langer requires for the 
fulfillment of the actual function of meaning in a symbol must 
surely be rooted in the inner-outer form and content dichotomy of 
the verbal-physical world. Consequently, restricting musical 
meaning to the "inner-life" as Langer does., and thereby denying 
an 'Outer' transcendent or social meaning, again seemB to be a 
product of traditional industrial epistemology as witnessed in the 
inner-outer opposition. Music is not an informationally uni- 
directional mode of symbolism relevant only to llemotiveý vital, 
sentient experience", or "inherent psyohological laws of 
'rightness' 119 but an instantaneous, two-way mode that, through 
its essentially dynamic structural nature is singularly suited to 
reveal the dynamic structuring of social life, a structuring of 
which the 'material' forms only one aspect. Music is consummatory 
because of the social meaning immanent in the individual 
consciousnesses and pieces of music of a society and, converselyg 
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because social meaning can only arise and continue to exist through 
symbolic communication originating in consciousness - communication 
of which music forms a part. 
It would be wrong$ of course, to imply that Langer's and 
1ýeyerls psychological view of music goes absolutely no way towards 
transcending the form and content dichotomy. In maintaining that 
there is a structural conformity between music and mind they have 
arrived at a position not totally dissimilar to the one put forward 
'erence, however, is that-in only allowing here. The crucial dif. -E 
for a unidirectional information transfer they have implicitly 
assumed mind to be a partially delimited entity. But as the 
following statement by Gregory Bateson indicates (1973y P-436), it 
is entirely possible to arrive at a totally open concept of mind 
consistent with the views expressed in this chapter: 
The individual mind is immanent but not only in the 
body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside 
the body; and there is'a larger Mind of which the individual 
mind is only a sub-system. The larger Mind is .... 
immanent in the total interconnected social system 
The superimposition of the structure that constitutes a particular 
piece of music onto a suitably predisposed mind is indeed essential 
to all musical communication. But equally essential is the 
social interaction responsible for the particular tstructurall 
disposition of that mind. 
Againý it would be -unfair to Suzanne Langer to imply that 
her notion of music as an ! 'unconsummated symbol" is totally without 
insight. As her support for Wagner's understanding of music 
suggests7, Langer tends to categorise experiences-in-consciousness 
into the 'unspeakable' and the 'speakable'. The former, implicitý 
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category consists of those experiences which can only be sensed in 
consciousness and not specifically referred to; the latterg 
explicit, category of those objects and concepts which may be 
definitively indicated. Music is to be equated with the implicit 
8 
category, writing with the explicit Now while it remains truo 
that music may emphasise the implicit and writing the explicit, it 
does not follow that music cannot encode the explicit, nor that 
writing cannot encode the implicit. As previously argued, 
different symbolic modes are capable of encoding similar 
structures but mayg because of their method of encoding, stress 
different aspects of those structures (in this regard, and this 
regard only, the explicit may be equated with relatat and the 
implioit with the relationship 'underlying' those relata). 
The concepts of explicitness and implicitness as possible 
paradigms for social and musical elucidation are discussed below in 
Chapter Seven. However, for the purpose of discussing Langer's 
theory, the following further relationship between media and world 
senses may be briefly indicated here. On the one handq there are.: 
those media which communicate 'implicitly' and those -which: 
communicate 'explicitly'; on the other there are those world 
senses (such as the pre-literate') which tend towards the implicit 
and those (such as that of industrial man) which tend towards the 
9 
explicit Music is quite capable of implicitly encoding an 
explicit world sense, a process evidenced through the entire 
tradition of tonality. Langer's concept of the implicit and the 
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exPli0it thus has substance? But her tendency to Zj&ftdl,, v equate 
music with implicitnessg her consequent implied denial of the 
social process immanent 'in' music7 and her subsequent failure to 
assign any )Zaal significance to music, once again points to the 
inadequacy of the view that music is an lunconsummated symbol". 
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NOTES i 
The best example of such an extension is provided by 
mathematics. 
2. Although symbols comprised of sound implicitly question the 
concepts of materiality and determinism (of. above pp. Ij -21)y 
sound itself obeys physical laws. 
of. above p. q. 
4. An excellent account of this incident is given in Werth (1949). 
5- It may be thought that other people may be perceived 
independently of any symbols they emit. But since no person 
can be arbitrarily isolated from his social milieu (with which 
he is constantly inter-acting), it may be asserted that the 
more existence of the lother"is incipiently symbolic. 
People and the symbols they emit cannotq in other words, be 
legitimately separated in this arbitrary fashion. 
6. See Langer (19602 p. 240). 
7- of. Chapter Two, n. 10. 
8. Once again, this division is a clear expression of the 
epistemologioal dichotomy of industrial man. 
9. The pre-literate world sense may be said to be implicit because 
it is a sense which is very much 'lived within'. The 
industrial world senses on the other hands is one in which all 
experience tends to be set out or understood in a totally 
tobjeotivel and 'rational' fashion. 
10. See Langer (1960, p. 245). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WRITING ABOUT IMIC -I 
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The attempt to establish in academic language that reality 
as embodied in the non-verbal and non-rational mode of music is 
equal and coextensive with that embodied in language is, of course, 
inherently contradictory. If life and experience as encoded by 
music has equal reality with that, encoded by wordal-why bother to 
verbalise about music? Is one not in fact denying the very theme 
being discussed and illustrated? Ideally, one might leave music 
to speak for itself were it not for the very fact that music2 for 
reasons indicated in Chapter Four, is often regarded as an 
elusive, epiphenomenal and somehow. unreal occurrence, which can 
only be brought into the fold of reality through verbalisation. 
The self-evidence of musical reality is therefore insufficient for 
establishinp that very reality. The only recourse available is 
to attack the lepiphenomenalist' on his own verbal territory, 
firstly by showing how his own kind of verbal approach to music is 
grounded in the physical-men-Lalg form-and-oontent epistemology of 
industrial societyy and, secondly by attempting to demonstrate 
that music does code social intellectual structures, 
These two processes are inextricably linked since the 
approach to musical meaning adopted here - itself a piece of 
writing - implicitly asserts the inadequacy of the traditional 
approach to writing about music. Also this traditional approach 
in itself2 and regardless of what it may concretely say about 
specific pieces of musio2 belies a certain epistemological approach 
that makes implicit assertions about the nature of music 
inconsistent with those arising from the Isooio-struotur. -CLI 
approach adopted here. What, one says about music cannot be 
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legitimately differentiated from the approach one takes in Baying 
itj since both activities are but different aspects of the 
initial process of reflecting on music. As well as putting 
forward a different view of music and how it may function (that isy 
a view of music as we might imagine it to be, 'out there' and 
'. beyond us' as 'objective fact'), it is necessary to constantly 
take into consideration how and why one is constructing that 
particular view. A view of music in itself cannot be isolated 
from the formulation of the view as part of. the social 
construction of knowledge and reality, because such isolationism 
subscribes to the fallacy of form and content, whilst at the same 
I 
time ignoring the efficacy of form Any discussion of music 
therefore involves, of necessity, a consideration of the method of 
discussion. 
The separation of "the objeotive from the subjeetive-that 
is typical of highly literate society has resulted in two basically 
differentapproaches to writing about music. The first is the 
descriptive or analytict which seeks to explain precisely what 
happens in the music. Reallsing perhaps that written language2 
with its overtones of determinacy and objectivity cannot adequately 
or usefully relate the subject experience that music isq analytic 
writers seek to explaing or at least bring into high relief, the 
music as 'objective fact'. The second approach recognises the 
emotional2 psychological and subjective in music and seeks to 
underline the experience for the listener by means of words. The 
words in such a situation are usually separated to a degree from 
their hard 'rational' biasq and the result is predominantly what 
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Wilfrid Mellers has termed a llpiýose-fiction". Both approaches 
have obvious drawbacks. The first fails to go beyond the physical 
patterns of sound as perceived and notated, and so implicitly 
supports the notion that all reality is ultimately reducible to 
and explicable in terms of the visually encodable material of the 
music. For reasons already put forward, it is therefore 
absolutely meaningless in itself and adds little or nothing to the 
aesthetic experience. The second - if well done, which is seldom 
the caseq because it would require the services of a very talented 
poet - may succeed in paralleling the aesthetic experience and so 
help to elucidate it a little, but at the expense of totally 
ignoring the musical 'fact'. Moreover, written language, by its 
very form, does not have such pliable parameters as music. As a 
result, the "prose-fiction" used to describe one piece of music can 
become dangerously similar to the prose-fiction used to describe 
anotherg often very different piece 
2. 
The inadequacy of both approacheB can be traced to their 
predication on the physical/formal (analytic) - mental/content 
(prose-fiction) dichotoMY3, -a dichotomy whose continued existence 
is concomitant with the maintenance of industrial man's world 
sense. There is consequently a reluctance among some musicologists 
to try to meaningfully relate the two approaches, for the successful 
achievement of any such relating would ultimately lead to the 
artioulation of a competing world sense4. Ro bert Lyle, for 
example (1948, P-158) cannot accept that the findings of analysis 
might be related to more philosophical considerations: 
The scope of music has been, and doubtless always 
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will be much debated. The problem arises as soon as 
musical criticism ventures to discuss the philosophical 
implications of a musical style or idiom. It must be 
faced, for analysis itself can only clarify; it cannot 
explainý nor can it relate its particular and highly 
speoialised findings to the wider context of man's 
preoccupation with truth and beauty. 
For Lyleq the creativý impulse or generative kernel of a piece of 
music must either reside 'within' the piece of music or 'outside' 
it. Meaning cannot transcend. If extra-musical ideas provide 
the impetus for a piecet then analysis can be of no avail in 
understanding it: 
Much music, especially "romantic" music can be 
understood only in relation to extra-musical ideas. 
This will seem obvious enough when we remember that the 
neglect of a purely musical logic does not by any means 
prevent a work of music being consistent, convincing 
and appealing. Only in such a case the consistency 
must derive from an initially non-musical source. To 
this division, criticism must constantly adjust itself 
for the formal completeness of say 'Se. ---Drift' [Delius) 
can only be subjectively felt, it cannot be objectively 
demonstrated in purely musical terms [my emphaseý 
(Lyle, 1948, P-158)- 
A method of writing about music that combines both 
approaches does serve to eradicate some of the inadequacies 
mentioned, but it, unfortunately, still fails to realise that 
music forms an integral part of the social process. With this 
methodp the objective and subjective in music are still often 
regarded at base as being two separate entitiesq rather than 
merely different aspects of the same phenomenon, and the effect 
achieved is often that of a mechanical mixture, rather than that 
of the elucidation of the organic social whole that a piece of 
music is. The a-sooial view of music discussed in Chapter Four 
and the specific approaches to writing about music mentioned here 
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are thus facets of the same social-intellectual structure as 
manifest in the realm of musical thought and articulation. In 
the modern Western world music still tends to be regarded as being 
beyond the pale of even the symbolic superstructure of crude 
Marxism, let alone being regarded as an active constituent of the 
social process. Western music critics tend to deny the 
possibility of the Soviet position with regard to musicology, 
that is, that musical form and 'language' have ideological 
kignificance. The denial results not because Soviet musicology 
fails to transcend the categories of form and content, but 
precisely because, in mechanically equating musical form with the 
. 
content of social dogma, it starts out on the road to the 
achievement of that very transcendence. 
The traditional approach to writing about music does li-'Utle 
but support a musically encoded ideology (that is, the coding 
through tonal classical music of the industrial world sense) 
through its own ideological implications (that isq the oppositional 
epistemological categories and centralised authoritarian 
structures symptomatic of th. at world sense)2 a process that is both 
ultimately tautological and of questionable critical value. The 
writer is tied to one viewpoint, the implication being that this 
viewpoint is sufficiently universal and objective for musical 
Judgement to be authoritatively disseminated. 
'The centralized definition of what counts as music has 
already been commented upon5. However, two further examples will 
be noted. Because both writers are concerned with the social 
implications of musical style, these examples serve to show how 
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deeply ingrained the centra_Jised or elitist view of oulture is in 
the consciousness of industrial man. The first example is taken 
from the writings of Theodor W. Adornoq a man, who despite his 
radical pose, betrays the authoritarianism implicit in many 
6 
elitist European academic systems Adonio's musical outlook is 
rooted very much in the 'highly conscious' and 'rational' aesthetic 
of Schoenberg and, as a result, he finds it very difficult to 
tolerate Stravinsky's music which, at ieast in its early phase, 
creates effects comparable to those of pre-literate musics: 
Authenticity is gained surreptitiously through the 
denial of the subjective pole. The collective standpoint 
is suddenly seized as though by attack; this results in 
the renunciation of comfortable conformity with 
individualistic society. But at the very point where 
this is achieved, a secondary and, to be sure, highly 
uncomfortable conformity results: the conformity of a 
blind and integral society -a sooietyý as it were, of 
eunuohs and headless men. The individual stimulus 
activated by such art, permits the survival only of self- 
negation and the destruction of individuation; this indeed 
was the secret goal of the humour of Petrouchka ... but 
now this obscure drive becomes a shattering fanfare 
(1973, P-159)-7' 
The second example. is taken from the writings of an 
eminent Soviet musicologistt Israel V. Nestyev. It should 
immediately be pointed out that his approach lacks any of Adorno's 
arrogancoý and that his discussion of music generally seems 
interesting, informative and perceptive. Nevertheless, the 
party line is maintained and judgement delivered. Summing up 
Prokofiev's achievements as a composer, Nestyev says: 
In his affirmation of human virtue and his exposure 
of negative forcesq Prokofiev was not alwaVB equipped 
with clear ideological aims. He never gave enduring 
expression to the heroism and pathos of the people's 
life in the period of the victory of socialism. He 
was more successful in depicting the past than in 
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portraying revolutionary struggle and socialist 
creation (19619 P-456). 
The principle reason for this attitude towards Prokofiev's music 
has already been indicated. 
It would be self-contradictory to imply that the approach 
to writing a6uý%"4c adopted here does not also make implicit 
ideological assertions. It does, but there are two differences. 
Firstly, the position adopted acknowledges that the writer, as a 
social animal, is his own prisoner, a. phanomenon implicitly denied 
by those who espouse the traditional approach. Secondly, the 
realisation of necessary social involvement in what is written, 
instead of putting blinkers on an observer and diminishing the 
usefulness and validity of his observationsg adds considerably to 
his insight. The writer may cast off from his safe haven of 
authoritarian objectivity and realise that no one viewpoint, no 
one musical language is sacrosanct. Only by uncovering his own 
material and absolutist'assumptional framework9 therefore, can 
industrial man step beyond the aesthetic implications of his own 
music, and so simultaneously realise the equal worth of other 
musical languages and the social significance of all music. 
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NOTE, S: 
of. above, pp. -4 --Ijrl and pp, 99- S9 It is precisely 
because the materiality of symbolic communication is 
ignored that ideas may be isolated from the content of 
their creation. 
2. Not all books on music display such a marked dichotomy as 
has been described here. Moreover, there are some books 
which tend very strongly in the direction of transcending 
the strict form and content categories. Wilfrid 11ellers, 
for example, has constantly striven to situate the music he 
is discussing in the full social context of its creation, 
and in this regard it is interesting to note that his avowed 
aim is "to understand rather than to evaluate". In spite 
of this, however, it does seem fair comment that a great 
number of books and articles implicitly take this dichotomy, 
! in one form or another, as the assumed methodological 
starting point for their enquiry and presentation. The 
number of books written along, the lines of "the man and his 
music" provides some testimony for this assertion, as do the 
number of books uhich seek to pass judgement on a work or 
body of music without making explicit reference (through 
musical examples or other devices) to the actual music itself. 
Again, more evidence is provided by the great number of purely 
analytic articles published each year. This is not to imply, 
however, that such material is of little value. The reverse 
is often patently the case. The argument is that by re- 
arranging the methodological basis for musicological enquiry 
it will be possible to gain greater insight into the music under 
examination, whilst retaining a more truly phenomenological 
sense oi. the music as music. 
This formulation of the dichotomy as applied to the traditional 
approach to music may appear confusing as, in the Newtonian 
cosmology the physical or material is regarded as the c' ontent 
of a homogeneous, three-dimensional, spatial form. It should 
be remembered, however, that the Newtonian/Laplacian view of 
the universe only constitutes one example of the articulation 
of the industrial world sense(cf. above pp. 6'0-51 ). The 
fundamental epistemological dichotomy engendered by phonetic 
literacy finds expression in many ways whichq on the surface, 
may appear contradictory or paradoxical (of. above pp. 51 -. r)Z). 
4- It oould be argued, for example, that it was the potential 
emergence of a competing world sense which. caused the impasse 
in Meyer's R: cplainina Ilusic (of. above, pp. -65-39 ), a book 
whose very aim is to reconcile analysis with the subjective 
element in music. The pointq of course, is that such 
reconciliation can only be fully achieved by viewing the 
objective and subjective as different aspects of one pre- 
existing social whole. 
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of. above, pp. 7 9- gl-. 
6. For a more detailed account of the contradictory pose of* 
such 'radicals' as Adorno and Luka. cs, see Wishart (1973). 
7- For a more detailed critique of Adorno's Philosophy of 
Modern Music see Shepherd (1975). This review is included 
as Appendix IV. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Part of the thesis is to indicate 
the way in which analysis canjHithin certain limitationsq elucidate 
the social meaning inherent in music. The limitations, of course, 
result from the fact that analysis is an overwhelmingly explicit 
prooedureq that music is an implicit form of communication, and 
that some world senses tend towards the implicit. The 
methodological implications of these relationships are discussed in 
Chapter Seven, and an analytic paradigm is evolved which as far as-- 
possible overcomes the difficulties highlighted by that discussion. 
Chapters Eight to twelve then examine different types of music as 
an integral facet of the social content of their creation. The 
thesis concludes with a brief re-examination of the problems inherent 
in writing about music. 
The approach to musical analysis indicated in this Part of 
the thesis can be applied at any level of generality, whether that 
of one work within a composer's total outputg the style of a 
composer as it articulates meaning within his social milieu, or a 
musical language as it embodies the social-intellectual structure 
of an entire society. It is bestq however, to demonstrate the 
method at the greatest level of generalityg becauseq until the 
articulation of a social-intellectual structure through the realm 
of musical knowledge has been consciously realizedg any examination 
of a composer's piece or style is likely to be compromised through 
--ignorance of its articulation at that greater level. The reverse, 
of course, is equally trueg since the evidence of any musical 
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: Language can only be ostablished through the examination of 
individual pieces. However, until a piece has been examined in 
the context of other 'culturally adjaoent' pieces, and in the 
light of the culture's particular world sense, it is doubtful 
whether its significance could be adequately elucida: ted. 
Blaoking seems to agree with this evaluation when he says that 
since musical patternst 
are always acquired through and in the context of social 
relationships and their associated emotionsq the 
decisive style-forming factor in any attempt to express 
feeling in music must be its social content. If we 
want to find the basic organizing principles that affect 
the shapes of patterns in music, we must look beyond the 
cultural conventions of any century or society to the 
social situation in which they applied and to which they 
refer (19739 P-73). 
Blacking further observes that: 
if you treat ... melodies as things in themselves, as 
'sonic objects', which is the kind of approach I am 
objecting tog you can work out several different 
analyses. This procedure is very common in analyses 
of European music and may be one of the reasons why 
music journals are so full of contradictory explanations 
of the same music (19739 P-93). 
The dangers of extrapolating from the particular to the general 
have been pointed out in Shepherd's (1976)l criticism of Meyer's 
(1973) theories. 
The descriptions and discussions which follow therefore 
explore the musical articulations of social-intellectual structures 
and frameworks in different societiesq and so give an idea of the 
culture-specific nature of such articulations. The intention of 
this Part of the thesis is not, however, to give a definitive and 
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oonclusive expose of the musical articulation of meaning in any 
group or society. Chapter Eightq for example, is included to 
show that at least in principle the approach outlined below is 
applicable to the very different world of pre-literate Musics. 
Whilst the vast diversity of this music naturally precludes any 
attempt at a definitive study it was felt important to indicate 
that the ideas put forward in this thesis had some validity outside 
the literate traditions of the 'civilized' world. Neither is it 
the intention of this Part of the thesis to. present an historical 
surveyy although there is some discussion of the factors affecting 
the development of tonality from plainchant. Using a restricted 
amount of material it is rather to argue the validity and 
legitimacy of a particular sense ('view') of musiot and of a way 
of elucidating the social meaning inherent in music in a practical 
and specific fashion. 
One final comment is necessary by way of introduction. it 
was argued in Chapter Five that there cannot be a determinant 
relationship between symbol and social meaning. That is why all 
symbolic exchange is potentially creative. It follows from this 
relationship that factors other than social meaning may influence 
the precise configuration a symbol assumes. Two of the most 
important factors are biological characteristics of the human 
organism and the inherent qualities of the material through which 
a symbol manifests itself. Since biological characteristics are 
species-specific they can be assumed to be constant or neutral as 
-far as-the overwhelmingly 'social-meaning of any particular music 
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2 is concerned But since the harmonic series has clearly been 
highly influential in the formation of both plainohant and 
tonality, technical explanations for these languages will be taken 
as far as reasonably possible in the ensuing discussion. The 
impossibility of purely technical explanations willý however, point 
up the ultimate necessity of a social understanding. 
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NOTESs 
16 See Appendix III. 
2. This is not necessarily the case. It is entirely possible 
that the characteristics of different world senses might well 
emphasise or conversely distort elements of musical 
expression derived from biological constants. However, 
precisely because they are constants, it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the elements of 
musical expression originating in them from those culture- 
specific elements which are socially mediated (of. Meyer, 1973, 
p. 214). Further, it seems highly doubtful whether elements of 
musical expression originating in biological constants could 
haveany meaning 'outside' those elements originating in the 
symbolic exchange essential to the maintenance of any society 
(of. the arguments concerning Langer's and Meyer's theories 
above pp. 3533). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IMPLICIT-EXPLICIT PARADIGM 
- 3.55 - 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the discussion in Part I of this thesis depended 
on an understanding of the very different world senses that may be 
said to be typical of pre-literate and industrial man. In 
attempting to render intelligible these two world senses it was 
impossible to avoid making or implying comparisons which in 
themselves assumed the existence of or6ss-cultural categories of 
analysis. It was necessaryg in other words9 to assume (cross- 
cultural) categories of analysis in order to make the 
characteristics of others (the culture-speoific) quite clear. 
However, the adoption of cross-oultural categories gives rise to 
two related but rather different problems. In order to understand 
these problems it is first necessary to briefly consider the 
logical status of categories of analysis in general. 
Categories of analyBis aTe developed or asBumed by people 
in specific social situations of which the phenomenon under 
examination forms only a part. The categories therefore result 
from theAnteraction of information 'provided' by the phenomenon - 
that is, the phenomenon as we might imagine it to be, out there and 
beyond us as objective fact, and the attitudes and preconceptions 
any person inevitably brings to the analytic situationi. The 
degree to which a person may be conscious of these attitudes and 
preconceptions and thus in a position to alter the categories 
should they prove inappropriate is circumscribed by the degree of 
self-meflexiveness exercised by that person. Further2 in the face 
of the intense dialectic inter-relationship of observer and 
observed, complete eradication of such attitudes and preconceptions 
- 156 - 
2 becomes a futile aspiration Indeedt truly phenomenological 
or 'accurate' analyses and descriptions seem more likely to 
result because a person brings to bear on any particular 
phenomenon a world sense whioh itself has characteristics 
eminently appropriate to those of the phenomenon3 I rather than 
because that person has exercised a high degree of self- 
reflexiveness. However2 even if categories of analysis used in 
relation to a phenomenon are highly appropriate, the fac t still 
remains that the categories can never be the same thing as the 
phenomenon. It is the distancing. between categories of analysis 
and phenomenoný together with the dialectic interaction of 
observer and observed which makes the inappropriate transfer of 
oharacteristics all too possible4. 
The first problem to result from the adoption of cross- 
cultural categories lies in the possibility of ascribing to the 
social process in general characteristics which are only 
appropriate to one culture-specific manifestation of that process. 
At the turn of the centuryq for example, it was not unusual for 
pre-literate cultures to be compared to our own in terms of a 
capacity for 'rational thought' and 'technological development'. 
Thus Tylor (19039 p. 27) states that: 
From an ideal point of view, civilization may be looked 
upon as the general improvement of mankind by higher 
organization of the individual and of society, to the 
end of promoting at once man's goodness, power and 
happiness. This theoretical civilization does in no 
small measure correspond with actual civilizationt-as 
traced by comparing savagery with barbarism, and barbarism 
with modern educated life. So far as we take into 
account only material and intellectual culture, this is 
especially true. Acquaintance with the physical laws of 
the world, and the accompanying power of adapting nature 
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to man's own ends, are, on the wholes lowest'among 
savages, mean among barbarians, and highest among modern 
educated nations. Thus a transition from the savage. state 
to. our oirn would be7 practically, that very progress of -art 
and knowledge which is one main element in the development 
of culture. 
The principal criteria for assessing such development and 
improvement are: "the absence or presences high or low developments 
of the industrial arts ... It is clears in other words, that 
Tylor ascribes to societies in general a capacity for 'rational 
thought' and 'technological development'. The degree to which this 
capacity is used is a measure of any culture's particular 
civilization. The highly ethnocentric nature of such a view 
becomes apparent against the background of arguments put forward in 
the first three chapters of this thesis. Yet its pervasiveness in 
past thought will be realised in the light of Evans-Pritchard's 
assessment of Tylor as a man "more cautious and critical than most 
of his contemporaries ... 11. 
Assuming that it is possible to avoid this type of 
ethnocentrism, however, the adoption of cross-cultural categories 
of analysis gives rise to another. problem, which is equally 
'ethnocentric' in its implications. For the adoption of cross- 
cultural categories implies that there is some feature or element 
of the social process which is common to all groups and sooietiesq 
and from which the categories may thus, be legitimately derived. 
While it is difficult to see how cross-oultural analysis could begin 
in the absence of such an assumptiong it is by no means certain that 
there is any feature of the social process which isý in truly 
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phenomenological termsq common to all societies. It is extremely 
unlikely,, for example, that pre-literate people conceive of 
'symbolic interaction' in anything like the same way that it is 
considered in this thesis. The not result of this second problem, 
then7 is that since oross-cultural categories must ultimately be 
comprehensible in the society which makes use of them, it is 
inevitable that they should, to a certain degree, be distortive in 
-their elucidation of other societies' categories. 
The purpose of this chapter is to overcome this second 
problem (as far as this may be possible) in the light. of the two 
propositions put forward in Chapter One. The first step in this 
process is to arrive at some cross-cultural categories of analysis 
which take into account the initial problem described in this 
Introduction. This may be done by consciously isolating some 
element or feature of the social process which it may. reasonably be 
suppo sed is common to all groups and societies, and then deriving 
the categories from that element or feature. Because this conscious 
isolation carries with it an awareness of the type. of ethnocentrism 
displayed by Tylort it seems. less likely that the categories 
subsequently derived would be grossly distortive of the social 
process* Yet because the second problem outlined above has not as 
Zet been accounted fort it remains the case that such categories 
'Vill, in all prObabilityg be distortive of other social realities 
in some resDects. This distortion represents a necessary stage. 
in the development of the implicit-explicit paradigm, however, for, 
'Until some aecific categories are adopted, it is impossible for 
the analyst to tell whether and in what respects Ihe categories are 
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distortive, and go to proceed to a more sophisticated basis for 
cross-cultural analysis. The immediate problem, then, is choozing, 
in a somewhat arbitrary fashiong 'temporary' categories of analysis 
which will be reasonably adequate on a cross-cultural basis and 
which, at the same time, will not be grossly distortive of the 
social process as that process is manifested in oulture-specifio 
realities. Only then will it become possible to identify the 
distancing between categories and phenoMenony and so to reduce the 
effects of that distancing as far as the two propositions made in 
Chapter One will allow. 
In isolating a leo=on' feature of the social process$ 
recouse may be had to an assertion made earlier in this thesis, 
that is, that societies can only arise and continue to exist through 
the creation and exchange of symbols. It is an adjunct of this 
assertion that the existence of society or culture can only be 
revealed to us through the symbols we perceive. For if society 
can only arise and be maintained by and through the mutual 
externalisations and internalisations of individual people, then it 
f ollows that any person can only be aware of his (social) existence 
and can only ascribe meaning to the world as a result of symbolic 
interaction. It is no answer to this statement to say that people 
exist independently of the symbols they emit and perceive7 for since 
we cannot know another as we know ourselves2 our knowledge is 
derived entirely from 'external' symbols 
5. Society is totally 
symbolic and so any 'social' analysis (and this is to say any 
analysis at ally since our knowledge of the world is ultimately 
mediated socially) must inevitably be grounded in symbolic analysis. 
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As Duncan (1968ý P-50) has so succinctly put it: "Interpretations 
of forces 'beyond' symbols must still be interpretations of 
symbols". 
SYmbols would thus seem to constitute one 'common feature 
or element of the social process which (possibly inter alia) could 
provide the necessary basis for the evolution of cross-oultural 
categories of analysis. It is possible to derive these 
categories from a description of the way in which symbols may be 
thought of as conveying their significance. It is not to be 
suggested, of ooursel that this description will necessarily be 
appropriate to all groups and all societies. Indeed, it will be 
the purpose of the next section of this chapter to indicate the 
limitations of the categories derived from this description. 
Symbols are perceived and internalized as delimited 
experiences whose delimitation implies other temporally and 
spatially adjacent experiences which are not, however, the focus 
of attention for self. The abstracted framework for this adjacent 
experiential environment which meaningfully situates the focus of 
perception is time and space.. Merleau-Ponty argues this with 
respect to the seeing of objectst 
The object-horizon structure, or the perspective, is no 
obstacle to me when I want to see the objects for just 
as it is the means whereby objects are distinguished 
from each others it is also the means whereby they are 
disclosed. To see is to enter a universe of beings 
which disDlay themselves, and they would not do this if 
they could not be hidden behind each other or behind me. 
Inother words: to look at an object is to inhabit its 
and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of 
the aspect which they present to it. But in so far as 
I see those things too, they remain abodes open to my 
gazes and being potentially lodged in them, I already 
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perceive from various angles the central object of my 
present vision. Thus every object is the mirror of 
all others (1962, p. 68). 
Merleau-Ponty goes on: 
What we have just said about the spatial perspective 
could equally well be said about the temporal .... 
each moment of time calls all the others to witness; it 
shows by its advent 'how things were meant to turn out' 
and 'how it will all finish'; each present permanently 
underpins a point of time -ghich calls for recognition 
from all the others2 so that the object is seen at all 
times as it is seen from all directions and by the same 
means2 namely2 the structure imposed by a horizon. The 
present still holds on to the immediate past without 
positing it as an object, and since the immediate past 
similarly holds its immediate Dredecessor2 past time is 
wholly collected up and grasped in the present. The 
same is true of the immediate future which will also have 
its horizon of imminence. But with my immediate past I 
have also the horizon of futurity which surrounded itq and 
thus I have my actual present seen as the future of that 
-past. 
With the immediate future, I have the horizon of 
past which will surround it, and therefore my actual 
present as the past of that future. Thus2 through the 
double horizon of retention and protention, my present may 
cease to be a factual present quickly carried away and 
abolished by the flow of durationg and become a fixed and 
identifiable point in objective time (1962, p. 69). 
Since all symbols are socially mediatedg they may therefore be 
described as articulations in time-space which are taken to be 
socially meanineul 
6. 
Moreover, because all social analysis is 
ultimately symbolict and since all symbols may be described as 
articulations in time-spacet the categories of time and space or 
time-space are completely pervasive and so extremely useful. 
There is no sphere of social activity which cannot be made to 
render information easily subsumed under them. 
From this theoretical argument, it would seem reasonable to 
assume that categories of time and space (or at least the 
experiencing of culture-specific durational-extensional qualities) 
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occur in all known social systems. In turn, this assumption 
would appear adequately general as an heuristio foundation in 
terms of which to begin a cross-cultural analysis. This was 
essentially the position adopted in Part I of the thesis. All 
the characteristics of pro-literate and industrial socioties as 
described in that Part can ultimately be grounded in the 
appropriate culture-specific temporal and spatial orientations. 
However, this grounding clearly does not take into account the 
second problem described in this Introduction. More specifically, 
it does not take into account the fact that while some world senses 
tend very much towards the implicit, analysis as we understand it 
is an overwhelmingly verbal-rational or explicit procedure. The 
following section considers this difficulty and puts forward a 
paradigm for social analysis which largely overcomes it. 
THE PARADIGIM AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
'Timeland IS13acel as Categories of Cross-Cultural Analysis. 
The first steD in the development of the Implicit-Explicit 
Paradigm is to consider the limitations of time and space as 
categories of cross-cultural analysis. The most obvious danRer 
of using time and space as a basis for cultural analysis is, of 
course, imputing to other societies. temporal and spatial categories 
Which are specific only to the analyst's society. It would seem 
that this danger has as far as possible been avoided in Part I. 
It is nevertheless mentioned at this stage, because the limitation 
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of time and space as cross-cultural categories -which follows from 
the sedond problem described above is not unrelated to it. 
This limitation may be approached in three different ways. 
First of all, any concept which might be legitimately subsumed 
under a . 
'time-space' lable would, in all probability, be 
meaningless or totally unimportant in certain groups and societies. 
Most obviously, pre-literate man's ability to live 'within' time, 
together with his immediate relationship to, and comparative lack 
of conceptual control over the environmentp would seem to preclude 
the creation of any categories of analysis which could be 
legitimately subsumed under the abstract 'time-space' label. 
Indeed, givon the abstract and permanent nature of such categories, 
one would only expect to find them in literate. sooieties. 
Secondly, it is necessary to be aware that modern English 
(and, mutatis mutandis, Standard Average European) possesses the two 
separate words of 'time' and 'space'. This in itself is not 
terribly significant. There are other cultures where 'time' and 
'space' may only be legitimately approached as two different 
aspects of one phenomenon, such is the high degree of inter- 
relationship between the two 'ideas'. Yet in these societies (for 
exampleg medieval societ ) the words 'time' and 'space' (or rather 
their 'equivalents' in other languages and dialects) are used 
without fear of distortion to denote the two different aspects. 
The existence of the separate words does become significant, on the 
other hand, when they are used against the background of industrial 
man's temporal and spatial sense, involving as it does a complete 
independence of time from space. For it then becomes very easy to 
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unconsciously assiýpi this quality of Complete independence where 
it is entirely inappropriate. 
Finally (and this reservation essentially underpins the 
two already mentioned), it should be noted that the adoption of 
time and space as categories of oross-oultural analysis can easil y 
give rise to the notion that there exists some generalized concept 
of time-space which can be used as a means of comparison. Ift 
taking into account all the reservations so far mentioned, it is 
assumed that all societies have ways of relating to themselves and 
the environment which may be subsumed under the common label 'time- 
spaoe1q then it must immediately be acknowledged that these ways 
display vastly different characteristics. If a generalized 
concept of time-space is to have any genuine standing as a concept 
separate from all other culture-specific formulationag then it too 
must possess identifiable characteristics. But the generalized 
concept is itself culture-specific, in its very attempt to have 
oross-oultural significance. It is formulated in a specific social 
situation of which these chapters form an important part. If this 
generalized concept has any identifiable characteristics therefore 
(as it must do to have any genuine standing)q it follows that it 
amounts to nothing more than yet another culture-specifio way of 
relating to society and environment -a way which may be subsumed 
under the common label 'time-space'. The generalized concept thus 
attempts to be a member of its own set, a position which, according 
to Russell' s Paradox, is logically untenable 
8. 
Reducing the generalized concept to the level of one of the 
culture-specific concepts subsumed can only be avoided if it can be 
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demonstrated that there exists a time-space concept which 
satisfactorily transcendn all others. It seems unlikely that 
such a construct has ever existed or, indeed, could ever exist. 
Time-spaoe constructs which have gained common acceptance have all 
been specific to a temporally delimited culture, and new concepts 
of time-space created by mathematicians during the last 150 years 
have been appropriate to different spheres of activity within the 
9 'physical' universe 
The problem now arises of identifying the assumptional 
framework on which a cross-cultural concept of time-space might be 
grounded . One thing is certain. If there is no transcendent 
time-space, then a generalized concept will tend to have 
characteristics symptomatic of a particular culture-specific 
concept. Beyond this, however, it seems more than likely that the 
terms 'time' and 'space' - as a general usage might be assigned to 
them in the context of. these chapters - are ultimately rooted in 
the industrial world sense. These chapters are conceived in an. 
industrial society2 and it is futile to think that one can 
ultimately escape its structuring. 
The limitation indicated here thus represents a concrete 
example of the second problem indicated in the Introduction. Fbr 
although the culture-specific notions of time and space haveg as 
it wereq been stretched and expanded to avoid the sort of 
ethnocentrisia- committed by Tylor, it is inevitable that the 
impressions of differing realities so far gained from previous 
discussions should ultimately be filtered back through the content- 
categories of the specific symbols 'time' and 'space'. It is 
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intended that the Implicit-Explicit Paradigm should overcome 
this difficulty. An insight into how this may be achieved can 
be gained by considering the logical status of reified concepts. 
The Logical Status of Reified ConceDts. 
So far the discussion in the section has centred round 
the application of time-space concepts as methods of elucidating 
specific world senses and social structures. In elucidating 
these world senses and structures, however, one inevitably becomes 
involved in an elucidation of social process, since a specific 
world sense or structure is nothing more than specific and ongoing 
social process as revealed and made manifest through the symbols 
10 
pertaining to a particular culture. And although social process 
is not 'something' which can be legitimately divorced from its 
ongoing articulation and structuring in any particular situation, 
it is 'something' in which the nature of the roles played by 
symbols and consciousness should be made as clear as possible. 
Since a particular society may be taken to be a totality 
of mutually efficacious and dialectically related symbols and 
individual oonsoiousnessest and since evidence for the existence 
of any particular society may only be revealed to us thr2y h 
symbols, it may be concluded that 'society' is of a different 
order from-the consciousnesses and symbols that encode 'it's Of 
specific importance to this argument is the assertion that 
'society' is of a different order of existence 
11 from the 
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objectified symbols through which it is revealed. 
The position with regard to consciousness in society is 
more complex. It was noted in Chapter Five that creativity was 
essential to the ongoing functioning of consciousnesses in 
society, and that such creativity was not possible at the level of 
(material) objectivation appropriate to symbols. It. folloWsq 
therefore, that at some stage in the mental process the mind must 
divest itself of ideas conceived and imagined in the objectified 
12 terms of ooncrete symbols If this were not done, the 
inflexibility of such objectified thought would preclude the 
creative moment. In this sense consciousness may be thought of 
as having two aspectst a sense of the world which is not 
symbolically imminent, and a sense which is made 'explicit'$ 
either 'in' consciousness or in the 'outside' worldt through the 
objectified mediation of symbols. Concepts belonging to this 
latter sense must always. ý to some extent or other, be regarded as 
reifications'39 no matter which medium is used to convey them. 
For any form of objectified expression inevitably freezes and 
dilutes the fluid and spontaneous nature of concepts originating 
in those processes of consciousness whose operations are not 
objectified. Because they involve an objectified mediationg 
these reified concepts always display characteristics which may be 
directly denoted rather than indirectly evoked. 
In constituting part of the experience that is 
consciousness, reified concepts should be thought of as one step 
removed from the society in which they occur. This 'distancing' 
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or 'separation' is based on the principle that a code cannot be 
the same 'thing' as the 'entity$ being codeJ4 - The objectified 
structuring generated by an individual consciousness is clearly 
not the same 'thing' as the ongoingly structured and dialectic 
relationships obtaining between the individual symbols and 
consoiousnesses of a society. Further, however, reified concepts 
are one step removed from society in the nature of their existence, 
Bince the structuring of society (as well as of some aspects of 
consciousness) is a process that is essentially not 
objectified, whereas a reified concept depends upon an 
objectified mediation for its very existenoel5. 
Reified Concepts and the Analysis of Social Process. 
All categories of analysis are reified conceptsý since it 
is an essential-feature of their usefulness: that they have 
characteristics which may be directly communicated to other people 
rather than indirectly evoked in their consoiousnesses. Time- 
space concepts are no exception in this regard. Both medieval 
man and industrial man, for exampleg have had ways of relating to 
themselves and the environment which may be legitimately subsumed 
under the 'time-space' label (bearing in mind the reservations 
stated earlier in the section) and which have been directly stated. 
Time-space concepts, therefore, are. ýessentially of a different 
order from the ongoing structuring of which they are symptomatic 
or to which they are appliedý and it is totally illusory to think 
- : L69 - 
of a 'time-space' as some sort of 'ultimate reality' in terms of 
which specific social structuring may be 'explicitly' grounded 
16. 
The higher reality is in the context of the non-objectifiod 
social process, and not the =eified concepts through which the 
process is approached. 
The lines of argument so far developed in this ohapter may 
now be summarised. It was suggested in the Introduction that 
since it was by no means certain that there was any feature of the 
social process which was, in truly phenomenological terms, common 
to all societies, it seemed highly unlikely that there could be any 
truly adequate categories of cross-cultural analysis. This 
suggestion was then substantiated by examining the limitations of 
time and space as such categories. The major limitation to emerge 
was the seeming impossibility of transcending the categories of 
'time' and 'space' as they occur linguistically in present-day 
'European' culture. It was then established, howeverý that all 
content-categories (whether categories of understanding which are 
an integral part of a social reality, or categories of analysis as 
applied from outside a group or society) are of necessity reified 
concepts, and so one stage removed from social process itself. 
More specifically, the danger of 'looking at' or utilising socially 
construoted. concepts as if they themselves wholly and integrally 
constitute specific social process was highlighted. 
It becomes apparent from this second line of argument that 
any paradigm for social analysis must somehow reach beyond specific 
categories of analYsis to the non-objectified social process of any 
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specific culture - this being the case even where the categories 
are fully phenomenological. For example, since the specific 
social process of the industrial world is not ultimately grounded 
in industrial concepts of time and space, it is necessary to go 
beyond thoseq or2 indeed, any other ('satisfactory') categories 
in order to sense the characteristics of the non-objectified 
industrial world sense. But this process shows us how to transcend 
oross-cultural categories of analysis as those ultimately culture- 
s_pecific categories are stretched and expanded to facilitate and 
accomodate insights into substantially different social realities. 
For as it is possible to ultimately dispense with specific content- 
categories in the elucidation of the non-objectified world sense 
in terms of which those categories are fully phenomenological, so 
it becomes possible to ultimately dispense with those same 
categories as stretched and expanded to accomodate different 
realities. As a result, the effect of the 'ethnocentric taint' 
inevitably contained in these categories as (objectified) reified 
concepts is substantially reduced. In leaving these reifications 
behind we cant in other wordsq think ourselves into differing 
realities in a much more successful manner. Having madethiB Very 
important conceptual stept it now becomes possible to indicate the 
nature of the Implicit-Mcplicit Paradigm. 
The Implicit-Rxplicit Paradigm. 
It is an integral aspect of this paradigm that its 
oharacteristics may not be directly stated2 but only approached 
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through the descriptions (which in themselves embody Ireified' 
concepts) of the concepts and ('concrete) symbols put forward in 
these chapters as symptomatic of different societies, More 
specificallyq the implicit-explioit oppositions of the paradigm 
eorrespond to the differing time-space senses and, concomitantlyg 
to the differing world senses of pre-literate and industrial man 
as set out in Chapters Two and Three. As the different aspects 
of a specific world sense as described'are all dialectically 
related, so the unified17 non-objeotified social structuring of 
which they are evidence may be sensed through them 'in' those 
processes of consciousness which are not symbolically imminent. 
It is these non-objeGtified processes of consciousness which 
approach most closely the non-objectified nature of ongoing social 
process, and which are therefore most appropriate for sensing such 
oulture-specifio processes in a 'seamless' and inseparable fashion. 
This level of abstraction is not easy to approachy howeverg because 
it cannot be. directly, conveyed in terms of symbolsq let alone in 
terms of industrial man's highly reified and phonetically literate 
world 
18 'Rationallylg social structuring can only be approached 
'through the objeotivation of symbols, 'Irrationally' and 
ultimately, realization depends upon the creation of constructs 'in, 
individual consciousnesses, or, as some people might prefer it, 
upon intuition. 
It_would be fair criticism to say that the paradigm put 
forward here would be as meaningless to certain societies and groups 
--as concepts of 'time' and 'space'. For exampleg it might be as 
meaningless to present-day scientists as 'time' and 'space' might be 
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to pre-literato people. Indeed, given the epistemological and 
cosmolodical background typical of contemporary society the 
paradigm would almost certainly come to be assigned an extremely 
low rational priority. However, it is precisely because the 
paradigm cannot be directly stated in terms of any symbol or 
concept that it might approach closest to a phenomenological 
elucidation (through the conscious, second-order use of symbols 
and reified concepts as the media of expression) of specific 
sooialq group and individual mental struoturings. The tendency 
of previous paradigms has been to. attempt to render explicit 
processes which are directly imperceptible in the direct 
referential and highly reified terms engendered by the media which 
made such explicitness possible in the first place.. In contrast 
the role of the Implicit-Explicit Paradigm, as t he reader has 
hopefully been able to intuit it, is to make possible the fully 
conscious creation 
owmot be directly 
meaningless only ti 
conscious of their 
not because, as an 
in the reader's mind19 of processes which 
conveyed. The Implicit-Explicit Paradigm is 
o the extent that many people are not largely 
own or other cultures' social structuring, and 
inherent part of itself, it imports culturally 
foreign concepts. To put it another wayj -the paradigm is 
culture-specific in being grounded on the socially-situated 
assumDtion of the universal importance of media (and dialectically 
related technologies) for the structuring of all human 
consciousnesses and societies, rather than on any specific 
-categories arising from the effect the feedback operations of such 
externalisations (the media) have on individual people and 
20 
societies 
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THU, PARADIGM AND IMICAL ANA-TYsis 
'Time' and 'Space' as Categories of Musical Analysis 
In order to show how the Implicit-Explioit Paradigm can 
be used as the basis for cross-cultural (social)-musical analysis 
it is, of courset necessary to consciously invoke some second-order 
reified concept as a means of giving expression to the paradigm. 
The concept used will again be that of 'time-space'. However2 for 
the notions of time and space to have any meaning in relation to 
musicý it becomes necessary to'consider to what musical parameters 
they may correspond. Of itself this task is not very difficult. 
Faced with such a question, most people would conclude that the 
temporal element of music finds expression in rhythm, and that the 
spatial element finds expression in the relationship between pitches, 
that is to say, in melodic structure and harmony. 
However, it is precisely at this point that the major 
limitation of time and space as categories of cross-cultural 
analysis finds specific musical expression. Musical analysis in 
the terms just indicated is largely appropriate 
21 
when considering 
tonality as an encoding and articulation of the industrial world 
sense. As will be argued in Chapter Twelvet the time/rhythm2 
spaoe/melodic structure/harmony parameters provide the framework 
from within which industrial man tends to relate to his music. 
But it is precisely this equation of time with our 'everyday' 
notion of rhythm, and space with similar notions of melodic 
structure and harmony which makes the Itraditionallparameters. of 
Imelody19 'harmony' and 'rhythm' largely inappropriate when applied 
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-to other musics. Fors in being predominantly evolved from tonal 
musicas frames of reference for the analysis of that musicy the 
terms lharmonylý 'melody' and 'rhythm' as we typically understand 
them tend to reinforce the time-space sense encoded in tonality. 
Th e use of these terms, and the derivation through them of any 
culture-specific time-space sense should therefore always be 
accompanied by a strong sense of the distortion such use might 
22 
orea e 
It is possible here to give a brief example of this 
distortion in order to show the kind of musical (and sociological) 
issues that can be involved. The example is a particularly good 
one, since it is drawn from the work of a writer on music who 
throughout his life has been aware of the sociological implications 
inherent in musiog and so of the fact that different kinds of music 
can convey different types of social reality. In his book on the 
Beatles, Wilfrid Mellqrs makes the following comment on The and, 
the final number of Abbey Road: 
This last number, having asked its questiong abandons 
words for a furious hammering of percussion: which leads 
into a long instrumental section, all dominant sevenths in 
rumba rhythm2 but rocking a tone lower than the starting 
point, getting nowhere. Suddenly the hubbub stops; 
there's a tinkling of A major triads on a tinny piano; and 
Paul's voice returns to sing ... (19739 pp. 122-123). 
It would seem fair comment to suggest that in Mellerst opinion the 
advent of the A major triads is musically more significant than 
the long instrumental section preceeding it. Mellers2 in other 
words2 attaches considerable importance to a 'traditional' type of 
-harmony, where each successive musical moment is clearly separated 
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and distanced from all others as part of a functional linear 
drive towards a climactic point - and this at the expense of 
another, more '. fluid' type of harmony, where the 'vertical' 
aggregates act as 'internal' timbral colourations of the 
individual melodic notes which constitute them. It is because 
the lencroachinglv internally directed musical space of the 
'rocking dominant sevenths' appears to be heard in terms of the 
'distanced', outer-directed space of conventional homophony thatv 
in comparison, the former seems as something of a "hubbub" and as 
"getting nowhere". . Yet it is this 'directionless hubbub' which 
is clearly of importance for those immersed in the 'rook' idiom. 
Graham Vulliamyy for example2 is therefore of the conclusion that 
Mellers' approach "tends to neglect many facets of the Beatles, 
music which the rock music lover ... finds the most musically 
satisfying" (1977, P-194)- Thust although Mellersq in his 
attempt to 'understand' rather than 'evaluate' the music of the 
Beatlesq has avoided the kind of musical ethnocentrism discussed 
in the first Part of this thesis (an ethnocentrism, incidentally, 
which is of the same order as that of Tylor's indicated earlier 
in the chapter)23, he unwit tingly creates another by using a 
musical terminology drawn from tonalityq and so invoking the time- 
space sense and ideology of 'modern educated man'. 
Having indicated this particular limitation of time and 
space as second-order reified concepts in relation to musical 
analysisq it might now be thought possible to proceed to an 
analysis of the way in which different musical languages 
articulate different time-space sensesq and so to an understanding 
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of the way in which they reflect implicit or explicit world 
senses. However, to do this would be to ignore the fact that 
music (and, indeed, any other type of symbol) displays two 
existential levels. On the one handq there are culture-specific 
musical languages which mayq bearing in mind the above limitation, 
be approached as articulations of the 'time-space' sense of their 
particular culture. On the otherl there is music as a medium. 
As such, and regardless of any culture-specific significance it 
may convey, it may be said to possess temporal-spatial 
characteristics of its own. 
It may be remembered from the discussion in Chapter Two 
that sound as a phenomenon predisposes man to relate to himself 
and the environment in a certain way. Any person2 therefore, who 
concentrates on a piece of music, in largely filtering out 
experiences transmitted through other media$ tends to encourage 
the creation of this sound-inspired world sense. This world 
sense then aats back on that person's perception of the music, 
predisposing him to sense it in terms of that world sense. There 
is, in other wordsq a dialectic relationship between music and the 
world'sense that the music encourages man to adopt in relating to 
it. In pre-literate societies this relationship is likely to 
undergo great mutual reinforcement 
24, but it isq on the other hand, 
seriously compromised by the industrial world sense 
25. For the 
purposes of the present distinction, howevery it may be asserted 
that any externalisation of our perception of music as a phenome non 
in terms of 'time-spaoel will result in a particular formulation 
of 'time-space' which is peculiar to music as a phenomenon2 rather 
than to any particular culture-specific musical language. Quite 
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clearly, any use of time and space as second-order'reified 
concepts in relation to musical analysis needs to take into 
account this 'phenomenal' time-space sense. It is necessary, 
in other words, to take into account the implicit nature of 
music as a form of communication. 
That this is the case may be demonstrated by a brief 
reference to tonality. Earlier in this section it was stated 
that the equation of time with rhythm, and space with melodic 
structure and harmony was largely appropriate to an understanding 
of the (social) significance of tonality. Such appropriateness 
derives from the fact that, within the industrial world sense, 
Iiimel and 'space' are conceived as being completely independent 
of one another. But as subsequent descriptions will indicate, 
'Musical' time and space do not display such independence. It is 
not surprising to find, therefore, that, even in the case of 
tonality, time cannot be exclusively equated with rhythm, nor 
space with melodic structure or harmony. This point may be easily 
illustrated by indicating the necessary inter-relationship of these 
categories. Melody (conceived as any sequence of notes having 
some sort of pitch or I ientation) automatically involves rhythm, and 
rhythm, in an overwhelming number of cases, automatically involves 
melody. Turthert harmony as we understand it is simply 
impossible without a pervasive rhythmic basis. 
It should be immediately emphasised that the relationship 
between music as a phenomenon and music as. a culture-specific 
articulation of socially constructed reality is a strongly 
dialectic one. As such, it parallels that between social process 
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in general and culture-specific world senses or social 
structures. As a specific world sense or structure is nothing 
more than specific and ongoing social process as revealed and 
made manifest through the symbols pertaining to a particular 
culture, so music as. a. phenomenon can only be revealed through 
individual culture-specific pieces of music. 
It is because the qualities of music as a phenomenon can 
only be revealed through individual pieces of music that it is 
fallacious to think of musical time-space as some sort of ultimate 
reality in terms of which all musical significance can ultimately 
be grounded. For to think that musical time-space can in some 
vV be responsible for musical significance would be to 
unjustifiably separate the two existential levels of music, and 
then to give a higher rational priority to music as a phenomenon. 
Music would thus once again be thought of as 'objective' or 
'absolutely and as having its own 'internal laws'. Since these 
laws would be thought of as ultimately responsible for the 
particular formulation of specific pieces, the implication would 
be that music is somehow 'independent' of man. The role of 
symbol and consciousness would once again be reversedg and the 
composer reduced to the position of a cipher. This line of 
26 thought is clearly illustrated in the work of Victor Zuokerkandl 
The limitations of time and space as categories of 
musical analysis may thus be summarised as follows* Firstlyq 
there is the danger of investing the culture-specific time-space 
sense as evidenced in one musical language with the characteristics 
evidenced in another. More specifically, there is the danger of 
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hearing all musics through the ears of tonality. Secondly, 
given the 'inherent nature' of music it is necessary to go beyond 
the categories of analysis evolved from a particular musical 
language in order to understand how those culture-speoific 
categories arose 
27. In particular, it is necessary to go beyond 
oategories of analysis derived from tonality in order to fully 
comprehend the manner in which tonality encodes the industrial 
world sense. But in giving the 'phenomenal' time-space sense of 
music equal status with culture-specific articulations, the 
danger then arises of regarding the 'phenomenal' sense as some 
kind of 'ultimate reality' in terms of which all other evidence 
accruing from a particular piece must be grounded. This sort of 
distortion, which is prone to occur in literate oulturesq results 
in a refutation of the social significance inherent in music. 
In the Introduction to this Part of the thesis, the point 
was made that the analysis of a piece of music as a 'sonic object' 
could only be legitimately carried out with a heightened awareness 
of the social reality which the piece helps to articulate. 
Against the theoretical perspective provided in this chapter, it 
now becomes more apparent as to why this should be so. For to 
locate the significance Of MUBio either in the workings of music 
as a medium or in the culture-specific categories of individual 
musical languages is to open the door for the type of reification 
which it has been the express purpose of this chapter to avoid. 
The way in which reification occurs with regard to the location 
-of significance in music as a medium is not difficult to 
understand, and was described at the beginning of Chapter Four 
28 
. 
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it is a little more difficultq however2 to understand in quite 
what way the location of the significance of music in the 
categories of culture-specific musical languages constitutes 
reification. 
In the previous section great importance was attached, 
in considering the process of analysis, to keeping second-order 
reified concepts quite separate in consciousness from the non- 
objectified concepts of implicitness or explicitness which they 
were being used to elucidate. in this section, however, the 
focus of attention has shifted from a consideration of the 
process of analysis to the analysis of social symbols themselves, 
and it is this change which makes it possible for reification to 
creep back into our thought processes. For, in concentrating on 
a particular symbol - that of music it becomes easy to forget 
that 'society' - the ultimate goal of analysis - is of a different 
order of existence from the objectified symbol through which it is 
revealed, The implication would be that the concrete sonic event 
which constitutes the particular (musical) symbol under 
examination is, of and within itselfý the social significance 
being elucidated. 
Social significance in symbols does not and cannot arise 
because they contain, completely within themselves, dynamic 
social structuring. Such significance arises because dynamic 
social structuring is articulated. ýZ and through a paxticular 
symbolic medium. Thatq in effect, is. why it is necessary to apply 
categories of analysis to music as a medium as well as to culture- 
specific musical languages. 
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The only legitimate approach to the meaning of music, 
thereforef is one which is always conscious of music as an 
objectified symbol through which non-objectified social p3ýocess 
is revealed. This does not mean to say that categories of 
analysis, as reified conceptsq cannot be applied to the 
articulation of social meaning through musiog merely -that such an 
application must focus on dynamic social structuring rather than 
, 
just on sonio objects. In order to achieve this focussingg and 
so to gain an understanding of the Implicit-Explicit Paradigm as 
it applies to musicq it is therefore necessary to consider the 
way in which the 'phenomenal' time-spaoe sense of music oan give 
rise to different culture-specific time-space senses. 
Before proceeding with this taskq howeverf it is necessary 
to stress the importance of the line of thought just developed. 
For this line of thought is vital if the discussion in the 
following chapters is to achieve full significance. Because the 
dynamic social structuring as revealed through symbols is non- 
objectified, it must be accepted that it thoroughly permeates the 
'objective' characteristics of those symbols. Simply because 
all music is socially signifioantg thereforeq it does not follow 
that all characteristics of music as sonic object areq of and bg 
themselvesý ideologically significant. For example, it will be 
argued later in this Part of the thesis that the implicit and 
melodic language of plainchant changes into the explicit and 
harmonic language of tonality through the externalisationy in 
harmony, of structures previously contained within the plainchant. 
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Yet there are plenty of examples of harmony (in Impr'essionistic 
music2 the rural blues and quite possibly some pre-literate 
musics) which are thoroughly implicit in their operations. Of 
and by itself2 harmony is thus not symptomatic of musical 
explicitness, although in certain cases2 such as that of tonality, 
it may well articulate explicitness. Now this does not moan 
that music works only through associationism, that is, the 
arbitrary association of certain musical patterns with certain 
types of significance. The discussions in the remainder of the 
thesis seek to illustrate an assertion made earliert namely, that 
musical structures are singularly suited to revealing the dynamic 
structuring of social life. Nor does it mean that there are no 
musical patterns which$ of and by themselves, might be pymptomatic 
of a certain ideology. It seems more than likely, for example, 
that pentatonicism can articulate little else but a musical 
implicitness. What it does mean, in the context of thi s thesis, 
is that the qualities of implicitness and explicitness as 
conceived in terms of music and time-space must be considered as 
ontologically prior to any concrete musical characteristics, 
*** 
The remainder of this chapter will now be concerned with 
an elucidation of the Implicit-Explicit Paradigm as it applies to 
music. The first step in this process is to summarise the main 
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characteristics of the 'phenomenal' musical time-space sense. 
In doing this, substantial use will be made of the womk of Victor 
Zuokerkandl, who has carried out a highly perceptive study in 
this area. Certain aspects of Zuckerkandl's work have, of 
course, already been oritised in this thesis. It should be 
noted, howeverý that these criticisms are in respect of the 
conclusions Zuckerkandl draws from the main body of his work2 and 
not in respect of that main body itself. 
Musical Time. 
Time as revealed through tonal music is usually associated 
with three different entities: pulse, metre and rhythm. Of these 
three entities only one is always heard directly, and that is the 
actual rhythm of a piece. Although the rhythm may conform to 
pulse and metreý and SO render these entities directly perceivableý 
it is not necessary for the rhythm of a piece to s: o. -. conform in-order 
that pulse and metre may be sensed by the listener. Since pulse 
and metre are very important aspects of tonal temporality it 
becomes necessary to understand this phenomenon if musical time 
is to be fully understood. For many musicians the phenomenon is 
easily explained through accentuation, that is2 the stronger or 
weaker ifeighting given to the beats of a bar according to their 
'Position' in it. But although much music will explicitly 
reveal strong and weak beats according to the strict scheme of the 
metre, there is much music which depends for its very effect upon 
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a negation of this classic procedure. The sense of metre is not 
denied in such music. On the contrary, it is reinforced 
Precisely because strict convention is-ignored, and would 
conversely be weakened to the extent that 'Correct' weighting 
were given to the appropriate beats of the bar. Many examples of 
music where this phenomenon is apparent will occur to the 
experienced musician, and it is probable that the vast majority 
of these examples will involve a degree of syncopation. There Js 
one example quoted by Zuckerkandlý however, where the rhythm is 
simplicity itself2 and that is the opening of the Beethoven Violin 
Concerto. The Concerto begins with four soft kettledrum strokes 
on the D below middle C. As Zuckerkandl points outs 
The thrillin, ý,, -, effect of this opening depends entirely 
upon whether the player succeeds in producing absolutely 
equal tones - certainly no easy task. His entire 
attention must be directed to avoiding the least trace 
of a difference in accentuation between the tones. if 
he is unsuccessful, if he involuntarily falls into even 
the slightest emphasis in the direction of quadruple 
meter ... ý the effect immediately becomes silly or 
ridiculous: it sounds as if the leader of an amateur 
orchestra wanted to count out one full measure aloud to 
his uneasy troops before they began: one - two - three - 
four - E21 But if the passage sounds as it was imagined, 
if the player succeeds in producing four really equal 
tonesy our auditive experience still does not coincide 
with this acoustical datum. Even in the complete absence 
of any differences in accent, we do not hear one tone four 
timesy but twice two toneBS groups, meter, measure (19569 
pp. 163-164). 
The conclusion drawn by Zuckerkandl from this line of argument is 
"that meter and accentuation are processes on two different planesý 
which are free to go together or to part company. Neither is 
dependent on the other - neither meter on accentuationt nor 
accentuation on meter. " (1956, pp. 165-166). 
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I. Iusical time may most easily be approached, perhaps, as 
a concept which involves the indication of discrete moments in 
objective time through the sounding of successive notes. The 
superficial nature of any such concept now begins to emerge. 
For an essential and extremely important aspect of musical 
temporalityq the sensing of pulse and metre does nott in its 
innermost quality, require direct and explicit statement in music. 
It is, as it were, one stage removed from the acoustical event 
of music itself. Yet such separation does not automatically 
mean that the characteristics of musical time will necessarily be 
at variance with those of a sequential or spatialised time. 
However, although it cannot be disputed that individual 
notes succeed one another, and may therefore legitimately be 
thought of as punctuating a spatialised time, it would indeed 
seem that the sense of metre - the temporal sense which is 
separate from the mere acoustical event of music - is not 
completely compatible with a straight-line view of time. it 
would appear to be a common experience that a sense of metre 
involves as much a recurring sense of to-and-frog arrival-and- 
departure as it does of progression through time. Zuckerkandl 
illustrates this experience: 
A piece of music is played; there is no accentuation. 
We count with the tones one-two-one- ... Why did 
we say 'one' hero instead of Ithree". P' What peculiarity 
in our perception of the third beat makes us count thus 
and not otherwise? If the now beat did nothing but 
bring us a further fraction forward in time, the 
phenomenon would be incomprehensible. If we 
involuntarily and unconsciously count 'one' to-beat 
number 3 this expresses the fact that it is not so much 
further as back that this beat carries us - and back to 
the starting point. To be able to come back, one must 
first'have gone away; now we also understand why we count 
one-tifoý and not one-one. Here 'two' does not mean 
simply 'beat number 21 but also 'away from'. The entire 
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process is therefore an laway from - back tolq not a 
flux but a cycle, a constantly repeated cycle, for the 
'one' that closes one cycle simultaneously begins 
another (1956, pp. 166-167). 
Tonality, howeverg is not the music of a society with a sense of 
cyclical time. Neither is it a 'single-level' music. Tonality 
is essentially the music of direction and culmination. Its 
notes constantly point outside themselves in their desire to 
'move on' and 'achieve fruition'. Furthermore tonality is an 
architechtonic music. It displays several 'levels' which 
'interact' to produce the particular experience common to all 
pieces of music conceived in that style. In view of these two 
oharacteristicsg it is more accurate to think of musical time as 
revealed through tonality as having a wave rather than a cyclical 
structure. Firstly, this structure allows for both a sense of 
recurrence and of continual forward motions 
Since in time there can be no real going backq and hence, 
strictly speaking, no real cyclical motion eitherý since, 
therefore, every-now beat does bring us to a new point in 
time, the process can be better understood and visualised 
as a wave .... which also best corresponds to our 
sensation of meter. Our sympathetic oscillation with 
the meter is a sympathetic oscillation with this wave. 
With every measure we go through the succession of phases 
characteristic of wave motion: subsidence from the wave 
crest2 reversal of motion in the wave trough, ascent 
towards a new crest, attainment of the summit, which 
immediately turns into a new subsidence -a new wave has 
begun (1956ý p. 168). 
Secondlyq whereas it is difficult to conceive of cyclical m6tion 
containing different 'levels' within itself, such a concept is 
relatively easy to imagine with a wave motion. Indeed, it is 
not difficult to conceive of simultaneous wave motions pertaining 
to a bar, a four-bar phraseý a sixteen-bar phrase and to 
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increasing sections of a movement right up to the complete 
movement itself. Conversely, wave motion is perceptible 'in' 
all the notes within a bar, no matter how small their value. 
But although the waves of musical time display these various 
'levels' they remain nothing more than aspects of one 
undifferentiated experience. Not only does the concept of wave 
in itself illustrate that music is an experience comprised of 
continual and unceasing motiong thereforeý but also that this 
motion pervades every 'moment' of the musical experience: 
It goes without saying that we shall observe an analogous 
phenomenon if we look in the opposite direction into the 
individual beat instead of beyond the individual measure. 
Even if the tones of the individual beat: are divided into 
smaller and smaller time values ... the temporal 
succession will not be experienced as a simple sequence; 
on these subordinate levels too the wave structure will 
unfailingly assert itself; we shall hear groups .aas 
What, as a beat2 is a mere phase of the cycle becomes a 
completed cycle, from the point of view of the next lower 
level and so on indefinitely. We can continue the sub- 
division to the limit of the perceptible, but we shall 
never come to a time value so small that time simply 
elapsies in it, in which the flux is not# also a pulse. 
The picture, then, is the same, whether we look beyond 
the measure or into the measure (1956, P-179). 
The wave is always in motion and is immanent throughout 
the musical experience. It cannot be halted, neither can it be 
segmented. Because music is ceaselessly ongoing in its motion 
and because time cannot be made to elaDse within musical 
experience, the relationship between the unfolding of time in 
music through the simple succession of notes, and the cyclical or 
wave structure that exists 'apart' from the music as simple 
acoustic occurrence, takes on an interesting complexion. It is 
not just that a succession of notes gives rise to a sense of 
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metro. It is also that these tones occur within the imminent 
phasing of a metrical wavet 
Certainlyq tones follow one another in time, fill their 
accurately determined portions of timet and thus for our 
. sensation (be it directly or indirectly) divide the time 
flux into equal fractions. But this is not all. We 
have seen that, in music, we never have to do with a 
more sequence in time. The temporal succession here is 
revealed not simply as a progression but as a combination 
of progression and recurrence; it does not represent 
itself to us in the image of a straight line but in the 
image of a wave. The equal portions into which musical 
meter appears to divide turn out, upon closer examinationg 
to be variously directed phases of wave motion; the 
moment of time at which a tone enter6. is not-a point on a 
straight line but on a wave; the interval of time that the 
tone fills in sounding is not a section of a straight line 
but a fractional phase of a wave. And as the tones fall 
on the different phases and fractional phases of the waveg 
the variously directed kinetic impulses of the different 
phases successi-wely implant themselves to the tones. 
This is what we hear when we hear music whose structure 
is metrical, -. the various directions of the successive wave 
phases (19569 P-173). 
Musical time, therefore, is precisely not an abstract durational 
shell which permits the existence of music. It is not a silent 
flow in which. discrete instantsq punctuated by individual notesq 
are necessarily separated in conception by a passive nothingness. 
Every musical momentý every musical phase actively vibrates with 
temporality. This variance in the characteristics of classical 
and musical time is made abundantly clear by Zuckerkandl: 
"Music is a temporal art" .... According to this 
-ones conception time appeared as a vessel through which -IV 
flow, or as the long empty course down which tones can 
pass; time made it possible for music to exist - without 
time no music, as without space no visual art; but that 
was all. In respect to the musical context itselft time 
remained perfectly neutral, it had no voice in it; its 
relation to the world of tonal event was like that of the 
still empty strip of film to the pictures that are to be 
taken on it (19569 pp. 180-181). 
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As we have seen, musical temporality is of a totally different 
natures 
It is not something coming from withoutiq the different 
accentuation of beats, which creates musical meter; 
musical meter is not born in the beats at a119 but in 
the empty intervals between the beats9 in the places 
where "time merely elapses". The mere lapse of time 
here effects something; it is felt as an event, strictly 
speaking as a wave ... s The function of time here is, theng no longer that of the empty vessel, which 
contains the tones ...; on the contraryý time intervenes, is directly active in the musical context. 
It is time which makes differently directed cyclical 
phases out of beats of equal length, which transforms 
equal measures into different degrees of intensity. 
Music is a temporal art not in the barren and empty sense 
that its tones succeed one another "in time"; it is a 
temporal art in the concrete sense that it enlists the 
flux of time as a force to serve its ends (1956, p. 181). 
So far it has been established that an adequate under- 
standing of musical time runs entirely counter to our traditionally 
lineal and segmented view of time. Yetý despite the fact that 
lineal and historical time are dialectic correlates of one. and the 
sane ideological structure2that is2 necessary aspects of one 
another, it would still remain possible to squeeze the rethought 
sense of musical time into what remains of the traditional view, 
namely, a view with a definite sense of the pastness of the pastq 
and the futurity of the future. For although it has been argued 
that musical temporality consists in unsegmented wave motion2 there 
is at the moment little in the description of that temporality 
which would prevent the notion that present musical experience 
depends upon the remembering of past motion and the conscious 
anticipation of motion yet to come. After all, a central part of 
the training for a professional musician involves the development 
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of an ability both to remember tones that have past, and to 
complete a melody or piece in the style appropriate to that 
piece. The professional musician, in other words, is expected 
to be able to consciously project himself backwards and for-., Tards 
in musical time with a great deal of 'accuracy'. Furthermoreq 
most laymen- who listen to music can easily become conscious that 
certain tones have passed, and that certain tones are very likely 
to occur, although their ability to reproduce or 'predict' these 
tones in an explicitly 'correct' manner is severely 
circumscribed. Important though this ability may be to a full 
understanding of the 'messages' implicit in tonality 
29 
1 it would 
seem to have little to do with the actual experiencing of time 
in the ongoing present. For to think that musical experience 
depends upon the recalling in memory of past tones that are now 
non-existent, or the projection in consciousness of tones that ai! e 
yet to have existence is to enter into a misconception. As 
already argued, the temporal aspect of musical experience does.. 
not SiMDly result from the succession of notes in time, but is 
the variously directed kinetic impulses evidenced through the 
occurrence of different notes as different phases or fractional 
phases of a wave motioný We do not become aware of a note as 
constituting a certain bear of a bar and as having a certain 
motional quality simply through countingy therefore. Counting is 
not a process whereby the mind externally imposes a consecutive 
organisation on past and potential. musical events. Rather, 
counting helps us to represent to ourselves a kinetic impulse that 
is revealed to us and that we experience directly: 
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Hearing music, we oscillate with its metric wave. Each 
tone falls on a particular phase of this wave; each 
phase of the wave imparts to the tone that falls on it - 
and3 through the tone, to the auditor- - its particular 
directional impulse. Not because I count "one" to a 
tone (or because the tone was emphasized by an accent - 
for often it is not) do I know that I am at the beginning of 
a measure, but because I feel that, with this tone, I have 
reached the wave crest and at the same time have been 
carried beyond itq into a new wave cycle. But because 
every tone ... is characterized -for my perception by a 
particular quality and because in these qualities the place 
of the tone ... on the metric wave is-expressed, I am- - -- 
able to hear directly from the tone ... in what part of 
the entire measure I am at the given moment (1956, 
pp. 204-205)- 
Musical experience thus contains the listener. It does 
not occur because the listener steps outside the present and, 
through the action of his consciousness, brings previous and 
future non-existent tones into simultaneous existence with 
present tones. Yet we are aware that different tones can only 
reveal their full musical temporality if they are played in time, 
a time, moreover, which seems to have its basis in a mathematical 
equality. How can we be aware of this phenomenon if not by 
objective measurement? Surely, the only answer is that two 
originally successive notes can be objectively measured for length 
and then compared by having them 'occur in consciousness' 
simultaneously. Upon reflection, it becomes clear that an 
awareness of the temporal 'correctness' of tones cannot come about 
in this way for one of two reasons. Firstly, the procedure 
indicated could involve the completely schizophrenic standing 
outside of oneself mentioned in Chapter Three 
30. Only by such a 
complete split in the self could the procedure be anything more 
than purely imaginary, or two tones whose musical temporality 
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depends upon their contextual successiveness have their 
temporality come under objective and simultaneous comparison 
without that temporality being partially destroyed. Secondly, 
if this schizophrenic approach is to be avoided, but the 
procedure mentioned above still maintained, there is no other 
alternative but that time should again be completely spatialized 
not from the point of view of the analyst, but as far as the tones 
themselves are concerned. Tones occurring 'in' time would be 
taken 'out' of time and re-arranged in a quasi-spatial manner, as 
if they were material bodies. Such spatialization is, of course, 
a-legitimate way of measuring time as it is evidenced in the. 
material sphere of the universe. Here, "the motion of one body, 
if it is taken as the measure of the motion of another body, is 
called time". Clearlyp if such motion takes place in the mind 
of the observer rather than 'naturally' in space, there is no 
distortion or loss of significance as far as classical time 
concepts are concerned, because the simultaneous motion and 
situation of material bodies in space is an inherent characteristic 
of their existence. On the. other hand, spatialized time isy as 
already intimated, completely inappropriate to an understanding 
of musical temporality in whatever aspect, because the manoeuvring 
of tones out of their contextual. situation destroys not only their 
full temporality, but their dynamic quality3l , since essential 
inter-relationships cease to exist. 
But surely, it will be replied, it remains perfectly 
possible to measure the length of notes and so determine whether 
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they are played in time? It doesq of course, remain perfectly 
possible to measure the length of notes as acoustical phenomena, 
but notq it will be remembered, as musical experience. Musical 
experience was precisely that which didn't lend itself to 
'physical' description 32. The sense of the temDoral 
correctness of a tone is, therefore, no more than that (a sense), 
and cannot be measured. Not only is it impossible to move 
tones around as if they were material bodies for the purpose of 
objectively measuring their temporalityý theng but the very 
immateriality of the tone as musical experience precludes 
temporal quantification in the strict scientific sense. Although 
musical time in tonality is based for practical and ideological 
reasons on mathematical equality2 and whilst admitting that gross 
distortion of this equality will destroy the temporal sense 
engendered by the music2 it has to be acknowledged that this 
equality and the measurement based on it are ultimately 
subservient to an intuitional sense of temporal correctness: 
Variations from absolute mathematical equality do not 
disturb uB9 if they serve to give the metre wave the form 
that is musically right. There is no such thing as a 
musician whose performance does not depart from 
mathematical equality within certain limits; accurate 
experiments have given amazing proof of how great such 
departures can be without even being noticed by the 
listener (even listeners with a thorough musical training). 
Whatq on the other hand, everybody notices instantlyg 
what disturbs everyoneg is the departures that do not 
serve the metric wave but go counter to it. The, 
commandment that is broken in a performance in poor time 
does not, then, refer to equality in length between 
intervals of time but to symmetry of mutually complementary 
wave phases (1956, p. 211). 
Existing within the one-dimensionality of musical space331 it is 
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therefore both logically and practically impossible for the 
listener to distance himself sufficiently from musical experience 
to objectively and explicitly situate metrical wave motions 
The one-dimensional creature ... is still unable to 
see outside its path; cannot look from without on 
distances traversed and compare them by measuring them. 
But it now seems that ... we can ascribe to it a sort 
of rhythmic feeling that tells it when phases Of its 
course balance each other. It is as though passing 
through - or let us rather say living through -a phase 
of its course had established a demand, has created an 
emptiness, to.: fill and fulfill which is the function of 
the following phase; if-the emptiness is filled, the 
brim reached, equilibrium is restored. The two phases 
do not stand side by side, are not compared and found 
equal; the sensation is that of a mutual complementing, 
a mutual interpenetrationg a mutual balancing) (1956, 
pp. 211-212). 
Our awareness of the metrical wave does not therefore 
result from the objective processes of counting or comparing 
successive tones. Rather, the wave or waves reveal themselves 
to us through the individual tones which are experienced in the 
ongoing present. Beqause of this, any attempt at conscious 
remembering or anticipation is liable to compromise the direct 
impact of these waves. Zuokerkandl discusses this phenomenon 
with regard to a two-beat bar: 
Remembrance is making present something that is past: 
consciousness turns back towards the past things, 
represents (re-presents) it to itself. But the way in 
which the past "one" is given in the present "two" is 
anything rather than a re-presenting. Do we remember 
"one" when we feel "two"? Does consciousness turn back 
towards the past moment? Not at all - instead we are 
entirely concentrated upon "two", on what is directly 
present. We feel "two" as what it is, as symmetrical 
oompl 
* etion and 
fulfillment precisely in relation to 
something which no longer is, which is not present. 
If. we tried, by remembering, to make "one" present 
simultaneously with "two", all perception of meter 
would instantly ceaselto be replaced by something as 
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meaningless as a photographic double exposure (1956, 
pp. 226-227)- 
The same argument obtains with regard to anticipation: 
We may be able to anticipateg in thought or feeling, the 
course of time, to make a future thing present in 
imagination. But the advance of "one" toward 11two"I 
which constitutes the nature of the first phase of the 
wave, is the exact opposite of such an anticipatory 
making present. Do we by any chance think ahead to 
11twoll, do we anticipatorily imagine "two", when we are 
feeling "one"? On the contrary, we are completely and 
exclusively concentrated upon the present "one"; with 
it we are directed toward a "two" as toward something 
that is not yet, that is in no way present, not even as 
a more representation in our consciousness. Anyone 
who anticipatorily represents 11two" to himself -while 
"one" is the present can no longer feel "one" (1956, 
p. 227)- 
The practice of rememberincrand anticipating therefore destroys 
the full experiencing of the metrical waves 
On the one hand remembering, on the other foreknowingg 
forefeeling - far from explaining the phenomenon of 
meter - are incompatible with it. Complete exclusion 
of any remembering and foreknowing is the necessary 
condition for experiencing meter (1956, p. 227). 
But although it has been established that memory and 
anticipation positively hamper the full experiencing of musicy 
it nevertheless remains true that what weq with our industrial 
mode of thought, think of as past and potential events, play a 
vital role in the creation of that musical experience. The 
'back-tot of beat one is only experienced as such because, there 
was an 'away-from' conveyed by a beat two. Conversely, 'away- 
from' can only be experienced in the context of a sense of a 
starting-pointy a home-base to which a return can be made. Againy 
the different levels of wave motion that may be sensed in the 
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ongoing present of the musical experience may only be sensed as 
such because the phase in some way 'refers' backward and forward 
to different"parts' oi. the work. The nature of this sqnsingg 
this experiencing, itself gives a clue as to the true nature of 
temporality. For if it cannot be the case that the human mind 
brings past and potential tones together to create the musical 
experience, then it must be that each tone somehow 'contains' the 
entire musical work in its own presence: 
The remarkable fact, which we also encounter 
elsewhere in nature, that a part of a whole is, so to 
speak, aware of its being a partl of its relation to 
the whole and its place in the whole2 and also imparts 
this knowledge to the observer - that, consequently, 
the whole is in some manner present in the part - to 
this fact our thinking seeks to do justice by the field 
concept (1956, p. 205)- 
The great interest of this concept is that it does not logically 
a2low ona to think of past tones as totally gone out of existence: 
"Two", theng follows "one" - in other words9 if "two" 
is present "one" is past. Is this pastness equivalent 
to nonexistence? Could "two" be what it is if 11one119 
because it was no longerg were'really nonexistent? "Two" 
is not simply the. boat that follows "one"; it is 
something quite differentg namelyg symmetrical complement, 
completion and fulfillment. The whole course of "two" 
is in direct correspondence with "one", it is this 
correspondence; in every instant of the exi7stence of 
"two" "one" is also containedg as the partner in this 
relationship, the object of the symmetrical completion. 
If "one"y once past, were lost in nonexistencey 
extinguished - asq according to the hourglass concept 
past time is extinguished - "two. " would be simply a 
second "one", and nothing more (1956y pp. 224-225)- 
This, as we have seen, is not a viable possibility. A similar 
conclusion may be reached concerning the nonexistence of tones 
not yet realised: 
"Two'' follows ''one'' - this too means if ''one'' is presentg 
"two'' is future. Is this all we know about ''two'' - 
that it is not yet if ''one'' is? Yet ''one'' is something 
quite different from the beat upon which ''two'' will 
- 197 - 
follow; it is the beat which proceeds toward "two", 
with which we ourselves move toward "two" .... 
Through its entire course we experience "one" as 
something to be completed; its existence is a need 
for symmetrical completion. "One" could not be what 
it is if 11two", because it was not yet, were really 
nonexistent, if the future "two" were not already 
part of the existence of the present "one" (1956, 
pp. 225-226). 
M these considerations lead Zuckerkandl to make what 
is perhaps one of the most perceptive statembnts concerning the 
nature of musical temporality. In it he puts forward a concept 
of musical temporality which is so obviously at variance with 
the time-sense of industrial man that no further comment is 
required: 
The present of music meter, then, contains within 
it a past that is not remembered and a future that is 
not foreknown - and not as something to be supplied b, y 
thought but as a thing directly given in experience 
itself .... What becomes of the point (on the 
sa: adle) "now" betweenthe two abysses of "no more" and 
"not yet", in the face of a present in which 'Inowllf "not 
yet" and "no more" are given together, in the most 
intimate interpenetration and with equal immediacy? This 
is a present from'which not I, thanks to my particular 
powers, look backward into tlTe past and forward into the 
future, but which itself thus looks backward and forward. 
These particular powers of remembering and foreknowing, 
then, are not required in order that future things and 
past things shall not be nothingo The nast is not 
extinguished, but Tot ause a memory stores it; it is 
not extinguished because time itself stores itý or, better 
put, the being of time is a storing of itseff-, - the future 
is not an inpenetrable wall, but not because a foreknow- 
ledge or forefeeling anticipates time; it is not 
inpenetrable because time always anticipates itselfg 
because the being of time is an anticipating itself ... 
the present of musical experience is not the dividing 
point that eternally separates past and future; it is the 
stage upon whichq for every ear the drama of the being of 
time is played - that ceaseless storing of, itself and 
anticipating itself which is never repeated, which is 
every instant new (1956, pp. 227-228). 
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Musical Space. 
The idea that there can be a musical time is one that 
is likely to go largely unchallenged. In many ways music 
more obviously depends upon temporal flow than any other art 
form, with the notable exception of film. But the assertion 
that music conveys a spatial aspect is not likely to be so 
easily accepted. In the opinion of Schopenhaus3: ý for example, 
music is "perceived solely in and through time, to the complete 
exclusion of space". The precise difficulty of proposing a 
. 
musical space can be brought to the fore by asking the question: 
'Where is music? '. Although it is possible to precisely locate 
the sources of sound, such as musical instruments or loud- 
speakers, in Newtonian space, such location is an impossibility 
with the sound itself. Sound,, as stated in Chapter Two, is 
the medium of circumambience. It surrounds and encloses us in 
a cocoon of simultaneously ongoing experience. Can one 
legitimately talk of musical space, therefore? There seem to 
be one of two alternatives in the face of this question. 
Firstly, one may define space in the narrow Physical senset 
that isq as a visual space marked out and presented to us 
through the precise location of material objects. This narrow 
but universal definition will result in one of two tendencies: 
either the spatial characteristics of music will be 
distortively re-arranged to fit the visual definition of spaceg 
or the question just posed will be dismissed as altogether 
meaningless. Secondly, spurred on by the fact that a temporal 
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aspect of music may legitimately be said to exist (and the 
existence of time in all other circumstances so far encountered 
presupposes that of space), one may hypothesize that musical 
experience displays characteristics analogous but essentially 
different from those phenomena we experience in a visual sense 
as spatial. In this case there is no alternative but to extend 
the definition of space to cope with a space that is not 
visual in nature. 
The second course is the one taken by Zue-kerkandl. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Zuckerkandl defines space as "that whence 
something encounters me" (1956, p. 271). Since tones are 
encountered as something apart from the self in the sense of 
being 'given' rather than created in imagination, it is 
legitimate to presuppose a space from whence these tones are 
encountered. Indeeay if space couldn't be presupposed purely 
on the basis of the encountering of tones, "there would be 
nothing whence they [the tones] could encounter me and they 
could not encounter me" (1956, p. 271). Having theoretically 
established a spatial phenomenon solely on the evidence provided 
through the encountering of tones, Zuckerkandl then goes on to 
describe how this evidence seemingly transcends the confines of 
visual or materially presented space. As noted in Chapter Twoy 
sound cannot be precisely located: 
We see blue flower; we touch smooth wall; but we hear 
tones - not sounding string. The colour we see, -the 
hardness we touchy normally leads us directly to the 
thingg the bodily spatial thingg of which it is a 
. -property - hence leads us directly to space. Tone2 
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on the contrary, does not lead us to the thing, to the 
oause to which it owes its existence; it has detached 
itself from that; it is not a property, but, an entity. 
So it might well be that, though tone presupposes space 
as that whence it encounters me, its connection with 
I traditional] spatiality is limited to the source of 
the tone, to the necessity for the presence of the 
bodily-spatial thing which produces it but from which 
it immediately detaches itself .... 
(19569 p. 273). 
The nature of this transcendence forces a consideration of the 
characteristics of tonal space, for to be left with a 'whence' 
or space which is completely amorphous and undifferentiated could 
seriously undermine the attempt to establish a tonal space. In 
themselves tones could be held to reveal a featureless space 
which is nothing other than the classical abstract shell awaiting 
the depth-giving articulation of precisely located material 
bodies. Space as presupposed through tones, it could be argued, 
is identical to that experienced by lying on one's back and staring 
into a cloudless blue sky. Although we may imagine a whence from 
which tones encounter usq therefore,. we must ask whether the 
encounter reveals space exRerientially: 
When tone encounters us, does it carry traces of that 
whence it encounters us? Is the experience "tone" a 
completely unspatial experience, or do we experience 
space in tone? Do we hear si3ace as we see and touch 
space ...? (1956, p. 273). 
In order to establish that space as evidenced through 
music is experiential rather than 'theoretical' in nature, it 
becomes necessary to revert to the original question; 111here is 
music? ' or more precisely; 'Where is the tone? '_ Since it has 
a1ready been acknowledged that tones are encountered as something 
apart from the selfý the most obvious answer, and the one 
immediately grasped by Zucker]kandl, is that tones occur in the 
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external world. in so doing they convey to us certain spatial 
characteristics of that world: 
Only what encounters me from without is veritably tone; 
what I call from memory to consciousness is more 
representation. Here then, the question 'IT/Tithin or 
without? " is meaningfulg and the answer is given: tones 
are without. To the tone when it encountersus, there 
must still cling something of that whence it encounters 
us, something of space; other-wise we could not definitely 
feel it as happening "without not within" (1956, p. 274). 
But what are those characteristics? To the extent that we may 
be conscious of the external world solely through the tones Of 
music2 music may be said to be localized in the external world. 
But as tones I detached' foom their sources music does not have 
precise location in that world. Although symptomatic of 
external reality, music reveals a space which remains a space 
without places: 
Tho space experience of eye and hand is basically an 
experience of places and distinctions between places; 
and the space we see and touchq in which we also move, 
and which, finallyserves our science of spaceq our 
geometry, -as starting point, has been defined as the 
aRgregate of all places. The ear, on the other handq 
knows space only as an undivided whole; of places and 
distinctions between places it knows nothing. The 
space we hear is a space without places (1956, p. 276). 
There is, furthermore, a difference in the relationship between 
perception and that which is perceived with regard to visual and 
aural experience7 a difference rooted in the circumambient 
quality of sound. IThereas VIsual perception is active and 
'outer directed', aural perception is 'passive' and 'inner 
directed': 
The colour I see is the property of a thing; it is with 
the thingv out thereq and it remains with the thing. 
But the tone I hear is not with the thing that produces 
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it and does not remain with itq it has detached itself 
from it; to encounter the tone isý so to speak, 
something in a different style frora encountering the 
colour (1956, p. 276). 
This difference in the style of encountering affects the nature 
of the spatial characteristics conveyed: 
As a creature who sees I laiow space as something that is 
without and remains without, that confronts me - here I 
am, there it is, two worlds rigidly and permanently 
separated; as hearer, hearer of tone, who has no 
conception of a "being without", I know space as something 
coming from without, as something that is always directed 
towards mey that is always in motion towards me (1956, 
p. 277). 
Visual space is statioý thereforýq and tonal space fluid. it 
is "not sound that has become alive in space'15 but rather "space 
that has become alive as a result of sound" (1956, p. 277)- As 
suchq tonal space reveals another characteristic totally 
inconsistent with classical formulation of space: 
We see*- and touch -a space in which things move; the 
statement that space moves is, for the eye and the hand, 
meaningless. But not for the ear. We hear space that 
itself is in a sort of motion; we hear - to try another 
formulation - "flowing s-Pace" (19569 pp. 277-278). 
Tonal space2 then, is not the same as the empty shell of 
olassical space. Although an undivided experiential whole, 
tonal space is "filled to the brim" and pregnant with motion. 
But a space which is "filled to the brim" and pregnant with 
motion presupposes a space that has depth. How can this be when 
tonal space cannot distinguish between 'here' and 'elsewhere', 
and knoirs nothing of visual boundaries. Although it is possible 
to distinguish between two tones, such distinguishing does not 
reveal located segments and boundaries: 
A new tone added to one already sounding draws no 
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boundaries in sDace, occupies no location that belongs 
to it alone, does not drive the first tone away from 
inywhere, is not in a different place from the first; 
they are both in the same place, namely, "without" 
(1956, pp. 283-284). 
The answer is that the depth "without" is brought to the hearer 
through tones. This sensation stands in direct contrast to the 
sense of touch, which cannot reveal anything that is not in 
direct contact with the subject: 
Whereas we feel the thing in contact with us simply as 
"there", we hear tone as "coming from ... - not from 
any one*location in space, nor yet from all locations in 
space, as if space were the inactive vessel through which 
tone approaches us. No, in tone, space itself ... is 
in a unique way directed toward the hearer, is experienced 
as in motion toward him. In this sensation - "directed 
from ... toward ... 11 - spatial depth is revealed to 
the hearer. Depth in auditory space, then, refers not to 
the distance between my ear and the location in space 
where a tone is producedg does not refer at all to the 
space in which I encounter tones; it refers to the space 
I enco7u-nter in tones, to the "from ... 11 element of the 
encounter. Depth in auditory space is only another 
expression for this "coming from ... 11 that we sense in 
every tone (1956, p. 289). 
Zuckerkandl concludes that: 
The space of tones ... is a placeless depth- 
surrounding the hearer org more properly, directed 
toward him, moving toward himý from all about. The 
depth of this space is. not the depth that, together with 
height and widthq makes up the three dimensions of 
visual sDace. Height, width, depth - there are no 
such disýinctions in auditory space. Here there is 
only one "from ... 11 - which, if we like, we may call the one dimension of auditory space. Here "from ... 
does not mean "from there or from elsewhere" but "out 
of depth from all sides"; and "out of depth" is not a 
direction in space but a (nayjjhje direction 2f space 
(1956, p. 290). 
- 204 - 
The Paradigm and Music 
Having now summarised the main characteristics of musical 
time and musical space, it is now possible to elucidate the 
Implicit-Explicit Paradigm as it applies to music. This may be 
done, it will be remembered, by considering the way in which the 
'phenomenal' time-space sense of music can give rise to different 
culture-specific time-space senses. The first step in this 
process is to describe the mutual dependency of musical time and 
musical space. 
Zuokerkandlls conclusion regarding musical time was that 
... the present of musical experience is not the dividing 
point that externally separates past and future; it is the stage 
upon which, for every ear, the drama of the being of time is 
played - that ceaseless storing of itself and anticipating 
itself which is never repeated, which is every instant new". 
Now although Zuckerkandl is clearly thinking here in terms of 
musical experience, it is just as easy to think of a 'purely' 
musical moment (that isy a sonic event which is 'out theret and 
'beyond us' as 'objective fact') which stores time within itself 
and then reveals it to the listener. It is the concept of 
musical space7 however, which ultimately defeats this un- 
dialectic mode of thoughtq because it is nothing other than the 
'Present of musical experience' that impinges on us from the 
"whence-ness" of auditory space. Whereas it is possible to 
conceive of musical time as being 'independent' of the listenery 
in other words, such a conception is impossible with regard to 
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musical space. Through its very nature, the listener is in- 
escapably situated as its 'focus of attention'. Musical time, 
then, may be thought of as being gathered and revealed within the 
revelationary present of musical space. It is this 
'relationship' which gives a real clue to the nature of the 
lphenomenalt musical time-space sense. For as the previous 
discussion. of musical time and musical space suggested, these 
'entities' are not independent abstract frameworks which contain 
musical events. Rather, the experiential musical moment is an 
event-world34 which displays certain Idurational-extensionall 
qualities. It is the ontological priority of this vibrating and 
organic event-world over its concomitant extension-duration which 
explains the essential there-and-nowl quality of musical 
experience. The lphenomenalt musical time-space sense should 
thus be thought of as a seamless duration-extension which informs 
the actual experiential moment from which it emanatesq yet of 
whichy in its virtualityý it still forms an integral and 'internal' 
aspect. To put it another way, the actuality of the 
experiential musical moment contains within itself a virtual 
time-space in which duration cannot be legitimately separated from 
extension. 
The next step in this elucidation should be to describe 
the qualities of implicitness and explicitness in terms of the 
'phenomenal' musical time-space sense. This description would 
represent an initial degree of distortioný'since the qualities 
of implicitness or explicitness experienced through music 
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essentially lie beyond the objectivation of that symbolic 
medium. However, because this description is extremely 
abstract, the qualities will be described in terms of musical 
time, and then, separately, in terms of musical space. This, 
of course, will add a second degree of distortion, because 
musical time and space are not entities that may legitimately be 
regarded as independent. Only after these separate descriptions 
will this second degree of distortion be removed2 and a 
description of the qualities of implicitness and explicitness in 
terms of the 'phenomenall musical time-space sense be attempted. 
Temporal imPlicitness7 then, may be said to occur when 
the evanescent musical moment as exuerienced in the 'saddle' of 
-the ongoing present gains its efficacy from its relationship to 
previous and potential moments. as mediated through that present 
moment. With temporal explicitness, however, the musical 
moment gains its efficacy from its relationship to previous and 
potential moments as mediated through their respective pastness 
and futurity. In both cases the musical moment possesses 'within 
itself' the virtuality of moments gone and not yet born. The 
difference between implicitness and explicitness is a difference 
in motional tendency as constantly. revealed through the 'saddle' 
of the ongoing musical present. 
In s-Datial termsy an implicit structure is one in which 
moments actually external to -the musical present are perceived to 
impinge directly on that present, this being the case whether the 
external momen-tus are in synchroniC35 or diachronic relationship 
with that musical present. Because all external moments are 
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gh the there-ness' of 
the present, it may be said mediated throua- 
that the present is central to a eircumjacence of such moments. 
And because all moments, as they attain actuality, imply an 
adjacency to all othersq there is little or no distancing 
involved in the relationships between them. With a fully 
explicit structure, on the other hands there is a greater sense 
of distancing between the present musical moment and others 
external to itj principally because any one of these external 
moments will have its relationship to the musical present 
mediated through the 'there-ness"of other external moments. 
That. this description of implicitness and explicitness in 
terms of separate temporal and spatial categories is distortive 
may be demonstrated by once again referring to the example of 
tonality7 but this time bearing in mind the description of 
musical time-space with tonality, the explicitness which we 
naturally think of as being spatiallypresent in harmony 
necessarily involves the temporal explicitness (naturally 
associated with rhythm) which gathers itself up and reveals 
itself in its virtuality through that 'spatial' harmonic present. 
Conversely, rhythmic explicitness which we naturally think of as 
being temporally present in the actual music moment contains 
within itself the explicit spatiality of melodic structure as well 
as that of synchronically existing harmonic moments. 
In the light of this distortion it is now finally possible 
to. doscribe the implicit and explicit oppositions in terms of one, 
undifferentiated, 'phenomenal' time-space sense. An implicit 
musical structure may be said to occur when the past2 potential 
- 208 - 
and synchronically texternall experiential moments which pervade 
the musical present do so immediately and directly. They come 
in on the present and are indwelling without, as it wereg any 
action on the part of that musical present. An explicit musical 
structure, on the other hand, may be said to occur when the 
musical present, as it were, goes out and 'collects' the past, 
potential and synchronically external moments which constitute 
its essential quality. Whereas the implicit musical moment 
points within itself through the other moments which inform it, 
the explicit moment points to these other moments, which do not 
have present actuality, but which nevertheless possess a certain 
virtuality 
36. 
*** 
One of the diff ioulties of explaining the paradigm in terms 
of differing time-spaces is that it is possible for us, _ex Zost 
faotoy to identify and explicitly set down a great number of the 
relationships pertinent to the musical moment in an implicit 
structure. Furthermore, it is only possible for us to conceive 
a genuinely implicit structure by filtering it through our 
particular world sense, which hasq as one of its characteristics, 
a desire for clarity and explicitness. The relationships of 
implicit structures are therefore only immediate or direct in 
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terms of our explicit orientation to the world. To the person 
living 'within' an implicit structureý the question of 
immediacy or directness would never'arise. Mary Douglas makes 
this clear in reference to pro-literate cultures in general: 
The anthropologist who draws out the whole scheme of the 
cosmos which is implied in these (primitive] practices 
does the primitive culture great violence if he seems to 
present the cosmology as a systematic philosophy 
subscribed to consciously by individuals. We can study 
our own cosmologies .... But primitive cosmologies 
cannot rightly be pinned out for display like exotic 
lepidopte-ra, iTithout distortion to the nature of a 
primitive culture (19701 PP-110-Ill)- 
This difficulty points to the central problem of this 
ohapterg namely) the contradiction inherent in trying to account 
for the implicit nature of the musical/social process in general 
and of some world senses in particular throug h the overwhelmingly 
explicit procedure of verbal-rational analysis. The 
contradiction has been circumvented by first moving from the 
common-sense and explicit reifications in terms of which we 
think2 to a paradigm for musical/social elucidation which in its 
essential nature was purely intuitional or implicit. Having 
achieved this 'pure intuition', it then became possible to 
gradually move back to a situation in which reified notions were 
again used, but this time being fully aware of the distortions 
they inevitably involve. The following chapters, in discussing 
different culture-specific musical realities, continue this trend, 
and so avoid the abstract and difficult argument which of 
necessity has characterized this chapter. Yet the discussions 
vhich follow should be read very much in the light of this present 
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chapter. For the musical realities do not reside in the verbal- 
rational reifications used to describe them, but rather in a 
social process which is of an entirely different order from 
those reifications. It is thus necessary to read much more 'in' 
and 'through' the discussions than is normal with verbal- 
rational descriptionsý and so to lodge the realisation and 
comprehension of different musical realities in those aspects of 
the mind which are not symbolically imminent. 
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ITOTES: 
For a further discussion of this relationship, see below, 
Appendix I. 
2. The implications of this sentence are further elucidated 
in the final two paragrphs of Chapter Thirteen. 
A specific example of such an occurrence is provided by the 
'discovery, of the laws appropriate to-the material sphere 
of the universe. See Chapter Three7 especially pp. +7- 
and also Appendix I. 
It might be thought that this sentence has a built-in 
contradictioný since I must be using certain unstated 
categories of analysis to approach the phenomena of 
distancing and dialectic interaction taken to be symptomatic 
of the relationship obtaining between phenomena and categories 
of analysis. In other words the categories of analysis I 
use to look at categories of analysis in general may them- 
selves be inappropriate, thus bringing into question the 
characteristics I assign to the generalised categories. 
This is no difficulty, however, because if I assumeg in 
using categories of analysis to look at categories in 
general, that my categories may be inadequate, then it is 
logically inconsistent to use this assumption to question the 
idea that all generalised categories may be inappropriate 
or inadequate. To put it another wayq it is logically 
inconsistent to use the assumptions of a meta-situation to 
question*the characteristics of those assumptions as they 
may appear in the specific situation. 
Even if it is accepted that we cannot know another as we know 
ourselves it might still be argued that people can be 
perceived independently of the symbols they emit. It could 
be suggested that we recognise a totally inert person (such 
as someone in a coma) as a significant other even though he 
emits no obvious symbols. This line of thought does not 
overcome the difficulty, however, that-no person can be 
arbitrarily isolated from the social mi7l-ieu with which he is 
constantly interacting. Our hypothetical inert person is 
eliciting a response from us because, in all likelihoodp we 
should want to know why he is inert and what we can do about 
it. Inert persons are potentially a cause for concerng and 
so the quality of inertness itself becomes a symbol. The 
mere existence of a significant other is incipiently symbolic, 
and people and the symbols they emit cannot be legitimately 
separated in such an arbitrary manner. On the other hand, 
it-remains perfectly legitimate to distinguish between the 
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phenomcna that we identify -as the externalisations of 
people and those peoDle themselves, provided we realise 
that this distinction itself lies within the totally 
symbolic world in which we exist,. 
6. The assertion that symbols may be described as articulations 
in time-space which are taken to be socially meaningful 
implies that there are other articulations or phenomena in 
time-space which are not socially meanineful. On the face 
of it, this implication uould seem to cont-radict the 
assertion that human existence is totally symbolic and that 
every perception is made in the context of and as part of 
this symbolically mediated existence. As already argued, 
however, the fact that all knowledge is rooted in the self CD 
and that it is logically impossible to escape the-symbolic 
nature of existence does not moan that there is no data of 
actuality coming from without which may be conceived of as Z; ) 
paralleling our conception of I reality I. Although all 
perception is socially bounded, therefore, it renains 
legitimate to assign certain phenomena a low degree of 
relevance to that situation. Typically2 articulations in 
time-space which are taken to be socially meaningful are 
those which, within our totally symbolic existence, we 
perceive to 'originate' and 'terminate' uith people. Less 
typical would be those Inaturalt phenomena to which a 
specific 'social' raeaning is commonly assigned. 11-Taturall 
phenomena which have little direct or immediate bearing on 
'social' process irould be essentially a-typical. The 
relationship of self to the symbolic manipulation of the 
environment is further discussed in Appendix II. 
See Poulet (19591 pp. 3-7)- 
ght be brought that a generalised concept of The criticism mir 
time-sDace has been assumed in order to disDrove its 
existenceg a situation which would be logically inconsistent. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the concept has only 
been assumed to demonstrate its inadequacy, the question of 
whether a truly transcendent time-space has ever -actually existed being discussed in the following parag-raph. There 
is, thereforeý no attempt to question the existence of the 
generalised concept as it exists in men's minds, but rather 
to demonstrate its exact status in relation to other 
societies. 
For example, Einsteinian time-space, which was pre-fipgured 
to a considerable extent by the theoretical work of Riemann, 
is primarily appropriate to frames of reference 
characterised by great distances and high velocities. 
10. In this sub-section2 I mean by a tsymboll something that has 
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embodiment in the external material world. 'Symbol', 
thereforeq should not be confused with Ireified concept', 
which has no material embodiment in the external world, 
although it is taken to be materially mediated in the 
processes of consciousness. Since a symbol has 'material' 
embodiment, and since a reified concept is, by definition, 
materially mediated, they may both be thought of as 
possessing objectivation. 
This may raise the question in some people's minds as to 
whether society, as described hereq actually exists. This 
question is meaningless insomuch as it depends upon one's 
criteria for assigning existenceý and these criteria, in 
turn, are grounded in one's particular world-sense. A 
person whose thinking is largely influenced by the 
'universality' of a reductionist and deterministic -world 
sense would probably argue that the concept of a society as 
here described has no actual existential validity, whereas a 
person who is capable of transcending the reductionist and 
materialistic straightjacket would probably be more kindly 
disposed towards it. 
12. It is interesting to note that in typographical societyq with 
its great emphasis on materiality, such thought processes 
tend to be repressed from consciousness. Only those thoughts 
which have direct physical referents (the written word) and 
which conform to convergent linear cause-and-effect processes 
are easily admitted to consciousness. In this context the 
work of Edward de Bono on lateral thinking is of great 
relevance. See, for example, Edward de Bono (1971 and 1973). 
The word Ireification' is here being used in a much iTider 
sense than usual. As a result, it is necessary to realise 
that there are different types and degrees of reification. 
Highest reification occurs with the physical referent of the 
written wordq whereas the lowest degree may be said to occur 
with music, whichq as indicatedg emphasises relationships 
rather than relata. Nevertheless, since music, in 
realising the non-material and directly imperceptible 
relations of society, momentarily 'freezes' the utter fluidity 
of those relationsq it does reify to a certain extent. 
14. This principle, in turn, is based on Russell's Paradox. 
15. This sub-section is predicated on the notion of tontic 
levels' developed by Wishart (1973). According to this 
concept there are different 'levels' or Ispheres' of activity 
within the universe (e. g., the materialg the biol6gicalg the 
social) which display different, and often mutually 
incompatibleý lairs and/or norms. Consequently, it is 
necessary to apply different epistemologies to these different 
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levels. Wishart's concept2 of courseq militates very 
strongly against a reductionist view of the universe. 
16. In this context it. may be remembered that the position 
adopted in Chapter Five with regard to ongoing social 
process specifically excluded the idea that any sector of 
social symbolic activity could somehow be regarded as an 
'ultimate reality' in which all other activity could be 
grounded. 
17. The use of the word 'unified' in this context does not 
indicate a consensual approach to social theory. It may 
be remembered that in Chapter Three it was specifically 
argued that the social-intellectual structure of modern 
industrial society actively facilitated and encouraged 
conflict along class lines. 
18. There is a strong tendency for conceptualisation at this 
level of abstraction to be actively repressed from 
consciousness in the industrial world. Reasons for this 
were put fonrard in Chapter Three (see especially pp., 'H -5-2 
19. It is pertinent to point out in this context that, as 
society 'displays' the two aspects of 'material' relata and 
non-material relationships, so consciousness may be conceived 
as a 'pre-existent' and 'wholel phenomenon of which matter 
and spirit are merely two different aspects. P. F. Stravison 
is of this opinion when he says that: "the concept of person 
is logically-prior to that of an individual consciousness. 
The concept of person is not to be analysed as that of an 
animated body or of an embodied animal' (Strawson, 1959, P-103). 
This concept of mind in giving equal ontological status to 
non-material relationships, underlines the desirability of a 
paradigm which does not rest exclusively on the material 
aspect of symbolization. 
20. Herein lies the essential difference between this paradigm 
and any generalized concept of time-space, for whereas the 
generalized concept has no characteristics (whether directly 
or indirectly'statable) which would seem to distinguish it 
from culture-specific concepts grounded in particular mediaý 
the paradigm does have characteristics (although not 
directly statable) whose very essence is that they are 
grounded in the media taken to be important in particular 
societies. 
21. But seeg however, the discussion later in this sub-section. 
22. Although the categories of analysis described here may be 
distortive they have still been used in the following 
chapters for two reasons. Firstlyý time-spaces other than 
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industrial time-spaco are very difficult to describe 
linguistically unless they are filtered to a certain extent 
t hrough the industrial time-space sense. What would be 
gained in phenomenological adequacy would be more than lost 
to obscurantism. Secondly, the musicological information 
drawn upon in these chapters has largely been conceived in 
these terms, and it would again seem counter-productive to 
indulge in involved 'translation' processes, See the 
comments at the end of the final section of this chapter. 
23. The ethnocentrism -predominantly being discussed in this 
chapter is between different societies. It is) as we have 
seen, equally possible for there to exist ethnocentrism 
betwe*en different groups in the same highly stratified 
society. However, there are no qualitative differences 
between these two types of gross distortion, and exactly 
the same strictures may be taken to apply. 
24. That isý because pre-literate man's world sense is 
essentially oral-aural in nature. 
25. That is, because industrial man's world sense is 
essentially visual in nature. 
26. Zuckerkandl (1956)2 has carried out a highly perceptive 
study of the way in which the 'phenomenal' time-space sense 
of music woVks2 and-this study is extensively drawn on later 
in this chapter. However, having elucidated the main 
characteristics of ('phenomenal') musical time2 space and 
motion,, Zuckerkandl then moves to a position of thinking 
these characteristics responsible for significance in music. 
Zuckerkandlls principal conclusion in this regard is set out 
earlier in this thesis as part of the discussion in Chapter 
Four (see above, p. 80 
27- It is necessary to be conscious of these two existential 
levels of musicq even, where the temporal-spatial 
characteristics of a culture-specific piece of music very 
closely match those of the 'phenomenal? time-space sense 
(as, for example, in pre-literate musics). For not to be 
conscious of these two levels can lead to a reification of 
the musical processq and so of the social significance 
inherent in music (see the discussion which immediately 
follows). 
28. See above , pp. 77-+ -a 19 . 
29. See below, Chapter Twelve, the section entitled "Some 
Comparative Remarks on Form". 
30. See above, p. 52. 
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31. See above, the discussion in Chapter Four, pp. 13 -71'. 
32. Again, see -above pp. 93 -9+ . 
33. For an explanation of this one-dimensionality see the 
following sub-section, on "Llusical Space". 
34. An event-world because actual musical moments contain within 
themselves other related moments which are virtual. 
35. The concept of an external musical moment which is synchronic 
with the present musical moment applies to those moments which 
occur 'at the same' time as the one under consideration. For 
many people a piece of harmony itself constitutes one un- 
differentiated experiential moment. For others, however, one 
aspect of a piece of harmony (such as the 'melodic note') may 
be given precedence in consciousness over others. In this 
case these other moments may be thought of as synchronically 
external to the present experiential moment. Such psychic 
separation, it should be notedq involves an element of 
temporality (since it -Dresupposes an ability to shift the 
focus of attention in time). Whether or not a piece of 
harmony will involve synchronically external moments thus 
depends on the mode of consciousness with which it is 
approached, and so underlines the essentially dialectic and 
experiential nature of musical moments. The fact that the 
existence of synchronically external moments involves a 
temporal element again underlines the great difficulty of 
separating musical time from musical space (or vice versa). 
36. The implicit-explicit paradigm as set out here has much in 
common with Chester's intensional and extensional categories 
(see Chester, 1970). Those categories are drawn from a 
comparison of 'classical' and 'rock' musicý Chester's 
purpose being to demonstrate the ideological distortion 
involved in judging rock music according to classical 
standards. Given the limited nature of his purpose, there 
is no attempt by the author to follow through the 
implications created by his categgorisation. Further, it 
seems unlikely that Chester would attempt to ground his 
categories in the role played by media in structuring men's 
consciousnesses and societies. There would, on the contrary, 
seem to be a far greater dependence on the dialectical 
materialism of traditional Marxist thoughtý a dependence. which 
would preclude many of the considerations discussed in this 
section. The paradigm would also seem to have a great deal 
in common with Basil Bernstein's notion of elaborated and 
restricted linguistic codes (see Bernstein, 1971). Space 
precludes a detailed examination of this latter parallel. 
- 217 - 
POPERENCES: 
BEMISTEEIN, B. (1971)- Class, Codes and Control, Vol. I. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
CIMSTER, A. (1970)- "Second Thoughts on a Rock Aesthetic: The 
Band". New Left Review (62). 
DE B01109 E. (1971). The Use of Lateral Thinking. Penguin 
Books Ltd. 
DE BONO, E. (1973). Po: Beyond Yes and No. Penguin Books Ltd. 
DOUGLAS, M. (1970)- Purity and Danger. Penguin Books Ltd. 
DUITCAIT, H. D. (1968). Symbols in Society. Oxford University 
Press. 
1,11MLEERS, W. (1971). Twilight of the Gods. Faber and Faber 
MERLBAU-PONTYI M. (1962). The PhenomenolocVýof Perception, 
Smithq C. (trans. ). Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
POULET, G. (1959). Studies in Human Time, Colemang E. (transe)a 
The John Hopkins University Press. 
STRAWSONs P. F. (1959)- Individua's. Methuen. L "I 
TYLOR, E. B. (1903). Primitive Culture. Murray. 
VULLIA11Y, J. G. (1977). III-Iusic and the Mass Culture Debate", in 
Shepherd, J. C., Virdong P., Vulliamy, J. G. 9 and Wishartq T., 
Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Lanojqges. Latimer. 
WISHART, T. (1973). -Creo . Part of D. Phil portfolio, 
University of York. 
- 218 - 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
PR: 4, '-LITERATE IRJSICSs 
SOME GENLTAL OBSERVATIONS 
- 219 - 
INTRODUCTION 
Any attempt to generalise about pre-literate musics is 
fraught with difficulties. Not only are there a great variety 
of pre-literate cultures whose individual musics can display a 
vast number of 'contradictory' characteristics, but the implicit 
nature of these cultures would seem to militate against a high 
degree of explicit analysis Initially, thereforeq some 
tentative suggestions will be made about the relationship of 
tmusiol and 'society' in pre-literate cultures. Only then will 
two possible ideas be mooted about the i-ray in which the internal 
'structure' of pre-litexate musics might be said to encode and 
articulate what has previously been described as a pre-literate 
world sense. 
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I MUSIC I AITD ISOCIETf I TIN PRE-LITERATE CULWRE 
In view of pre-literate man's relationship to the 
universe, it seems more than likely he experienced music as an 
all-enveloping happening. It was the medium of sound, it may 
be rememberedý which was largely responsible for the creation of 
a world sense through which pre-literate man encountered the 
universe as revelationary and relatively unpredictable. Unlike 
literate and typographical mang who fearlessly regards the 
universe as something to be controlled and manipulated, pre- 
literate man holds tight to a relatively unyielding legitimating 
structureq and tends to view anything which does not fall inside 
the confines or patterning of that structure as reprehensible 
and potentially dangerous. Non-knowledge in pre-literate 
societies, that which is disorder to the carefully maintained 
order, has two opposing but inter-related aspects: 
Granted that disorder spoils patterng it also provides 
the material of pattern. Order implies restriction; from 
all possible materials a limited selection has been made 
and from all possible relations a limited set has been 
used. So disorder by implication is unlimitedý no pattern 
has been realised in itq but its potential for patterning 
is-i. ndefinite.. This is why, though we seek to create 
order, we do not simply condemn disorder. Ve recognise 
that it is destructive to existing patterns: also that it 
has potentiality. It symbolizes both danger and power 
(Douglas, 19709 P-114)- 
There is a striking parallel between this ambivalent 
attitude towards disorder and the attitude that exists in some 
pre-literate societies towards musicians. In more than one 
society 
2 
musicians hold a lower status: 
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[ but ] in such cases there is a definite question as to 
whether the attitude towards musicians is not ambivalent 
and whether musicians may not in fact occupy a special 
situation in which behaviour not tolerated in others is 
considered acceptable or is at least tolerated for them 
(Merriam7 19647 p. 134ý- 
Thus, although the behaviour of musicians is oftern regarded as 
rep rehensible, and although they are frequently the recipients 
of derisory jokes, there can be little doubt that musicians are 
nevertheless essential to the social process. In Basongye 
society, for example: 
the reaction to the facetious suggestion that these nele-ý 
do-wells should be banished was one of extreme seriousness 
and even real horror. Life in a village without 
musicians is not to be considered, and people spoke of 
leaving the village were no musicians present. This 
reaction cannot be taken lightly, for the bonds of kinship 
and economics which tie an individual to his village are 
extremely difficult to break (Merriam, 19641 P-136). 
In some societies musicians might well provide a form of mediation 
between order and disorder, between that which is safe and normalg 
and that which is dangerous and powerful 
This mediation would seem to be reflected in one of the- 
compositional processes to be found in pre-literate societies. 
By this process, an individual Ireceivest a song from the 
4 
supernatural . In Flathead Indian societyy for exampleg 
While it is recognised that some songs are individually 
composed by human beings, and that some other songs are 
borrowed from neighbouring peoples, all true and proper 
songs, particularly in the past, owe their origin to a 
yariety of contacts experienced by humans with beings 
which, though a part of this world, are superhuman and 
the source of both individual and tribal Dowers and 
skills (Merriam, 19672 P-3). 
Moreover, "the Plathead believe that in former times all songs 
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derived from such experiences and that none were made up by 
individuals or borrowed from other tribes" (Merriam, 1967, P-3). 
One example of an experience can be given: 
There was a man who was out hunting. He was sneaking 
up on the game by sitting at a spot on the game trail 
when he heard somebody singing. Hethought "There must 
be people around". So he stood there and waited to see 
who was coming. Pretty soon a spike bull elk came out 
from. the bush and told him, "This is your song. If you 
really need this song, sing it". It was a love-song. 
So he didn't kill the spike, and never killed an elk 
again (Merriam, 19679 P-7)- 
Mediation with powerful and dangerous disorder is further 
suggested by two aspects of this compositional process. Firstly, 
whether the occurrence is accidental, as above, or purposefully 
sought$ as in the case of plains or plateau vision quests, the 
recipient leaves his village. This might be interpreted as a 
symbolic departure from 'conceptual surroundings' that are normal 
and safe. Secondly, the power of the supernatural is invested 
in the recipient: 
Songs which derive from the supernatural lead to two types 
of power for the individual who receives them. In one 
case this is shamanistic power, while in the other, power 
is scattered and of such a nature that the individual 
remains simply a person with special capabilities for 
doing or effecting special things. Thus while a person 
may have special powers in love, gambling, hunting, war, 
or other social situations, the shaman has a concentration 
of songs which center primarily about curing, although he 
may have obtained other skills through song as well 
(Iderriam, 1967, pp-3-4)- 
Whether or not these aspects carry the significance 
ascribed them may be debatable, but there seems little doubt that 
-the revelationary and unpredictable nature of this compositional 
process directly reflects pre-literate man's revelationary and 
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unpredictable world. 
In those societies where musicians do not hold an 
ambivalent position and where composition is not revelationary, 
it is still the case that music is assigned much greater social 
relevance and power than it is in the Western world. In other 
wordsq pre-literate man possesses neither the 'objectivity' nor 
the high division of labour5 necessary to divorce music from the 
immediacy of its social context. Merriam (19641 p. 262) makes 
this contrasts 
**. we can and do isolate music as a thing in itself 
and look at and analyse it as an object quite apart from 
its context. For example, we can turn on the radio, 
hear a piece of music being performed, and listen to it 
without having to know who the composer isý what period 
he representsg or what the function, if anyq of the music 
is. We can take music out of any other context and 
treat it objectively or subjectively as something which 
exists for itself. We do this not only in the listening 
process, but in our analysis of music; the student of 
music form looks at it as an objective entity which can 
be divorced both from himself and from its context. 
By comparison, "neither the Basongye nor the Platheads do this. 
For the Basongye2 to the contraryq every song depends heavily 
upon its cultural context and is conceptualized in this 
relationship" (Merriam, 1964, p. 262). Again, Venda music is 
clearly of great social relevances 
Venda music is overtly political in that it is 
performed in a variety of political contexts and often for 
specific purposes. It is also political in the sense 
that it may involve people in a powerful shared experience 
and thereby make them more aware of themselves and of their 
responsibilities towards each other (Blacking, 1973, p. 28). 
One aspect of the social relevance of pre-literate music 
may be described in more detail. Much important Imowledge in 
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6 
pre-literate cultures is commonly stored in tales or songs whose 
repetition is based on commonplaces, that iS2 set verbal formulae 
and themes7. These formulae and themes often feature complex 
but strongly similar rhythmic patterns which are part and Parcel 
of the method by which a reciter remembers the essential unvarying 
segments of the tale. It seems likely that song as we understand 
it came about as the result of the vocal inflexions peculiarto 
each commonplace, (that is, the separation and isolation of 
'melodic contours' previously an integral aspect of everyday 
speech-song). The singing of an-epic tale2 or songs which are 
part of a tale$ could thus be regarded as a stylization of the 
8- 
everyday speech upon which the creation and maintenance of vital 
information rests. Since the retention and repetition of the 
knowledge is essential for the survival of the society in 
question, the tale takes on a highly affirmative moral value 
9 
and the melodic shapes it generates become generall; Z symbolic of 
the 'emotional' security felt at reinforcement of the 
legitimating structure. 
Walter J. Ong underlines the inseperable intertwining of 
epic tales and music with the everyday life and concerns of pre- 
literate men. Talking about the lack of fundamental differen- 
tiation between the objective and subjective in pre-literate 
cultures, he goes on to say that: 
by the same token, in one way or another, everything was 
caught up in the polemic of the human life struggle. 
The action of the heroic figures generated in an oral 
' narration would natur, --Ily at root consist of a economy oL 
battle between forces of good and evil. When so much of 
the lore of a culture was retained through narrative 
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tales or songs about great. heroes, even what would be 
otherwise completely neutral material thus acquired a 
moral flavour by association with the polemic or agonia 
of the hero and his adversaries. The entire. -world thus 
tended to be polarised in terms of 'good guys' and 'bad 
guy s, e*** (1969, p. 641). 
Besides straightfOrIfard reinforcement of the status quo, 
music in pre-literate societies can also provide a means whereby 
a person collectively, and externally, copes with his problems. 
Titiev (1949, p. 2) describes this process with respect to ilhe 
Mapuche of Chile. Unaccompanied songs are improvised at 
social gatherings by men or women: 
who take advantage of the occasions to Iblow off steam'. 
or to call general attention to some matter of personal 
concern to the singer. Songs of this kind are called 
'assembly songs', and their moods may vary from naive 
and joyful to slander us, bitter or ironic (Quoted, 
Merriam, 1964, p. 203) 
Through this process the integrity of society is maintained. it 
is interesting to speculate that this is another fashion in which 
music mediates between the order of the status -quo and potential 
disorder. This disorder may derive from the desire of the 
singer to alter the status, auoý or from his wish to point out 
some misdemeanour or abuse of power on the part of someone else. 
Since pro-literate man possesses neither the 'objectivity' 
nor the high division of labour necessary to divorce music from 
the immediacy of its social context, it would seem highly un- 
likely that he would be able to distance himself to any 
appreciablnextent from the musical experience. Two inter-related 
aspects of pre-litexate man's attitude to-wards music -would seem to 
substantiate this claim. Firstly, it appears probable that music 
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is 'composedt or Imanipulatedt in a far less determinant and 
'conscious' man-vier than is the case in industrial society. The 
revelationary process of composition already described partially 
backs up this assertion, but it would also seem to be true in 
situations where songs are 'made-up'* It is Merriam who once 
again draws the distinction between Western and pre-literate 
cultures 
The second factor which7 in conjunction with the 
othersq contributes to the total Western concept of the 
aesthetic is the maniDulation of form'for its own sake. 
This is a strong part of Western music culture where 
change is a value, and it seems logical that where music 
is treated as an abstract thing in itself -the manipulation 
of form for its own sake might be regarded as a criterion 
of the presence or absence of abstractability (19649 p. 263). 
However, in Basongye and Flathead cultures, "there is no 
apparent verbalized concept of such things as intervalsq 
polyphony, melodic lines, melodic range, tonicsý and so forth 
(Merriam, 1964, p. 263). Consequently: 
If there is relatively little recognition of formal 
elements of music, it seems doubtful that music form can 
be consciously manipulatedg for manipulation implies a 
juggling of the elements of music structure in order to 
arrive at a fresh form (Merriam, 1964, pp. 263-264)". 
Secondly, because music cannot be 'viewed' or 
manipulated as an abstract entity, there is little questiong as 
Merriam has already implied, of Western-like aesthetic 
considerations being applied to its 
The concept of music as 'beautiful' seems to be generally 
undeveloped in primitive cultures. Informants speak. of 
songs as being 'good'. No doubt the prevailing 
functionality of music is responsible for this designationg 
for beauty is an end in itself, while 'good' implies 
usefulness for a specific purpose: a song may be good for 
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curing, good for dancing etc. In some tribes informants 
also describe songs as 'powerful', probably because -'(-, he 
songs have some sort of supernatural function (Nettl, 
1956, p. 20). 
The fact that pre-litorate man feels it necessary to 
mediate his relationship with a revelationary and unpredictable 
universe through music, that he does not possess the objectivity 
or high division of labour necessary to divorce music from its 
social context, and that he is not sufficiently distanced from 
his music to develop 'conscious' modes of composition or a 
Western-like aesthetic - all these characteristics of his 
attitude to music speak of a world sense which is essentially 
lived 'within'. So too do some claims made about the 'internal 
structure' of pre-literate musics. 
PRE-LITERATE MTSICS AND THE IMPLICIT-M[PLICIT PARADIGM. 
Since pre-literate man lived within time? the difference 
between the subjective and mechanical temporal span which is 
symptomatio of industrial man's world sense - together with the 
tendency to repress the subjective and emphasise the mechanical - 
was a difference that did not impinge on pre-literate man's 
consciousness. In the spatialised terms of industrial many pre- 
literate man could not have been conscious of time. The rhythms 
of pre-literate musicsý which are either corporeal or spiritual 
12 
9 
articulate this 'time-sense': 
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As the term. suggests, corporeal rhythm comes from bodily 
movements, from physical gestures in timeq associated 
with work or play. It thus tends to be accentual; the 
regularity of the stresses measures off Time without 
necessarily having any relationship to melody ... 
The effect of this Time-measuring thus tends to be 
incantatory and hypnotic. In becoming habituated to 
Time's beat we cease to be conscious of it, and this 
unconsciousness of our earth and time-bound condition is 
precisely the magic effect that primitive man sought 
through his music .... The other kind of rhythm, 
which we have called spiritualq arrives at a similar 
effect by the opposite means. Whereas corporeal rhythm 
is accentual7 spiritual rhythm is numerical, having the 
minimal relationship to bodily movement. It thus tends 
to be subtle and complex in its organisation; to suggest, 
indeedy a sell- I generative spontaneity. that counteracts any 
sense of periodicity or beat .... In effect it is 
liberative and therefore ecstacy inducing (Mellers, 1968, 
p-3)13. 
Both the externally emotive nature of the incantatory and hypnotic 
corporeal rhythmý and of the liberative, ecstasy-inducing 
spiritual rhythm is indicative of pre-literate mants propensity to 
externally and collectively mediate his life and consciousness24. 
A significant proportion of pre-literate music is 
monophonic. That which is not would seem to demonstrate from its 
nature that pre-literate man has not really escaped the confines 
of the mcncý)honic line. He is unable in other woids,. to place 
himself to any extent 'outside' his music. Firstly, "the tone 
systems of polyphonic material in a given style do not often 
coincide with the tone systems of the individual parts; this 
discrepancy is strong evidence against the beginnings of polyphony 
from a feeling of latent harmony" (Nettll 19562 P-79)- Because 
harmony. js Lie ty-oically understand it depends largely upon-the 
distancing from phenomena possible in phonetically literate 
society35, it would have been extremely difficult for the specific 
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pitch relationships and more general intervallic structures of 
pro-literate melodic lines to be externalised in the relationships 
obtaining between those lines, or, conversely, for the 
relationships obtaining between those lines to be internalised 
in the individual lines themselves. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that Nettl claims that "there are no kno-vm rules of 
consonance or dissonance operating in primitive music comparable 
to the strict European ones" (1956, p. 87). As a concept 
involving the explicit statement of tonal relationships, tonal 
harmony would most likely have been alien to pre-literate 
cultures, because it involves a relationship to the sound 
experience, and so to phenomena in general, that pre-literate man 
simply did not possess. 
The arguments presented in the previous paragraph are 
certainly consistent with the theories advanced in Chapters Two 
and Seven. As pro-lit. erate man lives 'within' his world2 so he 
lives 'within' his music, and his 'inability' to externally state 
in harmony the structures present in melody would seem to be 
symptomatic of an implicit musical structure. Unfortunately2 
the categories of implicitness and explicitness cannot simply be 
equated with the 'internal' or 'external' stating of possibilities 
inherent in melodic structure. As a major line of argument in 
the previous chapter sought to stress, the implicit-explicit 
paradigm was not concerned with the analysis of music as a 'sonic 
object', but rather with the analysis of the experiential musical 
moment. It is hardly surprising therefore, to find that there 
are some pre-literate cultures where the inherent qualities of 
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melodic lines are externalised in harmony. Blacking, for 
exampleg tells us that in some Venda melodies: 
The companion tones in a pentatonic scale differ because 
of the spacing of the intervalsq but the basically social 
principlo that a tone must have a companion tone still 
applies, and it may be expressed explicitly in the 
"harmonies" improvised by other singers (1973, P-85). 
Now it might seem that Blacking's exampley with the idea that 
Venda harmonies involve a certain degree of explicitness, 
seriously weakens the basic theory being put forward in this 
thesis - at least with regard to the analysis of music. 
Consequently, it may appear that the stress placed on the 
experiential musical moment in discussion of the implicit- 
explicit paradigm is a nebulous and rather unsatisfactory way of 
circumventing the 'difficulty' seemingly highlighted through 
Blacking's example. That it is not may be established by 
-reference to a more modern example. 
In Chapter Twelve it is argued that tonality is a highly 
explicit musical structure which both reflects and contributes 
to the highly explicit world sense of industrial man. In this 
discussion emphasis is placed-on the important role played in 
this structure by the dominant seventh chordj which finally and 
irrevocably points outside itself to the tonic chord that it helps 
to define. Now this very same chord structure (it is incorrect 
in these contexts to call it a dominant seventh chord, because it 
does no t perform that function) occurs in the music of Debussy 
and Deliusq and in much of the authentic rural blues. Sonically, 
it is identical (to all intents and purposes) with-the dominant 
seventh, yet its function is to act as a timbral colouration of 
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the melodic note. That is, there is an external statement of 
the harmonic partials existing 'within' the melodic note. In 
this case, there would seem to be little doubt that the chordal 
I 
shape is acting implicitlY. At the very least it is referring 
internally to the melodic note, and, in many cases, such as the 
openings of a number of Delius's orchestral works (where there is 
sparse melodic ma terial), it is referring internally to itselfy 
the 'individual' notes acting as mutual colouration 
conglomerates on each other. 
Whether or not these timbral colourations constitute an 
externalisation of melodic structure remains2 perhaps, an un- 
answered questiong although the pentatonic melody frequently 
associated with this colouration is itself drawn from the lower 
partials of the harmonic series 
16. I-That has been established is 
that an external statement in harmony of possibilities inherent in 
melody is not necessarily evidence of an explicit musical 
structurel7. In the case of Blacking's example, the companion 
note could sound to the Venda as an implicit harmonic reinforcement 
of melodic pentatonicism 
18. Furthermore, it becomes oloar that 
analysis of any musical phenomena as a sonic object can be very 
misleading as far as the elucidation of musical significance is 
concerned. 
Because it does not require the assumption of 'linguistic 
universals' in music, and because it transcends any purely sonic 
parameters (such as melody, harmony or specific chord shapes) 
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that we, care to assume, the paradign. would seem to provide an 
extremely useful backgro-Luid against which to approach culture- 
specific musics. While it provides an essential strength, 
however, the intuitional nature of the paradigm can make that 
paradigm difficult to. approach and understand. In the chapters 
which follow, it should therefore be noted that for the purpose 
of ease of understandingg and ease of understanding only, the 
notion of implicitness may be approached as being melodic in 
nature and that of explicitness as being harmonic. This is 
because plainchant is impliciU and melodioý and tonality highly 
explicit and harmonic. Thus, although implicitness and melody, 
and explicitness and harmony cannot be strictly equated, the fact 
that plainchant and tonality parallel the equation will provide 
the reader, i-rith a relatively easy way of approaching the 
intuitive parameters of implicitness and explicitness as categories 
of musical/social elucidation. As it affects the development of 
tonality from plainchantý this topic is again discussed in 
Chapter Eleven. 
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NOTES: 
An example of explicit 'musical' analysis relating to 
'social' phenomena is, howeverg to be found in Blacking's 
work on the Venda (see Blacking, 1973, pp-79-88). 
See Merriam (1964, P. 134 ff-)- 
. 
3. A very interesting parallel is provided here by attitudes 
towards jazz musicians in the United States during the 
1920's (see Merriam, 19649. p. 241 ff. ). The jazz musician 
was regarded as undesirably deviant, bui he was not 
tolerated, nor seen as essential to society, precisely 
because typographical man has such a 'rational control' on 
his world. Becker's (1963) work on jazz musicians is a 
classic study of deviance and attitudes towards it. 
4. See Merriam (1964, p. 167 ff. ). 
5- See aboveg Chapter Three7 pp.. r)l -5*8 , and Chapter Foury 
pp. 100 - 101 . 
6. See llerrýam' (19643' pp. 280-281). 
7- See Lord (19649 Part I). 
8. This might well be the origin of the 'elevated speechl to be 
found in many songs (see Merriamq 1964 P-188 ff-)- 
9. See Merriam (1964) pp. 204-206. The importance of music as a 
moral reinforcer is also underlined by the great emphasis 
placed on accuracy of rendition (see Merriam7 1964v PP-115- 
116)# Again7 abuse of the power invested in a particular 
song can have grave consequences for the miscreant. These 
0. onsequences may include-death (see Merriam, 19671 pp. 12-13). 
10. See also Merriam (19649 pp. 221-222). 
Conscious manipulation of musical material becomes a lot 
easier2 of courseq when those materials can be notated in a 
permanent fashion. 
12. It is perhaps instructive to give two present day examples 
of music which may be taken to have corporeal or spiritual 
rhythms. A clear example of corporeal pulse is provided by 
' rock and pop music which have the many different types oL 
their roots in various dance forms. The reader must not 
think, however, that all rock and pop music displays a 
corporeal pulse. An example of spiritual rhytLm is more 
difficult to find, but the singing of psalms in tile Church of 
England can probably be said to display 'spiritual' 
qualities. Although the music for the psalm is notated in 
strict tonal fashion, the singing depends to a considerable 
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extent upon additive and numeric characteristics resulting 
from the specific number and distribution of syllables 
'Within any particular verse. The chanting by the priest 
in the responses also displays 'spiritual' qualities. 
13. It should be pointed out that Mellers is speaking here with 
a certain amount of historical hindsight. It is strictly 
speaking incorrect to say that "this unconsciousness of our 
earth and time-bound condition is precisely the magic effect 
that the primitive sought through his music" [omphasis 
mine] I because pro-literate man was already in the 
condition whicliq according to Mellers, he was 'seeking' 
through his music. It is extremely uznlikely that pre- 
literate man has ever been aware of "our earth and time- 
bound condition" ýemphasis mine] . 
14. Berger and Luckmann have also noted the external and 
collective approach of Dre-literate man to life. For 
heuristic purposes they describe a society in which 
institutionalization is total: "all problems are common5 all 
solutions to these problems are socially objectivated, and 
all social actions are institutionalized. The 
institutional order embraces the totality of social life 
which resembles the continuous performance of.. a complext 
highly stylized liturgy. There is no role-specific 
distribution of kno-rTledge, or nearly noneg since all roles 
are performed within situations of equal relevance to all the 
actors". Although no such society exists, the authors point 
out that "primitive societies approximate the type to a much 
higher degree than civilized ones" (Berger and Luckmann, 
19715 pp-97-98). 
. 
15- See below pp. *195-2%. 
16. See below the argument in Chapter Nine, pp. 1+0-244. 
17. The reverse is equally true. The existence of a largely 
monodic tradition is not necessarily evidence of an implicit 
musical structure. Songs such as Summer is icumen in, for 
example, would seem to demonstrate a large degree of 
explicitness. 
18. This, however, is not necessarily the caseý because the Venda 
had been in contact with white men and their music for some 
considerable time before fieldwork was actually carried out. 
Although the Venda have as far as possible striven to 
maintain their identity, it is possible that some aspects of 
Western thought may have neverthless surreptitiously 
permeated their symbolic output. See in this respect 
Worsley (1970) and Fanon (1970)- 
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CHAPTER ITINE 
THE CASD FOR TIM UNDERLYING 
PENTATONIC STRUCTURE OF PLAINCHANT 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the advent of literacy substantially altered 
man's orientation towards himself and the worldý the strong 
residue of orality effectively prevented the development of any 
explicit harmo ny or metre until the late Middle Ages. The 
phonetic literacy of Ancient Greece, for example, provided the 
conceptual framework within which Pythagoras could evolve the 
mathematical basis of Western melody and harmonyq and within which 
it was thus possible to step outside the all-encompassing confines 
of the melodic line org in some cases, of implicit harmony. Yet 
the orality which largely underlay the society would not allow 
further musical exploitation of the discoveries made by 
Pythagoras; the "passionate religious mystical matriarchy ... 
remained at war with, and was too powerful to be absorbed by its 
new, empiricalq rationalistic patriarchy" (Mellers, 1968, p. 8). 
This dualism iras most probably reflected in the music, as Peter 
Crossley-Holland points out. "Practising Greek musicians", we 
are toldq although "by no means unaware of the role of the mind 
in defining their materials$ naturally placed more emphasis on 
the evidence of their ears than on the mathetmatics of the 
specialist theorists" (1960, p. 100). 
Again, in early medieval society, although a certain degree 
of 'objectivity' and 'reason' were used to maintain a theocratic. 
world, the orality which was still strong and very much at the 
basis of the theocracy prevented any development of explicit 
harmony. Man still thought of himself ad being at the centre of 
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the universe, and even the learned stock of kno-a-ledee was still 
reinforced orally. A student in a university, for example, 
"proved his ability in lo, -, ic, physics or -natural philosophy, 
ethics, metaphysics, law or medicine, as ifell as in theology by 
disputation and possibly a final oral examination in a 
disputation like form. T-here were no written papers, written 
ex ercises or written exam inations at - all. 
-11-riting-was- 
used a 
great deal, but in connection with oral expression" (Ong, 1967, 
P-59)-- 
It would be impossible to begin a discussion of any 
Western musical language 
I 
without mentioning at least the bare 
essentials of the Pythagorian discoveries2 since it is the social 
organisation of the natural phenomena brought to man's notice 
through these discoveries that results in those languages. The 
discoveries may be summarised as follows: when a note is sounded, 
certain harmonies are given off above the fundamental, in 
vibration ratios of 2 to 1,3 to 21 4 to 3ý 5 to 4 and so on.. 
These ratios constitute the octave, the fifth, t he fourth and the 
major third, and are just the beginning of a whole series of 
gradually diminishing intervals that constitute the harmonic 
series, (see Example 1). 
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As social constructions utilising this serios 
21 
the 
underlying structures of the Western musical languages possess 
the common element of being variously grounded upon the intervals 
of the octave, fifth and fourth. The keynote in tonality2 for 
examPle2 is dependent on the primacy of the octave, and is also 
harmonically defined by its relationship to the dominant (at the 
fifth) and subdominant (at the fourth) of that key. Again, the 
fundamental interval of the music of Ancient Greece - at least in 
its theoretical aspect - was the fourth of the tetrachord, two of 
these tetrachords being put together - "either disjunctly with a 
note to join them, or conjunctly with a tone to complete their 
downward series" (Crossley-Holland, 1960, p. 102) - to form the 
octave scale or harmonia. But there also exists another structure, 
that of pentatonicism 
3, 
which is based on the intervals of the 
fifth and the fourth, and whichy it can be argued, is the 
structure underlying a great deal of medieval music. 
*** 
It is a principal theme of the remainder of this Part of 
the thesis on the musical coding of ideologies that both the 
pentatonically generated modality of plainchant (and of some 
popular medieval songs) and the subsequently developed language 
of tonality are mutually exclusive systems derived from the 
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harmonic series; further, that medieval society retained 
pentatonicism for reasons of ideological implications, and that 
post-Renaissance society developed tonality as an integral facet 
of its own new ideology. 
The first step in this argument is to -out forward the case 
for the underlying, pentatonic structure of plainchant. Before 
doing this however, the indigenous nature of the octaveq fifth 
and fourth, both to the music of the Western world in general, 
and to medieval music in particular, may be more fully illustrated 
by reference to early organum (that is, parallel singing at the 
interval of a fifth or the interval of a fourth), and to the 
reasons that can be put forward for its development. Indeed, 
starting with the simple element of a monodic line, and assuming 
that the properties of the harmonic series influenced the manner 
in which people of different voice ranges sang with each other, 
it is not difficult to speculate on how parallel singing at the 
octave, fifth and fourth originated. Not only are the octaveq 
the fifth and the fourth the intervals (audible as harmonics) 
which occur first in the harmonic series4, but the fifth and the 
fourth provide convenient 'half-way' points between the two notes 
of the octave (which again, we may assume is the most 'natural' 
interval for parallel singing) for those whose voice-range does 
not easily fall within either of the two lines of the octave. 
Gustave Reese is substantially in agreement with this analysis: 
Another explanation [for the torigins' of parallel 
organum] is offered by the natural ranges of the four main 
classes of human voices, which, roughly speaking, lie at 
pitch levels a fifth away from one anotherg in consecutive 
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order from bass to soprano. The cong-regations that sang 
respo-nses at services did not consist of trained singers, 
but sang with rangres they found comfortable. Machabey, 
on the basis of this, writes: "The division of men's 
voices into two parallel lines, and of the high-pitched (women's and boys') voices into two other lines paralleling 
the first, must have followTed as a matter of course, 
without the executants noticing it". In 1908 in France, 
he heard an untrained congregation singing in organum, 
without apparently, intending to. The men and women each 
broke into two groups singing a fourth or a fifth from one 
another, according to the texture of the melody (1940, tD 
p. 25 0 
It should be noted in this context that the interval which is 
midway betweenthe two notes of the octave (that isý the interval 
comprised by the defining note of this octave and the sixth note 
of the semitone scale). is the augmented fourth of our tempered 
scale. This is the only interval that is not even approximaýted 
between two adjacent notes of the harmonic series. Moreover, if 
it is conceived in terms of two non-adjacent notesi. the vibration 
ratio is never the same (5: 7,7: 10ý 12: 17 etc. ). In comparison 
to the fifth and the fourth, therefore, which maintain exactly 
the same ratios"throughout the harmonic series, the unstable 
augmented fourth seems less of a 'natural' choice as an interval 
for parallel singing. 
The interval of the fourth is, of course, one removed from 
that of the fifth in the harmonic series, and it could be argued, 
in the case of parallel organum, that the fourth arises as the 
inversion of the fifth. Dom Anselm Hughes gives this impression 
in discussin- the organum of the Musica Firichiriadis (see Example C> 
2)s 
P-rom the Musica Enchiriadis we leani about four types of 
organum: (1) in parallel fifths, with the plainchant 
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me . lody on the -top. line; . 
(2) in the same, with the higher 
voice, or vox prinei-Dalis-doubled. at the octave below and 
the lower voice or vox organalis doubled at the octave 
above, thus resulting in a four part effect ...; 
(3) 
taking either the higher or the lower pair - of these four 
voices and running on in parallel fourths ... 
(4) a 
variant of this last method (1955, p. 278). 
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By inversion, therefore, the occurrence of the perfect fifth also 
underlines the. existence of the perfect fourth., even if the fourth 
cannot be said to arise in the first place by reason of its 
position in the harmonic series. But even then, it does not 
seem legitimate to conceive of. a perfect fourth on the fundamental, 
since no such fourth occurs either in the harmonic series or by 
inversion of the fifth. However, it could equally well be argued 
that, once the fourth was established as an equal partner of the 
fifth, it would not be a very great development for the fourth to 
become established in its own right as an interval directly 
relating to the fundamental. I-Toreover, notwithstand ing this 
theoretical 'difficulty', there still remains much evidence that 
the fourthy for whatever reason, was as much a 'natural 
modification' of the 'original' melodic line as the fifth. 
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Given the indigenous nature of the fifth and fourth to 
Western Music, it is not difficult to see how the pentatonic, 
scale could have come into existence5. If one takes the fifth 
and fourt h on the original fundamental, and treats them in turn 
as fundamentals with their own fifths and fo-arths, then one 
arrives at a structure of five notes (see Fig. 1). It might 
seem to the reader that this is a somewhat cursory explanation 
for the origins of the pentatonic structure in early medieval 
society. Surely there are many more detailed causes and 
influences that may be brought to light and put before him? 
There are two related answers to this possible criticism. 
Firstly, there can be no ultimate and complete explanation for 
the occurrence of any social symbol. In the final analysis all 
that can be said is that this pentatonic struotureq as 
specifically articulated in the plainchant repertoryg was 
creatively evolved 
6 
in early medieval southern Europe as part of 
the ongoing construction of social reality. Given this 
construction of realityq however, other structures with similar 
features and articulating similar meaning might well have come 
into being. Secondly, even if it were possible to adduce 
detailed 'causes' for the creation of this structure -a 
research project, which, given the almost total lack of written 
records, would be difficult in the extreme - then such 'causes' 
would never furnish a complete lexplanation'2 and, moreoverg 
would be symptoms of continuing structural change, rather than 
- 244 - 
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causes in the strict me, -. -ming , of that word. 
One of two further questions might also arise in the 
reader's mind regarding the structure in Fig. 1. The first is 
that, having accepted the indigenous nature of the octave, fifth 
and fourth to Western music, why is it that the progression of 
fifths and fourths shown in Fig. 1 stops at the second level? 
Why does it go as far as that and no further? The second 
question is this: once having generated a fifth and a fourth 
from the original fundamental (the underlined C of Fig. 1)7 why 
is it that another fourth and fifth are generated above the G and 
P rather than other subsequent intervals of the harmonic series? 
After all, this alternative suggestion does not negate the 
primacy of the fifth and the fourthý and would allow for the 
introduction of-. other intervals (audihie as harmonics) into the 
underlying structure. There are not2 and never can be, lintra- 
musicall answers to these questionsq for the Organisation of 
musical structures is ultimately a dialectic correlate of the 
social reality that is symbolically mediated by and through the 
music of a particular society. The answers will only emerge, 
thereforo7 as an attempt is made to demonstrate the way in which 
pentatoni ism and tonality have respectively mediated the 
medieval and industrial irorld senses. 
*** 
There are fundamentally three piecesof evidence7 which 
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support the hypothesis that Gregorian chant in particular, and 
medieval music in general, have an underlying pentatonic 
structure. Firstly, as Reese has noted, many chants 
8 
are 
purely pentatonic: 'Thether or not virtually the entire ancient 
repertoire was based on a pentatonic groundwork ... the fact 
remains that a considerable number of Gregorian melodies are 
clearly pentatonic" (19409 PP-159-160). Furthermore, It is 
interesting to note that medieval German songs also display a 
pentatonic character92 a feature which, according to Sir Jack 
Westrupý has "obvious association. s with Gregorian chant" (1955, 
pý. 259)- But even*where a Gregorian chant does not display pure 
pentatonic formulae throughout, there is often convincing 
evidence from opening phrases and subsequent motives that the 
pentatonic structure plays a generative role in that chant: 
Furthermorey many Gregorian compositions betray their 
pentatonic origin through characteristic opening phrases 
of a purely pentatonic nature (usually sung by the cantor 
alone). These produce an impression of being "principal 
themes" and are sometimes subsequently developed on a 
six or seven-tone basis. One finds a still greater 
abundance of the so-called "trichordal" motives - the 
nuclei of pentatonic formations. These are composed of 
three notes within the interval of a perfect fourth and 
contain no semitones. Thus C-D-F, D-F-G, G-A-C, A-C-D, 
as well as their various permutations and transpositions2 
used either consecutively or intermittently are trichordal 
motives (Yasser, 19372 p. 181). 
The most obvious objection which can be raised against 
the hypothesis of pentatonically structured medieval music is 
that very frequently more than the five notes of the pentatonic 
scale are in evidence. It seems more than likely2 however2 that 
the remaining two notes of the natural gamut which may appear in C) 
a chant do so in the role of passing notes: 
Still another important, piece of evidence should be 
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taken into account in determining the true scalar basis 
of mediaeval music. Ile refer to the quilisma, the 
symbol for which is today generally believed to have 
indicated the sounding, within a minor third, of a very 
light and transient ornamental note (Yasser, 1937, 
p. 182). 
As Yasser indicates 10 ,a striking precedent for this procedure 
is to be found in the Chinese jjiLen-tone. Moreover, there is a 
considerable amount of statistical evidence in support oj- the 
theorys 
Out of nearly 1600 Gregorian items which at present 
constitute the principal musical material of the Catholic 
liturgy, only a little more than 700 contain no 
quilismas at all. The number of those which do contain 
quilismas, impressive as it is (amounting to almost 900), 
must have been greater at the time when, as is supposed2 
the use of the quilisma was universal for all melodies 
that employed more than five notes within an octave .... The total number of quilismas found in the 900 
compositions referred to is 31007 of which 81-5 per cent 
are placed within minor thirds, 17 per cent within major 
thirds, and 1-5 per cent 'within perfect fourths (Yasser, 
19377 P-344). 
It may also be pointed out that the passing note theory does much 
to explain B flat as the sole example of notated Ichromaticism' 
in early medieval music - that is, it can be heard as one of the 
two possible'passing notes between A and C: "The ZiLen-tone theory, 
when its implications are fully worked out, shows that B flat is 
not merely a faintly undesirable substitute for'B natural, as the 
theorists too often imply, but its peer; and the melodies them- 
selves, with their frequent use of B flat, bear this out" (Reese, 
19401 pp. 160-161). Finally, if the original objection is still 
maintained by asserting that the passing notes are bound to 
immediately destroy any feeling for pentatonicism, and are likely 
to create an incipient feeling for tonality7 it may be pointed 
out that the existence of chromatic passing notes in tonal music 
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does not immediately imply the destruction of tonality and the 
creation of atonality. It is not necessary, in order-to 
demonstrate the existence of a particular musical structure2 
that only the notes of that structure be present in the music 
itself. 'Rhat is necessary is to indicate that the structure, as 
articulated by and through the musicý determines both the 
relative importance and function of the notes as used, as well as 
the more general characteristics of the archetypal melodic (and 
harmonic) formulae. 
This second line of argument for the generative function 
of pentatonicism in plainchant has been greatly substantiated by 
11 Jacques Chailley in two recent articles Chailley's position 
is that the traditional eight modes of plainchant are in fact 
extensions of peritatonici. sm-. 
QuIest-ce qu'un mode Gregorien? Dans 11optique de 
116tude ci-dessus, nous pouvons rePondre, en sim-plifiant 
au maximum: clest un modble formulaire provenant de 
l1amplification ornamentale d1un schema m-elodique reliant 
une. tonique a une corde do recitation ou teneur (dite 
plus tard dominante)ý sur une echelle pentatonique fixe 
comblee ad libitum pa 12 des degres faibles plus ou moins 
mobiles (1970, p*85) 
These modes, it may be argued, cannot be regarded as tonal 
formations in quite the same way as tonality can. For whereas 
tonality is a musical language universally evident in European 
'cultured' music between approximately 1600 and 18802 many 
individual chants are either modally ambiguous, or do not 
convincingly fit into any mode at# all. Moreover, without 
denying that much plainchant does fit into modal analysis, and 
may therefore be said to articulate different concepts of time- 
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space within that more generally articulated by the generative 
pentatonic structure, it seems very likely that the theoretic 
concept of the eight modes originally had as much to do with 
t heological numeric symbolism as it did with rationalising 
strictly musical evidence 
13. The . theory of tonality on the 
other hand, was completely derived from the music of the tonal 
period and is consequently universally applic7able to that music. 
Chailley takes\as his point of departure two tfacts' 
which, in his opinion, have been largely ignored by traditional 
theory: the pentatonic nature of very old melodY14 (. le 
caractýre pentatonique de la melodie la plus ancienne"); and the 
historical importance of chanting the psalms2 and so of the 
reciting note or tenor used in that chanting (I'llimportance 
historique de la psalmodie et par consequent de la corde de 
recitation ou teneur"). The importance of the tenor lay in the 
tendency of most chants to move around it before descending to 
the final ("Les usages universels de la cantillation nous 
enseignent que la tendance la plus courante do celle-ci conduit 
d1une part a des broderies autour de la teneurg d'autre part 'a 
une chute m'elodique finale au grave de celle-ci 
These legacies, argues Chailley, were highly influential in the 
development of both the gregorian chant and the eight modesý 
these latter evolving from the interaction of four factors: 
1. The range defined by the tenor and the final (the final 
gradually replaced the tenor in importance and 
traditiona. 11y became the somewhat unsatisfactory method 
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of assigning a mode to a chant). This range could 
be a minor or major third, a perfect fourth, a 
perfect fifth (these perfect consonances being the 
most 'fertile' generators of modes) and, 
exceptionallyq a minor sixth. 
2. The shape of the melodic kernel whose range has been 
fixed by the tenor and final. If one takes a strict 
p entatonic scale (and Chailley is very precise in his 
definition: 1111ýchelle de base etant celle du 
pentatonique anhemitonique divisant facultativement ses 
trihemitons incomposes par des piens faibles et souvent 
mobiles dont la hauteur ... se seraient vu fixe"e par 
Ilattraction,, 15), then, by starting in turn on each of 
the five notes it is possible to arrive at different 
internal shapes for the intervals of the fourth and fifth 
(this explains their 'fertility'). i. e.: 
16 
Perfect fourth: 
CDPGACT3TT3 i 
Shape "I" 
GACDPG3 T3T 
F DFGACD rS--T T3T. ý 
Shape 'III" 
ACDFGA T-ý? 3TT) 
The remaining 'scale' does not give an initial interval 
of a fourth. 
Perfect fifth: 
PGA. C. D FT- F-T T3 Shape "I" 
CDFGACT3 
) Shape "II" 
GACDPG T-S--Tl 3T) 
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PGACD ý-T-Tl 3T Shape "III" 
The remaining I scale' does not give an initial interval 
of a fifth. 
The fixing by attraction of the weak notes to be found 
in the two intervals of a minor third created by a 
pentatonic scale. 
The manner in which the range of. the melodic kernel was 
extended to give the ambitus (range) of a chant. This 
determined whether a mode was authentic or plagal. 
This analysis by Chailley has the advantage over the traditional 
classification of being able to account for modally ambiguous 
chants and chants which do not fit properly into the modal scheme. 
Finally, it would seem that the importance of the fourth 
and the fifth to both the pentatonic structure itself and that 
structure's generation of chants and modes finds expression in 
the method of analysis used by medieval theorists in regard to 
the modes. All eight modes (in the symmetrical systematization 
of Hermannus Contractus) were viewed as being founded on these 
two intervals: 
The system of the octave-species ... soon yielded ground 
in the analytical writings, being replaced in large part 
by consideration of what might be called the modal nucleus 
consisting of the notes immediately above the finalt and 
of the various species of pentachords and tetrachords. 
The admissible pentachords were TSTT, STTT, TTIIIS and TITST; 
the admissible tetrachords were TISTy STT and TTS; the 
diminished fifth and augmented fourth were inadmissible 
species (Reese, 19402 P-156). - 
This classificatfon is closely linked with the designation of the 
octave, fifth and fourth as the only admissible consonances in 
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0 
medieval music, at least until the thirteenth century: 
The classified species of the Yiddle Ages are 
bounded solely by medieval consonances - the fourth, 
fifth and octave. To obtain a full comDlement of 
early medieval consonances one need add to these only 
the unison and such octave-comuounds as the twelfth. 
The compass of the authentic Modes is often extended 
doi-mwards by one degree ... but these modes, 
neverthelessq continued to be classified according to 
the species, not of their ninthsq but, like the 
others, of their octaves .... The sixths, also, 
dissonances in the early Middle Ages, are among the 
intervals that never bound classified species: the 
hexachord though used for purposes of classificationg 
was not applied to the distinguishing of species. it 
could not have been, in its Guidonian form, since its 
TTSTT structure never varied (Reese, 1949, PP-156-157)- 
The exclusive use of the octave, fifth and fourth as consonances 
in early medieval music and as the distinguishing features of 
modal species provides striking parallels to the exclusive role 
of the fifth and fourth in generating a pentatonic structure. 
Moreover, given the exclusive use of these intervals as 
consonances and distinguishing features, it would be surprising 
to find that any other interval or intervals were fundamental to 
the structure of Gregorian chant. Indeed, if the melodic 
formulae of the chant do in fact articulate the fifth and the 
fourth as basic. structural elements, then it is but a small step 
to the externalisation of -these implicit elements as analytic 
tools. 
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NOTES: 
There are certain forms of twentieth-century music, of 
course2 to which this statement uou. 1d not apply. 
2. The question arises as to how conscious these 
rationalisations are. The entire question of 
consciousness vis-a-vis music in any society is very 
difficult, and cannot be discussed here in any detail. 
However, some general comments may be briefly made. 
Firstly, 'explicit' cultures would seem to have a greater 
degree of consciousness regarding some aspectsof the 
world (including2 fortexampleg the harmonic series) than 
, implicit, cultures. This degree of consciousness may be 
musically encoded. But, secondly, the musical encoding 
itself may be a largely unconscious process. This seems 
to be the case with both plainchant and tonality. in each 
case theoretical rationalisation takes place after the 
language has become establishedg and in the case of 
plainchantq it is clear that the generative pentatonic 
structure is never made explicit. The fac .t of ex Dost 
facto theoretical rationalisation would seem to ; ýuýg`est that 
the Irationalisation' of the harmonic series that initially 
takes place 'in' the music itself is largely unconscious. 
Thus, although Western man has been conscious of the 
harmonic series, its influence has still been an unconscious 
one as far as the formulation of musical languages is 
concerned. It is only during the twentieth century that a 
music's 'deep structure' has consciously preceeded its 
composition. 
It isq in fact2 quite possible that Ancient Greek music had 
an underlying pentatohic structure. Not only do the 
tetrachord and harmonia demonstrate a predilection for units 
of the fourthý octave, and subsequently, fifths, but the 
principle intervals of the diatonic genus (a whole tone) and 
of the enharmonic genus (a major third) are intervals that 
circumscribe units of conjunct motion within the scale (e. g. 
GAB DE). Moreover, the minor third of the chromatic genus 
is the interval derived from moving conjunctly between such 
groupings. This argumentý however, must remain largely 
speculative. 
4. See Reese (19401 p. 250) and Hughes (1955ý p. 275). 
5- There is some argument that a high proportion of pre-literate 
musics are based on the pentatonic scale. In this resnect 
Reese (1940, pp. 256-257) has noted that "all the primitive 
music based on a definite tonality system displays as its 
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most important structure-determining interval either the 
fourth or the fifth. Since the pentatonic scale, which 
we may indicate by the symbols. CDFGac ... is fundamental 
in all such music, the interval C-F... governs the 
melodic structure in some cultures (generally the more 
primitive) and the interval F-c... is predominant in 
others". Yasser (1932, P-335) has also expressed the 
opinion that "modern musical science ... accepts ... the 
historic universality of the pentatonic scale may be found 
in the past or present musical practise of almost every 
country". It is, in fact, extremely doubtful whether any 
of the structural elements mentioned can be regarded as 
universals. Yasser, particularly, is on very doubtful 
ground. The Balinese Pelog scale, foT example, is not 
very close to the pentatonic. Neither is much Venda 
music (see Blacking 1973). Yasser's theory smacks of an 
'evolutionary' approach to music history. 
See the arguments above, pp. 1), Z -12-+, and pp. 167 " 169. 
There is the possibility of a fourth piece of evidence in 
that parallel organum adopts the intervals of the fifth and 
the fourth, and these can be regarded as externalisations 
of the implicit melodic structure of plainchant. In that 
one has to assume the structure for this to become evidence, 
the argument might be regarded as somewhat circular, a 
criticism which could also be applied to the 
rationalisation of the modes in snecies of fifths and 
fourths. It has to be realised of course2 that the 
processes under examination are dialectic and do not easily 
lend themselves to sequential analysis. Even in 
sequential terms, however, both texternalisation' arguments 
take. on more significance in the light of the first two 
pieces of evidence given in the text. 
According to Joseph Yasser (1937ý P-344), some 700 out of 
the 1600 "which at prepent constitute the principal musical 
material of the Catholic liturgy". 
9. See Reese (19401 p. 233). 
10. See Yasser (1937t pp. 182-183). 
11. Because Chailley's theories are very detailed in their 
implications and very tightly argued, their full presentation 
in the text would have taken up more space than was warranted 
in the light of the overall argument. Although sufficient 
evidence is therefore presented in the text to show how eight 
modes (as well as modally ambiguous chants and those chants 
which fit no mode at all) could arise from the same 
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pentatonic structure, it was thought more appropriate to 
present Chailley's ideas in translation in Appendix V. 
12. "What is a gregorian mode? In the light of the 
following article we are able to reply with the utmost 
conciseness: it is a formulary pattern originating from 
the ornamentation of a melodic shape which links a tonic 
note with a recitation note or tenor (latterly called the 
dominant) in a fixed pentatonic scale. This pentatonic 
scale is freely completed with weak notes which are more 
or less mobile". 
13. See Werner (1948, pp. 211-255). IPwo of-the conclusions 
drawn by Iferner are particularly interesting. The first 
(p. 254) is that "the principle of the ootoechos originated 
not in musical but in cosmological and calendaric 
speculations. iihile the principle of eight modes is common 
to the entire Near East and, through dhristianity, 
conquered Europe, its-concrete musical implementations vary 
greatly according to the indigenous traditions of western 
folk-lore in the respective orbits". Secondlyq (p. 255) 
Werner concludes that "while the existing ecclesiastical 
modes must be considered yost factum constructions of the 
theorists, the conception of an eightfold modality was an a 
priori postulate of a religio-mythical nature to which 
theorists had to adjust the various systems of modes". 
14- It is far from clear exactly what Chailley means by this 
reference to very old melody. The work of P. Delalande and 
Y. Hameline is mentioned, but without a sufficient reference 
being given to enable it to be traced. From the context it 
is possible that Chailley is referring to the chant of the 
Near East. 
15- "the basic scale being that of a pentatonic scale without 
any semitones in which the unfilled minor thirds are 
optionally divided by weak and often moveable piens whose 
exact placement within*the minor third would seem to be 
fixed by attraction [to more important notes] 11, 
16. In the following scheme IT' indicates a whole tone and 131 
a minor third. 
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CHAPTER TEEN 
THE ARTICULATIOIT OF AN IDBAL FEUDAL 
STRUCTURE; THI ROUGH PZOTATONICISM 
- 258 - 
Unlike those of tonalityl the fundamentals of 
pentatbnicism are interlocking and mutually dependent; they do 
not point outside themselves. It is both impossible and invalid 
to hear any one note of the structure as the one to which all 
others irrevocably and necessarily tend. Assuming that passing 
notes-are not important structural elements in pentatonicism, six 
relationships only are possible for a pentatonic melody. The 
notes referred to are those of Pig. 1. Ex. I may also be 
consulted: 
1. Any note can be heard as its own fundamental. 
2. All the notes (except B flat) can be heard as the third 
harmonic relating to. a second (perfect fifth). 
3. All the notes (except D) can be heard as the fourth 
harmonic relating to a third (perfect fourth). 
4D can be heard as the fifth harmonic relating to a 
fourth (major. third). 
5- F and B flat can be heard as a sixth harmonic relating. 
to a fifth (minor third). 
6. Cý D and G can be heard as an eighth harmonic relating 
to a seventh (whole tone). 
Which of these relationships will be heard for any particular 
note will depend entirely upon its position in any particular 
melodyq with the preceding note ýJgnoring passing notes) most 
probably being the most important factor. One cang of coursey 
make a Sim ilar assertion for tonality. Any note of the major or 
minor scale may perform a number of different functions, all of 
which depend upon specific content. But whereas the function 
- 259 - 
of tonal notes depends upon a definite hieiýarchy in which certain 
relationships may be heard as more 'important' or 'fundamental' 
than others - thus giving rise to the oppositions of concord and 
discord, and the 'distancing' of modulation - the relationships 
of pentatonicism have no hierarchy. Imy one relationship is as 
timportant' or 'fundamental' as any other; it exists to a very 
large extent by and for itself, having no hierarchical function 
outside itself. 
Yet, although no one note of a pentatonic melody can 
become a basic fundamental to which all others must at some time 
resolve, many pentatonic and modal melodies give the feeling that 
one note is more important than the others. This feeling is 
created simply by stressing one note (such as the tenor of a 
chant) more than the others, and this sense of importance, as 
Rudolph Reti has pointed out 
1ý is of a 'melodic' rather than a 
2 'harmonic' nature Reti also demonstrates that a melody which 
possesses 'melodic' rather than 'harmonic' centrality can be 
brought to rest on the important note at any point in its 
duration. To attempt the same with a melody of harmonic tonality 
would be to "destroy the innermost sense . of -the whole line'13 (Reti, 
19581 p. 16). 
*** 
As was briefly noted in Chapter Three feudal society was 
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of a highly decentralised and localised type. The collapse of 
the Roman Empire, itself strongly centralised, created a 
situation favourable for the emergence of small social units 
whose population, at least in theory, were mutually dependent 
upon one another: 
To seek a protector, or to find satisfaction in being one - 
these things are common to all ages. But we seldom find 
them giving rise to new legal institutions save in 
civilizations vThere the rest of the social framework is 
giving way. Such was the case in Gaul after the 
collapse of the Roman Empire. 
Consider, for example) the society of the 11erovingian 
period. Neither the State nor the faiAly any longer 
provided adequate protection. The village community was 
barely strong enough to maintain order within its o-vni 
boundaries; the urban community scarcely existed. Every- 
where the weak man felt the need to be sheltered by someone 
more powerful. The poiTerful man, in his turn, could not 
maintain his prestige or his fortune or even ensure his own 
safety except by securing for himself, by persuasion or 
coercion, the support of subordinates bound to his service. 
On the one hand, there was the urgent quest for a 
protector; on the other, there were usurpations of 
authority, often by violent means. And as notions of 
weakness and strength are always relative, in many cases the 
same man occupied a dual role - as a dependent of a more 
powerful man and a protector of humbler ones. Thus there 
began to be built up a vast system of personal relationships 
whose intersecting threads ran from one level of the social 
structure to another (Bloch, 19617 PP-147-148). 
The creation of a social system which "involved a far-reaching 
restriction of social intercourse, a circulation of money too 
sluggish to admit of a salaried officialdom, and a mentality 
attached to things tangible and local" (Bloch, 1961, P-443)t 
naturally favoured the oral and face-to-face mediation of sociall 
relationships. Both medieval society and medieval man became 
. 4. 11centres without margins . 
Imagine two men face to face; one wishing to serve, the 
other willing or anxious to be served. The former puts 
his hands together and places themq thus joinedq between 
the hands of the other man -a plain symbol of submission 
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'the significance of which was sometimes further 
emphasised by a kneeling posture. At the same time, the 
person proffering his hands utters a few words -a very 
short declaration - by which he acknowledges himself to 
be the Imalil of the person facing him. Then chief and 
subordinate kiss each other on the mouth7 symbolizing 
accord and friendshiD. Such were the gestures ... 
which served to cement one of the strongest social bonds 
known in the feudal era (Bloch, 1961, PP-145-146). 
In this fashion one became the 'man of another man' rather than 
an anonymous cog of a strongly centralised bureaucracy. 
*** 
In commenting upon the cross-fertilisation of medieval 
sacred and secular music, Mellers has drawn a striking analogy 
between music and society: 
Not only had the religious art-music of the Middle Ages 
and the popular folk music many qualities technical and 
spiritual, in common; there was a continual interaction 
between them which is of crucial importance from both a 
sociological and a musical point of view. There have been 
many learned arguments as to which came first7 which 
influenced which, that seem to me irrelevant. If the 
feudal order meant anything (and one knows it nearly always 
failed to live up to its pretensions) it was an order in 
which cleric and peasant mutually succoured each otherg one 
provided for the needs of the body, the other for the needs 
of the soul. They were complementary parts of a social 
organism, allied in their very differences2 and their 
respective musical manifestations likewise complement one 
another (1946, p. 26). 
It is possible to go much further than this7 however, 'for the 
pentatonic' structure underlying much medieval music in itself 
serves to articulate the ideal feudal structure. The 
fundamentals of pentatonicism are complementary and mutually 
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dependent on one another. They are also contres without margins 
in the-sense that the relationships they form are made directly 
with other fundamentals, something that is simply not the case 
with tonality. Indeed, insomuch as one note of the pentatonic 
structure may be stressed more than the othersq Bloch's statement 
that feudal society was "unequal ,.. rather than ... 
hierarchical" (19619 P-443) is one that could equally irell be 
applied to the structure of pentatonicism as found in medieval 
music. 
The structural articulations of medieval music are not 
restricted to the Ispatiall sphere alone., however. Both the 
spiritual rhythm of plainchant 
5 
and the corporeal rhythm of folk- 
so ng 
6 
conveyed a revelationary sense of becoming rather than an 
incarnate sense of being . Time was a product of becoming: 
To change was to pass from potentiality to actuality. But 
this transition had nothing about it necessarily temporal. 
By virtue of the Christian doctrine of omnipotence it 
could have a tempbral quality only if there were some 
cause which did not allow the immediate transformation by 
divine action of the potentiality into the act. And this 
cause which required that time be involved in the change 
was a certain defect of matter .... From this Doint of 
viewq matter was nothing other than a persistcnco which, 
manifesting itself in the substance of a thing, hindered 
that thing from assuming instantly the fullness of being 
which its form would confer upon it, a resistance which 
introduced distance and tardiness, multiplicity and delay, 
where everything, it seemed, should have happened 
simultaneously and at once (Fouletq 1956, PP-4-5)- 
The instaneity of oneness with God stands in stark opposition to 
the spatialised temporality of industrial men. Both negate the 
subjective'flo-rT: oneness with God implies a completo losing of 
the self, a solipsistic consciousness2 whereas the conceptual 
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control of spantialised time indicates a consciousness of 
conscioutmess together with a sense of historyg progress and all 
the other categori6s o1L understanding sYm-Dtomatic of the 
8 
industrial world sense In negating the instaheity of oneness 
with Godq howeverg the temporal flow of consciousness reveals 
time without making it incarnate as 'objective fact'. The 
conceptual control medieval man has over the universe, therefore, 
remains slipperys "these men, subjected both externally and 
internally to so many ungovernable forces, lived in a world 
in which the passage of time escaped their grasp all the more 
because they were so ill-equipped to measure it" (Bloch, 1961, 
P-73). But, as Bloch indicates, the lack of measurement (and 
measurement is so vital to the time of industrial man) "was but 
one of the symptoms ... of a vast indifference to time" (: L96l, 
P-74) and so of the fact that medieval man still largely 6xisted 
within time. 
The revelationary nature of becoming is therefore closely 
related to medieval man's "lack' of self-contained margins. 
Medieval man feels much more intimately involved with and 
effected by events than does industrial man. Both the mutual 
dependency of the pentatonic fundamentals of medieval music and 
that music's spiritual and corporeal rhythms articulate this 
revelationary immediacy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that from the standpoint of industrial society, the music of 
medieval man seems to negate the individuality which is a 
dialectic correlate of that society's world sense9. Mellers, 
for example, is of the opinion that the singer of plainchant "is 
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not interested in the 'expression' of the individual" but in 
"the medium through which the voice of God manifests itself" 
(1946, pp. 24-25). Again, in noting certain similarities 
between plainsong and some secular songs, the same author infers 
a link between musical structure and the structuring of medieval 
society and consciousness: 
The rhythms are extremely flexible, flowing naturally 
from the spoken inflection ... ; there is a tendency 
towards fluid pentatonic vocal figurations analagous to 
the plainsong tropes; there is an habitual avoidance of 
leading notes and implied full closes, the same 
insistence on conjunct motion and the absolute and 
perfect consonances. The impression still tendsl that 
is, to. the merging of the pe rsonality in something 
outside itself; for all the local details of the songs, 
the effect is not that of the incarnation of a 'personality', 
but of a creative act which is independent of any 
particular person, made manifest through the human voice 
(1946ý p. 25)- 
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NOTES: 
Reti in fact uses the phrases 'melodic tonality' and 
tharmonic tonality'. The irord tonality was omitted in 
this context because it seemed confusing. 'Tonality' in 
this chapter refers exclusively to the musical language 
prevalent in Europe between approximately 1600 and 1900. 
2. Again) one must question Retils use of -the words 'melodic' 
and 'harmonic'. The classification Reti is attempting 
extends much beyond that which is simply melodic and that 
which is harmonic. The sense of importance of the key- 
note in a tonal melody without harmony is not in the 
slightest bit 'melodic' T-according to Retils categorisation) 
and there are some harmonies, such as are to be found in 
impressionistic music and the blues, which work in a 
decidedly 'melodic' fashion (again according to Retils 
categorisation). The specific reservations about the use 
of words such as 'melodic' and 'harmonic' have been made 
elsewhere (see above pp. 1-71--IS3). For the purpose at 
hand) however, Retils classification is sufficient. 
This method is not the only one by which one note may be 
given more prominence than another in pentatonically based 
melody, and it is not to be suggested that it is the one 
which necessarily gives rise to the inequality of 
fundamentals as experienced in Plainchant. Two other 
methods may be mentioned. The first is provided by the 
curvilinear shape of a melody which seems to create 
(possibly by the desire of the voice to relax the tension 
created by moving up and away from the first note) the 
propensity for the melody to return to its starting point. 
The second, which is related, involves the use of reverse 
curv linear shapes together with normal curv linear shapes 
so that, the melody pivots about a median. note. 
See above p. 69. 
There is insufficient space here to describe the often 
vitriolic disputes which have surrounded the question o-., ' 
plainchant rhythm. For a survey of the dispute see John 
Rayburn (1964)- For the purposes of this chapter it is 
adequate to note that all the three main schools of thou. -lit 
agree that plainchant rhythm was 'free', and that only an 
insignificant minority of scholars consider that it was 
strictly metred in the manner of tonality. No-one has ever 
suggested that plainchant had a rhythm founded on bodily 
movement. 
As with pentatonicism, spiritual and corporeal rhythm are 
elements that medieval music has in common with some pre- 
literate musics. Again, thorough comparative studies would 
be needed to establish that the rhythms of medieval music 
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betray a conceptual framework essentially different from 
t4oseof pro-literate musics. It is interesting to note, 
however, that medieval man's sense of time does involve a 
marked degree of distancing and historicity which one TTOuld 
expect to hear articulated in the rhythms of his music - 
see Georges Poulet (1956t PP-4-5)- 
These two phrases (a frevelationary sense of becoming' and 
and 'incarnate sense of being') refer respectively to 
relationships with the world typical of orally mediated*and 
typographically mediated societies. CD 
See above, Chapter Three. 
See above, Chapter Three. 
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CHAPMR ELEVIN 
THE DEVELORMT OF TONALITY: 
A STRUCTURAL APPROALCH 
- 269 - 
Accepting the notions of implicitness and explicitness, 
and the assertion that all musics articulate social-intellectual 
structpresq the difference between the monody of plainchant and 
the initial harmony which develops into tonality might not appear 
1 
as great or as 'fundamental' as one might think For the 
parallel fifths atid fourths of organum make explicit in this 
first form of Western harmony the fifths and-fourths of the under- 
lying and implicit pentatonic structure of much early medieval 
music. Such externalisation only represents a transient stage 
between the pure monody of pentatonicism and the fully-developed 
harmony of tonality2 however$ for pentatonicismg in thus becoming 
harmonically explicitq began to destroy its own implicit 
gualities.. As we have seen, the only inequality existing 
between the fundamentals of pentatonicism resulted from the 
stressing of one note through repetition -a stressing which did 
not serve to break up the mutual. dependency (and therefore the 
ambiguity of rblationship) existing between the fundamentals. 
The creation of the vox Principalis and the derived vox organalis, 
however, destroys this mutual dependency by creating a hie. rarchy. 
The vox organalis only exists insomuch as it is a function of and 
refers back to the previously self-sufficient vox principalis. 
Although the vox organalis taken on its own(as in the Musica 
Enchiriadis - see Ex. 2) could well be a self-sufficient line of 
plainsong, the way in which it is conceived and heard by medieval 
man negates such a possibility. It is now possible to extend 
Figure I to include these externalisations (see Fig . ,& 
2). 
- 270 - 
E 
bO 
1ý4 
0 
0 
EL. 
0 
C) 
0 
0 
-1 ul 
2 
Cý 
ur 
cb7 
11-1 
. 
- 271 - 
Furthermore, organum. may give notes i., -hich ,; ere 
Previously quilismas-a different hierarchical function, -thus 
Teak-ening their previous role as passing notes. In Eýc- 3, for 
example3 a note which is a passing note within the mode is now 
heard as a function of a fundamentali. 
Ex. 3 
CbEA ßrPAssIN,. foJ-s 
tJ- -O 
The process is more. obvious. in F-x- 4, where'a piece of disjunct 
motion utilises the note in a fashion that denies any possibility 
of it being heard as a passing note. ITotes which iiere 
previously ouilismas and, as such were unessential, here become 
essential parts of the structure of organuin 
2. 
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jA 
This is demonstrated in Figure 3. 
The role of organum in negating the very strupture it 
-is externalising can be further explained by considering the 
polyphony increasing importance of musica ficta to the emerging 
of the late Middle Ages. It has already been noted that the 
augmented fourth or diminished fifth, as approximated from the 
harmonic series, is a very unstable interval that falls roughly 
halfway both in an octave and bet-apen the intervals. of the 
fourth and the fifth. M'edieval theorists- have labelled it 
diabolus in musical therefore, not only because of its 
instability, but because any musical reference to it would tend 
to deny the 'natural' function of fourths and fifths in halving 
the octave, and so ultimately deny the underlying structure of 
pentatonicism. As a coroll ary of this denial, there would exist 
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a negation of the feudal structure of medieval society. It is 
furthermore vrorth noting, hoifever, that the augmented fourth is 
the only interval that does not naturally result from tile 
pentatonic structure and its passing notes. Fifths, fourths, 
major and minor thirds and whole tones can all be derived from 
the pure pentatonic structure, aiid the senitones occuras a 
-result--of -quilismas. AuFmented 
fourths can- only occur 
pentatonic melody by a leap to or from a passing note, a 
procedure irhich negates -the very function of a passing note. 
The fact -that -augmented fourths are not found in Gregorian chant 
not only supports the pentatonic theory, therefore, but again 
sh-ows, from a practical standpoint, how the admission of 
augmented fourths would undermine a pentatonic structure by 
giving passing notes an emphasis they do not possess. 
The parallelism of organum is therefore constrained to 
avoid the augmented fourths that irould inevitably result (see 
F-Xample 5) by resorting to musica ficta. Notes'which were not 
previously part of the natural gamut of a mode thus become an 
essential part of the structure of org, --n= originating in that mode. 
Ex -5 
ti 
-, 0- C) ý 
275 - 
In Fig. 3, for example, three natural gamuts may be derived from 
the original pentatonic structure (C DFG Bb): 
GDBFGA Bb 
GD Eb FGA Bb 
CD Eb PG Ab Bb 
*GDEFG Ab Bb * 
The starred shape is inadmissible, since it does not conform to 
a natural gamut. From the three admissible gamuts, two 
different gamuts with one musica ficta3 not e may be derived. 
CD Eb FG Afilb Bb 
CDE Eb FGA Bb 
Figure 3 may thus be modified (see Fie;. 4). This process, even 
more than that of making passing notes an essential-Dart of the 
structure of organum, again serves to seriously weaken the 
pentatonic structure being , externalised. 
Organum, however, does not simply externalise the 'Li. Lths 
camd fourths of the pentatonic structure but also, in free organum, 
the seconds and major and minor thirds. Since major and minor 
thirds do not follow each other in free organum, they"will be 
given as alternatives in Figure 5- For the reasons already 
discuzsed with reference to parallel org ganum, this procedure aýgain 
negates the implicit qualities of the structure being externalised. 
A strong potential may therefore be said to exist in both parallel 
and free orGanum for the articulation of an explicit 'three- 
dimensional' structure at the expense of the already existing 
implicit Itiro-dimensionall structure. 
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Before proceeding any further with this brief analysis, 
however, it is necessary to examine a little more closely the 
pre-conditions necessary for the development of. tonality together 
with some of the deyelopmental features related to those pre- 
conditions. First of all, it is clear that the possibility of 
externally 'stating' or 'reproducing' elements of music which 
before were only implicit results from the development of 
phonetic literacy and its concomitant concepts as outlined in 
Chapter Three. But, in contrastq it is by no means clear that 
the inception or creation of polyphony -uas coincidental with this 
'conscious, 4 externalisation. Although Lincoln Bunco Spiess is 
of the opinion that "there is no scientific evidence extant to 
prove beyond question that there was a rudimentary polyphonic 
practice before the organum of the ninth century" (1957, P-15)y 
such practice is a possibility that can hardly be ruled out5. 
The evidence relayed above by Reese to the effect that an 
untrained congregation may sing lorganuml without apparently 
intending to would alone seem to suggest that an 'unintended 
polyphony' was not uncommon in the early Middle Ages. 
It might well be the case, therefore, that the process of 
writing down harmony was partially engendered by the pre- 
existence of polyphonic forms which, howeverý were not originally 
'conscious' externalisations of the implicit plainchant melodies. 
It must not only be remembered that without the growing 
distancing and objectivity of phonetic literacy men might never 
have been able to recede far enough from the music to notice the 
implicitly structured and 'accidental' or 'natural' forms of 
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polyphony (parallelismg heterophony and imitation), but, that 
irithout those very formsq literacy might have been used for 
much longer than was actually the case in encoding monophonic 
lines, whether implicit or explicit. Indeed, it is a distinct 
theoretical possibility that the development of an explicit 
musical structure might never have been harmonically mediated. 
There existsq in other words, a dialectic relationship between 
literacy and growing harmonic explicitness in uhich it is 
impossible to identify individual cause and effect. In the 
opinion of Denis Stevens, then, both the perpetuation and 
development of polyphony are linked with the importance of the 
book to the Carolingian Renaissance: 
The art of writing, of calligraphy, became wedded 
indissolubly to the art of music. Thus the polyphony 
of earlier times and distant nationsl. however well 
organised into parallel melodies, tune-u-non-dronesp or 
thematic imitation, lacked the means to perpetuate itself 
unequivocally. It was the task of Nesteinn nations to 
transform sounds into symbols (1960, p. 211). 
It is crucial for an adequate understanding of develo-ping 
tonality that it is not viewed solely and simply as the result of 
the harmonic externalisation of a structure formerly implicit in 
the melodic lines of another culture. Tonality is not jELt a 
'three-dimensional' version of pentatonicism. It must not only 
be remembered that the phonetically literate concepts (described 
in Chapter Three) which instigated and facilitated the creation 
of tonality in themselves changed the very structure of society 
and consciousnessq but that evolving tonality itself represented 
a creative articulation and encoding of that change. The growth 
of a musical structure where harmony represents an initial 
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externalisation of the structure as implicit in melody is 
therefore part and parcel of a 'fundamental' change in the 
overall social-intellectual structure. Thus, although it is 
true that harmony may be regarded as the initial medium for 
grouing explicitness, tonality as it finally evolved displayed a 
total explicitness which transcends any melodic or harmonic 
parameters 
6. 
From this point of view it is 
'incorrect to hear 
the harmony of developed tonality simply as an externalisation 
of a structure formerly implicit in melody2-or the melody of 
developed harmony as simply 'containingl. structural or 'harmonic' 
implications that exist only because of the harmony, Any such 
line of thought ultimately depends upon the assumptional equation 
of melody with implicitness and harmony with explicitness. The 
validity of this equation was, of coursey brought into question 
in an earlier chapter7. 
As a corollary of this discussion, it should be re- 
emphasised that music does not possess its own internal laws. 
Tonality was not generated simply from 'within' previous musical 
forms, but was constructed and created as part of a continually 
developing social process. Even if music's dialectic 
relationship with wider social process is accepted, however, it 
could still be thought that the 'internal' and 'self-sufficient' 
musical laws which Icaused1tonality paralleled wider social 
'causation'. But, as previously argued, social process knows no 
strict or 'prime causation'. And, since creativity is an 
#tegrel part of the social process, there can be no ultimate and 
complete explanation for -the particular form that a symbol takes. 
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Harmonic externalisation cannot therefore be regarded as a link 
in a causal chain which inexorably leads to the full 
development of tonality. Rather, it was a symptom of creative 
and transcendent social change. As already suggested, -harmony 
might well not have been an absolute necessity for the 
development of an explicit musical language. 
*** 
Two further developments were required before the 
evolving tonality as set out in Fig- 5 could achieve full 
fruition. Firstly, the third was accepted as a consonance and 
replaced the fourth as an important structural element. Apart 
from the fact that the major mid minor thirds are, respectively, 
the next intervals to be generated in the harmonic series after 
the perfect fourth (see Ex . 1), the pre-conditions favouring the 
increasing importance of the third may best be elucidated by 
briefly considering the interplay between practice and theory in 
the I-liddle Ages. In an extremely interesting article Richard 
L. Crocker raises the question of why medieval theorists, given 
the legacy of the Greek Greater Perfect System, should bother 
with the construction of smaller theoretical units: 
What could be the purpose of articulating the scale 
into smaller units such as the tetrachord - as Hucbald 
did and as most other theorists did after him? T, -Thyj 
when early theorists had a complete scale - the Greater 
Perfect System - did they go through all this business 
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with scale segments? (1972, p. 28). 
The probable answer, Crocker states 
is ... that the Frankish musician started with the 
singing of the chant and worIced his way to,. -Tard theoretical 
constructions such as the scale, rather than the other way 
round. He was singerý teacherg theorist in that order. 
Cantus, not musica disciplina, i--ýas his starting point; his 
curriculum was that of tile 'monastic school of the 7th and 
8th centuries, not the liberal arts curriculum of an 
earlier - or a later - time. The Greater Perfect System 
itself was not a basic assumption but rather a theoretical 
abstraction relatively remote from practical experience 
(19729 p. 293. 
"In t_erm-- of that experience", Crocker continues, "there was a 
clear need for a scalar module of manageable size, such as a 
fourth or fifth" (1972, p. 29). In this context it must be made. 
perfectly clear, as Crocker does, that the octave did not 
provide a suitable scalar module: 
Nor was an octave module itself very appropriate; we are: 
so accustomed to thinking of the octave as the basic 
scalar module that we do not immediately recognize the 
circumstances under which it is inappropriate. From the 
Frankish point of viiew, the octave seemed too large a 
module .... in considering any extended scalar 
construction, -vie have to remember that there was no handy 
mechanical embodiment - no keyboard - for a standard 
reference .9*. Any tonal structure referred to must 
be sung and held in the ear. Hance the obvious advantage 
of using repertory pieces of chant to illustrate2 or 
rather to embody, tonal constructions .... This is a 
specific demonstration of the central importance of chant 
repertory in the development of medieval theory (19722 
p. 29). 
It appears that the fifth might well have been the most important 
interval in 11, his interplay between practice and theory. Not only 
is it the. first interval to be generated by the harmonic series 
after the octave (see Ex. 1) - and therefore the largest 
consonance to be of any great practical use to the medieval 
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musician 
8_ 
but, in being the interval 
the disjunct tetrachords around which 
it was arguably an extremely pervasive 
theory. Crocker intimates as much in 
husica Enchiriadis scale: 
of duplication between 
[loxachords were constructed, 
common element in medieval 
his discussion of the 
Instead of octave duplication, the scale embodies 
consistent duplication at the fifthý comparable - but more 
consistent - to Guido's affinity at the fifth. As 
Handschin observed, Hermann's instructions, "Take any 
tetrachord ... add a tone at either end ... 11 apply 
exactly to the constituent tetrachord of the Musica 
13nchiriadis scale, the tones added at either end 
corresponding to the tones of disjunction between 
successive tetraohords (1972, P-30). 
Bearing in mind the overall importance of the fifth, it 
becomes clear that the -oreservation of the fourth as a consonance 
in any developed polyphony having more than two parts would 
almost inevitably7 through inversion at the fifth, produce the 
unacceptable dissonance of the major second. If medieval 
theorists could not accept the third as a consonance, there seems 
little reason why they should have accepted the second. As 
intervals which occur next in the harmonic series after the 
fourth2 end which come midway between the second and the fourth, 
the major and minor third could be regarded, therefore, as 
'compromises'. 
A preference for thirds rather than fourths in the 
harmonic 'dimension' of Fig- 5 creates a situation highly 
favourable for the emergence of all the triads of the unified 
major-minor system. But before this could be achieved, it was 
necessary for one of the notes in each alternative situation 
indicated in Pig- 5 to be eliminated in such a way that the 
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resulting structure only utilized tile seven notes of the major 
scale. This development is indicated in Fig. 6. The scale 
chosen in Fig. 6 is F major. It should be pointed out, 
howevery that two other scalesq Bb major and Eb major, would 
9 have been equally possible . and that the particular 
development shown in Fig. 6 is thus only indicative of a wider 
and more significant change. For the posgibility of 
deriving three scales from the same structure is symptomatic of 
the relationship obtaining between the keys of those scales, 
and so' of the homogeneity and 'repeatability"O characteristic 
of the entire major-minom system. One major or minor triad of 
a particular key has relationships with other major or minor 
triads that may be precisely duplicated by those other triads 
if there is an appropriate 'key change'. To put it in 
practical termsq a piece of tonal musi c involving modulation may 
be played in any one of twelve keys. 
The hoinogeneity and repeatability of such inter- 
relationships are not characteristic of tho modal system. In 
this system each mode has a unique structure which is largely un- 
related to the other modal shapes. When the modes were first 
classified according to their finalsý for example) there was no 
attempt to xelate the finals on a common scale: "It is essential 
e9. to notice ... that the placement of the several finals on 
a common scale - so basic a step that we take it for granted - is 
actually distinct from the classification itself, which 
presumably came first as a separate step" (Crocker, 19729 P-30). 
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As Crocker points out2 it is difficult for us, i-,, ith our 
background of tonality, to imagine such a state of -affairs: 
it ... may require an effort, to imagine the situation 
as it first presented itself to the chant singer: he 
would have perceived several autonomous groups of chants, 
each group with its oim perceived set of tones and semi- 
tones, but'. lie iTould not nceessa-rily have been aware of 
any common scalar denominator that would relate the groups 
to each other. Indeed, there may have been no such 
denominator (1972, P-31). 
Although there probably was no common-scalar denominator which 
actually related the different groups of chant, it hasý of 
course, been strongly argued that. there existed, in the form of 
the pentatonic structure, a common Eenerative denominator. in 
this distinction lies the difference between explicit musical 
structuring, where the relationships between relata are made 
perfectly clear in the music itself, and a more implicit 
structuring, where the music does not, obviously display its own 
iinderlying structure. 
A crucial stage in the development of tonality is there- 
fore achieved i.., hich a scalar shape itself provides the module for 
11 
relating the different shapes A parallel develonment took 
place in medieval theory when the finals of different modes iTere 
placed on a comm3n scale adapted and devised for that very 
purpose. This process does much to explain the im-portance of 
the tetrachord 12 to the scale of the Musica Enchiriadis 
13 
and 
other. medieval theoretical schemes. But it was a process whose 
implications were only understood with some difficultyý and this 
difficulty gives a vital insight into the fundamental difference 
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between the modal and tonal systems: 
The underlying moment in this process was ... to 
understand the extended Ditch realm of the scale (i. e., 
the Greater Perfect'System as adopted by medieval 
theorists) in terms of the relationshipsamong, the finals: - 
that is, the relationships among any one final and the 
pitches above and below it and then the relationships 
among the finals when they themselves were taken to be the 
pitches above and below each other. This steD led 
outside of and be. way yond any one final: to put it another 
the ultimate purpose of the tetrachord of the finals was 
not so much to understand a particular final in terms of a 
scalar construction as to understand a scalar construction 
in terms of the network of finals. For it was the scaleý 
not the finals, that needed understanding (Crocker, 1972, 
P-33). [Second set of emphasis mine] . 
The difference between the development as it affected tonality 
and as it affected medieval theory is that whereas any medieval 
'common' scalar denominator was simply a theoretioal concept 
having no direct musical expression3 the tonal denominator was of 
identical shape with the scales being related. As such it had 
explicit musical expression. 
It has already been noted that, in order for the major 
scale14 shape to emerge from any of I the modal shapes, it was 
15 
necessary for the alternative notes of plainchant or organum to 
ýe 
eliminated according to a particular pattern (of- Pigs- 5 and 
6). It is now apparent that this pattern occurs as a dialectic 
correlate of the growing explicitness of evolving tonalityg an 
explicitness which requires that the different modal shapes be 
syncretised into one homogeneous structure with a single 
unambiguous focal poin 
16 
0 
The line of development so far arguod in this chap-Aller 
(see also Figs. 1- 6) is echoed by Reese in his discussion of 
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the Notre Dame School. Pentatonic melody and 'tonal' harmony 
balance each other; 
The uppea? voices, in weaving about the tones of the triad 
often supplemented them by the second and sixth, thus 
producing a strong g pentatonic effect. 
But the forceful- 
ness with which the triad makes itself felt, also, and in 
addition, the increasing appearance of the third shows g that the pentatonic and diatonic systems are poised in the 
balance (1940, P-303). 
The third., an. interval originally regarded as needing resolution, 
gradually became a consonance in its own right, a-ad superseded 
the fourth in its importance as a structural element: 
The feeling that thirds need resolution to perfect 
consonances is illustrated by Anonymus XIII ... 17110 
states ... that the major third should be followed by a 
fifth, and the minor third by a unison .... Practical 
music in the 13th Century, howeverg gave greater liberty 
to the third in particular ... While octaves and 
fifths predominate in the course of the pieces, the 
increasing recognition accorded to the third foreshadows 
the eventual doimfall of a harmonic system based on 
unisons, octaves and fifths, and (originally) fourths - 
a system, that is, betokening a pentatonic feeling for 
melody ... - and the approach of a harmonic system 
based or. the triad (Reese, 1940, p. 295)- 
k 
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NOTESs 
See the discussion above, pp. 221 -Z53 , concerning the 
relationship of implicitness and explicitness to melody 
and harmony. 
2. Since the quilismas can thus become essential both in a 
harmonic and melodic sense, the melodic part of the 
diagram is extended up another layer. The relationship 
between the ouilismas in a harmonic and melodic sense 
thus indicated - See Fic. 3. 
3. The examples and figures use a different set of notes, 
which serves to emphasise that the discussion is still 
centred around shapes rather than around notes having a 
precisely notated perfect pitch. The ori, ý-; inal pentatonic 
shape in the example is thereLore CDEGAI whereas in the 
figures it is Bb CD17G. 
The use of the Word 'conscious' in this context has already 
been briefly discussed (see above, Chapter Hine n. 2)- 
Its use here is meant to indicate that a certain growth in 
consciousness is being encoded, and not that the process 
of encoding itself is explicitly carried out or 
'conscious'. 
5. As we have seen (see above p. 2_51 ), the Venda have a 
developed harmony, and moreover, a harmony for which 
Blacking claims a. degree of explicitness (see Blhckling, 
1973, p. 85)- What is true of the Venda in this respect is 
probably also true of some other pro-literate tribes (see- 
Nettlj 1956, PP-77-89). Spiess is clearly aware of the 
existence of pre-literate polyphony, because he refers (1957, 
p. 11) to Schneider's theory that polyphony as we-now 
understand it evolved. from such pre-literate polyphony. 
Spiess does make one comment on Schneider's theory which is 
important because it once ag .:, ain points up 
the possibility of 
white influence (see above Chapter Eight n. 15). Although 
admitting that Schneider's theory is "logical" he says that 
"there is perhaps room for speculation as regards the 
alleged 'purity' of the aboriginal tribes from which stem 
the musical examples of Schneider's hypothetical first stage 
**** it does seem that during the one thousand years that 
polyphony has definitely known to be in existence ... some influence, however indirect, may have reached such 
aboriginal nations and tribes .... 11 
It must be remembered that the harmony of developed tonality 
is just one aspect of a 'pre-existing' whole. TWith 
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evolving tonality, therefore,, growing explicitness is as 
much 'in' the melodic line as it is lin'the harmony. 
Although in the case of evolving tonality, there would be 
no explicitness without harmony, the quality of 
explicitness is not restrictedto the harmony along. What 
is essentially a useful approach to understanding growing 
explicitness must not be allowed to distort the actual 
nature of such explicitness. 
See above pp. 1'82- -195. 
Although the octave. was admitted as a consonance by 
medieval theorists, and although it is important in its 
relationship to the fifth and fourth, it was not itself an 
important structural interval in medieval music. Crocker 
indicates this when he says that "iffien early theorists spoke 
of the octave, it was often in terms of its identity of 
resonaxice -I as When men and boys sinj- the same note (Crocker, 1972, -p. 29). 
This may be illustrated as follows: 
Bb CDEFGA Bb -F major 
Bb CD Bb FGA Bb - Bb major 
Bb CD Eb FG Ab Bb - Eb major 
10. Homogeneity and repeatability are key characteristics of the 
industrial world sense - see above, pp. 
+. 5 -0. 
The shapes are 'different', of course, only in that they 
have strictly notated perfect pitch. The actual shape is 
identical in all cases as regards modulation, but not as 
regards the triads built on each note of the scalar module 
(cf. below, n. 14)- 
12. The tetrachord is important because there are four finals, 
each of which is appropriate to two (one authenticq one 
plagal) of the eight modes. The'number of four is thus 
linked to the lorigins' of the eight modes as discussed by 
Werner (see above, Chapter Nine, n. 13). But it is also 
possible here to indicate a link between Werner's argument 
and the influence of the Greek Greater Perfect System on 
the formulation of the modes. For as Crocker indicates5 
although the classification of the modes is distinct from 
the -olacement of the finals of the modes on a common scale, 
"it is not entirely distinct from the number of finals 
identified, for this number will depend to some degree upon 
the type of common scale selected" (1972, P-30). This 
link again underlines the usefulness of Chailley's scheme 
in demonstrating how the eiEht modes could have evolved in 
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a purely musical sense, whilst at the sarae time not 
precluding the generation of plainchant which does not 
easily fit into any mode. 
13. Crocker, (1972, P-33) points out that the scale of the 
Musica. Enchiriadis "was the most extreme exponent" of the 
development here being described. It is also interesting 
to note that the emergence of organum and theory (which can 
be regarded as an externalisation of implicit structure in 
the same iray as organum) occurred at about the same time 
and in the same area (10th and Ilth century Fronce) as the 
beginning of thelzreakdoim of classic feudalism. This 
again provides evidence for the arguimeni that music both 
encodes and creatively articulates socially constructed 
reality. 
14. The minor scale may be said to emerge. as a result of the 
homogeneous nature of tonal structure. If every note of 
the major scale (the scalar sha-po which provides tile module 
for relatin, -, -, the 'different' shapes) generated a major triad 
or scale within the key of that scalar shapeq then the 
structure would immediately lose its characteristics of 
homogeneity and repeatability. This may easily be observed 
by reference to Fig. 6. 
15- As regards the shape of a strictly classified mode there are 
no alternative notes. Even if this was universally true in 
practice (whicli seems unlikely), then, according to Chailley's 
theory, there must have been alternative notes before the 
modes finally 16olidified' into their predominant shapes. 
The argument-here is -that as organum developed, these 
alter-native notes again came into playj and became 
symptomatic of the weakening modal shapes, It is interesting 
to speculate that nusica ficta had less to do with notat ted 
accidentals as it did with notes which were 'foxeign' to the 
shape or natural gamut of a mode. Alternative notes would 
have provided instances of such foreign notes. 
16. The essential reification of this sycretisation is the scale 
of equal temperament as embodied in the keyboard. 
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CHAPTE R TUMVE, 
TONALITY'S ENCODING OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL WRLD 3MISE 
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TILE? IITJSICIIL aNCODING OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD SMISE 
With the full development of tonality, the interlocking 
fundamentals of pentatonicism become separated. . 
In Fig. 62 
for example, it is perfec tly clear whether C is heard as a fifth 
of P, as its own fundamental, as a third oi- A or a fourth of G9 
and, more importantly, at what level in the structure those 
relationships obtain. For tonality creates a hierarchy of 
fundamentals, all of which, through the various levels of the 
hierarchy, finally and ultimately relate back to one note. 
In this fashion the architectonicism of"tho tonal structure 
articulates the world sense of industrial man, for it is a 
structure having one central 'viewpoint' (that of the key-note) 
that is the focus of a single3 unified. sound-sense involving a 
high degree of distancing. It isq in other words, a centre- 
orientated structure with margins. But it is. a further vital 
facet of tonal architectonicism that each note becomes a centre 
with margins. The 'more' important structural notes relate to 
each other insomuch as their precise function is defined by the 
'less' important notes belonging to 'higher' architectonic 
levels, and these tless' important notes only relate to each 
other insomuch as their position is defined by their 
relationshi Ds to the 'more$ important structural notes. 
The 'spatial' aspect of tonality is not, however2 the 
only one to articulate the social-intellectual structure oL 
industrial man. As the simultaneously divergent, viewpoints and 
time-spaces of medieval man were snapped into a single three-. 
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dimensional focus whose necessary adjunct was a spatialised 
time, so the syncretisation of the different modal shapes into 
the unified structure of explicit tonality necessitated a 
precise 'vertical' mensuration which could not help but 
articulate a sDatialised time. The correct 'vertical' co- 
ordination of the notes of the different melodic lines in 
tonality leads, as it were2 to the possibility of making a 
'spatial' 'three-dimensional' out along the 'time' axis of any 
tonal Diece of jusic. The typification of such a cut is the 
bar-line. It is, moreover, a dialectic correlate of the 
spatialised time articulated by tonality that industrial man, in 
becoming increasingly 'objective' and self-consei-ous2 is able to 
stand back and objectify the passage of time. The 
revelationary nature of time as articulated by spiritual and 
corporeal rhythms is thus negated by a unified rhythmic 
structure which gains its effect from the -null of rhythmic 
patterns against pulse as contained in the strict metre essential 
to the three-dimensional cut already meniioned. By bringing the 
corporeal -pulse of music into such continual high relief - and 
thereby altering and negating its original 'timeless' and 
hypnotic characteristics - the rhythmic structure of tonality 
helps to maintain industrial man's intense and constant awareness 
both of the passage of time, and of his oi-m consciousness. 
The vital change in man's orienetation toiraxds himself 
and the environment that occurred during the Renaissance created 
the fiction, if not the fact, of 'progress'. The classical and 
cyclical idea of historical degeneration and recovery: 
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*** lost its hold on the imaginations of men as a result 
of profound changes in the outward conditions of life 
which occurred in ffestern EAurope from -the fourteenth to 
the nineteenth century. Ar. qon. _- 
these changes were the 
rise of ordered secular governments, the growth of 
towns and industry, the geographical discoveries and the 
extension of commerce which brought Western Europe into 
direct contact with alien customs and ideas, and above 
all the rise of an educated middle class -,. Those interests 
were hampered by a form of society in which both the 
power and the doctrines of the Christian Church supported 
the autocracy of kings and the privileges of a landed 
aristocracy. It was in this time of revolt a,, -ainst 
ecclesiastical and secular authority that the Christian 
doctrine of salvation was gradually transformed into the 
modern idea of progress (Becker, 1969, p. 12). 
The central point upon which the entire social-intellectual 
structure of industrial man is focused and from which the 
majority of poirer and influence in the structure is derived ' 
provides a defined goal towards which all other elements in the 
structure tend. It was argued in Chapter Three, for example, 
that the phonetic literacy and typography responsible for the 
growth of the industrial social-intellectual structure was also 
heavily instrumental in generating a class dialogue that took 
place within the framework. of political and economic nationalism7 
and was overwhelmingly concerned with who should wield the 
centralised poiTer of nationalism. Progress, theng is concerned 
with impulsive movement towards the centres provided by the 
structure and its various sub-structures. But the concept is 
also a product of the temporal aspect of industrial society. The 
intense awareness of the passage of time that is concomitant uith 
industrial man's increased control of the environment leads him 
to conceive of manipulating and 'improving' the environment 
(social as well as physical) in specific stages which can be 
achieved within certain segments of spatialised time relevant to 
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his life span. For in being intensely aware of the passage of 
-time and so of his own finite existence, industrial man tends 
to bring an urgency to his activities which medieval mang living 
more uithin a revelat ionary time, would probably find hard to 
understand. As we have seen, the syncronisation of events 
according to the clock which is. so prevalent in industrial 
society would not have taken place in medieval society. 
The concept of progress through spatialised time towards 
culmination at a focal point finds expression in tonality through 
the spatial end temporal aspec-ts already mentioned. But perhaps 
the vital characteristic of tonality is its sense of magnetic 
pull towards the key-note, and it is this sense whi ch provides 
the quintessential articulation of the concept of progress. 
Whereas the intrinsic nature of the relationships between the 
interlocking fundamentals of medieval music is partially 
responsible for its tendency towards temporal simultaneity2 the 
sense of magnetic pull in tonality is achieved by utilising the 
heirarchy of fundamentals in such a way that the fundamental of 
each chord - as used in relation to the other notes of that 
chord - plays an explicit and retrospectivel pre-determined 
part in the passage towards a final and irrevocable statement. 
Tonal music is2 above all, the music of explicitly sequential 
cause and effect -a cause and effect, that is, which depends2 
in the fashion of materialis m, upon the reduction of a phenomenon 
undergoing explanation into 'indivisible' and discrete, but 
contiguou s constituents that are then viewed as affecting one 
another in a mono-causal and linear manner. The analysis of 
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tonal rausic, for exampley often. concerias itself with 'showing' 
ho-w the fihal satisfying effect of. stating the tonic chord is 
'due' to -Dreviously created- hai-zionic tension. It is probably 
no accident, in this respectq that completed and satisfying, 
harmonic passages arb freq-bentl"y referred ýo ans 'harmonic 
proG--essionsl. 
The sense--of7l direction and resolut, ion -produced in tonal -- - --- 
music is symbolised alraost'totally by one chord - the dominant 
seventh. - The importance of this chord can be accounted for in 
two stages. Firstly, it remains true that the three most 
important notes in the structure of tonality, and the ones which 
ultimately define the feeling for any particular key-note, are. 
the key-note, the fourth and the fifth. If movement between 
these fwidamentals and the triads which are built upon them occurs, 
notes I and V of the major scale are going to occur more often 
and'so strike the ear as most important (see Ex. 6). This 
5x, 
phenomenon coincides -with the fact that the perfect fifth is, 
apart f3ZOM the octave, the most basic and therefore the strongest 
interval in the harmonic series. As the two most imDortant 
notes, and as an expression of an accoustical fact, these two 
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notes, and, in conse. quence, the chords built u-pon them, are 
Going to be heard as the most important factors in the 
establishing of a particular key. 
Secondly, the next harmonic to produce a new note after 
the fifth harmonic is the seventh harmonic. This seventh harmonic 
produces the interval of a minor seventh above the fundamental, 
and so the chords of the dominant seventh. If this'harmonic is 
added to the basic triads of the three fundarqentals (I, IV and V), 
it becomes apparent that the one based on V is the only one to be 
included within the notes of the major scale derived from Fig. 6 
(see Ex. 7. *)- The importwance of the V-I movement just 
described is therefore reinforced by the legitimacy of this 
seventh chord, which contains the unstable tritone (formed by 
the fifth and seventh harmonics). 
Ex 
Or 
If the seventh chord on the dominant is sounded, alid the first 
degree of the scale is sounded, then the unstable tritone is 
going to be attracted to the harmonies produced by this latter 
note (e. g., in C: F- Ej and B-C. The fifth degree of the 
2 
dominant in this movement is strictly speaking redundant) 
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As well as reinforcing the V-I movement central for 
the establishing of a particular keyt the dominant seventh 
further emphasises the magnetic pull of tonality by being 
extremely important for the modulation without which any sense 
of progression in an extended piece uould be lacking. The 
role played in modulation by the dominant seventh is related to 
the characteristics of the higher partials in the harmonic 
series3 - partials whichg until the development of tonality, 
were not relevant as structural elements. - Taking C as the 
fundamental and key-note, B flat and F sharp are stronger than 
B natural and F natural4. Thus when modulation is imminent, 
the introduction of these notes will not strike the ear as too 
unnatural. This is particularly true of the B flat, the seventh .L 
harmonic, which i3 audible to the ear. 
It becomes apparent that the introduction of the B flat 
is the most natural manner of modulating. B flat is a 
relatively strong note in the harmonic series; it can be 
immediately inserted on top ol. the tonic chord to form a new 
dominant seventh; and it is slightly flat, thereby increasing its 
propensity to resolve to A. P sharp, on the other hand, is 
higher in the harmonic series then the B flatq and so relatively 
weaker. It is also flat5, being almost half-way between P 
natural and F sharp, thereby weakening its tendency to move 
upwards to G. Finally2 although its relative importance over F 
in the harmonic series allows it to be fairly easily introduced 
at a point when the overall feeling of tonality is C, it cannot 
be directly introduced with C as the fundamental. A new dominant 
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chord, based on D as the secondary fundamental, has to be 
introduced 
6. 
In this fashion the use of the dominant seventh 
emerges as the quintessential method of tonal modulationg a state 
of affairs which is underlined by the immediate case of 
modulating flatward. 
The inherent instability of the augmented fourthq as 
underlined by the properties of the harmonic seriesq is in 
practice at the heart of a great deal of tonal movement and 
progression. Put e-nother way, the tonal key system can be seer, 
as the result of a conflict between man's attempt to organiso 
rationally (through the tempered soale) the properties of the 
harmonic series, and the properties themselves. This conflict 
again serves to illustrate that no music can be regarded as a 
closed system having internally sufficient laws. Both 
pentatonicism and tonality are grounded in the relationships of 
the harmonic series, but both structures are extended and 
directed in different ways as dialectic correlates of the ongoing 
social-intellectual structure of the time. 
jT 23D SOME ýaUIýSTI014S AITSIE -, 
It now becomes possible to imderstand -why the original 
pentatonic structure (see Fig. 1) was limited to three 'levels' 
of notes and two ,, enerative intervals7. In view of the creation 
of the structure represented in Fig. 62 it is apParent that the 
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addition - in the structure as represented in Fig. 1- of 
thirds to the oriezinal fourth and fifth (F and G), in probably 
encouraging a similar process with the 'fundamental' (C), 
would have produced a structure involving a higher degree of 
distancinE than was appropriate to the world sense of early 
medieval society. Flurthermore5 the addition of another level 
of fundamentals would have Droduced seven notes of relatively 
equal standing. In this situation the augmented fourth and 
semitone might well have been given more pror. -Analice than was the 
8 
case Extension of the structure along the lines suggested 
therefore, would have produced a totally different structure. 
having more in common with tonality than pentatonicism. The 
medieval world sense which T)entatonicism at the same time 
mirrored and articulated would have been negated. Extension of 
the structure, in other words, could only occur as part of the 
continually developing social construction of knowledSe and 
reality. 
S0,11B COIERLIRATIVE M-LIARICS Oil FORM 
Pinally, in discussing the musical encoding and 
articulation of social mea-ning5 some comparative remarks may be 
made concerning 'form' in pre-literate musics and tonality. The 
differences in the formal aspects of the two classes of music 
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reflect the difference between oral man's and typographical man's 
orientation with regard to time end memory, and are therefore 
respectively indicative of implicitly and explicitly structured 
music. In pre-literate music any "unifying factors" of form 
are "intrinsic" (Nettl, 1956, P-76) rather than extrinsic and 
externally imposed. Firstly, the most common melodic factor is 
that of the repetition and variation of short motifs. Secondly, 
we are told that "most primitive polyphonic music employs 
identical or similar materials in each part" (. 31, Tettl, 19156, P080). 
Formal effect, therefore, seems to depend upon the immediately 
adjacent existence in the memory of the listener of material 
closely related to that which he is actually hearing. In this 
sense, the music is in a constant state of re-creation within 
time. 
Form in T. Testern music, however, depends very much upon 
comParison mid long-term memory in order that the relevance of 
its constituent Darts may take full effect. The 'rationally' 
9 
and visually derived devices of polyphony (such as inversioný 
augmentation and diminution) lose much relevance if the listener 
does not consciously relate them to the initially stated 
subject. Furthermoreq the whole principle of sonata form 
depends upon the relationship of one section to its antecedent. 
Development is meaningless without exposition, and re- 
capitulation is meaningless without development. And if the 
recapitulation differs from the exposition, then the re- 
capitulation cannot be said to have realised its full effect 
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without comparison to the exposition in the light of the 
develowent. In other words theme or themes are 'discussed' 
or externally manipulated, and discussion involves the 
separation of entities from their natural occurrence in time. 
In order to 'understand' tonal music, industrial man must stand 
outside of time and music. 
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17, OTES -. 
It is important to realise that such 'completeness' can 
only be realised when the work is vlewed as a whole. While 
the piece is being composed and while it is being ,5 
heard (at 
least for the first time), there are7 at any one point, 
many alternative directions that the piece can twke, 
althouSh the number of such alternatives decreases as the 
piece prog-resses. Only when a piece is completedý there- 
gicl become apparent. One is not fore, can its 'inner log dealing with reversible time, therefore, even though 
reversible time is the logical and ultimate conclusion of 
the spatialised time articulated by tonal music, and is 
also a necessary correlate of the deterministic and 
re'ductionist world sense. -Any reader who 
is further 
interested in the contradictions inherent in this 
description should refer to Capek (1961), especially pp. 121. - 
133, where the problem of reversible time is fully discussed. 
2. in a German sixthq for exam-ale, which functions in much the 
same way as a dominant seventh - except that a different 
C resolution is produced by positing type of _, a 
different 
fundamental - the fifth can be changed to produce a French 
sixth, or omitted altogether, to form an Italian sixth. 
3's The following -argument owes much to Demyek Cooke's analysis 
of the relationship of the harmonic series to tonal syntax 
(Coo1ze, 1959, PP-41-45)- However, it should be pointed out 
that the conclusions drairn in these pages are only relevant 
once the-seT)aration of fundamentals has occurred. The 
crucial role played by fundamentals in the development of 
tonality is not mentioned by Cooke, his argument resting 
almost exclusively on the nature of the higher partials. 
Indeed, his argument is essentially a melodic one, which 
seems strange when the explicitness of tonality involves a 
highly developed harmony. It must be re-emphasised, there- 
fore, that neither harmony nor melody in tonality can be 
legitimately separated from each other or regarded as 
logically prior to one another. Melody and harmony in 
tonality are but different aspects of one underlying 
structure that both encodes and articulates the industrial 
world sense. 
4. This is so because both notes occur earlier in the harmonic 
series than their counterparts and so are more likely to be 
audible to the ear. 
It must be emphasised that, the B flat and P sharp only sound 
out of tune as a result of man's adaptation of the natural 
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intervals found in the harmonic serios to form the 
tempered scale* 
6. It is interesting to noteg. however, that both C and F sharp 
figure in a dominant seventh based on D. 
See the questions posed above on pp. liýQi6 - 
8. The augmented fourth was, of course, given no prominence at 
all. It is also relevant to note that the semitone in many 
circumstances was actively avoided. In discussing anti- 
phonal psalmodyý for exampleg Reese (1940, p-176), tells us 
that: 71The point of division bet-ween the tiTo parts of the 
verse is knoim as the caesura. In settings of long texts 
the tenor of the first half of the verse may be interrupted 
by a doimward inflexion called the flexa, which is also a 
type of cadence. If the tenor is sub-tonal (that is, if the 
scale degree immediately belo-wr it is a whole tone away) the 
inflexion descends a whole t. one; if it is sub-semitonal ... 
the inflexion descends a minor third", Reese talkes this to 
be "an additional bit of evidence for the :, -, )entatonic nature 
of at least some of the Chant". 
The processes of turning something upside doim, or of 
elongating or compressing it are essentially 'spatial' 
rather than 'temporal', and therefore lend themselves more 
easily to visual rather than aural comprehension. The 
difficulty of actually hearing and identifying such devices 
as developed and used by the serialists is commonly 
accepted. 
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CHAPTDR TIIIRTZ MT 
CONCLUSION: 
IfRITING ABOUT MUSIC -2 
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The attempt to indicate the social structuring that is 
inherent in particular musican languages and groups of languages 
has led to an approach to writing about music that transcends 
the categories of form and content. For, by moans of comparing 
musical analysis with the world senses of the relevant 
societies it has been unnecessary to translate the musical 
experience into strictly verbal and substantive meanings. Since 
music is its own meaning there is, of course, no need to write 
about it. But it would bo flying in the face of rea-ity to 
ignore the fact that, because ma2ýls most 'useful' and prevalent 
symboloo-r is language, he will continue to legitimate the vast 
majority of his experiences, including music, through language, 
The academic who writes about music is merely indulging in an 
I 
extension of this process Uriting about music, then, is a 
legitimate activity insomuch as the 'meaning' of music is 
elucidated by reference to the social and montal structuring 
uhich is lextornall to the music, but which the music neverthe- 
less transcendentally articulates from 'within' itself. In 
Part II, therefore, the attem-pt has been to use words as: 
indicators or probes of an articulated meaning that essentially 
lies 'beyond' not only the words used, but 'beyond' their 
referential significance. The intention has been to bring to 
life the dynamic relationships revealed to us through the 
material relata (and, derivatively, the relata of reified 
concepts) ultimately necessary for referential language, rather 
than to distort the musical experience into the reified confines 
o-. 1' referential objects and concepts. 
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The limitations and implications of such an intention 
must bb made fully explicit, hoiTever. Insofar as it remains 
necessarylat the present time, to verbalise about musicq a 
Istxucturall approach as modified through the implicit-explicit 
paradigm would seem the most appropriate. But since the 
communication of this approach is as much rooted in the written 
word as more conventional aU pproaches to writing, about music, it 
should be rea-lised that it cannot renroduce mausic's 'emotion' or 
immediate -ooirer. It would appear, thený that the sole 
contribution words can make to the musical experience lies in the 
realms of leE; itimation and criticism, a criticism, mo-. eover that 
must ultimately be grounded in the individual's social situation. 
As conceived in these chapters, therefore, writing about 
music is a maieutic process. It seeks to elucidate articulated 
meaninjS hitherto vague in the listener's consciousness, and so 
to heighten the awareness of self in relation to society. 
Society, as argued in Chapter Five, can only be regarded, 
as being immanent 'in' the specific articulations of symbols, and, 
since these symbols originate from and aro only socially 
efficacious twithin' individual minds, as being immanent 'in' 
individual consciousnesses, Given the culture-sPecific 
articulations and encodings of different musicsq writing about 
music can never be an exercise in objective aesthetics. No one 
person or group of people is in a position to centrally define 
what good music is, what it should 'mean', and ii-hat the 
sophisticated and informed person should listen to. There never 
can be a simple one-way transfer of verbally pre---pacIkaged 
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iartistic, or cultural, content. Writing about music is quite 
_J_ 
2 
literally an extension of the musical experience, and inasmuch 
as literacy aids Tecession from everyday reality, and so the 
process of being self-reflexive, writing about music becomes an 
extended exercise in looking at self and society through the 
medium of music. It is a means by which each persong writer or 
reader, can critically examine the structuring of his social and 
mental existence. Nhat we like and what we do cannot be 
artificially divorced from the everyday life that constitutes 
such structuringý and no two structurings, either social or 
mentalq and despite whatever underlying similarities may exist, 
can ever be identical. 
It should now be more than apparent that the traditional 
ways of 'looking at' and writing about music discussed before 
deny the critically self-reflexive process that such writing 
could belfirstly by discussing a centralised and hierarchical 
thoritative terms, and secondly by music in centralised and aut 
developing a tendency to view other musics ethnocentrically. By 
not examining the assumptions of his own position the 
musicologist can only appreciate his ovm 'point of view', his 
own deep-seated preferences and phobias. In this respect he is 
in the identical position to the sociologist who, in examining a 
society2 whether his own or another, does not examine the 
implicit assumptions of his oim social position. 
There is, however, a limit to the degree that one Can 
uncover one's o,, m assuraptions. Not only is the conce-ptual 
'level' involved in self-reflexively receding from everyday 
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reality circumscribed by the media available to aid such a 
process, but, within the conceptual parameters --o circumscribed, 
there is a practical limit to the number of times one can examine 
one's own position. For every time one set of assumptions is 
uncoveredý another is created as part of the meta-situation 
necess, ary for the initial examination. It is necessary, in 
other words, to have an assumptional framework in order to 
examine an assumptional framework. But continued pre-occupation 
with this infinitely regressive process precludes any real 
participation in the everyday -viorld. -and is liable to have one 
labelled as 'insane' by the people of one's own society3. As 
an antidote to central authoritarian objectivity2 unremitting 
self-examination generates its own kind of useless isolationism. 
For although the observer continually interacts with what he is 
observing4l there comes a point when he must leave behind the 
infinite adjustments of his own position and contribute to his 
own society. 
Detachment-in-involvement thus seems to be the only 
realistic position to be adopted by any 'thinking' (i. e. self- 
reflexive) person. One makes a contribution, not from the 
proverbial ivory tower of academiaý but because one believes it 
to be relevant to one's situation and society. Again, it must 
be emDhasised that activities carried out in recession from 
everyday reality (such as the academic) cannot be totally 
divorced from everyday reality. But this aDDroach must 
constantly aciaiowledge its necessary limitations. Since the 
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social-intellectual structure of any society is constantly 
changingl and since what any person says is -in some measure - 
part of the axticulation of that structure, that person must 
accept that anything lie says2 on whatever time-scale, is 
necessarily ephemeral. The very act of constructively saying 
anything automatically makes the writer or 'thinker' - to a 
certain ex-tent -a prisoner of his oi-m position. 
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NOTES: 
The stance adopted here throws some light on the position 
of those people who maintain that analysis and Writing 
about music can never be a legitimate or useful process. 
This position is based on the opinion that analysis and 
; about music can never replace the musical experience,, writinEp 
ahich is perfectly true. flowover, it does not follow from 
this opinion that analysis or writing about music is 
useless, because, although these activities cannot replace 
the musical experience, they can be an ex-treriely useful aid 
to critical thought, as Part II has sought to 
demonstrate. What people who hold to the -above position are 
in fact doing is denying a critical and self-reflexive 
approach to music. It is thus difficult to see how anyone 
in this position could be conscious of music's rotentially 
creative role with regard to social and intellectual 
structurinE;. Strictly speaking, these people can only 
relate to mublic as a purely sensuous social ornament. 
This last conclusion is only true in a strict sense, houever, 
because there are very few people who do not e-x. ternalise 
their responses-to pieces of music. The -oerson w1io maintains 
that analysis and i-rriting about music are not useful processes 
is therefore really contesting the degree to which he should 
be critical and self-reflexive. There is no difference in 
kind between the initial verbalised reaction to -- -oiece of 
music, and a detailed and considered expose of that response 
which in effect elucidates many of the implications behind it. 
But, in elucidating all the implications behind his initial 
responseg. a person is much more likely to question its 
adequacy, rather than solely passing judgement on the music, 
. which is frequently what initial responses are exclusively 
concerned with. 
2. An extcnsioný that is, in the McLulianesque sense. 
3. This is true of societies iffiere reality is not reco6-nised 
for the relative construct that it 'really' is. There is 
no lultimatet reality, merely different realities constructed 
by different societies. Where reality is considered as an 
absoluteg another's differing reality appears as dangerous 
unreality, classifiable as '? insanity'. 
_-R. D. Laing 
indicates this process, at the same time illustrating the 
genuinely relative nature of differing realities through a 
L insanity: "'Then inside demonstration of the relativity of 
and outside have been flinDed so that inside-outside for A 
is outside-inside for B and both think 'absolutely', then 
we have sDiralled into the most extreme interex-oeriential 
disjunction in our culture - psychiatrists, sane: patients, 
psychotic. The psychiatrist in this case has no doubt 
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about the diagnosis. The patient is psychotic and 
-tTithout insight. The patient thiiuks the -psychiatrist is 
psychotic end ITithout insight. The patient is psychotic 
and without insight because he thinks that 
psychiatrists are dangerous lunatics who ought to be 
looked up for their own safety, and if other people are 
too much under the spell of the thought-police to see 
that, he is going to do something about it" (1971, P. 43). 
If one thinks in terms of sanity and insanity, then it is 
just as valid to think of someone who has greatly indulged 
in the process of infinite regress as a sane person looking 
in on an insane world as the other way round. 
4. This statement is a necessary adjunct (in the social 
sphere) of the sociological stance adopted throughout 
these cha-Dters. It is readily adl-mowl edged, howevor, 
that the material sphere of activity in the universe is not 
appreciably affected by human observation, notwithstanding 
the dialectic interaction between object and observer. 
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APPME-TDIX I 
ON -EPISTU. '10LOGICAL RIMATIVITY 
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A 
In the Introduction tuo the thesis it will be remembered 
Llhat reforence i7as made tuo. t4o way in iThich two serainal books 
h T o-Structure of'Scientific Revolutions by. Thomas S. Kuhn, and 
the ýOcial Construction . of Re. -Jity. by Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luck=qn) gave an insight into heir to go about solvin T-That g 
seemed to be a fiLndamental problem in musicology. This- 
A-D-Dendix will noir describe the nature of that insight more 
fully, as well as considering one or ti; o 'methodological 
difficulties that arise from it. As a corollary, it also 
becomes possible to give a more extended theoretical coverage of 
the opposing notions of 'absoluteness' (or 'objectivity') and 
'relativity' which underpin so much of the discussion in the 
earlier parts of the thesis. 
Certain parts of this and the following Appendix use 
passages from the main body of the thesis. This procedure has 
been adopted for tiTo reasons: first, it serves to preserve the 
flow of argument within the Appendices; secondly, it gives those 
passagos a greater depth of si6nificance '1111an it was possible to 
provide within the main body of the thesis. 
B 
IThat Kulints book sets out to establish is that the 
traditional understanding of scientific progress does not square 
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with "the historical record of the research activity itself,, 
'(1962, P-I). - According to Kuhn, the usuni image of scientific 
Pro, rress is derived from textboojý-S7 -uhose function is to provide 
a clear and concise account of scientific kno-viledge as ýt 
pres6ntly' stands. Because such Presentations are essentially 
unhistoricl , the following image of science arises- 
science has reached its present staIle -by a- sories--of--- --- - 
individual discoveries and inventions that, when gathered 
'toGether2 constitute the modern body of technical 
kZiowledge. Prom the beginning of the scientific 
enterprise a textbook presentation implies, scientists 
have striven for the particular objbctives that are 
embodied in today's paradiGms. One by one2 in a 
process often compared to the addition of bricks to a 
building2 scientists have added another fact, concept, 
lair, or theory to the body of information supplied in 
the contemporary science text (1962, P-140). 
The task of the historian of science is thus twofold: 
on the one hand, he must determ, ine by what man and at 
i-That point in time each contemporary scientific fact, 
law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the 
other, he must describe and explain the congeries of 
error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the 
m ore ra-oid accumulation of the. constituents of the 
modern science text- (1962, p. 2). 
But this traditional understanding of scientific progressý in 
which Iaiowledge accrues teleologically through the adoption of 
new theories and the rejection of erroneous and idiosyncratic 
ideas, does not agree with the facts as some historians of 
science find them: 
... 
these ... historians confront groiTing difficulties 
in distinEuishing the "scientific" components of past 
observation and belief from what their predecessors had 
readily labelled "error" and "superstition". The more 
carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, 
phloGistic chemistry, or caloric theri-iio dynamics I the more 
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certain they feel that those current vie,,, s of nature 
iiere, as a whole', neither less scientific nor more the 
product of human idiosyncra-cies than those curvent 11, oday. 
If t1lose olut-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then 
myths can be produced by the same sort of i2ethods and 
held for the same sort of reasons that now lead to 
scientific lmowlodge. If, on the other hand, they are 
to be called science, -then science has included bodies 
of belief- quite incompatible i7ith the ones we hold today. 
Given these altornativesY the historian must choose the 
latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle un- 
scientific because they have been discarded. That 
choice, _hoi7over, makes'it 
difficult-to- see-- 
development as a process of accretion (1962, pp. 2-3). 
The implication that science progresses by dispensing with one 
internally consistent view o. f nature and then adopting another, 
equally consistent but mutually incompatible viei-r, is undoubtedly 
radical and poses a number of difficult questions. These 
difficulties are discussed at later stages in the Appendix. Of 
more immediate interest, however, is the theory developed by 
Kuhn to cope with. this notion of scientific endeavour. 
Basic to -TCuhnts 
theory is the concept of a paradigm. In 
general terms a paradigira may be thought of as a model or pattern 
through -w-hich a body of knowledge c--n be understood and 
manipulated. For. Kuhn, paradigms are located in significant 
scientific achievements demonstrating tuo cliaracter-is ties: 
firstly, the achievements must be I'sufficie ntly unprecedented to 
attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes 
of scientific activi ty" (1962, p. 10); second, they must be 
"sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the 
redefined group of practitioners to solve" (1962, p. 10). Kuhn 
J, he21 Goes on to argue that the vast najority of scientific t 
research; which he terms 'normal science', is concerned with 
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solving puzzles set up by the Particular P, radiL-m in question. 
. 
'ablishing That is, norý-: jal science is concerned with est', 
. 1-oratical satisfactory connections 
between a paradi nn Is ti, n 
predictions and observed nature. "One of the reasons", 
therefore, "why normal science- seems- to progress so rapidly is 
-Problems that only their that its practitioners concentrate on U 
orn- lack'of. ingenuity-. should-kbep them-Srom -solving!, -- 
(1962, 
--- - 
-P-37). It is this type of activity which contributes to the 
traditional imp-go of scientific-research as a straightforward- 
accretive process: 
ýL Normal science, the puzzle-solving activity ... is a 
highly cumulative enterprise, eminently successful in 
its aims, the steady extension of the scope and precision 
of scientific knowledge. In all these respects it fits 
with great precision the most usual image of scientific 
work (19623 P-52). 
The reason that historians of science auestion this 
image is that every so often there appears to be a major re- 
orientation in an area of scientific work which itself is 
produced by normal scientific enquiry: 
... one standard product of the scientific enterprise 
is nissing. Normal science does not aim at noveltips 
of theory mand -when successful, finds none. New ajqd un- 
precedented phenamena aTe2 however, repeatedly uncovered 
by scientific research, and radical new theories have 
a, c, ain and again been invented by scientists. History even 
suggests that the scientific enterprise has developed a 
uniquely power-Cul technique for producing surprises of this 
sort. If this characteristic of science is to be 
reconciled with what has already been said, then research 
under a paradigm must be a particularly effective way of 
inducing paradigm change (1962, P-52). 
Kuhn's ex-plz! nation of this apparent paradox is that paradigms, 
for one reason or another, frequently produce anomalies. 
Observed nature, in other words, does not square with 
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rodiction. Quite of paradigmatic p Lteny these anomalies are 
satisfactorily resolved in terms of the prevalent paradigm. 
have been fI or a plece of Previous reasoning may aulty 
1 
apparatus may not have done the job it was have supposed to. 
Every now and then, however, -1n anom,, Jy 1, -iil prove extrenely 
obdurate, and will create a crisis within the relevant scientific 
community. -- As a -result, -Iextrzaordinaxy. ' scientific work-i-rill-, be __ 
caxried out iThich del)arts more and more from the -parameters 
erected by the no-u suspect paradigm. Eventually, an -alternate 
paradigm will be put for-ward which solves the anomaly and a 
scientific revolution will have been achieved. The revolution 
with which most people are to some extent familiar is that 
instigated by -Dinstein's 
two theories of relativity and the work 
2 in quantluil mechanics which followed shortly thereafter 
Further insight into the notion of a scientific 
revolution may be obtained by seeing in part how this notion 
transcends the traditional concept of. teleological scientific, 
advance. It has already been noted holT science textbooks 
necessarily and inevitably present their material in terms of 
current paradigms. Kuhn expands on this the. r. -iie: 
For rea. s. ons that are both obvious and highly functional,, 
science textbooks ... refer only to that part of the 
work of past scientists that can easily be viewed as 
contributions to the statement end solution of the 
texts' paradigm problems. Partly by selection-and 
partly by distortion the scientists of earlier ages are 
implicitly represented as having iior'ked upon the same 
set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same 
set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in 
scientific theory and method has j,, iande seem scientific 
(1962, P-138). 
That this traditional view is unhistoric is illustrated through 
Newton's assimilation of Galileo's kinematic theorem: 
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Newton -, Trote that Galileo had discovered that the 
constant. force of' Ellavity _')roduces a motion proport 
. ional 
to the square of the time. In fact, Galileo Is kinematic 
theorem does ta I Lýýhe that COM -. -Then embedded in the matrix 
IT I-s. of _, e-., -ton1s wun dyna-mical concep-t, But Galileo said 
nothing of the sort. His discussion of falling bodies 
rarely alludes to Lorces, much less to a uniform 
gravitational force that causes lbodies to fall, By 
, 
to Galileo the answer to a question that crediting L. 
Galileo's paradigms did not permit to be aslked, Nei I Tton Is 
account hides the effect of a small but revolutionary 
reformulation in the ques. tions that scientists -asked 
about motion as well as in the ansi, ýe rs they felt able to 
accept (1962, pp-139-140). 
- This example points to another essential feature of 
scientific revolutions; For a revolution does not, as may 
sometimes be thought, involve the rejection of all previous 
Imowledge as incorrect. Rather7 it involves a shift of 
emphasis and outlook -i-Thich not only provides for the resolution 
of an anomaly but at the same time allows for the preservation 
of a considerable amount of previous Trork, albeit in a slightly 
different form. - Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that a 
scientific community -would accept a ne-.. r pera-digm unless it were 
capable of satisfactorily transcending the majority of extant 
1alowledge. A new paradigia thereLore needs to meet two 
conditions rather than just one: 
9*. scientists will be reluctant to embrace [a new 
paradi8-. n] unless convinced that ti-, -o all-important 
conditions are being met. FirstY the new candidate 
must seem to resolve some outs tanding and generally 
recoEnized problom that can be -, -, iet in, no other way. 
Cý Second, the new paradiC-L--ii must promiso to preserve a 
relatively large Part of the concrete problem-solving 
-ability that has accrued to science through its 
predecessors. Novelty for its oim sake is not a 
desidoratum in the 
' 
sciences .*.. though pa-radiGms 
seldom or never Possess all the capabilities of their 
predecessors, they usually preserve a. great deal, of the 
most concrete parts bf past achievements .... 
(1962, 
p. 169). 
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But as ji-itimatod, the shift of emphasis and outlook 
onSendered by"a paradigm'change also-results in certain questions 
and problems no longer being reEarded as lepitimmate topics for 
scientific enquiry. As Kuhn has remaYked,. "there are losses as 
well : ts ghins in scientific revolutions -and scientists tend to 
be particularly blind to the former" (1962, p. 167)- Newton's 
understanding -of--the -universe --for examplej--facilitated a control 
and mani-oulation of the environment that had hitherto been un- 
ima, girýAle. Yet at the same Uime it resulted in the loss to the 
scientific conriiunity for nearly two hundred years of any notion 
of spatial or motional relativity. LeibnizIs concept of 
-relativity was, of course, quite different from that of Eninsteid. 
The uoint, hoiTever, is that for two hundred years the question of 
relativity i-Tas inadmissible as a topic for scie ntific discourse 
because it uould have to have been -predicated on an lincorrect' 
understanding of the universe. It could not therefore provide a 
proper basis for problem formulation and puzzle solving. 
One other ey-am*Dle may-be draiTn from ITe-, Tton's work: 
-#* though much of Newtollf s work was directed to problems 
and embodied standards derived from tile r., iechanico- 
cor-ouscular world view, the effect of the paradigm that 
resulted from his work was a further and partially 
destructive change in the problems and standards legitimate 
X, for science. Gravity, interpreted as innate attraction 
betireen every pair of particles of matter, was an occult 
quality in the same sense as tile scl-holastic's "tendency to 
fall" had been. Therefore, while the standard of 
corpuscular-ism remained in effect, the search for a 
mechanical explanation of gravity was one of tile most 
challenging problems for those who accented the Principia 
as paradigm. Newton devoted much attention to it, and so 
did many of his eighteenth century'successors. The only 
apparent option iTas to reject ITTeuton's 
theory for its 
failure to explain gravity, and that -alternative too, was 
widely adopted. Yet neither of these views triumphed. 
Unable either to practice science without the Principia,. 
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or to make that jroi: k conform to "the corpus-cular standards 
of the seventeenth century, scientists gTadually. *accepted 
the vie-vT that gravity -was indeed inna-te. t By the mid- 
eighteenth century that interpretation had been almost 
_L universally accepted, and the result was a E; enuine 
reversion ... to a scholastic standard 
(1962, p. 105). 
Not until Einstein's general theory did the importance of this 
problem once a-Sain become fully clear. 
It 'is thus not difficult to see how the process of 
scientific revolution for Vnich Kuhn is arSuing could have given 
rise to the idea of teleological advance -,, rhich has such a strong 
hold today. For when one internally consistent para4igm succeeds 
another equally consistent but mutually incompatible paradigm, 
two things happen: those parts of the previous paradigm. not 
mutually incompatible with the present one are preserved in a 
slightly different form and those parts iThich are incompatible 
are rejected as legitimate topics for scientific enquiry. The 
revolution, in other ifords,. is subsequently hidden from view. 
But this 'compatibility' between the process of 
revolution and the usual image of teleological progress is only 
partial and does not reveal the full extent of the relationship. 
For if one accepts Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, then 
two assumptions fundamental to the teleological vieii come into 
question. 'Either one adheres to the vie-w that all paradigms 
-ire 'mythical' or potentially erroneous - that the present 
paradigm, in other iTords, is no less likely to be fallacious than 
its Dredecessors - thereby questioning the i dea "that the 
scientific comn-unity knows iThat the world is like" (1962ý P-5)- 
Or one agrees that all paradigcns are equally scientific, thereby 
undermining the notion that external rea-ity is absolute4. Not 
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only does it become 'extremely doubtful whether it is any lonGer 
legitimate to think in terms of the ? objective observation of 
absolute external reality'ý therefore, but it 'also become s- 
uncertain as to whether the notion of I-progress' fundamental to 
Uhe teleological view of science can retain any validity under 
these conditions: "we may", says Kuhn, 11have to relinquish the 
notion,, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm__parry 
scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to. 
the truth" (1962, P-170). It is at this point that the 
logical status traditionally assigned scientific knowledge comes 
seriously into doubt. The discussion of this status is 
continued in section D'of this Appendix. 
It is because Kuhn's theories question the very bedrock 
of normal scientific endeavour that his worýk has become -as 
controversial as it has. And this controversy has been aided by 
the admittedly stereotypic nature of the theories5. Scientific 
revolutions vary in scale and consequence, may take a great deal 
of time to accomplish, and frequently meet with quite natural 
opposition. FurthermoTe, new paradigms are more often than not 
arrived at gradually as the result of work carried out by more 
than one person. Not always do they emerge on the scientific 
scene with quite the far-reaching consequence of Einstein's 
theories of relativity, for example. Because each revolution 
is likely to display some characteristics unique to itself, there 
is clearly room for a questioning of Kuhn's theories on empirical 
as well as theoretical grounds. Discussion will doubtless 
continue for some time to come, both within the scientific 
- 328 - 
corununity and ý-Taong'interestled acade-mics in Gencral, and there 
will be . many who will wish to disa,,, L-ree with K-uhn's basic tenets. 
But - those -who do . 
di san-ree Kunn's underlying hypothesis 
- 
Z> 
might -paradoxically be providing a woi: king exaraple of it in a 
In 1)[uhn's terminology, they iTill be stressing the wider sense. . 
validity of a paradiSm -v, -hich has become Droblematic for 
historians of science , whilst at the same time denying the 
vali - dity of another that, goes a long way towards solving those 
nrobl-e. ms. This paradox suggests that lCuInits ideas might well 
have application outside the strict confines of-sclencey and 
might i-Tell be highly insightful in understanding the ii-ay in which 
knowledge in all its aspects 'progresses'. At the very least 
they present a useful and readily comprehensible framework in 
terms oL which the aims of this thesis can best be understood. 
C 
It was sur6,5es-tecl in the Introduction to the thesis that 
a major change in outlook miiflit be required if the problem of 
significance in music (together with the-related problem of the 
significance of, musical analysis) was to be solved. To borrow 
a colourful ractaphor from Kuhn, it seemed that "an occasion for 
retooling [had] arrived" (1962, P-76). This thesis has 
sought to justify that intuition by showing that the 'prevalent 
. musicological paradio-ml 
is inherently anomalous, and by putting 
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forward another paradigm T7-hich solves the mnomalics while p-t 
the same time satis-iCactorilY Itranscending previous v-oi: ok. 
On the surface, the analogy of approach drm, 11 from 1, -uhn 
would seem to be straight-Corward. That it is not is due to the 
distinction tura-ditionally made- between science and the arts, that 
_L isl the distinction bouiTeen those subjects which concern themselves 
with whz_it nost--Deo-Dle- t. -Jce__to_be. an-absoluAle-external- -reality----- 
independent of man, and those -allose focus of attention is -the 
activities of man himself. 
professional experience in 
of the depth and _pervasivi 
academic life of both this 
general: 
One uriter, C. P. Snow, who has 
6 
both camps 2 is left in little doubt 
Iness of this distinction in the 
country and the IlTestern world in 
There have been plenty of days whon I have spent 'the 
i7orking hours with scientists and then gone off at niEht 
with some literary colleagues. I mean that literally. 
I have had, of course, intimate friends among both 
scientists and irriters. It iTas through living among 
these groups and much more, I think5 through moving 
regularly from one to the other and back ag-ain that I got 
occupied with the -Droblem of what, long before I put it 
on pa- perg -I christened 
to myself as the It-wo cultures'. 
For constantly I felt I -vTas moving among tv-o groups 
comparable in intelligence, identical in race, not, grossly 
different in social origin, earning about the same 
incomes, who had almost ceased to communicate at all, irho 
in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so 
little in common that instead of going from Burlington 
House or South Kensington to Chelsea, one niýfht have 
crossed an ocean (1960, p. 2). 
This division of acade-mic activity into 'the sciences' and 'the 
humanities' is admittedly crucle. Not only is the dividing line 
difficult to draw with ai-ýy satisfactjoný but there are those 
1-Tithin each category with significantly different outlooks. ffne 
room for misunderstanding between engineers and pure scientists 
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is considerable, and there are some sOcioloeists uho would 
disagree' f undan-ent-ally with many. literary or art critics.. 
. 
Yet 
despite this crudity C. P. Snow stiýl thinks that the distinction 
retains a high degree of validity: 
I have thouSht a long time about going in for Lurther 
refinements, but in the. en 
,dI 
have decided against. I 
was searching for something a little more than a dashing 
rietaphor, a good deal less than a cultural rfl, -I): and for 
t4ose purposes the two culturesisa'ýout right, -and- 
, es 
than subtilising any more would bring more' disadvantag 
it's iTorth (1960, p. 9). 
The distinguishing feature of any scientific i, -oxýk is that 
tho community responsible for it will only accept one paradigm 
as a- valid basis for problem f7ormulation and puzzle solving. 
Reasons for this are clear enough. Because it, is assumed -that 
there is only one reality under exanination, and because it is 
being assumed that man can objectively observe it7 I it follows 
that there can only be one legitimate explamation. for the 
operations of that reality. Further, this explanation can 
usually be tested by atte. -P. pting to match theoretical predictions 
against observed behaviour. That is not - to say, however, that 
two or -more 
theories or paradigms have not at some time or other 
co-existed in various fields of scientific enquiry. But such 
an occurrence is. usually symptomatic either of a 'pro-p, -Taditr5p 
statel (that is the state precodine the first General acceptance 
of a para. AiGm) or of aI revolutionary situation Because they 
implicitly question assumptions fund=aental to any scientific iTovk 
these occurrences are regarded by scientists. as highly undesirable, 
and as representative of problems i-Thich should be solved as 
quickly as possible. 
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The situ, -Ition in the arts ýlncl hu-manities is rather 
'cren' however. This difference owes itself t6 uhe-Greater 
difficulty inherent in attempting objective descriptions and 
explanations in these subjects. Indeedý there are a minority 
of academics in the humanities who would claim that to invoke 
an objective approach is actually to distort-the phenomena under 
examination-- Some sociologists, for example, would-not only 
maintain that the interaction between observer ý-nd observed is 
significant enough to completely negate any claim made for 
objective observation, but that objectivity is itself a culture- 
specific concept i. -hose uncritical application is liable to 
8 compromise any consideration of another group or society 
Again some critics of the arts might argue that the aesthetic 
experience involves such an intense relationship between the art 
object and the individual that any statement made about it can 
have no absolute or universal validity. Every person's response 
is liable to be. different, and so each experience may differ in 
one or another important aspect. All that can be claimed is that 
the critic's response. is so insightful as -to be instructive or of 
interest for others exposed to the same art object. In neither 
example2 it should be noted, is it being sug ggested that -research 
be pursued along irrational or illogical lines. It is nerely 
being aclmowledged that some phenomena do not lend themselves to 
objective observation. 
By contrast, a majority of academics in the humanities 
would seem to accept that objectivity is necessary as an ideal 
. even if the ideal is impossible to attain in practicell.. The 
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study. of human _activity involves 
the understand ing and 
manipulation of a welter of complexly intenroven variables 
-v, ýhose separation is not nl-ways legitimate or possible. 1--lost 
exDerimental science, on the other hand, depends precisely on 
the suc cessful isolation of -variables, and the obýervation of 
the -way those variables interact. For this reason most people 
wo3: 01zing in the hunanities--ý-, Tould-probaably acknowl edge -that -the--4 
selection of some facts or variables as important and of others 
as insignificant can easily involve implicit value judgments 
ca. pable of affecting the nature of any conclusions drai-M. These 
conclusions can seldom be tested by attempting to match 
predictions against* observed behaviour simply beca-use human 
behaviour is often notoi-iously unpredictable9. 
It is because prediction and completely objective 
observation are impossible that competing theories or paradigms 
frequently coLexist in. the humanities. For this reason the 
emphasis on authoritative textbook knowledge is less and the 
awareness of the historical nature of the subject matter greater: 
In music, the grap , Lhic arts, 
and literature, the 
practitioner gains his education by exposure to the works 
of other artists, principally earlier artists. Text- 
books, except compendia of or handbooks to original 
creations, have only a secondary role. In history, 
philosophy and the social sciences, textbook literature 
has a greater sionificance. But even in these fields 
the elementary colleGe course employs parallel readings 
in original sources, some of them the 
; 'classics" of the 
field, others the contemporary research reports that 
practitioners iTrite for each other. As a result, the 
student in any one of these disciplines is constantly 
made aware of the immense variety of problems that the 
members of his future group have, in the course of time, 
attempted to solve. Even more important, he has 
constantly before him a number of competing and in- 
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commensurable solutions to. these problems, solutions 
that he nust ultimately. evaluate f"or himself 
(Kuhri, 1962, p. 1: 65)- 
The co-existenc6 of competin 
.g theories has a reverse side 
in that*it militates against an anomaly being universally 
accep-Ced as Such. I'Anomily"ý' states Kuhn, "appears only -against 
the background provided 'ýy the paradigm. The more precise and 
far-reaching Ahe-pajýadijgm -is, - the- more- sensitive - indication-it- - 
provides oi- anomaly and hence of an occasion for paradigm 
change" (1962, p. 65)- It is not difficult to see why this 
should be so. If a paradigm has universal acceptance"and 
produces an anornaly, there can only be t-,.., o logical alternatives. 
Either the anomaly can be solved in terms of the paradigm or it 
can't. And the more fruitful that paradigm has been in terms 
of accomplished wor1c, the less the chance that an obdurate or 
long-standing anomaly will succumb to a traditional solution. 
If, onthe other hand3 an anomaly is produced by one of several 
competing theories, then there are three logical alternatives. 
Either the anomaly can be, solved in terms-of the theory producing 
it2 it can be solved by one of the other theories, or it cannot 
be solved in terms of any of the theories. But it is an 
ess. ential feature of such a situation that no one alternative 
will gain universal -acceptance. The proponent of any one theory 
is therefore more likely to view his theory as unproblematic 
while at the same time insisting that all others are anomalous. 
.L Indeed , the least he can maintain without actually abandoning his 
o-, m position is that whereas all -theories, including his mm, 
appear an omalous, he believes that all anomalies -will eventually 
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be solved in terms of his o-m theory. 
One other important difference results from the 
traditional distinction between science and the arts. As -vie 
have seen, the co-existence of competing theories or paradigms 
in any area of science is a cause for grave concern. However, 
although people i-, rho in the humanities formulate and adhere 
_to-different- 
theories 9 -they-seldom claim universal -st, atus 
for------- 
those theories. Altliough, in other words, they might try to 
persuzýde others to changge their opinionsý they will be only too 
well aware that more than one interpretation of the "facts is* 
perfectly possible. The existence of competing theories in the 
humanities is thus less likely to be seen as a matter for grave 
concern, and more as an inevitable result of the nature of the 
subject. 
The process of identifying a single paradiSm in any area 
of the humanities, of establishing that the p'aradigm is 
anomalous, and then of convincin g the practitioners in that 
area that the situation is one which cries out for immediate 
attention - this process not only seems fraught irith difficulties 
but could quite easily prove to be impossible. Musicology is 
no exception in this regard. There are probably about as many 
different approaches to analysing and writing about music as 
there are musicologists. William S. I-Te-vrman (1972) and itilf-rid. 
I'lellers (1962) are undoubtedly discussing the same to-pic when 
they t--I-, e as their subject matter the sonata in the classical era. 
Yet few people would maintain that their approaches, though 
compatible, have much in common. Further, when two authors do 
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maintain diametrically opposite anpDroaches, they only scem'to 
ackno-irled, ge the pr6blematic Or anomalous nature of -their 
opponent's theory. This phenomenon may be illustratbd-by 
reference to the different attitudes adopted by Robert Lyle and 
Deryck Cooke in discussing the music of Delius. 
Robert Lyle commences his discussion by coramenting on a 
problem inherent. in music criticism: 
The scope of music has been, and doubtless al-ways will 
be, much debated. The problem arises as soon as 
musical criticism ventures to discuss the philosophical 
imDlications of a musical style or idiom. It must be 
fac6d, for analysis itself can only clarify; it cannot 
explain, nor can it relate its particular and highly 
specialized findings to the widez context of man's 
constant preoccupation with truth and beauty (1948, P-158). 
Lyle Goes further than this, however: 
In addition, much music, especially "romantic" music, 
can be understood only in relation to extran-musical 
ideas. This will seem obvious enough when iTe remember 
that the neglect of a purely musical logic does not by 
any means prevent a ww: lz of music from being consistent, 
convincing and appealing (1948, P-158). 
Analysis is thus of little use Lor Lyle in understanding the unity 
or formal completeness that is unquestionably present in many of 
Delius's -wmrks: 
Delius ... makes an intensely subjective appeal 
to his adnizers, iiýho, if pressed, can never satisfactorily 
explain why his music so attracts them as long as they 
talk in musical terms: sometimes even, they are driven 
back upon such vague generalities as "the -u7hole philosophy 
of the thing". Indeed, no analysis of his distinctive 
harmony cam explain its poiLnancyj nor examination of his 
methods of construction account for the impression of 
balance and unity which his i-Torks so often leave (1958, 
p- 158) - 
Cooke, on the other hand, is incensed by the notion that 
musical form is lacking in the works of Delius. While 
acImoul edging that Delius was "of all composers the most purely 
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concerned with extra-musical expression", he stresses that even 
composers who are most concerned with extra-musical 
expression are also preoccupied ýAth for, -., ill 
(1962, P-393). The 
problem as Cooke sees it is that Delius's formal methods 
are terra-incoL-nitall (19622 P-460). Consequently, "all 
'wholesale journalistic condemnation of his music on structural 
gro_unds_ is so much idle opinion ý based on. ignorance of , 
the-true 
. 
acts" 
(: L062, P. 46o). Cooke then attempts to substantiate his fa 
point-of view through a thermatic a-palys: Ls of the Violin Concerto. 
It is his belief that the analysis conclusively demonstrates the 
". entirely unrhapsodiog vigorously oraanic mastery" (1962, P-465) 
of the Piece. 
These views are' diametrically opposed in that ý. -Thile Lyle 
maintains that the, unity of a Delius ITOrk cannot be due to any 
musical logic, Cooke claims to have demonstrated that same logic 
through analysis. The problem, and the point for the present 
discussion, is that neither protagonist need acknoirledge either 
Uhat his opponent's -view is of significance2 or consequently, that 
his o-wn theory may be problematic. Cooke iTould undoubtedly argue 
that his analysis leaves Lyle uith6ut a foot to stand on. Lyleý 
on the other hand, could claim that -while sone analysis of 
Delius's style is possible, such analysis does little but 
superficially reflect the iTay an extra-musical formal completeness 
expresses itself through music. The Eiere presence of thematic 
transformations, in other -words, is not necessarily evidence of a 
musical logic, and does not therefore necessarily aid the 
elucidation of musical significance. ITithin the purview of 
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traditionala; pproaches to nusicolpgyý this question ultimately 
turns on whether Cooklets analysis demonstrates a musical logic. 
Unfortunately, ' any decision made is rather more likely to rest 
on implicit -assumptions about the nature of music in general and 
Delius's music in particular, than it is on any 'objective' or 
Idispassionatel thought about the adequacy of the individual 
- analysis- 
10 
Finally, zllthough the issues raised in the previous 
Para&, raphs could be seen --s central to any -research on the nusic 
of Delius, they are issues iThich have been studiously avoided by 
Delius scholars. By failing t1o overtly acknowledge that the 
problems inherent in these issues might represent a considerable 
hurdle to researcli these scholars seem to be a, ý7reeing (through 
omission) that such competing points of view are an inevitable 
aspect of any musicological activity, and thus not a matter for 
grave concern. The problems highlighted by the competing 
theories are in other words as inevitable as the theories thera- 
selves, and therefore uniLk-ely to be solved in a generally 
acceptable fashion. And it is probably because theoretical wo3: k 
in musicology as a whole is unli! ýely to Gain universal acceptance 
that the majority of scholars concern themselves with those more 
substantive or Ifactuall areas -.. There the potential for disagreement 
is less. Leonard B. Meyer certainly seems to be in agreement 
with this assessment when he says that "disheartened and perhaps 
dismayed by the speculative uncertainties of theory, criticism 
and, one should add, history as distinct from chronicle, too many 
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humanists, particulirly those in music, have tend, ed to -1[7olloir 
the vell-worn path of safe scholarship" t (19732 p. 25). 
D 
In view of the distinction made in the previous section, 
it must now be asked whether Y-uhn's theory in fact provides a 
suitable framework against which to conceive a re-evialuation of 
traditional approaches in musicology. Cam a -model 
derived from 
the m. anipulation of scientific knoTTI-edge adequately serve as the 
basis for an examination of the control and manipulation of 
Musicological knowledge? Certain considerations would seem to 
suggest that Kuhnis ideas retain s ome validity outside the strict 
confines of science. 
The distinction drami in the preceding section was based 
on a qualitative difference in tile phenomena being observed. On 
t (, he one hand,, the sciences -were taken to be concerned with an 
independent and absolute external reality capable of being 
objectively observed. The himanities, on the other hand, were 
te2, -, en to be concerned with the activities of man. In this case 
objective observation was ac! mowled, -ed to be rather more difficult. 
But this distinction does not constitute a just criterion for 
judging the general applicability of KuhnIs ideas. For those 
ideas are not focussed on the phenomena under examimation (in this 
case, -those of external reality), but on the manipulation and 
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control of the knowledF'O derived frora, that examination. An d 
although. there is little 'doubt that the inherent qualities of 
-ohenomena clo affect modes of cognitive control and manipulation, 
this inter-relationship does not preclude the possibility that, 
at a -dee-per levely all knowledý; c owes its existonce and 
maintenance to one and the same process. Although Kuhn's theory 
may require-some extension to become clearlyapp - 11 - 
dic. ýtbl e- -. 
to- 
-the 
understanding of cognitive processes in general, therefore, there 
is no reason to think that such extension cannot be legitime, tely 
made. 
Kuhn himself gives an indication as to the direction the 
extension should t,, ke. Because the concept of scientific 
revolutions implicitly undermines the notions of an absolute 
external reality and of objective observation, Kuhn is led to 
consider whether the control and manipulation of scientific 
Imowledge proceeds according to purely objective and scientific 
principles, or whether these principles arerather more subjective 
than is frequently thought. 
There, are two types of situation in which theoretical un- 
certainty can prevail in any particular scientific field. The 
first of these is the pre-paradigm state. It is evident that a 
pre-paradigm state cannot be resolved by appeal to any scientific 
principle. If it could, the state would not exist. In these 
cases it is hardly surprising that adherence to a particular theory 
is based on subjective or metaphysical grounds. Kuhn gives an 
indication of this in discussing the different theories for the 
nature oj. light that existed in the period preceeding ITe-,, rton's 
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-VTOVIC: 
One group took light 
ý0 be particles emanating from 
material bodies; for another it was a modification of 
the-medium that intervened between the body and the 
eye; still another explained light in terms of an 
interaction of the medium with an emanation from the 
eye; and there were other combinations and modifications 
beside. Each of the corresponding schools derived 
strength from its relation to some particular metaphysic, 
and each emphasized, as -paradigmatic observations, the 
particular cluster of optical phenomena that its own 
theory_ could do 
. -mo-st -to- 
explain (l962q-ppl2-l3). ------- 
In the case of paradigms competing for supremacy during 
0- scientific revolution, on the other hand, the basis for adherence 
ccems vastly more satisfactory. If the new paradigm solves an 
outstanding an omaly while at the same time transcending the vast 
majority of previous io3: 01c, then it must be given preference over 
its predecessor. But scientific revolutionsseldom occur in 
I 
anything like such a decisive fashion: 
When a new candidate for paradigm is first proposed, it 
has seldom solved more than a few of the problems that 
confront it, ýind most of the solutions are far from 
p. erfect. Until Kepler the Copernican theory scarcely 
improved upon the predictions of planetary position made 
by Ptolemy. I-Then Lavoisier saw oxygen as "the air itself 
entire", his new theory could cope not at all -with the 
problems presented by the proliferation of new gasesq a 
point Uhat Priestly made with great success in his counter- 
attack (1962, P-156). 
Scientists caught up in a revolution frequently have recourse to 
a criterion other than -, ', he problem solving ability of either 
-oaradi, Smg therefore: 
*.. paradigm debaLes are not really about relative 
problem solving ability, though for good reasons they 
are usually couched in those terms. Instead the issue 
is -iihich paradigm should in the future guide research on 
problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim 
to resolve completely. A decision bet-ween alternate 
ways of practising science is called for, and in the 
circumstances that decision must be based less on past 
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achievement than on future -oromise. The man who embraces 
a new Paradigm at an early stage must often do so in* 
defiance of the evidence Provided by probler, -solving*' He 
must that is, have Laith'that the neu paradiSin will 
succeed t; ith the many largq_: problems that confront it, 
knof., -in- only that the older pnradi&m has failed with a 
few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith 
(19629 PP-157-158)- 
'Fais sense of faith is as often as not based on llarg=entsý 
rarely-made entirely explicitý that -appeal to the individual's 
se. , qSe of the appropriate or the aesthetic the new theory is 
said to be 'neater' 'more suitable', or 'simpler' than the old" 
(1962, p-155)- 
But the central question must now arise as to whether 
recourse to aesthetic criteria is sim-ply due to "the 
circtunstances" or -. -Thether in themselves the criteria constitute 
the real deep-seated reason for paradigm choice. Because this 
topic strikes at the very heart of basic scientific assumptions 
it is necessarily contentious and difficult to discuss. Certain 
conclusions may however be drawn without immediately examining 
the validity of those assumptions. Firstly, it must be 
accepted that during the crisis stage of a scientific revolution 
no recourse can be had to scientific principles. If principles 
existed which were capable of resolving the crisis, then there 
would clearly be no crisis to resolve. Second, there can be 
little doubt that the clarification of a crisis state and the 
shift of scientific opinion to one or other paradigm is influenced 
by. the problem solving ability of the competing paradigms. The 
difficulty arises, however, iihen the scientific community seeks 
to invest the successful paradigm with a fully objective status. 
For as ire have seen, such a move necessitates distorting the 
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historical situation of previous transcended worlkj. as well as 
suppressing certain problems as legitimate areas for scientific 
enquiry. The only problems iThich c-, n be legitimately considered 
are those defined by the contemporary paradi6m, and since that 
paradigm iiill inevitably solve the vast majority of those 
problems it -will obviously be seen to be highly successful. It 
is this- ci-rcularity-or -positive-. Leedback--i)rhich--resul-ts-in--a--------*- 
contemporary paradigm being assignedpan absolute rational priority 
according to the assumption that scientists can objectively 
observe an absolute reality. 
ITo-kT although crisis situations do clarify with the 
passage of time, it seems doubtful whether this clarification 
involves any qualitative change in the logical status of the 
winning paradigm.. There may still be problems which cannot be 
solved in terms of the paradigm (the problem of -gravitation vis- 
a-vis Neuton's Principia springs to mind), and there may still 
exist other theories or paradigrins -Fhich are equally compatible 
with observed nature, and which might prove instructive in 
solving problems repressed under the successful loaradigrin (late 
seventeenth century notions of relativity provide good examples). 
It is these possibilities which allow the adherents of. old 
paradigms to remain sure in their faith until they die: 
In the past Esuch occurrences] have most often been 
t, -'-, en to indicate that scientists, being only human, 
cannot always admit their errors., even when confronted 
with strict proof. I would argue, rather, that in these 
matters neither proof nor e=or is at issue. The 
transfer of allegiance from paradign, to paradigm is a 
conversion experience that cannot be forced. Lifelong 
resistance, particularly from those whose productive 
careers have committed them to an older tradition of 
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normal science is not a violation of scientific 
st*andards but an index to the nature of scientific 
research itself (1962ý P-151)- 
The point) -11,11erefore, is not that relative problem 
solving ability does not affect the outcome of a scientific 
cjýisis (aithough it should be remembered that as a crisiS 
resolves, 0-11 PrAloms will gradually come to be defined in - 
ter-. -, is -of - 'Uhc ý-Tinnimg - paradigm, -thereýby -creating -a--po sitive- 
feedback situation), but that such ability can never constitute 
an absolute scientific principle in terms of which one paradigm 
may be assiEned a higher rational priority -than any other. 
Further, if this now putative principle does not rest on the 
notion of relative problem solving ability - on the notion, in 
other words that one theory works better than all its uu 
comnetitors then it is extremely difficult 11o see how any such 
principle can exist at all. Since each successive paradigm 
traditionally incorporates TTithin itself the idea that it, and 
it can facilitate the objective observation of external 21P L 
reality, and since the possibility of validating that idea in 
practical terms has been neZated, it -must be concluded that 
neither this idea, nor any idea derived from it, can be used to 
establish the ultimate validity of any one paradigm. 
It Tollo-ws from -%That has just boon said that the criteria 
according to which the success of any paradigm is judged will be 
incorporated in the very assumptions of that paradigm. 
Consequently, "each paradigm will be shoi-n to satisfy more or 
less the criteria it dictates for itself and to fall short of 
those dictated by its opponents" (1962, pp-109-110)- For this 
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reason not only is- "the competition between paradigms ... not 
the'sort of battle that can. be resolved by proofs" (1962, P-148), 
but it is a battle in which there ,,, -! Jl alimys be a certain lack, 
of common ground. Prota. S-pnists will always, to some extent or 
other,. talk a: t cross-purPoscs- Kuhn -orovides m exa-TnDie of this 
Phenomenon: 
The laymýn - who -scoff ed--at -Einstein I s- general-- theory- of 
relativity because space could not be "curved" - it was 
not that sort of thing - were not simply urong or 
mistaken. Nor i-, ýere tile mathematicians, physicists and 
philosophers who tried to develop a Euclidean version 
of Dinstein's theory. Uhat had previously been meant 
by space iiras necessarily flat-, homogeneous, isotropic, 
-and unaffected by the presence of matter. ý If it had 
not been, Neutonian physics i, -ould not have worked. To 
make the transition to Einstein's universe, the i-, rhole 
concentual web whose strands are spacey time, matterj 
force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid down again 
on nature iThole'. Only men who had together undergone 
or failed to undergo that transformation would be able 
to discover precisely what they agreed or disa,, -reed about. 
Communication across the revolutionary divide is 
inevitably partial (1962y P-149)- 
E 
It now becomes possible to draw some conclusions 
regarding the logical status of scientif 'ic knoll-ledgc. In view 
of tile arg-unents -presented in the previous section, there exists 
a very-strong case for asserting that no scientific theory can be 
unequivocably established as 'objective, in the accepted sense of 
the word, and that the criteria according to which a theory 
becomes pre-eminent are not to be found within the confines of 
scientific activity as that activity is usually interpreted. it 
- 345 - 
is necessary to --abandon the idea that. there is -an absolute and 
definitively cognisable truth towards which scientists have been 
single-mindedly striving since the da-ln of civilisation. 
Science is . not a process whereby the scientist feels his way 
,ha maze of "error, myth and superstition" until he throu. - 
discovers -uh, --. t has seer-Angly alimys been there for the 
understanding. 
But what does this -assertion tell us in a positive sense 
about the logical status of scientific 1moji-ledge? In the first 
place, the notion of faith or aesthetic. sense would seem to 
remain crucial in the process of deciding between competing 
paradigms, and therefore in the process of ascribing any one 
paradigm a high rational priority. Furthermore, this notion 
involves questions of value, and it is these values which 
constitute the extra-scientific criteria mentioned above: 
... since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it 
defines and since no two paradigms leave all the same 
problems unsolved, paradigm debates always involve the 
question: which -probler-nis is it more significant to have 
solved? ... that question of values can be ansi; ered. 
only in terms of criteria that lie outside of normal 
science altogether, -and it is that recourse to external 
criteria that makes paradigm debates revolutionary 
(19622 p. 110). 
Yet reliance on the value judgments of people does not mean that the 
scientific enterprise is inherently capricious, nor that there 
is a return to the Idistortive subjectivity' i-Thich a scientist 
seemingly divests at the moment of tobjective discovery'. 
Nithin any particular set of paradigmatic assumptions good normal 
science will still be thoroughly rational and logical. Not 
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only does successful scientific work have to meet the highest 
of'critical standaTds, but in the vast majority of cases the. 
results of this -,, Tor-k must be capable of being- reproduced at 
will. It therefore becomes necessary to agree uith Kuhn that, 
in this difficult areay "something even more fundament`, ýl then 
values is also at stakell (1962, P. 110). 
Any real insight into the logical status of scientific 
kn o-wledge depends on an understanding of what happens within 
the mind of a scientist T-rhen he is converted from one paradigm 
to its successor. Kuhn argues that i-ffien a paradigm change 
occurs-there is quite literally a change of 1-Torld view within 
the relevant scientific community: 
... when paradigms change, the world itself changes 
with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adont 
new instribnents and look in new -olaces. Even more 
inportant, -during revolutions scientists see new and 
different things when looking with familiar instruments 
in places they have looked before. It is rather as if 
Uhe professional community had been suddenly. - transported 
to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a 
different light -and joined by unfamiliar ones as well 
(19622 p. 111). 
It is at this point that the disjunction between the traditional 
view of science a-lid the one which is now emerging becomes fully 
Ciear. For the traditional view depends on and at the same 
time supports one of the basic epistemoloEicai assumptions of 
Uesten-i man, namely, that external reality pres ent every person 
with the same fixed and neutral data. Good science then depends 
on the correct interpretation oi- the fixed and neutral sensory 
experience that results. But in the 'Lace of arguments presented 
in this Appendix, this assiuaption is no longer tenable. For if 
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it is assmed that the Jaws nmd norms of nature are not entirely. 
capricious (and there is an overwhelming weight of practical 
evidence to back up this a--surliption)2 -then it-is man's ability 
to objectively perceive nature that comes into question. For 
exainple, ' 'Newtonian physics mmains perfectly workable for- 
localised spheres of activity involving relatively low 
ý -- veloci'vies, -. a-nd on this basis_--may--be--ladequately-integratedt------. 
into Einstein's universe. Yet an -adequate understanding of 
that universe requires that 11the whole. conceptual i-, -eb whose 
strands are spa-ce, -time, matter, force and so on Cbej shifted 
and laid do-im a., -,, P-in on nature whole". Uhile ITe-47tonian physics 
xemain 'perfectly valid', in other words, HeiTton's -perception of 
the iLniverse is completely incompatible with that derived from 
Einstein's work. It is with this apparent conundrum that 
Kuhn's discussion of scientific revolutions ends: 
But is every sensory experience fixed and neutral? 
Are theories simply man-made interpretations of given 
d at a? The epistemological vie-erpoint that has most 
often guided 'Western philosophy for three centuries 
dictates an irlredi, -te and unequivocal, Yes! In the 
absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible 
to relinquish that vieb-point. Yet it no longer 
functions offectiyely, and ... attempts to make it do 
so ... now seem to me hoDeless 
(1962, p. 126). 
The key to the soýution of this conundrLm and to the successful 
extension of Kuhn's theory would thus seem to lie in an 
C perception. exa-Taination of the nature O-L 
When we perceive something gý the natural assumption is 
that what -,. ie perceive exists 'out there' and 'beyond us' in 
external reality. As we have seen, this is the fundanental 
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nassiraption of the teleological view of science: there is a one- 
-ray transference of 'information f rorii a discrete and delimited 
external reality to the equally discrete and delimited mind of 
the clear-siifhted scientist whereby nature is thought of as 
Igiving up her secrets'. But a moment's reflection leads'to 
the conclusion that our perceptions are as much 'in us' as they 
depend-on-phe. nomena-lout-tlierel. - Every -person I s-perception 
belong-s uniquely to theri, if for no other reason than that they 
cannot exist outside themselves in coexistential unity with the 
reality they perceive. Not only can ire never definitively 
that external reality possesses the characteristics which comprise 
our perception of it, but -i-re can never definitively kno-d that it 
actually exists at all. This is not to imply, however, that 
reality is a total fi6-mient of one's imaS-inatioý, and that there, 
is no data of actuality coming from without which may be 
conceived of as corresponding to orparalleling onets conceDtion 
of reality. As i-Te can never definitively Imow that external 
reality actually exists, so equally we can never definitively 
know that it does not exist. Althou, -h our perception of- 
reality lbelon6gsl uniquely to us, therofore2 it is not a 
perception that may be legitimately separated from the data of 
actuality coming from i7itliout which is responsible for the 
instigation of the perception. In our perception of a phenomenon, 
there exists a -relationship between us and the phenomenon that has. 
as much to do ivith the phenomenon as it does with us. The 
argumentq then2 is that there is a continual and dialectic 
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information flow between us and a phenomenon of which our mental 
limagel and the phenomenon's Imateriall attributes --re only 
asi)ects. 
Al-It, hough it applies to a different situation ('purposeful 
. action' rather-than trationaI dedudtiont)7 Gregory Bateson gives 
an example of such an information-flow which provides a useful 
mocael ___f o-r... subs equent- 
di s cuss ion. --In giving-the-examplei---- 
Bateson draus a careful distinction between relationships 
occurring solely in the material (mcclianico-corpuscular) sphere 
of the universe end relationships which involve people. The 
latter are dialectic), the former are not: 
Consider a man felling a tree with an axe. Each 
stroke of the axe is modified or corrected according to 
the shape of the cut face of the tree left by the 
previous stroke. This self-corrective (i. e. mental) 
process is brought about by a total system, tree-eyes- 
brain-T-auscle-axe-st-roke-'UTee; and it is this total - 
system that has the characteristics of immanent mind. 
More correctly we should spell the matter out as: 
(difference in treeý (difference in retina) - (difference in brain) (difference in muscles) - (difference in movement of axe) - (difference in tree) 
etc. Uhat is transmitted around the circuit is 
transforms of differences. An a... a difference 
which makes a difference is an idea or unit of 
information. 
But this is not how the avera. 6re Occidental sees 
the event sequence of tree felling. He says 'I cut 
do-, m the tree' and he even believes that there is a 
delimited agent, the 'self', which performed a delimited 
'purposive' action upon a delimited object. 
It i.., ould be all very well to say that 'Billiard ball 
A hit Billiard ball B and sent it into the pocket I; and 
it iiould perhaps be all right (if iTe could do it) to 
give a complete hard-science account of the events all 
around the circuit containing the man -and the tree. But 
popular parlance includes mind in its utterance by 
invoking the personal pronoun and then achieves a mixture 
of mentalism and physicalism by restricting mind ii-it-hin 
the man and reifying tile tree. Finallyy the mind itself 
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becomes rei-fied by the notion that since. the. 1selft 
acted upon the ureeý the 'self' must also be a Ithingt.. 
The parallelism of syntax between 'I hit the billiard. 
ball' and Ithe ball hit another ball' is totally 
misleading (1973, pp. 288-289). 
The sI ituation in the experimental sciences is highly analogous. 
iThen a s'Cientist wishes to unders-tuand a phenomenon for which 
there is as yet no satisfactory explanation, lie will put forward 
a .. i. -;, o-rking-hyj)othQsis --- 
based-on general-scientific princi-ples and----- 
successfully concluded -,, -orlz in adjacent areas Unless he is 
extrembly luexqr, the results of the experiments conducted on the 
basis of this hypothesisl-Till not be those predicted. To put 
it in Bateson's terms, there is a difference bet-,, ýeen 
hypothesized prediction and observed behaviour iThich in turn 
results in a modication (difference) of the hypothesis. The 
cybernetic circuit is conDlete. Yet this is not usually how 
the scientific process is seen. Because he deals more thom most 
people i7ith a mechanico-corpuscular -v, -orld susceptible to 
reductionis. t-analysis, the temptation for the scientist to 
restrict. mind iTithin the physical confines of the body are 
. enormous. 
Once this delimitation has been achieved, of course, 
there is no'other possibility than that the external iTorld too 
becomes delimited and reified. And this latter separation is 
one that is made all the more easy"through the knowled_re that the 
laws and norms of the Inatural. -world' are unaffected by hum,: Iai 
volition. The scientist, in other words, tends to think that 
the experimental process is concerned with the discovery on his part 
of i.., hat is actually 'out there' in external reality. 
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In order to understand whal we mi, -, ht imE, -, -lne --s 'really' 
ha-p-pening, it is necessary to remember that ire can never 
definitively know that external reality possesses the .- 
characteristics ii. -hich comprise our perception of it. A theory 
can never be the same thing as the phenomena it seeks'to explain. 
Discovery - the process whereby a previously ujilmown fact is 
uncoveredil-diselos-edl_divulged-or revealed--=---. is precii3ely-what-- 
does not happen, therefore. For that fact does not have prior 
ex istefice in external reality. It only comes into existence as 
part of a uorking hypothesis or a theory which is subsequently 
tested axid then ascribed the status of a fact by scientists. 
To put it- another waý, j the scientist produces a thour, 411t pattern 
whose characterisAtics sufficien narallel those of the 
phenomena he is examining to -effectively 
terminate the 
of difference transforms. This termination 
conbtitutes the moment of 'discovery'. 
But -, -, here do these thought patterns originate if they are 
not, as it -wereq 'incipiently' supplied by external reality? In 
the first place it must be em-phasised that no scientist 
approaches a problem in a pristine state of mind. Ile brings to 
the analytic situation a body of Imowledge and a set of 
attitudes and preconceptions which are in existence prior to the 
situation. Secondly, it must. be remembered that there is a 
continual and dialectic information flow beti-ireen -the scientist 
and the phenomena he is seeking to explain. IThen, therefore, a 
scientist enters the analytic situation there occurs an 
instantaneous, intense and indisoluble relationship betweerl 
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perception and phenomena -whose total and immanent character- 
istics circumscribe the further exploration of those phenomena. 
Such is the nature of scientific paradigms. 
In the majority of cases an adequate theory can be 
- constructed for the phenomena under observation within the set 
of characteristics so circumscribed, and paradigmatic 
assumption: i-. do-not-come-into--question. -That does not--mean, - 
however, that the theory is in any -,. iay definitive. Because of 
the iiýevitable distancing between theory and phenomena, and 
because theory owes a great deal to preconception, it is entirely 
possible for more than one 'scientifically adequate' theory to 
have existed at different times for the same sphere of activity 
within the universe. 
The most telling example of such an occurrence is 
provided through the work of Newton and Einstein. Because 
Newtonian physics remains completely workable, and because it is 
a basic assumption of science that there can only be one correct 
theory for any sphere of activity-within the universe, many 
scientists 
12 
axe of the view that Newllonls work is com-oletelY 
compatible with that of Einstein: 
Rela-tavistic dynamics cannot have shorm Newtonian dynamics 
to be i-rcong, for Nci. rtonian dynamics is still used with - 
Ereat success by most engineers and, in selected 
applications, by many physicists. Furthermore, the 
propriety of this use of the older theory can be proved 
from the very theory that haslin other applications, 
renlaced it. Einstein's theory can be used to show that 
predictions from -Neutonts equations will be as good as 
our measuring instruments in all applications that, satisfy 
a small number of restrictive conditions (Kýilm, 19627 -p. 99). 
- Newtonian theory forms a special case of Einsteinian, in other 
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words, amd "since no theory can possibly conflict with one of 
its special cases" (1962, p. 99), the Newtonian must be taken 
as 'correct'. Such a view provides a very Cood exazi-iple of the 
small but vital distortion necessary with any scientific 
revolution. POr not only 
iS 14T 
e-wrttonls preconception of the 
universe (iTorld view) totally incompatible with that of Einstein, 
but this incommensurability is mathematically, even if not, 
practicably, demonstrable. The only situation iffibre Ne-, Aonian 
dynamics do form a special case of Binsteinian, and where there 
is consequently-a mathematical identity -rhen all the bodies is i 
under consideration are stationary with regard to one another. 
To put the relationship between Newtonian and Einsteinian 
dynamics in a different ýight, the inability of scientific 
instruments to measure infinitesimally small distances does not 
provide a philosophically sound basis on which to deny'the 
occurrence of a scientific revolution. 
The fact that many scientists feel it necessary to 
ascribe Neutonian physics 'true scientific status' highlights 
the possibility that exists for totally different paradigmatic 
assumptions to give rise to different theories of comparable 
adequacy. By contrast, the. assertion that Newtonian theory is 
strictly spea-lk-ing inadequate in terms of Dinsteinian (which 
itself may well be shown as inadequate in terms of some -Future 
theory), highlights the necessity of recognising the inevitable 
distance that always exists between theory and phenomena. 
- In order to understand the full logical status of 
scientific knowl. edge, hoi-Tever, it is necessary to consider the 
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minority of cases where the ciTcumseribing characteristics of 
the diýlectic analytical situation do not allow for the 
construction of . an-adbqu, -'ue theory, where the týaznsmission of 
difference transforms do not cease, and where paradigmatic 
assumpt. ions are ultimately brought into question. It is in. 
these situations, it will be remembered, that scientists are 
driven 
- 
to--util4 se-, criteria-iThich -a-re -not-. 
' scientific! -- in- the-_ 
sense in which that word is usually intended. Since all science 
is carriod out irithin tile parariieters of specific paradigms, and 
since all paradigms are ultimately located in these Inon- 
scientific' criteria it -would seem that all science is grounded 
in those 'non-scientific' modes of thought. Identification of 
the processes ultimately responsible for the generation of these 
modes of thought will. therefore establish the ultimate location 
and source of all scientific knowledge. 
F 
The assertion that alT science is ultimately grounded 
in 'non-scientific' modes of thought highlights the fact that 
scientists do not live completely in a ii-orld of their oim. They 
are in everyday contact with society as a whole, and in order 
that they may maintain meaning--ful relationships with people in 
general, it is necessary that they have a symbology in common 
with thosepeople 
13. 
That scientists are members of society who use symbols 
of all kinds in common with the other members of that society is 
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not in itself remarkable. But certain rather more important 
considerations follow. For societies can only arise and continue 
to exist through communicationý that is, thro uEh the creation a-lid 
exchange of symbols. Symbols are not self-contained phenomena. 
They are not God-given but created by people to cope itith the 
many varied situations in which they find themselves. The 
, --meaning of -and-. sets -ofsymbols-are- originally -, 
derived 
from s-oecific and real-social situations. But there is ahother 
side to the coin. Once a symbol or set of symbols has been 
created in response to a new situationthese symbols in retrospect, 
colour that situation. When people look back at a series of 
events. they do so by means of and through the symbols created to 
define it. Furthermore, the now symbols may be used in other 
situations. - Since the symbols are not specifically created for 
these other situationsy they bring to them meanings which although 
not necessarily 'irrelevant' or Ii-Trong', are obviously coloured by 
previous usage. The reverse, of course, is equally true, for new 
situations modify the meanings of the already existing symbols 
used to denote such situations. In other words, situations and 
symbols have a dialectic relationship crucial to the dynamics of 
the social pamcess. 
This relationship is most easily un I derstood irith regard to 
words, which constitute man's most important symbolic mode. Not 
only do the meanings which arise in sdcial situations Give. rise 
to words -and continually modify the meanings of pro-existing i-Tords , 
but words -and complete langua, -, es bring pre-conceived meanings to 
bear on our everyday sense of the T., -orld. Indeed2 any new 
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situation and/or symbol is mediated to an extent by prc- 
eýcisting adjacent me anings. Me world we live in has meaning 
for us only boo-ause we sy-mbolically mediate the events than't take 
place in it with other peopley and ire do this primarily with 
ten conceived as an absolu words. Reality - of C, te fact which 
cannot be changed by people, but only misconstrued - is thus 
-- constructed-' by-people -through the mutual a, =5ce. ment bý -, 
', To-r-ds- 
other symbols on experiences undergone by individual people: 
11"Torld view" is an elusive term, ' but when i-re speak of 
someone's-world view in any sense, we do not mean simply 
the world impressing itself'upon his passive receptors, 
sensory or intellectual. 'A person does'not receive a 
morld view, but rather takes or adopts one. A world 
view-is not a datum, a donne, but something-the 
individual himself, and the culture he shares partly 
constructs; it is a person's way of organising from 
within himself the data of actuality coming from without 
and within (Ong, 1969, p. 634). 
For the purpose of clear understanding a theoretical 
distinction may be dra-u-n between environment and everyday 
reality: environment is the imiqualified situation (reality as we 
might imagine it to be as -absolute fact) in which a Derson finds 
himself; everyday reality is the result of that personts 
interaction with the environment and the interaction of this 
subjectivity with other subjects. In practice, the distinction 
is invalid for two related reasons: first, no person finds 
himself without society and therefore pre-existing cultural 
support; secondly, subjectivitiesend ensuing inter-subjectivities 
become legitimated or integrated into a world sense through which 
the environment is mediated to -people. Human society is 
-quintessentially symbolic. That is to say, world senses and the 
legitimating structures that integrate intor-subjectivities into 
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i-Torld senses - -ýIie meaninCs of societty - anýe createcl ,, nd 
maintained i--ri artcl. through pco-ple's collectuive exluerll. ilisa-tiors. 
Every perception made azid every symbol externalised is done so 
as , contribution to and in the context of tile symbolically 
mediated and, since now situations are constantly arisiftg, 
dialectically ongoing field of meaning peculiar to any group or 
society. 
Any field of meaning is predicated upon assumptions -,, -jiich 
evolv6 as a result of the inter-subjective legit-imations of 
perceptions, events and situations that articulate the field of 
meaning. These assumptions may be thought of as the unexamined 
paradigmatic frameuork or' structupe upon which all sensory or 
intellectual interaction is unconsciously grounded. The 
realisation, of the existence of such assumptions does not negate 
the dialectic concept of society (one might conclude that it 
encouraged people to perceive the nature of all perceptions, 
thoughts and externalisations as mechanically determined). 
Assumptions serve, on the contrary, to mediate, process and in 
some cases repress socially efficagious information in one way 
rather than in any other. Society is not a one-level2 linear 
cause and effect sequence, but a mosaic of simultaneously inter- 
cting and complementary fields of action and influence. it 
must further be enphasised that assumptions are implicitly agreed 
upon inter-subjectively and as such are themselves, at times of 
great stress and rapid or fundamental change, subject to the 
ongoing dialectic processes of society. 
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World senses, then; must not be thought of as deterministic 
monoliths. They may most usefully-be conceived as totally fluid 
processes containinig a r..,, vriad 11-ovels' which perrait the 
categories of understý-idin- specific to assumptive framework's to 
act back on each. other in countless different jTaysl4. Beyond 
this it is necessary to realise that the concept of 'levels' is 
only --a convenience2- 
'or Ifundanentall categories of-understanding- 
may only be elucidated througi h examination of the concrete 
articulations specilic to any i,, orld sense. Finally, it 
-should 
be noted that change in society would be utterly impossible 
without an element of genuine creativity which finds potential 
expression through the thoujc; -ht processes of every indi 
per on15. 
But de6pite the total fluidity and inherent creativity 
of the social process, it should still be remembered that the 
power of world senses to mould our ways of thinking is iramense. 
The -ability of any individual to escape the predominant modes of 
thought in his society is, depending on different variables 
16 
1 
severely circumscribed. In understanding the logical status of 
scientif"ic knowledge, therel"ore, the crucial question is th1s: 
even giventhe division of Ia-bour in modern society upon which 
pro-Cessiona-1 groups are predicated, how possible is it for 
scientists to escape the fields of meaning relevant to modern 
industrial society and the assumptions upon which they are 
grounded? In constituting various professional groups there can 
be little doubt that scientists have their own structured field 
- 359 - 
of meaning and action which each person in that group helps to 
articulate through his own inter-subjec'tively constructed role- 
specific field of neaning. But such a professional group does 
not exist incommunicado from the rest of society. Since 
society continues to exi st in and through the symbols of 
communication, we may assert that as a member of a group helps 
to-artioulate-the-larg. er--fielcl-of- meariing of--the group1so- the 
group, in and through its collective activities, helps to 
articulate the larger field of meaning in society as a whole. 
Given the dialectic nature of the social process, the fields of 
meaning and structures ef, "icacious for the individual, the 
profe ssional group and society integrate and inter-relate in an 
overwhelmingly unified and conplementary mannerl7. I-P . hen a 
scientist acts 'scientifically' he not only articulates the 
structure of role-specific Imovledge, but also a legitimating 
structure relevant for the accrued knoiTlodge of the entire 
society. Conversely, the pre-existing but dialectically 
articulated legitimating structure of" I social I knowledge 
influences to. a large extent the dialectically ongoing 
18 
processes of professional groups and role-specific 1-_nowledge 
A further observation may be made on the relatedness 
of scientists mand other professionals to society as -- -. -. -'-, iole. 
The separateness of such groups wid their role-specific 
knowledge from the 'mainstream' of society is genuine and may 
ain contexts precisely because usefully be viewed as such in cert 
it is predicated upon the high division of la-bour prevalent in 
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modern industrial society. But in turn it nust be recogmised 
that the division of labour as a method of social and economic 
orGanisation is itsclýf C-rounded upon the legitimating structure 
and assumptions of that society. The effect of those 
assumptions as manifest in the division of labour h, 7-6 been-the 
mystification of role-specific Imouledge for Eroup protection 
and. hence 
-a 
one-sided empha-sis- on -the -. -'-u2iiauf-ýneps-l-or--Iseplrationl------- 
of that k-nowledge alt the expense of a' recognition of the -more 
19 
unified processes of society Paradoxically, the scientists' 
attitude that scientific knowledge can only be created and 
naintained with reference to nothing but 'purely scientific 
principles' is'an aspect oT the irrevocable fashion in which a 
scientist is a prisoner of his mm. social situation. In order 
to understand. this -attitude in its fullest context, therefore, 
it has been found neces. sary to bring to the fore one of the most 
importaiat facets of the entire modern industrial society. This 
procedure in itself supports the theme of the argument. 
It is now possible to enlarEe upon the central assertion 
of the previous section, namely, that an adequate scientific 
theory arises when a scientist produces a thought pattern whose 
characteristics sufficiently parallel those of the phenomena 
under examination. For if it is accepted frOM tile areuments 
presented in this section that scientific knoulodE; e both reflects 
, and at the sam e time contributes to the wider social reality of 
iThich it forms an aspect, t'hen it can be understood that -adequate 
scientiLic theory will only arise ithen it forms part oi- a wider 
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social reality or world sense whose _characteristics 
potentiallm 
2r nearl. ý 2ýýail-e those of the -phenomena under e. -cam ination. 
In Chapter Three, for ex2nnic, it was domonstrated (inter alia) 
the universe arose as an how the NeWtonian-Laplacian concept of It 
aspect of - the wider world sense oj. post-Renaissmnce industrial 
society. 
--- The loZiýal-status- of not--- ---- -- 
therefore to be located in a spurious objectivity or 
absoluteness. It is to be located rather'in science's 
contribution to the articulation of a socially all-pervasive 
world sense, a contribution, it should be re-emphasized, that 
is not at all incompatible i7ith the high degree of adequacy 
demanded of scientific knowledpe. 
G 
Crom the discussion in the It would seem -to follow -L 
previous section that all Imo-, -Tled_c-o is embedded in the irider 
social reality of which it forms a dialectic facet. That is 
if scientific k: nowledge is taken to be grounded in a wider social 
reality, then it appears inescapable that all forms of Imo-uledge 
N.. -hich Go to makc up the lbackgrowid' of that reality must at the 
same time and in the same way form dialectic as-pects of it,, 
This line of thought may be reinforced from another 
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direction. It ii-ill be reziembered that the usual view of 
ken to be absolute sCience, whereby scientific statenents are t--, 
-pan object and neutral, doponds on 
the assumption that man c Uively 
observe external reality. It is this objective observation 
which frees science from the 'distortive imluence of personal 
preconception. The huri-minitics, on the other hand, can never 
.. -make absolute --and -neutral 
statements becauýe_their_ subject-------- 
matter does not permit objective observation. It is the 
impossibility of objective observation which allows personal 
preconception to creep into lobjectivised' statements. 140-ir if. 
it is accepted that scientific knowledge ultimately depends upon 
socially. constructed value judgments, then it becomes very 
difficult to see how the same conclusion cannot be accepted for 
the humanities, bearing in mind that value judgments are already 
aclkno-ul edged to be an integral aspect of any work in -this area. 
1,11lusicoloor is no exception in this regard. But does 
the assertion that musicology is an aspect of socially constructed 
reality reveal anything that Tas previously unlaloi,. -n? Was it 
necessary to go to all the trouble of demonstrating that 
scientific -k-nowledge 
is socially constructed in order to establish 
something that humanists . have accepted 
for a long time, namely, 
that tile characteristics of any particular niece of ýznouledge 
are deeply and inevitably affected by, the outlook of tile people 
responsible for its inception and propagation? The advantage- 
of considering tile logical status of scientific 'knowledge, it will 
be remembered, was that it inevitably led to the questioning of 
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objectivity per se, and consequently forced the focus of 
-attention towards the hunv-n Val-u-0-9 that at the deepest level 
underpin all 1-mo-iTledge. But ilad the ajppendix started irith a 
consideration, say, of the logical status of musicoloV or of 
one of the other humanities, it -k, -ould have been very difficult 
to convincingly lead the discussion beyond the usual conclusion 
Llhat the proliferation of co thig these-subjec-ts-- mpe- -ýtheories - 
in.... 
- 
t 
derives from the nature of the subjects thenselves. The shift 
Ir 
of focus that 'UIM, S theory ultinately forces essentially 
substantiates an assertion made at the beginning of section D, 
that is, that although the inherent que . -lities of plienomena 
do 
affect modes of coGnitive control and -manipulation, this inter- 
relationship does not pTeclude-the possibility -that, at a deeper 
level, ý-. 11 knoi, -led, -e o-ues its existence and maintenance to one 
and the s. ame process 
20 
Concentration on the logical status of 6cientific 
Imowledige has in other words led to the conclusion that the 
present state of any discipline vis--a-vis the universal 
acceptFmce of a paradiem. or the disputuation of competing 
theories has at least as much to do with the distin, -, uishing 
characteristics of the underlyine world sense as it does with 
the 'inherent cliVracteristics' of the subject matter. If there 
is a hiG11 deZroe of conr-, -ruity - zalthouSh not necessarily 
absolute equivalence - beti,, een the ': inherent characteristics' 
of the phenomena under consideration and those of the social 
reality underpinning the explanatory theory, then a- universally 
acceptable paradigm is 1L', -ely to cmcr&o. If, on the other 
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hand, there is a relatively low de, -ree of conC-ruityl then 
pinions are likely to emerae varying ol J, - as to the mý--nner in which 
21 
a particular set of phenomena should be'explained Instead 
of there being a sinele paradiG. m which produces a number of 
peripheral anomalies, there is -much-nore I-jL-ely tc) 'be a single 
and irreducible problem i; hich pervades a_number of different and 
possibly-incom-patible, -theorieq. 
is- this 
- second -celationship 
between i.,, orld sense and johenonena which solves the difficulty 
indicated in section Cy for as the first Part of this thesis 
was at pains to indicate, there would seem to be a single'and 
irreducible musicological 'problem' (that of the 'meaning' or 
significance of music) irnich pervades a number of different and 
frequently incompatible approaches to the subject (f -0 -LOr eXaM-Dle 
the purely analytical and the purely . 
'psychological' or 
'aesthetic'). Because this second type of relationship is 
appropriate to musicology (and the discussions in the first 
seven chapters of this thesis would appear to indicate 
rrevo. cably that -the industrial world sense is totally unsuited 
for an understwiding of musical process), there is no need to 
establish that the discipline possesses a single paradigm. 
Kuhn's ideas still remain appropriate and instructive. 
H 
Having indicated the basic terms in which the thesis iras 
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conceived, it is now possible to go on and consider, from a 
theoretical porspectivey sor. qe fund-mental methodological 
auestions. Firs t --mong- these is the n-e-cessity of examining 
a world sense in order, to demonstrate the inadequacy of a 
theory grounded on it. For even granting that the -adequacy 
or otheridise of a theory ultimately rests on the deEree: o: C 
congruity betiieen--t-he. -. characteristics--of world sense and---- 
phenomena, that adequacy can only ultimately be asse ssed through 
some sort of Ire-exa-raination' of the phenomena in question. 
. And since the theory will in some way undoubtedly evidence the 
characteristics of the world sense on which it is grounded, 
could it not be concluded that a Ire-examination' of phenomena 
and theor y alil-01-o would be just as effective in assessing the 
theoryls adequacy -as an elucidation of. the underlying world 
sense on which the theory is grounded? That this is not the 
case can be illustrated by comparing two stera&ypic situations. 
Both situations are based on a scheme possessing three elements: 
the -Dhenomena under examination, the theory which seeks to 
explain them and the world sense or -urider social reality in 
which the theory is grounded. It is assumed in both situations 
that the theory furnishes an inadequate exp1miation of the 
phenomena. 
In the first situation the theory is 'derived' from the 
phenomena in. ignorance of the world sense responsible for its 
, generation. The only iTay in which the discrepancy beti-Teen the 
characteristics of phenomena and theory can be highlighted in 
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this situation is throuGh a lphenomcnologicall e-nalysis of the 
phenomen'a, that is, * an analysis which does not pi-esuppose any 
=, Lori cateGories of u-iaderstEmqdinjS: 
First) and -above all, an explanation must do justice to 
the thing that is to be explained .... The question 
is not "At iThat vi6ir of* the -phenomenon must we arrive 
ill 
order to explain it in accordance iilith one or another 
philoso--phy? " but -. orecisely 
the reverse: Ill iat Philosophy 
is requisite if i7e are to live up to the subject, to be 
on-a--level-with-it? "---- The question-is not--how-the----------- 
phenomenon must be turned, twisted, narrowed, crip-Died 
so as to be explicable, at all costs, upon principles 
that -we have once and for all resolved not to Go beyond. 
The question is: "To what Point must we enlarge our 
t thought so that it shall be in proportion to the 
phenomenon .... tt22 
The advantage of this procedure is that, in theory, it does not 
favour any one approach to understanding a particular set of 
-ohenomena. However, since no person finds themselves without 
society -and the consequent assumptions on which the life of 'that 
society is foundedý such supposed neutrality is completely 
spurious. If, therefore ,a person who is largely unconscious 
of his oun. -world sense intuitively suspects-that a particular 
theory is inadequate, and consequently seeks to indulge in a 
'phenomenological' analysis, then the analysis itself i-, rill 
inevitably and ultimately be grounded in the same categories of 
understanding that were responsible for the original inadequacy. 
'a theory cannot, it, iTould scony be assossed in The adequacy of 
any real sense. 
Two qualif! cations need -to be 'made to this line of 
thou-jht, hoi: ever. First of all, because 7. Torld senses are not 
deterministic monoliths, it is quite possible for a person to 
partially transcend the inadequacy of a theory by intuitively 
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allo-wing lbasicl cate, ý-ories of understanding to act back on 
ea-ch other at a nurmber of dij--, "eron'U levels. But although 
this procedure permits a considerable degroe of distmncing 
from, the central core of socially constructed reality, it can 
never facilitate a fundan. ental broý-% -, Tith that reality nor 
consequently, a true transcendence of the inadequate categories 
of underptandinS,.,. 
_ _Secondly_, _the. 
fact thata T)ers-on--is--, 
- 
E' the existo! Icc of tile ITorld sense in I. ffiich ulloolls'iOus Oj- 
traditional theories are sroumded does not necessar-ily mean that 
t Uhe nerson is inso facto incapable of turanscending Ithat world 
sense. It should be remenbered that world senses only exist 
throu, Pýh the '-Pcc: ij-ic articulations of individual people and that 
they ca-n be changed through those SaMe -articulations. However, 
the imposing n2assivity of everyday reality me! -, es such intuitive 
or wiconscious changes extremely difficult to accomplish. 
The advantages accruing fron, the secbnd situation only 
emer, ge. with an understanding ples involved when a of tile -princi- 
. 
person becomes conscious of their underlying world sense. 
Because world senses are only articulated through the 
externalisations of individual people, and because tile adequate 
examination of any viorld sense inescapably involves an 
elucidation of its assumptions, any person izho attempts to 
recede 'Lrora the world sense which envelops thera -, All necessarily 
engý-, -e in an examination of the assumptions underlying their 
oiým mental structuring. But on what is that examination 
predicated? I, Te have already seen that it is impossible for 
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anyone to approach. an analytic situation in a pristine state 
of mind, yet to predicate an examination of one's underlying 
assumptions on those very same assumptions is clearly to 
compromise the efficacy of the examination. 
This difficulty highlights the importance of creativity 
to the social process. For every time one set of assumptions 
-is. -uncoveredl-ano: 
ther--iýs-implicitly-qrqated as. -part .1 of-the-metaý, ------ 
situation necessary for the initial examination. It is 
necessary, in other words2 to have an assumptional framework in 
order to examine an assui. iptional framework. The process of 
exposing the assumptions off one's oi-ni society therefore involves 
a high degree of Is'eparation' or 'distancing' botý from oneself 
and one's society. Now the separation or distancing can never 
become total. Not only are people unable to step completely 
outside themselves in order to examine the characteristics of 
the 'old self' but if they wish to communicate and remain sane 
in the eyes of their own societys then they must stay to a certain 
extent, within the field of meaning of that society. This. 
problem was touched on at several -points in the thesis when 
discussion required it. A final statement regarding it'was also 
made in the concluding chapterý All that needs to be acImowledged 
in the present context, however, is that when a person becomes 
largely conscious of their own world sense they implicitly create 
23 
another, transcendent world sense in the process. 
It can now be understood that once a person is largely 
conscious of the world sense responsible for the generation of a 
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Particular theory, the self-reinforcing circle of perception 
and phenomena specific to that theory becomes potentially 
loosened. 
. And 
if, as is the-case in the second of these 
st6fe&ypic situations, the theory in question furnishes an 
inadequate explanation of the phenomena under examination, then 
the new frame of reference provided by the implied and 
transcendent- world- s ens e mos-t-likely-- highlight--that- 
inadequacy. Consciousness of the world sense underlying theory 
thus provides the 'enlargement of thour,,,, ht' demanded by von 
Schelling. An understanding of its potential role also 
explains why proper knowledge of the logical status of 
musicological theories is a necessary prerequisite for a full 
discussion of their adequacy. 
But this does not mean that the approach being 
recommended here will lead to perfect and incontrevertible 
assessments ol. different theories. For another difficulty 
presents itself at. this stage.. Despite the advantages 
accruing from this second situation, it still remains the case 
that theories can only be shown to be inadequate through a 
'phenomenological' analysis of the phenomena they seek to 
explain. Now although the new world sense would seem to 
militate against a repeat of t he difficulty noted in connection 
with the first situation (where the lphenomenologicalt analysis 
was inevitably and ultimately grounded in the same categories 
of understanding responsible for the initial inadequacy), there 
is absolutely no guarantee that the new world sense would not 
bias the analysis in favour of itself. If, on the one hand, 
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the 'phenomenological' analysis in this second situation 
demonstrates no great inadequacy on the part of the theory 
under examinationy then it would seem reasonable to assume 
that this theory possesses a high, although not necessarily 
absolute degree of adequacy. But, on the other, if the theory 
appears to be substantially inadequate, it still remains 
-possible-Ahat -the new--w6rld--sense-has--ge4erated a- 
I-ohenomenologicall analysis - now to achieve the status of new 
theory which itself may be imagined as being inadequate. This 
second-order difficulty is inevitable if for no other reason 
than that "the competition between paradigms is not the sort of 
battle ihatýcan be resolved by proofs". 
Although there are sometimes practical ways of minimising 
the effect of this second-order difficulty 
24 
1 there is only one 
set of circumstances in which it does not arise. This set of 
circumstances is of considerable importance to the discussion of 
Langer's and Meyer's theories on music which took place in the 
main body of the thesis. It was mentioned earlier in this 
section that because world senses are not deterministic monoliths 
it is quite possible for a person to partially transcend the in- 
adequacy of a theory by intuitively allowing 'basic' categories 
of understanding to act back on each other at a number of 
different levels. In a situation where the characteristics of 
world sense and phenomena are incompatible, therefore, there , 
exists the potential for the characteristics specific to the 
instantaneous and indissoluble perception-phenomena relationship 
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to distort the underlying world sense characteristics in such a 
way that the validity of the theory becomes severly compromised 
in terms of that underlyin i-Torld sense. The continual and 
dialectic information flow between observer and phenomena has 
in other words allowed the characteristics of the phenomena to 
twist a4d cripple those of the observer. The theory 2ýemains 
-- inadequate for the 
. phenomena-because-it is-ultimately-grounded[ 
in an inappropriate world sense. But because that grounding is 
inconsistent the theory retains little meaning in terms of the 
world sense. 
.. 
In this kind of situation there is no absolute 
necessity for a lphenomenoTogicall analysis. All that is 
needed is a substantial awareness of the world sense underlying 
theory 
25. 
i 
The presence of the second-order difficulty-d6scribed in 
the previous section underlines the absence of any ultimate or 
absolute standard a, -ainst which the adequacy of the theory--ý---. 
put for-., Tard in this thesis can be judged. The adequacy of 
different theories can only be relative, and this relativity is 
ultimately grounded in the specific world senses of different 
groups and societies. As Kuhn once again so succinctly puts it: 
"as in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice - there is no 
standard higher than the assent of the relevant cýmmunityll (1962, 
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P-94). 
It is equally the case, thereforeY that the theories 
whiA come under criticism in this thesis cannot be 'proved' to 
be I-arong'. This thesis is much more an exercise in 
transcendence whereby some features of previous theories are 
preserved and incorporated into the new theoryý and other 
features discarded as anomalous. _---- 
Again3_jh_ere 
_is_no. 
intenti6n- 
to imply that vast tracts of musicological research are 'wrong'. 
Such d suggestion would be ludicrous. The intention is rather 
to rearrange the methodological footing for musicological_ 
enquiry in such a way that it will be possible to gain a greater 
insight into the music under examination while at the same time 
attaining a more 'truly phenomenological' sense of music. as. 
music. 
Within the context of the argumenýs presented in this 
Appendixg the approach and methods adopted in the thesis 
probably seem-reasonable enough. There does, however, exist a 
meta-situation which is both a necessary adjunct of the position 
adopted in this Apppndix and of crucial relevance to the general 
acceptability*of this thesis. This meta-situation was briefly 
indicated at the end of section B when it was noted that those 
people who disagree with Kuhn's underlying hypothesis might well 
be providing a working example of it in a wider sense. They 
would, in other wordsy be stressing the validity of a paradigm 
which has become problematic for historians of science, while at 
the same time denying the validity of another that goes a long 
373 - 
way toýTards soýlving those problems. But' -this assertion di'storts 
those people's position, involving as it does a b9lief in man's 
ability to objectively observe external reality. For their 
denial necessarily incorporates a further denial of the very 
concept of a paradigm. Thei'r view of science is not one of a 
number which, according to one's i-Torld sense, possess varying 
degrees of adequacy. It is one iThich in their eyes has 
absolute validitY and which therefore guarantees the 
fallaciousness of-all others. 
This meta situation is paralleled in musicology. As 
indicated in Chapter Four2 there exists the as-sumption among 
many-musicologists that there is some form of abstract and 
objective-aesthetic in terms of which the value and 'g-reatness' 
of music may be judged. There need not, of course, be universal 
agreement as to the nature of that aesthetic. The 'highly 
subjective' nature of music is usually taken to preclude such 
agreement. The point, however, is that belief in some form of 
objective aesthetic not only negates. the idea that there may be 
other, relatively adequate paradigms for explaining musical 
significance, but thereby denies the idea of a paradigm at all. 
The difficulty which results from the existence of this 
meta-situation may be summarised in the following general 
fashion. On the one hand people -,. Tho believe in the ultimately 
objective status of knowledge can hardly be expected to admit 
that this view in itself constitutes a paradigm possessing a 
relative degree of adequacy among others. On the otherl people 
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who believe that the . adequacy of knowledge can only'be relative 
and not absolute would be inconsistent if they claimed ý-n 
objective status for that belief.. It has already been admittedý 
for example, that althouGh the appzoach put forward in this 
Appendix for assessing different theories may be claimed to-be 
more adequate than the traditional, it can never be judged as 
-t-oerf6ct-or absolute in-terms-of the--findinSs--t'lo-i-rhich-it--gives------ 
rise. - Belief in paradigms of relative adequacy itself 
constitutes a paradigm of only relative adequacy. 
It is apparent from this discussion that the common 
, ground between the tiýaditionalist and 
'Che relativist is minimal 
in the extreme. And it is precisely because communication 
across this revolutionary divide is virtually non-existent that 
there seems little point in discussing the matter any further, 
except, perhaps, to note that since neither the traditionalist 
in science or musicology would admit the validity of such a 
divide, they would not agree with the statement just made. For 
them, 'discussion is all too possible and in their eyes would 
result in the conclusive negation of all that has so far been 
argued in this Appendix. Against this type of attack the 
relativist has no defence that would be deemed satisfactory. 
For while it is an integral aspect of his position that he cannot 
appeal to a higher authority to validate his overall approach, 
the traditionalist is perfectly at liberty to make exactly this 
sort of appeal and, if pushed, will frequently do so 
26 
. 
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NOTES: 
Kuhn (19622 p. 81) provides an example of such an 
occurrence: 11. .. during the sixty years after Newton's 
original computation2 the predicted motion of the moon's 
perigee remained only half of that observed. 4s Europe's 
best-mathematical physicists continued to wrestle 
unsuccessfully with the well-knoi-m. discrepancy, -there were 
occasional proposals for a modification of Newtonts universe 
square law. But. no one took the proposals very seriously, 
and in- -practice --this- pati6nce--with-a- major -anomaly-proved-I 
justified. Clairaut in 1750 was able to show that only 
the mathematics of the application had been wrong and that 
Newtonian theory'could stand as before". 
2. For a full discussion of the implications of this work see 
Capek (1961)., 
3. Capek (1961, pp. 263-264), for example, states: "But this 
emphasis F-On the. part of late seventeenth century natural 
philosophers] on the relativity of-the frame of reference. 
hardly goes to the root of the matter; otherwise it would 
be correct to claim that Einstein was fully anticipated by 
Descartes, Leibniz, and Huygens, who all insisted on the 
relativity of motion. Yet, in spite of their occasional 
prophetic insight, it would be naive to look for even a 
remote foreshadowing of the relative fusion-, of space and 
matter in their thought. In their corpuscular-kinetic view 
of-the universe they-were not different from Gassendi and 
Newton. 
4- An external reality which is 'absolute' is taken to be one 
whose laws and norms are essentially unchanging and operate 
independently of human volition. 
5- See Kuhn (1962, pp. viii-ix). 
6. Besides being a noted novelist, C. P. Snow spent some time 
at Cambridge as an experimental scientist. 
It should be remembered, of course, 'that this section is 
based on the view that Kuhn has of the traditional approach 
to scientific work. This approach involves the assumption 
that man can objectively observe external reality. There 
might seem to be a confusion here because the previous 
section, which is based on Kuhn's work, broýight that notion 
into question and thus implicitly blurred the traditional 
distinction drawn between science and the arts. This 
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confusion may be cleared up by noting that there are three 
possible views of scientific work: (i) the traditional view 
of how the traditional approach to science works; (ii) the 
view that someone like Kuhn may have, of the way that the 
traditional approach workýs; (iii) a new view or 
approach that may emerge as a result of Kuhn's work. it 
'is only (iii) which causes a reconsideration-of the 
traditional distinction between science and the arts, a 
reconsideration which begins in section D of this Appendix. 
This section, however, only concerns i' tself with (ii), and 
since this view incorporates (i) within itself, the 
traditional distinction can for the moment remain intact. 
The culture7-specific nature of the concept of 'objectivity' 
is demonstrated in Chapters Two -and Three. Subsequent 
discussions in this Appendix (see sections E- J) argue 
strongly against the use of 'objectivity' as an intellectual 
tool in any situation. 
The necessarily creative and therefore spontaneous nature of 
human existence is noted in section E of this Appendix. it 
has, of course, be_en discussed at more length in Chapters 
Five and Seven. 
10. At the beginning of this section reference was made to a 
I-prevalent musicological paradigm'. In view of subsequent 
discussion, it must be seriously questioned whether such a 
concept actually exists. This potential difficulty is 
resolved at the end of section G. 
11. The scientific process is, of course, a lot more varied and 
complex than implied here. However, this simple model 
suffices2 as all scientific work involves some-sort of 'gap' 
between paradigm and nature. That is why the work is done. 
12. Kuhn (1962, p. 98) notes that the assertion that the 
dynamics of Newton and Einstein are fundamentally 
incompatible, 11today ... remains a minority view". 
13. The following four paragraphs also occur in Chapter One. 
14- An example of the way in which the categories of under- 
standing specific to assumptive frame;.., orks can act back on 
each other. is given in Chapter Three. See above, pp. 41 -56r. 
15- of. the discussion of creativity in Chapters Five and Seven. 
16.. The most important of these variables are the media of 
communication at the individualts disposal (see above pp. 576 - 
6+ ), and consequently in modern society, the individual's 
location in the overall social stratification. Transcendence 
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(rather then destruction) of a world sense 
, 
is easier for 
highly educated and articulate people than it is for those. 
who attach less importance to such attributes (see 
Bernstein, 1973). 
17. This assertion is not meant to imply a consensual or 
conservative approach to social theory. it is -apparent 
that the high degree both of social stratification and of 
the division of labour prevalent in modern industrial - 
society, together -with the stress on individualism, provide 
excellent spawning grounds for social dissension and 
conflict. However, -as Chapter Three seeks to argue, all 
the - characteristics-of--modern-industrial--socie'Lly--which----- 
facilitate and encourage strife are themselves grounded in 
the world sense of industri. al-society. 
18. The theoretical basis for this view of the inter- 
relationship of individual, professional groups, and society 
as a whole' is provided by Berger and Luckmann: "It'is 
important to bear in mind that most modern societies are 
pluralistic. This means that they have a shared core-- 
universe taken for granted as such, and different partial 
universes co-existing in a state of mutual accomodation. 
The latter probably have some ideological functions, but 
outright conflict between ideologies has been replaced by 
varying degrees of tolerance or even cooperation" (1971, 
P-142). 
19. This process is discussed and illustrated in Berger and 
Luckmann (1971, pp. 102-106). The authors' , example of. 
the 
medical profession (P-105) is particularly pertinent in this 
respect. 
20. The exact -. relationship that occurs between the inherent 
qualities of phenomena (and here I am thinking very much in 
terms of the science/humanities split of Pýection C) and the 
deeper social process in the construction end maintenance 
pf knowledge is not one which seems to have been greatly 
explored. There is little doubt, however, that the inherent 
qualities do play a significant role in theory construction 
and manipulationp but within the world sense/phenomena 
relationship as set out. in the follouing paragraph of the 
text. For example, the scientist -,. rill nearly always be 
able to use an observable anomaly in external reality as a 
lever through which to present his new theory or paradigm. 
For one reason or another, establishing the existence of an 
anomaly in the humanities still remains a much more difficult 
exercise. These reasons are usually traceable to the fact 
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that the-phenomena examined by the humanist are not* 
independent of human thought and volition. The point to 
be emphasised, however2 is that' , 
the existence or otherwise 
of a universally accepted paradigm in any disci-pline or area 
of a discipline is in no absolutely dependent on the 
inherent qualities of the phenomena under examination. 
21. It should be noted thatthe line of argument in this 
paragraph stress&s one dialectic moment of the social 
process at the expense of others. It does not mean to imply, 
however, that world senses are some kind of Igivenlor datum. 
They are - created-AL-hrough 
the actions of individual people, 
. ........ and-scientific-theory--can-contý-ibute-to--this-creative-- 
process just as much as any other activity. 
22. Friedrich von Schellingg Philosophie der Iýythologie 
(Stuttgart and Ausburg 1856-1861), quoted in Zuckerlkandl 
(1956). 
23. The use of the word 'transcendent' in this contemt is not 
meant to imply that the second (transcending) world sense 
contains within itself the. entirety of the first (transcended) 
world sense. IThen one world sense is impliedly created and 
'transcends another, the process is closely akin to that of a 
paradigm change. The majority of the original, transcended 
world sense continues to exist within the rather different 
framework provided by the second, transcending world sense, 
but certain aspects of it will be repressed from consciousness. 
Further, the second, transcending world sense will possess a 
number of characteristics not evident with its predecessor. 
For exampleý the world sense underlying this thesis 
preserves the majority of the preceding industrial world 
sense, albeit in a rather different form. - Yet it attempts 
to dispense with concepts such as 'objectivity', while 
asserting that there are elements of-external reality 
(for 
example social relationships) which do not have physical 
embodiment. 
24. For example, the analysis of the 'phenomenal' time-space 
sense of music which was set out in Chapter Seven was 
probably not biased in favour of the world sense underlying it, 
because the analysis resulted from an examination of tonality, 
a musical language which, at the culture-specific level, 
displays a radically different world sense and concomitant 
time-space sense. 
25- It should be remembered that a new, implied world tense 
which facilitates awareness of a previously held world sense 
is itself transcendent of this 'old' world sense (see note 23 
above for a definition of the word 'transcendent). Because 
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of this a theory which is inconsistently expressed in terms 
of the original, (transconded ' 
)yorld sense is unlikely to 
become logically consistent in terms of the new (transcending) 
-world sense. A change of world'sense does not imply a 
. 
logical inconsistency -within the old, transcended world sensel 
but rather the adoption of a new set of assumptions within 
and in terms of which the presence or otherwise of logical* 
consistency may be ascertaixied. - There can be no question of 
a logica-I inconsistency obtaining between different world- 
senses, only a mutual incompatibility. It seems extremely 
unlikely, therefore, that a logically inconsistent theory can 
be rescued by any world sense. It is thus not necessary to 
engage : Ln-a lphenomenolog-iýaý' analysis of the -phenomena to 
which such theory is applied. 
26. Me'yer gives a very good example of the way a traditionalist. 
can be so pushed in his essay, "Value and Greatness in. 
Music". This essay essentially argues for an objective 
aesthetic rooted in gratification delay. The aesthetic 
works very well for 141eyer when comparing pop music with 
Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, but becomes rather more 
problematic when comparing that symphony with Debussy's 
Afternoon of a Faun. At this point Meyer feels constrained 
, to deal with the argument 
(essentially a relativistic one) 
that each work is good in its own way. The only way he can 
do this is by positing some form of authority which is higher 
than the different criteria embodied in the respective works 
of Beethoven and Debussy, for only when this higher authority 
is so posited does the question of absolute value itself 
become problematic: "At this point some of our social 
scientist Iriendsg whbse blood pressure has been steadily 
mounting, will throw up their hands in relativistic horror 
and cry: 'You can't do this! You can't compare baked Alaska 
with roast beef. Each work is good of its kind and there's 
the end of it. ' Now granting both that we can enjoy a 
particular work for a variety of reasons and also that the 
enjoyment of one kind of music does not preclude the 
enjoyment of others - that we can enjoy both Debussy and 
Beethoven - this does not mean that they are equally good. 
Nor does it mean that all modes of musical enjoyment are 
equally valuable. In fact, i-Then you come right down to, it, 
the statement that 'each is good of its own kind' is an 
evdsion of the problem, not a solution of it. And so we are 
still driven to ask: are all kinds equally good? " (Mleyer, 
1967, pp-34-35). This argument by Mýeyer demonstrates 
exactly how wide the assumptive divide between the 
absolutist and the relativist really is. 
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TIN, ý IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA 
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A 
The purpose of this Appendix is to expand on the second 
of the propositions put forward in Chapter One, namely, that 
the media people use in any particular society to communicate 
between themselves play a pervasive role in the structuring of 
that society's world sense, and so in the creation of the 
assumptions on which the processes of that society are grounded. 
The following two sections of the Appendix put forward a 
-theoretical argument aimed at substantiating this position. 
The final, section then gives an historical perspective to the 
ideal-typical discussions of-Chapters Two and Three2 discussions, 
that'is, which focus exclusively on oral-aural cultures at one 
extreme and phonetically highly literate cultures at the other. 
B 
This section begins by reiterating a point made in the 
previous Appendix, namely, that there is a continual and 
dialectic information flow between us and a phenomenon of which 
our mental 'image' and the phenomenon's 'material'. attributes 
are only aspects. As a corollary of this assertion it was 
further argued that when any person enters into an analytic 
situation there occurs an instantaneous, intense and in- 
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dissoluble relationship between Perception and phenomena whose 
total and immanent characteristics circumscribe the further 
exploration of those phenomena. *A case was then made for the 
deep and pervasive way in which pre-existing and underlying 
world senses to a very great extent influence our understanding 
of phenomena. 
--The- concerns -in--this -. Appendix are--rather- different -F 
however. The focus is no longer the relationship between a 
phenomenon-and a pre-existing world sense, but the dialectic 
moment internal to the construction of world senses which most 
influences their specific configurations. . It was of course 
stressed in Chapter One that to consider the dialectic moments 
of the social process as if they were separate and sequential 
moments in a causal-temporal chain is to distort the essentially 
symbolic nature of that social process. That was why, for 
exampleg it was considered invalid to draw even a theoretical. 
distinction between the environment and everyday reality 
1. 
Howeverý if the intention is to identify (and therefore mentally 
isolate) one dialectic moment among others, then there is no 
other option but to commit the distortion just mentioned and 
create an heuristic situation in which a group of people are 
ima, gined as engaging the world in a pristine state of mind. 
Because this situation allows us to 'reconstruct' in our 
imagination the steps by which world senses are constructed, it 
facilitates the diachronic and separate display of moments which 
are in reality synchronically dialectic. The situation thus 
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contains only the four elements which are necessary -,, e- 
requisites for-the . construction of world senses: people, their 
individual creativityy their ability to externalise symbols, 
and the world they engage. 
The 'lack' of a. pre-existing world sense does noty 
hoi-rever, negate the continual and dialectic information flow 
-between- an---observer-and--iiha: t-he-is--obý erving-. --Given-- this------ 
heuristic situation (and the consequent Ilack' of a pre- 
existing world sense) it must therefore be immediately-conceded 
that the role played by the inherent characteristics of a 
phenomena in the instantaneous and indissoluble perception- 
phenomena relationship will be very considerable indeed. But 
this does not mean that the characteristics will'determine 
people's 
.. 
perception of them. Not only will every personts 
reaction to the phenomena be creative rather than passive, but 
this individualýcreativity will result in an inter-subjective 
response unlikely to be precisely duplicated by any other group- 
faced with the identical set of phenomena. - Nevertheless, in 
order to understand why the inter-subjective response in this 
heuristic situation assumes certain deep--seated characteristics 
rather than any others, it clearly becomes necessary to focus 
on the role played by external reality in the construction of 
world senses. 
This focusing may be best achieved by considering-the 
different kind of mediation that exists between animals and the 
environment, and man and the environment. Both the physical 
characteristics and behaviour patterns of a particular species 
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are selected and influenced in accozdance. with the species' 
2* 
environment , and this environment may'_bo said to be 
constiiuted by the media in which the species lives (air, water, 
land, mud, trees and so forth). Man is no exception in this 
regard, but, in his-relationship to the environment, he differs 
from other animals in two important aspects. Firstly, in order 
to - favour -his -chances --of - survival ---man can--modify-hi-s-eii-virohbent-- 
in any particular situation-to a- far greater extent than other 
species can. This gives man's dependency on the environment a 
greater flexibility: 
Ilan occupies a peculiar position in the animal kingdom. 
Unlike the other higher mammals he has no. species- 
specific environment2 no environment firmly structured 
by his own instinctual organizations. There is no man- 
world in the sense that one may talk of a dog-world or 
a horse-world. Despite an area of individual learning 
and accumulation, the individual dog or the individual 
horse'has a largely fixed relationship to' its 
environment, which it shares with all other members of 
its respective species. One obvious implication is 
that dogs and horses, as compared with man, are much more 
restricted to a specific geographical distribution. The 
specificity of these animals' environment, however, is ,. 
much more then a geographical delimitation,. It'refers to 
the biologically fixed character of their relationship to 
the environment even if geographical variation is 
introduced. In this sense, all non-human animals, as 
species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose 
structures are predetermined by the biological equipment 
of the several animal specids (Berger and Luckmann, 1971, 
p. 65). 
Second2 human means- of communication, even simply in 
terms of the spoken word, are very highly developed in comparison 
to animal means of communication. I-Thereas verbal language is 
primarily concerned with denoting specific and delimited things 
and events, it would seem "that the discourse of non-verbal 
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I 
communication is precisely concerned with matters of 
relat'lonship - love, hate, respeett fear, dependency, etc. 
between self and vis-a-vis or between self'and environment 
(Batesoný 1973, p-388). Bate6on gives an example of 
such -non-verbal communication: 
lfhen your cat is trying to tell you to give her food, 
how does she do it? . 
She has no word for food or for 
milk. 11hat'she does is to make movements and sounds 
tliiýt'are characteristically those'that a kitten makes 
to a mother cat. If we were to translate the cat's 
messages into -, -ýordsq it would not be correct to say that 
shie is crying 11. lilkl. -' Rather, she is saying something 
like 'Mama! I Or perhaps still more correctly, -we should 
say that she is asserting 'Dependency! Dependency! ' The 
cat talks in terms of patterns and conting-encibs; of 
relationship, and from this talk it is up to you to take a 
deductive step, which 
, 
marks the difference between pre- 
verbal ma-mmalian communications -and the languages 
of men (1973, pp. 336-337). 
For Bateson7 theny "what was extraordinary - the great new thing - 
in the evolution of human language, was not the discovery of 
abstraction and generalization, but the discovery of how to be 
snecific about somethIng other than relationship" (1973, P-337)- 
My emphasis There was, in other words, a shift from a 
mediation of relationships,. which is immediate and does not 
involve reflexive conscio usness, to a re-cognition of things which, 
at varying times in man's history, has involved differing degrees 
of conscious realization. Hhezeas we may assume that animals 
simply experience, it may be argued that, to some extent or other, 
most men experience that they experience. 
The discovery indicated by Bateson has one very important 
consequence. Since every person and every animal is to some extent 
in dialectic relationship with the environment, it becomes clear 
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that any ongoing relationship exclusively don 
I 
pted 
. 
as such by a 
person or animal will in fact contain that animal or person as3 
an integral part of itself- Non-verbal communication is thus 
tied very much to the present. On the other hand, language 
which is specific about things and events-emphasises the mutual 
'delimitation' of the very things and events that are co-existent 
with_any parti-Qular-ongoing-zelationship. ----And--as-the-Itree------- 
felling' example of the previous Appendix so vividly illustratedy 
one of'those . co-existent 'things' is the observer* The ability 
of. human language to divorce specific things and events from the 
contextuality oiý their ongoing relationships with other things 
and events thus enables people to transcend the 'herelahd now': 
Language has its origins in the face-to-face 
situation, but can be readily detached from it. This 
is not only because I can shout in the dark or across 
a distanceg speak on the telephone or via the radio or 
convey linguistic signification by means of writing (the 
latter constituting, as it were, a sign system of the 
second degree). The detachment of language*lies much 
more basically in its capacity to communicate meanings 
that are not d, irect expressions of subjectivity 'here 
and: nowl. It shares this . capacity with other sign 
, systems, 
but its immense variety and complexity make 
it much more readily detachable from the face-to-face 
situation than any other (for exampleg a system of 
gesticulations). I can speak about innumerable matters 
thý_t are not present at all in the face-to-face 
situation, including matters I have never or never will 
experience directly. In this wayq language is capable 
of becoming the objective repository of vast 
accumulations of meaning and experienceg, which it can 
then preserve in time and transmit to following 
generations (Berger and Luckmann, 19711 P-52). 
There can be little doubt that these two characteristics of man's 
unique relationship with his environment are closely inter- 
related, for man's ability to linguistically transcend the 'here 
- 388 - 
and now' strikingly parallels his ability to transcend the 
biological or environmental there and now'. But this parallel 
is merely symptomatic of a more concrete connection, -namely, 
that without the linguistic capability of referring to the 
specific things and events co-eiistent with his relation"ship to 
the world, and so of storing the meaning and experience 
resulting --f-rom--such relationships y -man would--not- have been in 
possession of'the conceptual apparatus necessary to facilitate 
a 'loosening' of his ties -with the environment. 
It becomes evident from this line of thou,, r., -ht that man's 
ability to 'prise himself away' from -the physical or biological 
environment is contingent on his ability to substitute for the 
immediacy of that environment another of his o-wn creation. if, 
therefore, one accepts that man lives largely within an 
environment of his o-rm making, and that he is in dialectic 
relation with the information he receives, then it follows that 
man is in dialectic relation with information largely 
externalised by himself: 
.*. it is important to emphasize-that the relationship 
between man, the producer, and the social world, his 
product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man 
(not, of course, in isolation, but in his collectivities) 
and his social world interact with each other. The 
product acts back upon the producer. Externalization 
and objectivation are moments in a continuing dialectical 
process. The third moment in this process ... is 
internalization (by which the objectivc-ted social world 
is retrojected into consciousness in the course-of 
socialization) .... It is already possible to 
see the fundamental relationship of these three 
dialectical moments in social reality. Each of them 
corresponds to an essential characterization of the social 
world. Society is a human product. Society is an 
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objective reality. Man is a soc 
- 
ial 
- 
product (Berger 
and Luckmanny. 1971i pp-78-79)-* 
The assumption. of anheuristic situation in which a group of 
people were imagined as engaging a previously unmediated world 
in a pristine state of mind has once again led to the conclusion 
that human society is essentially symbolic. For when those 
people engage the world, they will immediately discuss their 
reactions among themselves, and so create a symbolic filter which 
they may contemplate and internalize, but whose containment they, 
will never be able to escape. 
a 
Because, in his mediation of the environment, man 
interDoses a medium of his own making, and because he cannot 
experience the world apart from this symbolic medium, it must be 
concluded that man's-symbolic output constitutes the dialectic. 
moment which most influences the particular configuration adopted 
by a world sense. It is, however, possible to be more precise 
than this, for as previously acknowledged, it is words which 
constitute man's most important symbolic mode. 
Now in terms of our everyday understanding of the woýld, 
there are two aspects to linguistic exchange. Theze are the 
content to which words refer and the form in which the words are 
conveyed. Given our everyday understanding of the world, it is 
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certainly more: self-evident that the form a particular reality 
t, -kes depends to. some extent on the W-ay that a society's symbols 
categorise and denote what we might imýLine to be a previously 
undifferentiated world. Mlany people have had the experience of 
trying to understand, even in closely, related European languagesy 
woz-ds for which there are no direct equivalentsin English. A 
true-understanding of-these words involves a change of world 
sense, however slight. What is being suggested here2 on the 
other hand, is rather different. That is, that the way people---- 
communicate in constructing their reality (whether the face-to- 
face oral-aural situation of spoken discourse, the visuality of 
handwr. iting and printing., or the aural-visual immediacy of 
electronic forms of com munication) ! -,, lso affects -their outlook- on 
the. worldo It is not so much what is conveyed that is important 
in this respect but how it ia: conveyed. Although this idea may 
at first seem strange and its implications difficult to grasp, 
there would seem to be little doubt as to its validity. For if 
it is accepted that man is in dialectic* relation with the 
information he receives, and if it is further accepted that this 
information is inescapably filtered through his symbolic output, 
then itwould seem to follow that the inherent qualities of the 
conveyancing medium - whether the aurality of spoklen discourse or 
the visuality of typography - will to a certain extent influence 
man's understanding of external reality. 
It seems likely, however, that the influence exerted by 
media of communication on the. structure of world senses is fax 
more extensive than that exerted by language cate&ries. This 
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ýLssertion may be theoretically justified by reference to two 
lines of argument. * The first requires a return to the heuristic 
situation outlined above. Because the individuals who initially 
engage theworld have no pre-existing linguistic categories of 
und6rstanding nor, consbquently, any pre-existing medium of 
communication2 it would seem reasonable to suppose that the 
linguistic- categoHes vThi ch- are - mutual-ly -ore -at ed--to -des crib e--, And-- 
mediate the world will'be influenced to a very high degree by 
the irlerent characteristics of the observed phenomena. This 
was a point discussed in the previous section. Now although it 
seems more than possible that verbqlisation arose from a 
particular constellation of biological and environmental 
conditions (that, in other words, the advent of verbalisation 
was dialectically related to the external world), it would seem 
that there is no necessary direct influence between the inherent 
characteristics of this oral-aural communication, and the 
inherent characteristics of the conditions whic h prompted itý, 
For example, it might well have been the'case that verbalisation 
became extremely useful to man the hunter because he could 
communicate in dense forest. The need to communicate locations 
in visual space thus paradoxically could have given rise to an 
oral-aural medium. In terms of the heuristic situation, it 
might therefore be concluded that media of communication are more 
distanced from the environment2 and so'more inexorably 'tied' to 
man than any other aspect of the symbolic filter which both 
surrounds him in his perception of reality and at the same time 
forms an integral aspect of that reality. To put it 
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Simplistically, in contributing to the dialectic creation of the 
symbolic filter it is the external environment which supplies 
the phenomena and man who suppliea the medium. 
Dispensing with the heuHstic situation. does not in 
itself wealk6d"this line of argument, for although the pre-existing 
tcontent-categories' of a group or society are liable to condition 
-the - way - the- -members -of --that-group-or -n- ew 
phenomena, it may still be argued t1fat the influence exerted by 
external reality on our perception stops short at the filter 
presented by our own ability to verbalise. This point is 
relatively easy to establish, because the inherent characteristics 
o. L the spoken word can be taken to be independent of the inherent 
characteristics of any phenomena to which it then refers. 
Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to establish that the 
media which are extensions of tho. spoken word are likewise more 
'tied' to man than any other aspect of his symbolic filter, for 
the creation of these media was not engendered by a particular 
constellation of biological and (physical) environmental events, 
but by the particular configuration of world senses significantly 
distanced from the biological pre-requisites of their 
4 
development The considerations fundamental to the emergence 
of these media were, in other words, an integral part of a 
symbolic output which becomes objectivated and retrojected into 
consciousness. The 'Primacy' of media once again comes into 
question. 
An insight into this problem may be gained by considering 
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the precise way in which man can be conscious of his symbolic 
filter, for although the symbolic output of a group or society 
does become objectivated and retrojected into the collective 
conspiousness of that group or society, there is a limit to the 
extent td which the group or'societ. 2ý can in fact be consciou's 
of that output. If it is accepted that man cannot go-beyond' 
his- oirn--symbolic filter--in contem lating- and inteinal-izing Ahe - p 
world, then it must follow that he cannot go 'beyond' that, 
filter in contemplating that part of the world which is 
constituted by that very same filter. This is to say no more 
than that man cannot exist outside himself in coexistential 
unity with the reality he perceives,, 
This point may be put in a different wa V. It has 
already been stated in this Appendix that when any person 
enters an anal ytic situation there occurs an instantaneous, 
intense and indissoluble relationship between perception and 
phenomena whose total and immanent characteristics circumscribe 
the further exploration of those phenomena. To transfer this 
argument to the present situation, it can be asserted that when 
a person observes part of their own symbolic output, there arises 
an intensely dialecticrelationship between the inherent 
characteristics of that output and the fundamental categories of 
understanding specific to the underlying world sense which that 
person inevitably brings to the observation It is the 
characteristics of this relationsh ip which the -person will be 
conscious of, rather than the underlying world sense, which is a 
phenomenon that tends to be very much 'lived within'. But 
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because world senses can only be maintained in and through 
symbolic utterance, it may equally well be said that there are 
those aspects of symbolic output of which people tend to be 
largely unconscious. 
Now if it remains true that the media which are 
extensions of the spoken word are more inexorably 'tied' to man 
____than__other_aspects_ofý 
his 
-symbolic -filter, -then-one-i.,, ould--exDeot 
that. the considerations which influence the energence of these 
media-would be located in those aspects of the symbolic filter 
of which people are le, --st.. conscious. This would certainly seem 
to be true of the two media whose conditions of emergence we 
know most about. Moveable type printing could only emer*ge 
because of the concepts of lineal segmented sequentiality and 
arrested time that were becoming increasingly prevalent to-dards 
the end of the Middle Ages. Again, electronic forms of 
communication could only come into being because. of the concepts 
of homogeneity and repeatability that underlay the tremendous 
scientific advances of the modern world. Both sets of concepts 
were at the time of their greatest influence very much taken for 
granted, and wer e thus not subjects to be explicitly considered 
6 
for their oim inherent values The proposition that media are 
more inexorably 'tied' to man than any other aspect of his 
symbolic filter would therefore seem to remain valid in the case 
of these 'second-order' media because the characteristics 
facilitating their creation are located in those aspects of the 
symbolic filter from which man has the greatest difficulty in 
distancing himself. 
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The second line of argument is easier-to establish. it 
may most usefully be approached by acImoirledging that the 
influence media bring to bear on the structuring oýf psyche and 
civilisation tends to cut across the confine. s imposed by the 
existence of any role-specific bodies of knowledge in a 
7 
particular society The. degree to which such bodies of 
kno-. -TI-edte--Krd- de-V61-oped varies greatly -and--i-s-i-n fact ultimately 
circu-ms crib ed by the medium of communication iThich predominates 
8 
in any society In pre-literate societies, for example, the____ 
division of labour upon which role-specific knowledge is 
9' predicated tends to occur largely along lines of age and sex, 
10 
and may thus be said to be relatively undeveloped 
Consequently, the amount of distancing and separation that may 
occur in pre-literate societies between different bodies of role- 
specific knowledge and the universally shared knoirledge 
appropriate to everyday reality is minimal. Further there is- 
little potential for the growth of competing definitions of 
reality based on discrepant and mutually'inaccessible bodies of 
11 
knowledge Industrial society, on the other hand, 'is 
characterized by an extremely high division of labour which has 
much more to do with the creation, maintenance and exploitation 
of an economic surplus than it does -with the rather more 
12 
straightforward matter of biological survival Thus, although 
there exists a sizeable body of knowledge which may be thought of 
as common to the everyday reality of the vast majority of the 
population, rolp-specýfio bodies of Imowledge in industrial 
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society-,. tend to be hermetically conceived and articulated, to 
have the minimal of relationships with each other and the central 
13 
core of knowledge appropriate to everyday reality , and to 
encourage the existence of co mpeting definitions of reality. 
Yet despite these differing degrees of develo pment all 
role-specific bodies of knowledge nust by their very nature 
-peripheral remain'to -: 30me -extent -to-each- 
other *and -. 
the- core--.. -- 
knowledge of everyday reality. Consequently, the influence the 
content or subject matter of these bodies of knowledge might have 
oult. side their specialised realm of application is, to a certain 
extent, restricted. This is a-. trend more noticeable in 
industrial society than in pre-literate society. Now it is true 
to say that in many societies there is little or no significant 
correlation between the different messages of role-specific 
knowledge and the media used to encode those messageS14. Almost 
by definition pre-literate societies are*those in ýhich all 
knqwledge. is mediated aurally and, as Chapter Three seeks to 
elucidate, the high division of labour typical of industrial. 
- society could not have occurred without the ability of that 
society to encode and store its knowledge in print. This being 
the case, it becomes apparent that the role played by media in 
structuring a society's sense of the world is more pervasive 
than that played by individual bodies of knowledge. Not only 
does the role played by media match the universality 
characteristic of the knowledge appropriate to everyday life, but, 
in reaching beyond the boundaries of that knowledge to encompass 
bodies of role-specific knowledge, it transcends the realms of 
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application specific to those various delimited bodies of 
ýmowledge. 
The assertion that media . are more . pervasive than any 
body of knowledge in their-influencing of the particular 
configurations specific to different world senses in'itself 
supports the theme of this section of the Appendix. This 
second. 
_l_ine_of 
argament may-houeyer-be -extended 
by 
-noting -that 
the different s-ohezes of activity in the social-and 'natural' 
world to which role-specific bodies of knowledge refer frequently 
have different and mutually incompatible characteristics (this. is 
a claim which has been substantiated by previous discussions in 
this thesis). Now even if it could be-demonstrated that 
different media of communication are influenced in their 
e mergence by the particular characteristics of certain observed 
phenomena, then it would immediately have to be conceded that 
the inherent characteristics of those media would not necessarily 
have a high degree of congruity with the quite possibly different 
characteristics of other phenomena which are subsequently 
mediated through these sa-me media. Once again media seem to 
have attained a certain degree of 'independence' from the 
phenomena with which man is in such intense dialectic 
relationship. 
Any theoretical discussion of the role played by media 
in the structuring of world sensesis bound to be difficult 
precisely because of the intense dialectic relationship obtaining 
between the different aspects of inan's symbolic filter, and 
because of the intensely dialectic nature of the relationship 
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between man and 'phenomena' which gives rise to that filter.. 
Nevertheless, the weight of argument Put for-ward in this section 
would seem to suggest that'-beca-use the inherent characteristics 
of observed phenomena and resultant content-categories have to 
be filtered through the 'independent' and all-pervasive 
characteristics of the predominant medium in a society - the 
influence -exer-ted--by-media-on-tho--strueture-of--i.. -orld-sonses-is 
far more extensive than that exerted by the linguistic content- 
categories-themselves. All the. content-categories of a 
particular society will in other words tend to reveal a common 
typology not evidenced elsewhere.. 
D 
This final section of the. Appendix seeks to impart a 
more general historical perspective to the ideal-typical 
discussions of Chapter Two and the first section of Chapter 
Three, and so to highlight the fact that there are few, if any, 
societies which can be said to be either entirely oral-aural or 
entirely phonetically literate in their outlook on the-world. 
However, it is precisely this lack of purely oral-aural and 
purely phonetically literate societies which m. -ýes the ideal- 
typical categories evolved in these two chapters so valuable in 
approaching the hybrid situations that actually exist. 
It seems reasonable to assume that, in the mists of the 
past., communication in all societies took place in face-to-face 
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situations. But because of the enormous spread in the past 
2,000 years both of literacy itself and the effects'that 
11 iteracy has had on perception, intellection and social - 
organisations, the number of genuinely pre-literate societies 
that anthropologists have been able io study is not as great 'as 
one might perhaps imagine. As Jack Goody has noted, however, 
encroaq4ing- literacy -is--not-an-aspect--of-l-traditioiýai I- societies--- 
to which anthropologists have always paid much attentioni-, 
Sociologists ... have generally taken their field of 
study to be advanced literate societies, while social 
anthropologists have mainly concentrated upon 'simple' 
structures, the 'elementary forms' of religion or 
kinship, 'pre-monetary economics', 'primitive', lexoticlý 
'unsophisticated', 'practical' or preliterate societies.. 
Buty at least during the past 2,000 years, the vast 
majority of the people in the world (most of Eurasia'and 
much of Africa) have lived in neither kind of situation, 
but in. cultures which were influenced in some degree by 
the circulation of the written word, by the presence of 
groups or individuals who could read and write. They 
lived on-the margins of literacyy though this is a fact 
that many observers have tlen4ed to ignore (1968ý PP-4-5)- 
Similarly, there are societies (such as China and India) which 
possess an indigenous literacy, but in iihich3 because. of the very 
nature of that literacyl5l there remain vast numbers of 
illiterate people. But again, one cannot discount the influence 
of this highly restricted literacy when examining the world sense 
of those illiterate people. As David Riesman (1970, p. 109) has 
observed: "there are im-oortant differences ... between the 
preliterate tribe that depends entirely on an oral tradition, and 
the peasant culture where illiterate folk dwell within the moral 
and intellectual ambit of a tradition of iTritten literature ... 
As well as those societies wh6re the world senses and 
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social organis, ation of the illiterate majority are siEnificantly 
modified through contact with a literate tradition, there also 
exist those societies -, 'ihere literacy has had more far reaching 
consequences, but where the characteristics of the oral 
tradition have by no means been entirely eradicated. - Phonetically 
jiterate societies which -are largely dependent on chirography 
Vi-, Y C (Axic:!: en't GreF6-ce, Roin-6--dnd--medi-ijVal: -Edfojý-6 0 
examples of such societies. These cultures, as Ong has 
indicated, "remained committed to the spoken word to a degree 
which appears to our more visually organized sensibilities some- 
what incredible or even perverse" (1967Y P-55)- In the 
medieval world, for example, "those who could read or write were 
the few, and it is likeiy that most of them did not read or write 
with our methods*or with our facility" (Chaytor, 1970, P-117). 
The medieval reader "was in the stage of our muttering childhood 
learner; each word was for him a separate entity, and at times a 
problem, which he whispered to himself when he found the 
solution" (Chaytor, 1970, p. 122). The highest reality, there- 
fore2 was still to bb. found in auditory experience: 
He [the medieval reader] was confronted not by the 
beautiful products of a university press, but by a 
manuscript often crabbed in script and full of 
contractions, and his instinctive question, when 
deciphering a text, was not whether he had seen, but 
whether he had heard, this or that word before; he 
brought not a visual but an auditory memory to his 
task (Chaytor, 1970,, p. 123). 
The importance of residuary oral traits is underlined by Ong 
(1967s p. 21) when he, poin-. tsý out that "in the Caroliýngian Middle 
Ages much law was not what was written, but what the ruler said 
orallY7 the written documents being rather commentaries on the 
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law A further striking example of this importance 
is the fact-that silent rea ding -was unusual enough to elicit 
comment: 
In his Confessions (vil 3), Augustine makes special note 
of the ! ýact that when he once dropped in on Ambrose,. 
Bishop of Eilan, he found Ambrose reading to himself 
without making any sound. Augustine's note shows that 
silent private reading was not entirely unknown, but it 
also shows that it was singular and deserving of 
__cqmment_ 
. 
--(Ong, -1967-, -P-58) ------- 
Finally, not only were the formulae and themes symptomatic of an 
L6 
orally'mediated reality- "part of formal education'through the 
Middle Ages" 
(Ong, 1ý67, p. 28), but they were also common in the 
work of Greek and Roman writers. The second part of Albert B. 
Lordts The Singer of Talesq for example, is set aside to 
demonstrating the essentiallY formulaic and thematic nature of 
the Iliad and the Od. -issOY17. Furthermore, Cicero's ability as-. 
an orator lay precisely in his capacity to remember and 
successfully mýnipulate. a large number of these'formulae: 
In working up orations Cicero used writing, but only to 
a limited degree. Like other orators of antiquity 
generallyý he carried in his mind a vast stock of 
commonplaces, in the sense of purple patches or set 
themes such as treachery, loyalty,, honesty of character., 
decadence. 0 tempora! 0 mores! - this piece which 
Cicero put down in the Catilinarian orations he must have 
used elsewhere any number of times. It was his "things- 
are-goingýto-potll topos or "bit" (Ong, 19672 PP-56-57). 
As well as remembering that there are relatively few 
'traditional' societies which have remained untouched by literacy 
up until the present time, it must also be understood, therefore, 
that Ifull1literacy did not occur until at least the sixteenth or 
seventeenth centuries Even then, it has to be acknowledged 
19 20 
that there always has been , and still is a significant 
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minorjtý of people in. modern industrial society who xemain 
illiterate, and whose -jrorld sense has something in common with 
21 
that-of genuinel: ý pre-literate people Given these facts, 
the clear ideal-typical distinction made in Chapters Two and 
Three takes. on a broader sigriificance. For the categories of 
this distinction provide a very useful means of understanding 
ýOme aspects of the very considerable number of societies which 
display both oral and literate characteristics. This aspect of 
the distinction's usefulness was of relevance in the discussion 
of the musical coding of the structure of classic feudalism which 
. 22 Look place'in Chapters Nine and Ten 
It is also of relevance in understanding the 
characteristics of world senses in those societies whose literacy 
is not phonetic. 1, Thilst one would be unlikely to find a 
conscious distinction between form and content in Chinese and 
Indian societiesq one does find, as Kathleen Cough has indicated 
(1: 968, PP-74-79)9 a sense of lineal time coexisting with a sense 
of cyclical time, an emerging distinction (to different degrees 
in either 'country')_ between myth and history, and a search for 
objective truth that5 however, by no means replaces the 
reverence for traditional knowledge. 
While the categories of the ideal-typical'distinction are 
clearly of use in approaching oral/literate 'hybrid' societies 
(and these must be copsidered to form a substantial majority),, 
it is equally clear that detailed knowledge of the varying extent 
of these different media in such societies, and the way in which 
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they interact to. give rise to different and sometimes 
incompatible categozies of understanding, is lacking. Kathleen 
Gough (1968, P-72), for example, is forced to come to the 
following conclusions regarding Indian and Chinese cultures: 
Lacking adequate evidened ... I an obliged to class' 
the high cultures of India and China along with that 
of Greece on grounds of qualitative criteria such as the 
existence of universities, libraries, public inscriptions 
---And -Yill age-- s cho-ols, - 
11ore-precise 
-res e arch may, - __4 however, reveal quantitative differences in literacy 
which are in fact crucial for some of the cultural 
differences discussed. 
It is more than-PO00ible thatý given such evidence, the ideal------, 
typical categories developed in Chapters Two and Th: cee would 
need to be refined. At the moment, hoiiever, such refinement, 
if needed, could not be carried out. As Goody (1968, p. 19) 
has pointed out, "the fi., -u--res are lacking and the data too 
limited to set up a more sensitive scale. " 
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NOTES: 
1 See above, p. " 
2. This statement emphasises one aspect of a dialecýtic 
-situation, jor it is equally true 
that the physical 
characteristics o-ndbehaviour patterns of various species 
influence the configuration of the environment. The eco-_ 
system, in other wordsý displays dialectic qualities 
(seeg 
for example, Bateson, 1973, especially PP-445-481). 
3. It is an integral aspect. of the argument in this and the 
succeeding paragraph that man's ability to verbalise 
ultimately rests on certain of his'characteristics*as a 
biological organism. However, it must at the same time 
be acknowledged that the impetus for this abili , 
tY to develop 
probably rests on the sort of environmental pressure 
described in the text. Yet it is because biolcgi Cal 
considerations are fundamental to verbalisation that the 
inherent characteristics of this medium of communication 
need not be influenced by those of external events. 
It seems unlikely in the extreme that the invention of . 
writing or printing, for example, resulted from some change 
in the 'biological' or 'physical' world. The conditions 
favourable for their creation must therefore. have been 
located in man's own symbolic output. 
Because world senses can only be created and maintained 
through man's symbolic output, this statement might seem to 
be highly tautologous. Would not the categories of 
analysis specific to 1world sense' and 'symbolic output' be 
identical, for example? It should be remembered, however, 
that world senses are not deterministic monoliths, but 
possess many 'levels' capable of interacting with one 
anoth9r. 
It is interesting to note that these concepts are still very 
much taken for granted. Few people can conceive of 'time' 
as'anything other than a lineal, sequential and spatialised 
phenomenon. Again, many people would have great difficulty 
imagining a universe in which different spheres of activities 
operated according to mutually incompatible laws and norms, 
a were. appreciable degrees of spontaneous ýnd in which there 
creativity- It was because of a deeply ingrained belief in 
a single unified (homogeneous) space and a spatialised time, 
for example, that-laymen found Einstein's theories of 
relativity difficult to accept. 
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7. This remains true even when literacy is directly 
associated-with a particular role-specific body of 
knowledge-or a group of role-specific bodies 6f knowledge, 
Ideogrammic literacy, for examplejencodes only the 
knoiTledge which is. acceptable to the scribal el'Ite. This 
situation exists because ideograms encode ideas directly and 
not the sounds through which the ideas appropriate to the 
-oral discourse of any group might be expressed. In 
facilitating the existence of ýn autocratic'elite, 'howevery 
ideogrammic . literacy may be said to have influenced ' 
the 
structuring of civilization and psyche in a quite pervasive 
manner. 
8. This*point is discussed more fully in Chapter Three (see 
above, pp. 56 - 59 ). 
Berger and Luckmann (1971, P-158) indicate the connection 
between the division of labour and role-specific knowledge 
in discussing secondary socialization: "Secondary 
socialization is the internalization of institutional or 
institution-based 'sub-worlds'. Its extent and character 
. 
are therefore determined by the complexityof the division 
of labour and the concomitant social distribution of 
knosledge. Of course, generally relevant knowledge, too, 
may be socially distributed - for example, in the form of 
class-based. 1versionst - but what we have in mind here-is 
the social distribution of 'special knowledget - knowledge 
that arises as a result of the division of labour and whose 
carriers are institutionally defined. Forgetting for a 
moment its other dimensions, we may say that secondary 
socialization is the acquisition of role-specific knowledge, 
the roles-being directly or indirectly rooted in the 
division of labour. 11 
10. Evans-Pritchard, for example (1951, p. 8), would define 
primitive societies in terms of the*comparative 'simplicity' 
of their social organization: "It suffices to say 
that when anthropologists use Ethe term 'primitive 
society']- they do so in reference to those societies which 
are small in scale with regard to numbersj territory, and 
range of social contacts, and which have by comparison with 
more advanced societies a simple technology and economy and 
'little specialization of social function". 
11. Berger and Luckmann (1971y pp. 183-184) draw this sterotype 
in discussing degrees of socialization: "Maximal success in 
socialization is likely to occur in societies with very 
simple division of labour and minimal distribution of 
knowledge. Socialization under such conditions produces 
identities that are socially pre-defined and profiled to a 
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high degree. Since every individual is confronted i-Tith 
essentially the same institutional programme for his , 
'life 
in the society2 the"total force of the institutional order 
is brought- to bear with more or less equal weight on each 
individual, producing a compelling massivity for the 
objective reality to be internalized". This discussion is 
reminiscent of Durkheim's description of 'repressive law' 
in primitive societies., Soe in particular -Emile. 
Durk-heim (19642 pp. 138-146). 
12.. The classic formulation of this development is to be found 
in Durkheim's The Division of Labour in Society: -"Nowadays 
the-- [division- of- -1 abouý---has - develbped,. -: so--G--Iloyal-lzr-it---is----' 
obvious to all. 'We need have no further illusions about- 
the tendencies of modern industry; it advances steadily 
towards powerful machines, towards. great concentrations of 
forces and capital2 and consequently to the oxtreme division 
of labour, Occupations are inf initely separated - and- 
specialized, not only inside the factories, but each product 
is itself a speciality dependent upon others .... But 
the division of labour is not peculiar to the economic 
world; we can observe its growing influence in the most 
varied fields of society. The political3administrativeg 
and judicial functions are growing more and more specialized. 
It is the same with the aesthetic and scientific functions. 
It is long since philosophy reigned as the science unique; 
it has been broken into a multitude of special disciplines 
each of which has its object, method and thought" 
(Durkheim, 1964, pp-39-40)- 
13. "As more complex forms Of knowledge emerge and an economic 
surplus is built up, experts devote themselves full-time to 
the subjects of their expertise, which, with the development 
of conceptual machineries, may become increasingly removed 
from the pragmatic necessities of everyday life" (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1971, PP-134-135). 
14. This is not true of ideogrammic ; cultures. ' See note 7 above. 
15- See above, pp. 56 -5-1. 
16. The relationships between commonplaces and oral 'literature, 
are set out in Lord (1964, PP-30-98). 
17- See Lord (1964ý PP-141-197). 
18. This would seem to be a reasonable assertion to make, 
notwithstanding the lack of historical studies on literacy. 
Discussing this difficulty, R. S. Schofield (19682 p-312) 
has saidt "Despite its a7eLevance to many kinds of historical 
studies, literacy does not feature very often in historical 
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discussion, and jrhen it doe% appear a certain vagueness 
surrounds its meaning. This vagueness is in part forced 
upon historians by the facts of history. Historically the 
-situation has been complicated by the fact that although 
England has loný been neither d . -Tholly literate nor a 
from the sixteenth Wholly illiterate society, at least, 
century literacy was no longer confined to a caste educated 
in a foreign tongue, as is the case in several of the 
developing countries today, and the existence of a 
vernacular literature made the whole population potentially 
members of the literate culture merely for the price of 
learning to read". 
19. The ease with which the assumption of complete literacy 
with regard to the modern Ilestern world can be made is 
indicated with specific reference to England by R. S. 
Schofield: "It is perhaps too easy to an historian to 
assume that'England -since- the Middle Ages has been a 
literate societyý without pausing to enquire whether. there 
1, as. not also been a second culture., an oral cultureq 
substantially unknown to history, because history is 
derived from written records, and w: r! i-ýten records are 
produced by literate man". (Schofield, 1968, P-311). 
The exact extent of illiteracy in present day society is asý 
difficult to determine as that in times gone by. The most 
. recent statement is 
that to be found in the -recently 
published report of the Committee of Inquiry teaching 
of English in schools in England and Wales undeý? the 
chairmanship of Sir Alan Bullock: "Various fleure. r. i. have been 
suggested for the probable total of Eillitei-atý) people in 
England and 11-fales. We -referred earlier 
to the figure of a 
million as one estimate, but some people have put it at 
twice that number, or even higher. It is, of course, 
impossible to be certain. In 'The Trend of Reading 
Standards' 3.18 per cent of the 15 year olds-in England were 
found to be semi-literate by the definition given in the 
linistrY of Education pamphlet. This defined a semi- 1950 YL 
literate as a person whose reading age was 7.0 years or more 
but less than 9.0 on the Vatts-Vernon test. An illiterate 
was given as one with a reading age of less than 7.0- The 
percentage of 3.18 per cent represents nearly 15,000 young 
people on the basis of the knov-n number of 15 year olds in 
school in 1970" (Bullock, 1975, p. 12). 
21. Robert Roberts, for instancet discussing the outlook'of 
illiterates in prison, states that "many illiterates, 
although they may have travelled a good deal, seem to 
possess little idea of distance or direction" 
(1968ý P-53). 
Again, any developed sense of history appears to be laeking. 
We are told that "simple facts about history and archaeology 
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rouse only tepid interest " (1968, P-54), and 'that "major 
events of the past appear to have little signi-. cL 'icance. 
It seems more than likely that pastevents which are 
significant for these-prisoners are relived in-the present, 
an oDinion which is reinforced by anecdotes recounted in 
Robert's book. 
More speculativelyy it would be interesting to explore the 
relationship between illiteracy, semi-literacy or reduced----- 
literacy among young people and the kind of behaviour which 
has made headlines in recent years. The first example 
which springs to mind is the destructive behaviour at foot- 
ball matches, which seem to be. symptomatic of a group of 
-people -who --are unable -to--cope-i'iith-their - situation-in-- life--- 
in a literate or 'rational' fashioný and feel it necessary 
to act them out. Such 'tribal' behiviour is very 
3ýeminiscent of Ong's description of rioting Congolese armies 
(see aboveý p. 6-7). Also, it seems pertinent to draw on 
Miellers I -insight that - pop music -has ritualistic aspects 
Acknowledging that "the pop world is too complex to, permit 
. of definitive amswers". he continues: "that there are 
parallels with ... 'music of necessity' [music in pre- 
literate and 'traditional' societies] would seem, 
none the less, to be inescapable fact pop has ... 
reawakened our ritual sense" . 
(Mellers, 1971, PP-1453-1454)- 
The more notorious behaviour at some pop concerts would seem 
to be a manifestation of such Irea-wakening'. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that electronic media probably also 
have quite an influence both in bringing about such behaviour 
patterns (cf. McLuhan, 1964). and possibly in favouring 
illiteracy (cf. the discussion on the relationship between 
illiteracy and televi. -; Aon in Bullock, 1975, pp. 12-15)- 
a; ice in understandingg -from a music It is also of releva. al/ 
analytic viewpoint, the differing social realities 
articulated by 'classical' music and-certain types of-'pop? 
music in present day society. For as well as containing a 
minority of non-literatesý modern industrial society also 
contains within itself a substantial giýoup of people -who, 
although not illiterate) are certainly not. literate in quite 
the same sense as, for exampleý university intellectuals. 
Such people tend to relate to the -world much more in terms 
of the 'oral-aural' commonplaces or formulae of homespun (or 
Media-spun) wisdom. This wisdom is then given an overlay 
literate mediation. 
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APPENDIX III 
MEYER'S : -; XPLAINIITG DMIC 
- 411 - 
ExiDla-ining 11-usic is Leonard B. Meyer. 's latest- offering 
in his s'elf-admittedly personal quest for a Productive and 
rewarding analytical/critical method. "The author's purpose- 
in developing such a method is, in the words of the publicity 
blurby"Ito discover . the secret of the singular - to explain how 
the patterns peculiar to a composition are comprehended by, and 
affect-Ithe-l-istener'l. - --However -because -11idio syncrati c 
relationships can be explained only in terms of general 
princiýlesll, and "because such principles, as formulated in 
existing music theory, often are inadequate for Mr. Meyer's 
purpo, ses) he proposes new explanatory hypotheses from time to 
time". Consequently, the book is "theoretical as well as 
critical". 
Ex-olaining Music is divided into two parts which do not, 
however, correspond to the theoretical-critical distinction just 
mentioned. In the first, which is based on the Ernest Bloch 
lectures given at the University of California at Berkeley in 
1971, Meyer principally considers what are probably the two most 
important inter-related constituents of tonality: conformant 
relationships (that is, relationships in which "one 
identifiable, discrete musical event is related to another such 
event by similarity") and the hierarchic structures of which these 
relationships are such essential building blocks. In the second 
part, originally conceived as an independent book, the author 
considers an aspect of tonality clearly inherent in its hierarchic 
structure: namely2 the way in which the important 'events' of a 
piece carry implications which are variously realised throughout 
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its duration. Meyer elucidates this -pro. cess by reference to 
different types of melodic. structure. Finally, the two halve S 
of the book are dra-, m together by a brief but perceptive 
discussion o. f the first 21 bars of Beethoven's Les Adieux 
Piano Sonata. 
To put it in a nutshell, the criticism in this book is 
first-rate 2--but-the -theories -- -or-j--more-(ýorrectly-i--the 
theoretical implications - are rather more questionable. On the 
one hand, Meyer is so steeped in the tonal tradition from which 
the individual analytical examples are taken, that his personal 
observations and insights will undoubtedly prove extremely 
valuable for other people wishing to examine pieceo in that 
tradition. On the other hand, his inability to go-oeyond a 
certain restricted viewpoint has both unduly cirouni--cribed the 
effectiveness of his explorations, and permitted the continuation 
of unquestioned and possibly unfounded assumptions about the 
function of music. 
That his quest for a'critical method has been partially 
circumscribed is admitted by Meyer in a some-what roundabout iray. 
Right at the beginning of the book (p. ix) he states that: "As I 
intend the term, criticism seeks to explain hoir the structure and 
process of a particular composition are related to the component 
listener's comprehension of it. " The nature of this 
comprehension is expounded on towards the end of the book. (p. 242): 
"A competent listener perceives and responds to music with his 
total being ... Through such empathetic identificationy music 
is quite literally felt2 and it can be felt without the mediation 
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of extramusical'concepts or images. Such kinesthetic sensing 
of the ethos or character of a musical event is what the term 
ethetic refers t6. " It is precisely this ethetic relationship, 
which stands at the heart of musical apprehension that is 
problematic for T-leyer. - "Ethetic relationships. are unquestionably 
important'. [ýut] are hard to analyse with rigor and 
prepision [There--is- 4-abs en ce -of- an-- adequate- theory- of 
ethetic change and transformation" (pp. 245-246). ---Again: 
analysis must end here [because] the rigorous 
-wialysis of ethetic relationships is beyond my knowledge and 
skill" (p. 267 
"eyer's own hands. In The remedy, it would seem, is in M 
his opening chapter, -'On the Nature and Limits of Critical 
Analysis', the author draws a basic distinction between critical 
analysis and style analysis. Whereas critical analysis is 
concerned with the singular and idiosyncratic, s-ýyle analysis 
"is concerned with d iscovering and describing those attributes of 
a compo. sition which are. common to a group of works" (P-7). 
Theory2 moreover, Ilendeavours ... to discover the principles 
governing the formation of the typical procedures and schemata 
described in style analysis" (PP-7-8). To complete the 
relationship: ''Critical analysis uses the laws formulated by music 
theory ... in order to explain how and why the particular events 
within a specific composition are related to one another" 
It could be assumed from this last statement that the 
principles and laws of music -theory i-Tould be of crucial importance 
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to the development of a critical method. But apparently ihis 
. 
is not so, In being required to explain why the melodies of 
Palestrina, for example, display a certain-structural'feature, 
Meyer sufr ests (p. 8) one answer "with a general law of some 
sort". -This law might 
be "the Gestalt law of completeness, 
which asserts that the human mind, searching for stable shapes, 
-wants patterns to be as complete as possible". Býyoýýd thisy 
however, Meyer does not think it necessary to go. There. is 
thus no need to enquire why the mind searches for stable shapes: 
I'dioubt that the explanation of musical practice needs-. to 
be pushed back this far. As a rule we are, I think, satisfied 
with the least inclusive law which will account fo7r the events- 
described. " 
But satisfaction is surely the thing 1,1ey-or does not 
attain. In one breath he tells us that "the ri, ý1-, i: lrous analysis 
of ethetic relationships is beyond my knowledge and skill", and 
in another he strongly implies that the psychological processes 
which he clearly sees as important to those ethetic 
relationships - do, not themselves require that same 'rigorous 
analysis'. 
It is possible to trace this conundrum to the central 
difficulty in understanding the functioning of music. Unlike 
words and pictures, the significance of music cannot, as Meyer has 
already said, be approached through "the mediation of extra- 
musical concepts or images". If, indeed, music can be said to 
have Imeaning'2 then it is undoubtedly to be located within the 
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internal structuring of the barticular composition in question. 
And since music both originates and is efficacious within the 
minds of men, --it can be'assumed: a) that'there must be a 
conformance between musical structures and the structure of the 
human mind, and consequently b) that this structure can be 
ultimately revealed through the analysis of any musical idiom. 
---Both-th6se-assum-Dtions--are-implici-tý- -in-Illeyerl-8---thought-i---"Ih 
music,, psychological constants such as the principles of pattern 
organisation, the syntax of particular styles, and t -ypical 
schemata ... constitute the rules of the game ... For 
any given musical repertory, the 'rules' determine the kinds of 
pattern that can be employed in a composition" (P-14)-- It 
-P follows, then, that music can be satisfactorily explained in terms 
of itselfy and it is symptomatic that, in supporting his idea of 
the 'least inclusive law', Meyer incorporates 1,71ario Bunge's view 
that "every system and every event can be accounted for 
primarily in terms of its o-wn levels and adjoining levels". 
Since, - on the surface; 'there would seem to be nothing 
inherently fallacious in this line of argument, Meyer looks 
elsewhere for the cause of his difficulties with ethetic 
relationships. He apparently concludes that the cause is to be 
found in the impossibility of distinguishing between psychological 
constants and the conventions of a particular music idiom: "In 
theory, it is possible to diý, tinguish between archetypal patterns 
and schemata. The former would be those patterns which arise as 
the result of physiological and psychological constants presumed 
innate in human behaviour. The latter would be those norms which 
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were the result of learning. ýut the distinction breaks down 
in practice. For most traditionally established norms'have 
some basis in innate constants7 and, on the otherhand, patterns 
derived from innate constants become parts of tradition. " 
"This being the case", concludes. Meyerg "the terms will be uded 
raore or less interchangeably. " (p. 214). 
It- is---no-t-to-be- disputed--that-psychol-ogical-or-physi-o-l-ogical- 
constants are incorporated in all forms of musical expression. 
But since, on Meyer's o-wn admission, the constants are 
assimilated in, and become indistinguishable from ;. he norms of 
specific musical idioms, would it not be more fruitful to seek 
for the basis of ethetic relationships in these different and 
identifiable norms? Here, however, the difficulty of musical 
'meaning' again comes into Play, because if it is assumed that 
musical significance is to be located in the structuring of 
particular norms, then it is not a. very big step to further assume 
that this structuring is rooted in the extra-musical 'beliefs' and 
'ideas' of the appropriate culture. 
Although this difficulty cannot be discussed here, it is 
far from insoluble. Moreover, in situating different musical 
'. meanings' in the particular cultural milieu of their creation, 
the solution not only solves Meyer's problem - by providing an 
exDlicit basis for understanding ethetic relationships - but 
puts the significance of his book in a clear perspective. For 
the book does not texplain music'. It simply elucidates 
withy it should be reiterated, considerabl-e perception and 
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lucidity the fact but not the function of tonality. it 
accounts for the '-,. That' but not the Ii-Thyl. I-nd since it is 
the norms, rather than the culture-specific significance of 
tonality that Meyer has so clearly set ouý, absolutely no 
conclusions can be inferred about any other kind of music. 
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NOTE: 
1.14ýrio Bunge, 'The, -Mletaphysicsy Epistemology and 
Methodqýogy. of. Levelslj, in Whyte, Wilson and Wilson., (eds. ), 
Hie3ýarchic Structures-(New York: Elsevier, 1969), p. 24- 
I 
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. 4-PPEITDIX IV 
ADORNOIS PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN MUSSIC 
- 420 - 
Adorno's book consists principally of two essays, one 
on Schoenberg, written in 1941', and one on Stravinsky, written 
in 1948. After completi ng-the Stravinsky essay the author 
wrote an Introduction designed to relate the two halves of the 
book. 
Adorno's approach-to his subject-matter is founded in 
the- belief--that -the --dognitive -elements--of 'n-t I 
historical processes and tendencies articulated in and through 
the music. Modern music, as an incarnation of the ongoing______ 
contemporary social process, thus incorporates the diale ctic of 
the bourgeois domination that is, and the society without 
domination that might be. Not only is this dialectic present 
in the antinomies of individual works, but also in the different 
compositional attitudes of various composers. For Adorno, then, 
the works of Schoenberg and Stravinsky become mepresentative of 
two opposing mainstreams of. composition prevalent in the Western 
ýi, )rld during the first half of this century. In Adorno's 
opinion ... only in such extremes can the essence of music be 
defined5 they alone permit the perception of its content of 
truth ... It is for this reason and not in the illusion of 
grand personality that only these t1jo composers ... are to be 
discussed. For if the total product of new music were to 
be scrutinized in its entirety ... these same extremes would 
again be encountered". (PP-3-4). The one'stream - that of 
Stravinsky - represents reactionary and regressive tendencies, 
both in its attachment to 'archaic' sounds and forms, and in its 
avoidance of the inherent contradiction of its position. The 
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other, however, . in. its conscious attempt to relentlessly pursue 
its antimonies to their ultimate conclusioný represents the 
I forces of progress. 
Adorno's book isq by any standards, difficult. This 
difficulty lies not only in the-intensity and convolution of 
thought which brings together the apparently disparate realms 
----of sociology -and --music but--in-a-style whiich-i-sUnifor-mly 
characterised by tortuous. syn-tax and esoteric language. Although 
the translators have clearly struggled manfully with the original 
German, there can be little doubt that its complexity which 
tho translators acknowledge "makes translation seem impossible" 
has resulted in a prose strained far beyond the limits uf 
1ýeadable English. Indeedy for any reader industriouz cnough to 
send off a few contributions to. Pseud's Corner, this book could 
lit, urally be a good investment. 
Upon a first reading it might appear strange that a book 
. 1.4--h is so obviously polemic, and the implicit purpose of which 
mi6l'it. thus be deduced as rational persuasion, should indulge in 
such an obscure and mystifying style. Such a style, however, 
is not an entirely unnatural adjunct of Adorno's attitude towards 
the world and his material as that attitude is conveyed by the 
book. For despite Adorno's radical stance against the 
domination of industrial bourgeois society, he adopts an 
intellectual pose which is part and parcel of that same society. 
Domination in industrial society depends upon the centralised and 
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authoritarian co-ordination of its members' activities by a 
privileged elite, a process which in turn is ultimately 
dep 
. 
endent upon the centralised dissemination. 
. Of information. 
Given the high degree of the division of labour upon w hich 
industrial society is. *predic'ated.. the creation of such 
information falls to a large degree within the 
. Province of the 
acadpmj: p-. --- 
There always_exir? tsy thereforey the. -potential 
for_ 
these who create information in our society to have, albeit 
unconsciously, a vested interest in the Prevalent structure of 
thal society. Certified as experts by society at large, there 
can exist the tendency for some academics to give the impression 
that their pronouncements ýave an authoritative weight which is 
beyond question. 
This attitude is patently true of Adorno in the opening 
pages of his book. The author clearly considers himself to be 
in a position to determine the relative worth of all 20th century 
vo, t; ics and cultural attitudes: "Because. the monopolistic means of 
distributing music stood entirely at the disposal of artistic 
traih and 'compromised cultural values I and catered toý. the 66ci4lly 
determined predisposition of the listener, radical music was 
forced into complete isolation during the final stages of 
industrialism. For those composers who wanted to survive2 such 
isolation becomes a moral-social pretense for a false peace. 
This has given rise to a type of musical composition ... which 
has adjusted to mass culture by means of calculated feeble- 
mindedness" (p. 6). Although only Hindemith, Shostakovitch and 
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Britten are named, one gains the-distinct impression that,. 
outside the twelve note school and Stravinsky (who is dealt-with 
separately), there are few composers who do not fall under this 
rubric. Adorno is equally dogmatic with regard, to popular 
music": tI. .. the perceptive 
faculty has. been so dulled by the 
-omnipresent 
hit tune that the concentration necessary for 
responsibl e- -listening- has -become-impo ssi-ble 'ý---(p. 10). --- -By-taking 
such an attitude, Adorno eschews any phenomenological approach 
to his subject that -would acknowledge the different, but equally 
authentic and genuine world senses articulated. by different 
, fpes and 
schools of composition. Rather -than allo-wing various t., 
musical types to, as it were, present their own 'sociological' 
evidence, Adorno externally imposes upon them a view which is 
firmly rooted in his position as a member of an authoritarian 
and hierarchical academic tradition. 
The one essential criticisin that must thus be made against 
Adorno is that he does not examine the implications of his own 
position. Like-many sociologists, he fallsinto the trap of 
criticising an aspect of his society, in this case musiog in 
terms of the assumptional framework upon which that society is 
grounded. In this way the status 9ýLo not only of the society, 
but of the author's position in it, is paradoxically reinforced. 
Where Adorno could be elucidating both the implications of his 
oini position, and those of the music he is examining2 he is 
entrenching his academic role through mystification of his 
subject-matter -a process for which elaborate verbosity is 
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undeniably helpful. . And whereas 
he could be acknowledging his 
culture-specific orientation to the worldq and thereby opening 
up the possibility of realising the value of contradictory 
world senses, he implicitly assumes that people in general, and 
-himself in particular, can objectively stand outside both themý 
_selves 
and the society bein, &-examined. This assiLmption does 
nothing but- un de rl ine--th e way- in- which-Adorno-I so titlidok- is- 
unconsciously bound to industrial bourgeois society. 
In view of Adorno's ambivalent relationship to bourgeois 
society, it is not surprising to find that he thinks of the 
Schoenberg school as representing the forces of progress 
(another industrial concept), since twelve note technique 
attempts to negate tonality (which encodes and articulates the 
industrial world sense) by an extension of trends already 
inherent in tonality. The interdependent but functionally 
separ ated fundamentals of tonality become completely isolated 
(alienated) and reinte. grated- to form a musical language where 
no one fundamental dominates another. Expressionism, in over- 
emphasising the isolated subjectivity of bourgeois society, forms 
the transition between late tonality and twelve note technique: 
"If the drive towards well-integrated construction is to be 
called objectivity, then objectivity is not simply a counter- 
movement to Expressionism. It is the other side of the 
Expressionistic coin. Expressionistic music had interpreted so 
literally the principle of expression contained in traditionally 
Romantic music that it assumed the character of a case-study. In 
-II- 
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s. o doing, a sudden change -takes place. I-Tusicy as a case- 
study in expression. is no longer lex-pressive, (P-49). 
Schoenberg's music attains its-14uthenticityl-'through recognition 
of this change: "The siýbj bet of modern music, upon which the 
music itself piZesents a-ca-se-7study2 is'ýhe emancipated, isolated, 
concrete subject of the late bourgeois phase. 'This concrete 
subjectivity and the material which is radically and thoroughly 
formulated by it furnishes Schoenberg with the canon of 
aesthetic objectivism. The depth of his wwAk is thereby ' 
.- disce-rhible" -(P-57). -Parallel with Adornos- Iobje_ct_iv_jty', _ 
Schoenberg's twelve note music seeks to objectively contain it6 
own subjectivity and so stand outside itself. The 
pervasiveness of the Freudian outlook in both men's work thereby 
becomes apparent. 
In a similar manner the temporal aspects of tonality 
become over-extended in the twelve note technique. Tonality,, 
through the vertical cc ordination of horizontal lines 
originating with mensuration, essentially spatialises the 
temporal flow of those previously more independent lines. 
Twelve note technique, in its dislocation of centrally-dominated 
fundamentalsq and its retrograde rows (these rows, it can be 
arguedý serve to encode and articulate a reversible time - and 
reversible time is the logical extension and conclusion of a 
spatialised time) serves to totally extinguish any sense of 
temporal flow: "The continuum of subjective time-experience is 
no longer entrusted with the Power of collecting musical events, 
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functioning as a unityp and thereby imparting meaning to them 
.. * Once again music subdues 
time, but no longer by 
i; ýibstituting music in its perfection for time, but by nogating 
time through the inhibition of all musical mom ents by means of 
an omnipresent'construction" (p. 60). In objectively stepping 
outside its constitutive subjectivity twelve note music 
potentially destroys_the temporal-flow--of consciousness. 
If it is Adorno's natural affinity with the Schoenberg 
school'(he, studied with Berg) that makes his discussion of it so 
largely perceptive. -then it is his blind allegiance to the 
Schoeribergian aesthetic that renders his discussion of Stravinsky 
so suspect. Adorno's fundamental criticism of Stravinsky is 
that. --his jusicy in its denial of tonalityy nonetheless articulates 
the domination of bourgeois society. The integrity of the 
individual subjectivity is threatened: "In Stravinsky's case, 
stilijectivity assumes the character of sacrifice, bui - and this 
where he sneers at the tradition of humanistic art the music 
does no. t identify with the victim, but rather with the 
destructive element. Through the liquidation of the victim it 
rids itself of all intentio ns - that is, of its own 
subjectivity" (P-143). The new collectivity thus favours the 
industrial forces of suppression: '"Authenticity (in Stravinsky's 
music) is gained surreptitiously through the denial of the 
subjective pole. The collective standpoint is suddenly seized 
as though by attack; this results in the renunciation of 
comfortable conformity with individualistic society. But at the 
very point where this is achievedt a secondary) and, to be sure, 
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highly uncomfortable conformity results: the conformity of a 
blind and integral society -a society,, as it were, of*eunuchs 
and headless men" (P-159)- This, for Adorno, is the ess'ential 
contradiction inherent in Stravinsky's musicy a contradiction 
which im . pairs musical meaning. . Stravihsk-Y "is 
. dra-wn' in th'at 
direction where music - in its retarded stageg far behind-the 
fully 
- 
develope d. bou-rgeois-subject- -- functions-as -an eiement------------ 
lacking intentiont arousing only bodily animation instead of 
offeriiig meaning. He is so. attracted to that sphere in which 
meaning has become so ritualized, that it cannot be experienced 
as the specific meaning of the musical act" (P-140). 
It is from this position that Adorno criticises aspects 
of Stravinsky's musical lan6uage. Alack of thematic material 
compromises completeness of form: "His music is devoid of 
recollection and consequently lacking in any time continuum of 
permanence. Its course lies in reflexes ... This lack of 
thematic material, a lack of which actually excludes the breadth- 
of form, the continuity. of the process - indeed, it excludes 
'life' itself from the music" (p. 164). Again we are a. mazingly 
told that "Stravinsky's music remains aperipheral phenomenon 
because it avoids the dialectical confrontation with the 
musical progress of time" (p. 187); "such suspension of musical 
time consciousness corresponds to the total consciousness of a 
bourgeoisie which denies the time process itself, and 
finds its utopia in the withdrawal of time into space" (p. 190). 
Adorno is unable even to consider that Stravinsky is 
articulating in his music a world sense which he, the author, 
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has not comprehended. He is unable to conceive that, for 
Stravinsky, the conscious variati'on of explicitly stated themes 
(a process which, for the listenerg requires a long memory 
span, and so the ability to stand outside the temporal flow of 
his consciousness) and the consciously 'rational' ordering of 
temporality were unnecessary devices for what he sought to 
achieve. Only someone whose world sense was so firmly rooted 
in the spatialised time of post-Renaissance thought could so. 
paradoxically conceive of Stravinsky's music as 'timeless'- and 
so possessing a temporality that 'vanishes into space'. Adorno 
cannot sense that immersion in the temporal flow of 
consciousness requires a releasing of consciously controlled, 
time. 
Perhaps the statement which best sums up the narrowness 
of Adorno's outlook is the following: "The total energy exerted 
(in Stravinsky's music) is placed in the service of blind and 
aira-less obedience to blind rules; -this energy is devoted to 
Sisyphus-like tasks. The best of the infantile compositions 
exhibit the delirious and confining gesture of chasingm-onels-. 
tail. This Drovides the alienated effect of not being able to 
escape one's own grasp" (P-179). Alienation does not derive 
from a lack of self-distancing and objectivity, but rather from 
an excess of it. And because distancing and objectivity is, 
in both a personal and social sense, what Adorno subscribes to, 
he cannot help but feel alienated in the presence of a music 
which is concerned with the revelationary process of continual 
Becoming, rather than the over-extension of the incarnatory 
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process of static Being* 
Adorno's musical lethnocentricity' is reflected in his 
attitude towards the consciousnesses*bf pre-literate and 
industrial man. Pre-literate consciousness, in Adornots view, 
is simply a'proto--ýversion or undeveloped form of industrial 
consciousness: "The belief that the archaic simply lies at the 
- aesthetic disposal of the-ego - 
in order that the, ego might 
regenerate itself-through it - is superficial; it is nothing 
more ýhan a wish fantasy. The force. of the historical process 
which has crystallized the firm contours of the egoy has 
objectified itself in the individual, holding him back and 
separating him from the primeval world contained within him. 
Obvious archaic impulses cannot be reconciled with civilization" 
(p. 168). Again we are in the hands of our old 19th century 
friend - progress. 
The critical sociologi"cal and anthropological traditions 
of this century have dispensed with the notions of inherent social 
progress and the unquestioned superiory of modern Western mane 
Furthermore, in recent years, Marshall McLuhan and others have 
argued that the structuring of our consciousness and our society 
has during this century begun to change to something comparable. 
with that of the consciousnesses and societies of pre-literate 
men. Instead of living in a contradictory world of individual. 
purpose and social domination, of which the watchword with regard 
to both man and environment is that of conscious alienated 
control, we are entering a period where the immediacy of inter- 
personal relationships and the acceptance of rapid and frequently 
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unpredictable change is fast becoming the. order of the day. 
We are beginning to live more witýin ours'elves and our world, 
and this is a situation which is simply incompatible with the 
domination of bourgeois society. For the increased intensity 
of man's relationships both with himself and the events of the 
world has resulted in many sectors of society becoming too aware 
to remain ciphers 
-in 
a centralised 
_syqtem-. 
In many ways St-ravinskylsý music articulates this changed 
structifre, a structure which is so clearly anathema for Adorno. 
No-IL'ther sociologically'nor musically does Adorno escape'the 
bourgeois - all must be highly conscious, 'objective', 'rational' 
and painful effort. Anyone who does notTace 'the problemt in 
this fashion is reactionary and regressive. Adorno cannot 
conceive that to Stravinsky, who was brought up in a country 
whilch did not have a Renaissance2 his formulation of the problem 
of'late bourgeois society might have little significance or 
relevance. 
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APPENDIX V 
TRANSLATIONS OF TWO ARTICLES 
BY JACQUES CHAILLEY 
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A 
Chaillcyý J. "Essai analytique sur la formationý do lloctoechos, 
latin", in. 1-lestrup, J.., (ed. ), Essavs presentedto Egon Wellesz, 
Clarendon Press, 1960. 
Research on the source of the eight ecclesiastical modes 
hýLs -progressed cowsiderably-7: trf-jý-0-cent years. ' T. fe-owe-- 
particularly to Eric Iferner an insightful comparison [of the 
modes] with the traditions of numeric symbolism in which the 
source is located, and to the eminent dedicatee of this present 
study a demonstration of the correspondence between the Western 
repeptory and the Byzantine tradition from which the modes take 
their oldest names. Nevertheless, the source remains a mystery. 
We voist henceforth give up the overly simple explanation of 
Geve-ert's-schooll who found an implied parallel with the music 
of Ancient Greece. No other serious landmarýk occurs between 
this and the treatises of the eleventh century which put forward 
the same concept in an all but definitive form.. Perhaps7 in 
this matter as in others, it is necessary to beware confusing 
theory with practice, and taking as the cause something which is 
often only the result of subseqUent rationalisation. The present 
study proposes to-suspend theory, and to attempt, through simple 
musical analysis, an approximate reconstitution of the probable 
chain of events as they occured in a situation undoubtedly 
comprised of unknown singers charged with developing the repertory. 
ITe apologise for drawing on concepts more familiar to ethno- 
- 433 - 
musicology than to the traditional analysis of gregorian chantq 
but does not our best chance of solving old problems i-rith new 
insights rest in this collaboration of disciplines? 
The point of departure for this study has been the 
assertion of two facts to' which traditional theory has hardly 
paid any attention, and -which, although formerly ignored, are 
today almost unive one hand, rsally reco&ý'ised: _on -the --the - 
nentatonic nature of ' very old melody (cf. the work of P. 
Delalaiide or of Y. Hameline) which allows one to surmise a 
certain similarity of development with pentatonic melodies of 
an eth-nomusicological background; on the other, the hi---torical 
importance of chanting the psalms, and so'of the recit-: Lng note 
or tenor (cf. the work of P. Claire at Solesmes) which, however, 
plays no real role in the traditional classification, based as 
it nearly always is on the finals (these latter, however, being 
absent from numerous plainchant formulae). 
The initial criterion for a mode seems not to have been 
a classification according to the final2 but the manner in which 
sounds and melodic patterns group themselves around the 
reciting note. Universal practices in chanting tell us that 
the Dredominant tendancy was, on the one hand, for there to be 
ornamentation around the tenor and, on the other, for there to 
be a final melodic descent away from the tenor whichý in other 
circumstancesq could sometimes have been described as a true 
-oarlando. It would seem that things were much the same with 
gregorian. chantq the basic scale being pentatonic, without semi- 
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tones, in which the i4nf illed minor thirds are optionally 
divided by wealk and often moveable ]Liens whose exact placement 
is fixed by attraction. Later, the tenor became the dominant, 
that is to say, it lost its importance as a reciting. note and 
became little more than the axis of a melody, or2 more 
precisely, the upper limit of the Principal melodic nucleus 
kernel-], - --It is the rel at ion sh ip-be twe en--th e -upp er, -and----- 
lower limits of this same kernel - the lower limit becoming the 
final and then the 'tonic' -which gave rise to the actual. modes 
themselves. Given this perspective, it is. not necessary to 
say that the idea of the tetrachord is as much a fiction as that 
of the hexachord. The first is a scholarly left-over from 
Greek theory (for which it was a reality), the second a teaching 
device destined to undergo. solminisation (and thereby be 
,. mproved), and not at all a structural element. 
Other, additional characteristics emerged; in particular, 
ý11 
tho piens 'solidified', and became reinforced in their function 
through the attractions they underwent; the strongest of these 
attractions was that ofthe dominant, provided the pien was next 
t. o and in melodic conjunction with it - the next strongest that 
of the tonic; finally2 the attraction exercised on a weak ILien 
caused the tritone to be reduced to a perfect fourth, at least 
within the same area of attraction, there naturally being no 
reason for this phenomenon to occur between two different areas. 
The change from chant to free melody also saw an 
inversion of the dominant-tonic relationship into that of tonic- 
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dominant. But in both cases there none the less arises a 
principal melodic'area (zone] which -constitutes the kernel. 
of the mode. An occasional overstepping of this zone does not 
necessarily result in the creation of a new one, but if the 
overstepping persists ýnd develops, 'a new one -ixises which is 
independent of the first and in which att_ractions may be 
modified-and-pi lens-transformed. --Asý-long-as--the-range-of-the 
kernel is no more than a fourth, that is, the universal unit of 
homogeneous vocal'utterance, there is nothing to prevent new 
zones being created both above and below the existing one. 
There thus arises a central kernel flanked by two adjacent 
zones. Is it a coincidence that theory labelled these types as 
t pla-al Iy th 
. 
us indicating L. 'en glosant]" id est a latere? 
But if the kernel is snfifth or greater, vocal effort gives rise 
to a cl-, v. r. -Aeristically high zone which precludes any 
development. loi-Ter down, with the exception of a single - note which 
m-?. y *ý., i cnmpared to the sub-tonal note rproslambanomenoýjj Of 
the Greek system. It is to be noticed that this note only 
emerges as a whole tone beneath the tonic, and not. as a semi-tone 
or as the unfilled minor third of pentatonicism. There thus 
arises a kernel made up of a lower zone (+ the contingent sub- 
tonal) surmounted by a higher zone., with the dominant forming the 
I ink. This is the authentic mode, the following being the 
correct sense of -1, I)OiVTý9: 'that which surmounts, which, rises'. 
It is st3cange that etymology gives a totally different and I 
difficult to justify definition (authentic = master, plagal 
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servant, as partners E"asso'cie""I Such definitions are. 
frequent when lost initial meanings are-followed by an 
artificial search for explanations. 
Having made these generalisations, we may now examine 
the different possibilities to emerge from -the above conditions 
one by one. In general terms the result of our analysis will 
be nothing other than the eight ecclesiastical--modes, -. 
includ-ing 
some reputedly eccentric shapes for which theory has had great 
difficulty in accounting, but whose existence cannot be denied. 
ITe must first of all have reference to the basic 
pentatonic scale, enumerated by fifths according to the principle 
we have outlined elsewhere Ci. e., the cycle of fifths] 
I. FGACDF=TT3T3 
II. CDFGAC=T3TT3 
III. CDP0 -- T3T3T 
IV. DFGACD=3TT3T 
-V. 
ACDFGA3T3TT 
The tvTo notes B and E are piens, wealk optional notes whose 
absence does not prevent conjunct melody. Their varied 
placement depends not on the cycle of fifths fundamental to the 
structural notes. above, but on the circumstances of their usage 
as dictated through attraction. Thus arises the well-known 
problem of B flat. But has this problem ever been correctly 
formulated? Here is why we d6ubt so-. 
When gregorian chant came into being there was neither 
appropriate notation nor appropriate solfege. The only point of 
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reference was intervallic overall shape] It is 
hence impossible to see how the view could be established that 
'only B was able to be flattened', since such a phraýe was 
meaningless before the ninth century. But when, towards this 
time, --the degrees of the solfege scale came into being, they at 
first borrowed a tetrachordal terminology from ancient Greece. 
Did- 
-this-usage--stemý 
from. a preserved- scholarly-tradition, -or------ 
from a humanistic study of ancient authors, particularly 
Cassiodorus, but above all Boethius? We would opt for the 
second possibility. Be that as it may, -these last two Roman 
survivors. of ancient Greek music were improperly adopted as 
theorists for the sole music then existingg ecclesiastical music, 
so that when a. lphabetic Roman notation came into being, it was 
assigned a theory belonging to the ancient pre-established scale 
which approximated it the most, that of the Greek diatonic 
System. In this system there was only room for one moveable 
note, B, brought about by the building up of. conjunct tetrachords 
from disjunct ones. It is probably for this sole reason that. 
theoryq then solfýýge and finally notation, never all. owed for 
any other possible alteration in the gregorian frame-work than 
that of B to B flat. By contrasty the pentatonic structure 
calls for two: B and E (or even more in certain complex cases). 
Thus - and here, of necessity2 one is guessing there arose the 
transpositions which have avoided theoretical difficulties, but 
by which we must be careful not to be influenced. 
In effect2 and this cannot be repeated too much, the 
medieval concept until about the ninth century was a purely 
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intervallic one. - The names of notes were unknol. m,. and we 
should only use them to help understanding: it is always 
necessary in constructing a theory to follow a logical course. 
This said, and although the real point of departure should be 
the dominant-rather than the tonic, it is the tonic whichý 
through convenience, we will set out as above by fifths in 
e quating-A t--with- -the --lo wes t-extremi ty-of-the-kernelv- This-- 
procedure also gives us the position of the dominant and so 
measures up to. the crux of the problem. For example-, to 
discover which system contains a kernel made up of two whole 
tones, written T T, we look for the pentatonic system which 
begins T Tý and find the pentatonic shape 11 also called 
pentatonic F (F is presumed to be the tonic) - of which the 
dominant is consequently F+TT=A. 
In this system2 and although the real point of departure 
should be the dominant, the habit of counting upwards causes us 
to posit the first note as the tonic for the sake of simplicity. 
This procedure does not involve any notable distortion, s ince it 
defines the dominant just as clearly.. It follows -that this 
notation will eventually lead to a symmetrical development of 
the scale going doimwards (for example, one can recognise in 
the TT3T3, shape of our pentatonic F another potential shape 
TT3T3 which must, of course, be approached backwards, since 
the procedtire adopted here requires the enlargement of the 
melodic kernel). Similarly, in going upwards, the scale must 
continue for as long as necessary by repetition. 
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We will hence be looking at all the hypothetical 
intervals possible between th6 tonic T and a dominant D, 
studying the shape of-the kernel, the position and the role of 
the moveable plensy and then the adjacent melodic z. ones. What 
will emerge will be the formation_of the eight 
ecclesiastical modes--. 
--kEfdTEt-bF A SEMI-TONE- This is excluded by definition3, since 
the interval is unknown in the scale. 
KEIMEL-OR'A WHOLE TONE. - Theoretically possible (shapes 1,112-- 
III). Its presence in the repertory is attested-to by 
several archaic pieces forwhich theory has never been able to 
account (Sanctus and Agnus of mass XVIII, for example). its 
rudimentary form permits little development, and it seems to 
have rapidly disappeared. It is with the kernel of a minor 
third that a definite modality appears. 
KERNEL. OF A KINOR THIRD. This third is in principle unfilled 
and can be divided by. a pien + II 
Ei. pol the pien is the second 
noto'going upwýqrds from the tonic] It corresponds to the two 
shapes IV (D) and V (A): 
(a) The Kernel. Tvro Possible internal shapes, TS or ST 
according to the position of the Dien, + II. By reason of. its 
proximity to the dominant, the attraction of the latter is the 
strongest, and so the natural shape largely predominates, without U 
however, excluding an occasional flattening under the attraction 
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of the lower note (see the Gradual 'Haec dies'). 
(b) UJppeu zone. The piens are +VI in shape 6r +V in 
sha-ue A. +V only remains, a natural because of the thre'at-of 
a tritone being formed with the tonic: in this case it coincides 
'With +V of the other shape. For its Part, +VI can-only '6e 
flattened, for, placed at the extremity of the scale, it_is 
only -pulled downwards: -i-t-thus-co 
incides- with - +VI-- off, the other--- 
scale. As in the case of the kernel, the two scale shapes 
coincide. 
(c) Lower zonýj. The piens are -III in shape E Ci. e., 
the pien is the third note going down from the tonic]: and -IV 
in shape A (the others are too far removed to be of 
consequence). Turned upwards towards the kernel -III is 
normally a natural and so doeE#'t coincide with -III (F) of 
shape A7 unless, in being extended exceptionally*far down-vrardsl. 
it is subject to a reverse attraction and becomes unexpectedly 
flattened (see the response 'Collegerunt'). In fact, this 
degree of the scale seems particularly weak-, and it is to be 
noticed that it is nearly aalways absent. Consequently, its 
divergence from shape A doesn't really hinder the unification of 
the two shapes. For its--part, -IV coincides in both cases: it 
is a natural in shape A for the same reason that -III was in the 
other shape. 
(d) Modal structure. The two scale shapes are fused into 
one model whose kernel is a minor third. This third may be 
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unfilled or may be divided by a moveable Dien (S T or T S) -with 
a larg e predominance of the shape T S. ' In the upper zone the 
shape beýcomes TTSTT, in the lower (in descending order) 
TTSTT The weak and moveable degrees of -the scale shapes 
are -III, +II and +VI. in shape IV 
(D), with -III usually being 
omitted, and -IV, +II and +V in shape V 
(A). The two shapesý 
-------are-s ometimes added-to-one-another--in-the--same-piece-(-sed-the 
Offertory 'Tollite portast). 
(e) Notation. Depending on the position of the piens 
there are two possible methods of notation: in D or in A. Both 
methods are used, without there being any need to consider one 
as the Itranspositiont of the other. 
The mode we have been considering is the second mode or 
llýrotus plagal" Ca.. e., the HypodoTian] . 
VERNEL OF A MAJOR THIRD. A single shape is possible for the 
kerne12 T T, without an interior jaLen. It corresponds only to 
the pentatonic shap .eI (F)-. 
(a) The kernel. Defined above, it poses no problems. 
(b) Upper zone. The plens ar e +IV and +VII, but this 
latter is rarely in evidence. Located at the extremity of the 
scale, it would tend to be flattened: this situation hardly 
occurs,, and this is fortunate, for it would only match 
subsequent theory with difficulty. +IV is normally moveable 
but, because it usually looks back to the kernel below, there is 
a tendency for flattening to occur. 
(c) Lower zone. The piens are -II, which is normally a 
natural becalise of its tendency to look up towards the kernel, 
lk 
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Yet is also frequently omitted; and -Vj which is rarely-in 
evidence (looking upwards, its tendency would be to bea 
natural). 
(d) Modal structure. Uniform kernel of T T; in the 
upper zone the shape is usually STT, but with a theoretical 
possibility of TST or 3 T; in the Tower zone (in descending 
order) - the- shape--is--3-T or-S- -T-T-- exceptiond 
structure is of pentatonic shape I. 
(e) Notation. In P or in C. 
This is the sixth mode or "tritus- plagal" [i. e., the 
Hypolydian] . 
n'RNEL OF A FOURTH. The fourth may take the form T3 or 3 T. 
Two different modes are thus derived: 
(A) The fourth T 3. This corresponds to two pentatonic 
-,, iapes, II (C), that is to say T3 TT3, and III (G), that is 
to say T3T3T: 
(a) The kernel. The moveable pien is +IIIý with an 
overall tendency to be a natural because of its immediate 
proximity to the dominant above. However, a flattening is 
possible if the pien looks back towards the tonic, and this tonic 
allows the development of a strong -II which requires the 
avoidance of the tritone; this may happen with the. pentatonic 
shape G of which -II is a fixed degree. 
yj2per zone, The 2iens are +VI or +VII according to 
the pentatonic shape. With the pentatonic shape G, +VI is the 
-oien E. Given its close proximitY to B +III, which remains a 
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natural if it is . in any sort of relation with the E (since it 
willbe drawn upwards)ý there is little chance of the E being 
flattened, since-that would lead to the creation'of . 
[another] 
tritone. As a natural, it corresponds to the A +VI of the 
pentatonic shape C. In this latter shape, it-is +VII which is 
the pien (B). -- Situated extremely high in the shape, it has 
-Tittle-chance-of-turning-any-vrhere-but-to-the-middlei--and-hence- 
tends to be flattened, thus corresponding to the F +VIT of the 
other shape. The two scale shapes: coincide. 
(0) Lower zone. The piens are -II or -III according to 
the pentatonic shape. -II is B in the pentAtonic shape C. 
Situated immediately beneath the tonic, it tends to become a 
natural, but this results in the formation of a tritone with the 
dominant, and this outweighs the influence of the topic. It is 
thus flattened, and corresponds to the F -II of the other shape 
(spe, for example, the Alleluja 'Virga Jesse'). The Eý-: -III of 
the pentatonic shape G is without contradiction drawn towards 
the kernel and so becomes a naturalý corresponding tothe A -III 
of the pentatonic shape C. Once again, the two scale shapes 
coincide. 
(d) Modal structure. This follows from the preceding 
remarks: a kernel of a fourth T3 with +III moveable, thus giving 
rise to either TST or. T T S; in the upper zone2 TTST; in the 
lower (in descending 'order) TSTT. The structure can be 
thought of as the pentatonic shape III with weak. degrees *III & VII 
or thQ-shape II. with weak degrees +III & VIII -II & VI. 
(e) Notation. Since +III is the only degree which is 
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truly moveable, one would expect. to find notation in G 
entirely satisfactory. 
This is the eighth mOcle '072 ll. tetrardus plagal" 
ýi'a'e. 
, the 
Hypomixolydian] 
(B) - The'fourth 3 T. T4is corresponds to'two pentatonic' 
shapes, IV (D), that is to say 3TT3T, and V*(A)) that is to 
s ay 3ý T 3. T T. 
(a) The kernel. The pien is +IIy and is too far removed 
from the dominant to come under its influence. It thus becomes 
subject to the influence of the tonic, next to which it is 
situated, and so becomes flattened, but only provided that it 
does not lead to the creation of a tritone with any other 
important note which influences it. 
From this point of view the situation is different with 
regard to the two peritatonic shapes. In the case of the 
. "., ntatonic shape D, the tonic which flattens the +I1 also 
influences the 2Leh -III, which, drawn back towards the kernel, 
tends to become a natural and in turn causes. the +II to become a 
natural in order to avoid ýinother] tritone: besides, a 
flattened +II would induce a tritone with +V, which is here a 
fixed note. This gives rise to amaturalised shape2 TST. 
Vith'Ahe pentatonic shape A2 the situation is exactly the reverse. I 
The exterior pien which instigates the rejection of the tritone 
is +V. Situated immediately above the dominant, it is forced 
to become flat, and thereby causes +II to become flat. Going 
downwards, it is -III which gives rise to a tritone: unlike in 
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the previous pentatonic shape -III is pot a moved . 
ble_p2. en,. but. 
a. fixed note -which causes +II to become flat. This second 
kernel thus tends to adopt a shape, ST Tj which is different 
from that of the pentatonic shape D. 
By contrast -výith the shapes already studied7 the kernel. 
of the fourth 3T thus has for a pien notý-a moveable note which 
varies-at-the---di ctation-of-at tract ions -but - -a-degrce-whi-ch-has-a 
different Position according to whether it is located in the 
-pentatOnic shape D or A: natural in the first case,, flat in the 
second. 
(b) Upper zone. The piens are +V or +VI, -ýV occuring 
in the pentatonic scale V (A)', which usually involves the 
flattening of +II and +V, with the latter nevertheless remaining 
moveable; +VI occurs in the pentatonic shape IV (D) which 
usually involves a natural +II and +VI, the latter nevertheless 
remainG moveable. 
(c) Lower zone. The same situation. With the 
pentatonic shape IV (D)t the jjLen -III becomes a natural in the 
same way as +II; with the shape V (A), the Dien -IV is by 
contrast moveable: its attraction towards the kernel tends to 
make it a natural, the danger of forming a tritone with +II 
tending to make it a flat. 
(d) Modal structure. Despite the original similarity of 
the kernels, the two shapes have too many differences to enable 
them to be reconciled. The pentatonic shape D gives rise to a 
kernel TST extended upwards by the shape TTST, and downwards 
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(in descending order) by the shape TST. T, 'with weak degrees 
-III., +III +VI. The Pentatonic shape'. A giyes rise to a kernel 
STT extended upwards by the shape STT, and doi-mu'ards (in 
descending order) by the shape T-T ST or. 'T TTS, with weak 
degrees -IV, +JI, +V.. 
Furthermore., in the shape_with'the flattened +II, a 
conflict often appeia eýýTee; the pentatonic s ructuie-which 
gives this +II the role of a weak plen, and the considerable 
reinfdrcement that the pien receives from the cadential movement 
associated with its semi-tonal proximity to the final. This 
conflict often results in artifices of style. One of the most 
frequent of these consists of the avoidance2 up until the 
cadential close2 not, as one might think, of the Ei: en +II itself2 
but of the tonic to which it is leading. Thus arise the long 
insistances on the minor third -II/+II which, until the 
t7adential close, actually create the impression of +, he second 
mode 
[1ýypodorian] (See 
. 
the 
(e) Notation. A notation which conforms to etymology is 
seldom possible. because of the imDortance of the E flat. That 
is why one habitually notices notation in A or E; 1, ut It is 
necessary t6 understand that in either of these cases one is not 
dealing with the etymological orthography: even the notation 
in A, with B natural, is often a transposition of the pentatonic 
shape D, while notation in E is usually a transposition of the 
pentatonic shape A (with B flat). 
The explanation that we have put forward doesy we believe, 
dispel a number of the anomalies that result from a traditional 
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theory. which always seems to be at a. loss when faced i-Tith the 
mode under discussion. Because, with its chdracteristid S. T T 
kernel, the mode is considered by traditional theory to be in-E, 
such theory can only include the shape TST with difficulty. 
This'shape is considered to be a deviant form in Al. and-theory 
is hard put to explain how antiphonals in one shape correspond 
--so-easily--w-i 
. th- intoning-in-the--other---Despi-te-their--4------------ 
I 
considerable differences, the two shapes in fact originate from 
the same kernel, and this is why they remain identified-with the 
same mode. - the fourth or I'deuterus plagal" 
[I. e., the 
Hypophrygian] . 
KERNEL OF A FIFTH. For reasons set out in the introduction we 
now leave behind the plagal structures (kernel a central zone 
BAniked by', two adjacent zones) - to come to grips with the 
auU11entic (kernel a lower zone surmounted by a higher). 
Bencath this lower zone there only remains a weak sub-tonal note. 
The fifth can give. rise to three shapes depending on 
whether the minor third is at the bottom, the qentre or the top: 
3'. 'T T, T3TTT3 
(A) The fifth 3TT. This co rresponds to the pentatonic 
shape IV (D) 3TT3T. 
(a) The kernel. The pien +II is subject to two 
contradictory but unequal forces. The lesser force is the 
attraction of the adjacent tonic, which tends to flatten it. The 
greater force is -provided by the d-anf,, er of forming a tritone with 
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the dominant, which tends to make 
.: 
Lt a natilral. In these 
conditions -&'. -, he Pien becomes a moveable note2 flattened or not 
accordiný to -, iýhether it'is drawn downwards or upwards; in fact 
the two tendencies are clearly differentiated and have led to 
two distinct modes. Howeverq the one which contains the flat 
was not for long able to resist the aversion to the tritone and 
soon-became-transformed thus leav-ing-i-t-1-i-ttle- more-thayr-an---- 
archaic remnant. 
(b) The suh-tonal note. Normal: a tone under the tonic. 
(C) 'Upperzone. This is more developed than with the 
plagal. -structures. It is easily able to take in +VII, and'is 
pretty nearly able to become autonomous. This is why the pien. 
+VIj which in a plagal structure is almost always drawn downwards, 
and hence flattened because of its -proximity to the dominant, 
h,: ý, a7e remains moveable: a flat or a natural according to whether 
it tends downwards or upwards. The tritone which is formed with 
+III also doubtless plays a role, but is not so much a sole 
determining factor. 
(d) Modal structure. That of the pentatonic shape IV. 
The kernel of 3TT becomes TSTT (and even STTT, but in this 
case one is confronted with a new mode which will be studied in 
terms of the kernel of a sixth which has taken its place). The 
sub-tonal note is a whole tone. The upper zone comprises 3T or 
STT or T ST. The weak degrees are -II (the sub-tonal note), 
+II and +VI piens). 
(e) Notation. In D if +II is,, a natural, but in E it is 
a flat. 
With a natural +II, the mode is the first or "protus 
authente" 
[i-e. 
9 the Dorian] With aflattened, +II we I are 
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confronted with an archaic form of the third mod6 
[the Phrygian] 
hotated'in E with a dominant of B natural, which has a strong 
tendency to 'slide' to C to give-a kernel of a ininor sixth. 
(B) The fifth T3T.. This corresponds to two 
pentatonic sha-j)es, -II (C) T. 3 TT3, and III (G) T IT 3 T. 
(a) The'kernel. The 2ýen +III is an equal distance'from 
the tonic and the dominant; since the attraction of the latter 
is stronger, the overall tendency would be for ýhe pien to 
become-a natural; this tendency is reinforced by the danger of 
nreating a tritone with +V. 11 a fixed note in the pentatuonic 
shape C, and fixed by analogy in the pentatonic shape GI-as we 
shall see. The flattened form is thus-rejected in fRvour of the 
shape TTST. 
(b) The sub-tonal note. Normal: a whole tone under the 
!, )rlic in the pentatonic shape G. With the pentatonic shape C, 
it becomes a moveable pien with., a tendency towards the naturalg 
but ire have already seen that the sub-tonal note can only be a 
whole tone. The natural form is thus rejected and the two 
shapes remain identical. 
(C) Upper zone. The pien is +VI with the shape G, +VII 
with the shape C. In either case a +VI which is flat is not 
capable of being notated with a +III which is natural. Is it 
for this reason that this combination has never been 
encountered, or because the notation itself is inadequate? Be 
that as it may, the +VI which would normally be moveable is in 
fact always a natural. It hence corresponde.. -with the +VI of 
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the pentatonic shape C. Similarlyl. the flattened +VII of shape 
C corresponds with the fixed +VII of the pentatonic shape G. 
It thus seems that the'two types are founded on one shape only, 
the strong notes of one reinforcing the weak notes of the other. 
(d) Modal Structure. The kernel is T3 T-or TTST 
with a sub-tonal note. The upper zone has the shape TST. 
_-The --weak- no to s --o ther-than-- 
the - sub-tonal--II-i- -are -+IIL-andT-- 
according to the situation2 +VI or +VII. Naturally, -II will 
cease ýo be weýk if, by an exceptional doimwards extension of the 
------ - -------- - 
scale, it becomes a proper pentatonic note (see the Gradual. 
'Jacta cogitatum'). 
(e) Notation. Usually in G, exceptionally in C. 
This is the seventh mode or "tetrardus authente" Ci_e. ý the 
Idixolydian] 
(C) The fifth TT3. -This corresponds to the pentatonic 
shape I (F) TT3T 3o. 
(a) The kernel. --- The pien +IV vacillates between the 
attraction of the adjacent dominant which tends to make it a 
natural, and the danger of forming a tritone with the tonic, 
which tends to make it flat. It is thus moveable according to 
whether it is drawn upwards towards the zone of attraction of +V 
or downwards towards that of I. 
(b) The sub-tonal note. It would not here be a tone, 
but a semi-tone or a minor third. It did not develop. 
(c) Upperzone. The pien is +VII, which is attracted 
upwards towards +VIII rather than doimwards; the natural form, 
moreovery is favoured by notation2 which was unable to reconcile 
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the flattened form with the ability Of +IV to become flat 
the required notation was in P (and B flat can't be notated). 
(d) . ilodal'strue'ture- 'The pentatOnic qualitY is very 
obvious the pentatonic shape I having no rival. The kernea 
is ok the shape TT3 . ith an optional and moveable +IV. The 
shape may thus become TTST or TTTS; frequent 6missions of 
I +II-- axe -noti-ce able-, - -al though- etymo I o-gical ly-thts-jýs-a-s t-r&jf, -gý 
degree. There is insu&icient space to study this phenomenon 
here. There is no sub-tonal note. The ulýPer zone takes the 
form T3 or TTS, and is thus structured like a genuine 
tetrachozd; +Vjj is reinforced to the point of creating a real 
pentatonic unit of 3TT between +III and JIVII 
(see the Gradual 
Sion', on the word 'cong-regatel). 
(e) Notation. Generally in P, exceptionally in C. 
This is the fifth mode or "tritus authentell E3-e-I the - 
,, Ydi, m] with occasional references 
to the seventh mode [the 
I-ydian] transposed in C (see the Antiphonal 'Me suscepit'). 
YLERNEL OF. A MINOR SIXTH. This is the greatest diýtance at. which 
the tonic-dominant relationship can occur. . 
It only arises in a 
single case, through the extension of the kernel of a fifth in 
connection with the third mode 
[the Phrygian] This is brought_ 
- the tritone -which results betiTeen the dominant, about because of 
the strongest note of the model and +III which2 despite its 
, becomes reinforced 
through its importance to the origin as a jLifn 
cadence. 
It follows from this that the traditional explanation 
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according to which the dominant moved from B to C because B 
cannot become a dominant can only be an explanation (? ) after 
the event. Couldn't it be that this explanation implies a 
lfsolfýgell.: reasoning based on a non-existent notation system? 
Although notated in E because of the inadequacies of 
solfege, the third mode is not, as we have se . en, a mode in El 
but - the -flat ten e cl-+II---shdpe -of --jj(j; jjc e ffý 
3TTT structure, with the first minor third divided S T. 
The same pentatonic shape with the division TS would have------ 
given the first mode... The stridency of the trione +II/+V 
(+V being the dominant) led to the displacement of this dominant 
towards +VIj so that the pentatonic shape D in its turn 'slid' 
towards the pentatonic shape V (A) 3T3TT. The orthography 
(in E) E-G-A-C-D-E is in reality a transposi 
. 
tion of A-C-D-F-G-A. 9 
with a stable B flat. in the same way that, up until its own 
cadence, the Hypophrygian mode makes frequent references to the 
Hypodorian, so the Phrygian achieves its own kind of 
juxtaposition Trith the Doriany even though this juxtapositýon. is 
founded on different degrees (see the Introit 'Sancti tuil, which 
begins in the pentatonic shape IV on D and then moves into the 
pentatonic shape V of the third. mode, on E). In this situation, 
there can be no question of flattening the neir pien +V (the old 
dominant) I only of leaving it out if the occasion presents 
itself. Such, in its definitive form, is the third mode, 
I Ideuterus authentel I Li. e., the Phrygian] 
Conclusion. It can be seen that, regardless of theory, ýhe 
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eight ecclesiastical modes-were the result of the creation - 
below the tenor of the chants-, and in terms of a pentatonic 
scale ultimately completed with"moveable Piens of a melodic 
zone fixed at one extremity by this tenor or dominant, and at 
týe other by a final or tonic. The modes exhaust all the 
combinations derived-from this hypothesis, from the minor third 
to- the -f if tif-bius 'orfe -addE-rioH--hiý; t-d-r: i: d--alYy- acco-urft-e-d- for-bk-- 
the minor sixth This hypothesis is, 
-however, 
quite different 
from the view presented by traditional thleory. Such theory 
presents the eight modes in-terms of a succession of pre- 
established finals forming a tetrachord D-E-F-G, with each note 
givýng rise to two modes: 1 a principal or authentic mode 
is 
characterised by the division of the octave of the mode into a 
fifth +a fourth; a secondary or plagal mode by the division of 
this same octave into a fourth +a fifth. Everything about 
this description is wrong. 
dominants or moveable notes. 
It doesn't takle into account 
The explanation of the terms 
authentic and plagal is a misinterpretation of another legitimate 
meaning which we referred to above. The concept of the octave 
of a mode and its division is simply a misunderstanding whose 
origin is l6cated in the middle of the ninth. century. It isl 
moreover, a concept with absolutely no musical application to 
the repertory. In conclusion, the finals only form a 
justifiable tetrachord through a transposition whose sole 
vindication is the incorrect transfer of the ancient Greek 
tetrachordal (diatonic) scale -a transfer which it seems improbable 
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-was noticedbofore the ninth century.. 
If the eight modes were formed-in the absence of theory 
by the'slow and unconscious work of unknown singers preoccupied 
with establishing the repertory, must it be concluded that this 
theory was constructed (badly at that) by classical scholars 
more aware of Boethius's diagrams and Ogdoad's symbols than of 
the--musical-structures-which-they-were-expoundingi-and-must-i-b----- 
be deduced from this that theory could hardly have taken root 
-before the ninth century? I-Te would not pretend to be able to 
confirm this view; but we are not far from. thinking it. As 
for determining, in this development, what derived from the 
Romans and what from the Byzantines, this is the sort of 
question we cannot allow ourselves to become engaged on here. 
111he most we can wish for is that Egon I-Tellesz, after so much 
prest-,,, -eous work on related subjects, will one day present us 
with -the definitive solutio-q. - 
B 
Chailley) J. "Une nouvelle methode d'approche pour l1analyse 
modale du chant gregorien", in Becker, H., and Gerlach, R. (eds. ), 
Speculum Musicae Artis, Ifilheim Fink, 1970- 
Having rejected the ideal dear to Gevaertand his schoolq 
that the eight modes of plainchant were nothing other than the 
ancient Greek modes handed down under other names as part of an 
uninterrupted tradition (with or without the intervention of 
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Byzantine chant)$ one is increasingly forced to consider the 
ecclesiastical repertory as an autonomous'creation5 'influenced 
more by the chanting'p-ractices of the -people of the Middle East 
where the church took root, than by theoretical concerns which 
became evident very much later and which., at least*in the early 
stages, were without any real influence. 
How did- this-reper-tory-come---into-being9ý---ý-n-a- study- 
dedicated to an authority on Byzantine music, we put foriýard a- -- 
hypothesis which -we would like to develop here, happy to be able 
to dedicate this neir work to one of the musicologists who in 
our own time has contributed much to an understanding of the 
music of the high Middle Ages. 
What is a gregorian mode? In the light of the following 
, qrtiolel-we are able%to reply with the utmost conciseness: it is 
- ý', --mulary pattern originating from the ornamentation of a 
shape which links a tonic note with a recitation note or . 4-- ---. 
teno-tý (latterly called dominant), in a fixed Dentatonic scale.. 
This pentatonic scale is freel completed with weak notes which 
are more or less moveable. 
Such was the hypothesis that we put forward in 1966. Vie 
would now like to specify its scope and consequences, 
1. The Pentatonic Kernel of the Modes. 
In the aforementioned article we analysed the different 
possibilities that could arise with kernels of an ambitus 
ranging from a major second to a minor sixth, and shoiied that 
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once placed within a pentatonic scale, these kernels 
corresponded ek-actly to. the different forms of the eight 
ecclesiastical modes. Without beginning the'demonstration 
anew, we will lay out a table which shows the schematic typology 
of. these eight modes* 
The basic pentatonic scale will be written in the usual 
alphabetiq--notation3,. --without E-or-B: - 
**. ACDFGACDF etc. 
The octave of C as set out in this table (C DFGA C) 
will be called the pentatonic form C the octave of D 
(D FGAC D) that of D, and so on. The following intervals 
ari. se: 
minor second: 
major second: 
minor third,.: 
major third 
fourth 
f 'th iL 
minor sixth 
G Dg F Gy GA 
Tý 
yDF 9A 
ED 
Ignoring the major second, which can be recognized in 
archaic forms (Pater etc. ) but which subsequent repertory in 
actual fact abandoned, one notices that, in moving from the 
tonic to the tenor and-back again, the schematic melody-types 
can adopt eight different forms only (it being clearly 
understood that regardless of solffege concepts there is no 
differencey for example2 between AC and D F, both intervals 
being the same): we will set out these types below, noting the 
tonic and dominant in capitals2 and the pentatonic notes which 
pass between them in small letters. Since 
[in some cases] 
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there is more than one'p. ossibili-ty, we will give first the 
'spelling' which approaches subsequent theory most closely.; 
These eight shapes form the basis of the"eight gregorian 
modes: - 
PLAGAL 
minor third., forms A CI*D F D P D =A C-A . . . .. ... mode 2 
major third, form FA F g A gF . mode 6 
fourth, forms A- D and D G: D f G fD A cD c A. ... hode 4 
-forms-G-C-and 
C F: 
_G_ _a_ 
C 
-a 
G =__C -. --. -mode 
8 
AUTHMIC 
fifthq Toxms CGGD: G a c Dc aG =C d fG fdC mode 7 - form DA: D f g Ag fD .. . .. ... mde 1 form FC F g a Ca gF .. . . mode 5 
Lainor sixthý form AF A 0 d Pd cA mode 3 
2. Authentic and Plagal. 
"fe knbw that for*a singer with an ordinary voice (and 
the trained voice of the eighteenth century not having'come into 
existence, our gregorian chanters must have sung with an. ordinaxy 
voice) an ascending movement which goes beyond a fourth can only 
be kept'within the same compass withdifficulty (Paul Collaer 
has-studied this phenomenon with regard to ethnomusicology in the 
fourth volume of Colloques de If&, -imont, 1964)- 
Beginning with the fifth, the singer thus gains the 
impression of arriving in a new register. The melody established 
in this new region 'surmounts' the one below; this latter remains 
within a common area on both sides, and doesn't go beyond it: 
such is the original meaning of the words authentic and plagal, a 
meaning which finds justification in the following table. This 
table transposes the previous one in terms of a single final (D 
A 
IV 
by convention); ý plal:. 
Auth. 
2 I t; 
__________ 
. 
_____ 
135.. . -- 7 
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Ther e can be little doubt that this is the reason for the 
choice of the words c(i) ObTIC (which surmounts) and-rlýp-og (which 
accompanies), a choice which is entirely justified in terms of 
the above meaning. 'In consequenceý the double meaning of these 
words has undoubtedly led to the introdubtion of an incarrect 
notion of qualitative ranking: hence the latin translations such 
___. _as_, principalis -subjugalis. 1-etc. -t --which-have- 
given -rise-to- 
misunderstanding of these terms. 
'Completion Using the Sixth and Seventh Degrees of the Scale. 
The filling in of initially empty minor thirds with weak 
intermediate notes (piens), which then gradually 'solidify, is 
a phenomenon well kno-iin to ethnomusicology. We now mcet the 
procedure again in conditions which this disciplino . -: vaid 
find 
familiar. Even iflas is the case with the fourth mode, these 
Ilotes of completion -Thich int-; ýoduce the semitone) are 
integrated into. the characteristic-modal shape, they play a very 
different role from all preceding notes. We have studied their 
treatment in detail in the aforementioned article; the basic 
principle would seem to be the following. - 
Completion notes assume a hýh or low (natural or flat) 
-0 osition according to forces of attraction or repulsion which are 
exercised on them. If these forces are contradictory ýd equal, 
the note becomes. moveable. The attractions derive above all 
from the tonic. and the tenor, the repulsions from the tritone. 
In the case of conflict, or of different possible interpretations, 
opposing schools will frequently arise, and variants will be 
- 459 - 
introduced. The well kno-wn phenomenon of sliding from B to C 
which is found in germanic regions,. pnd the changeable tradition 
with regard to" the flattening-of certain Vs, are different 
examPles of this fundamental fact. 
Orthograph 
There are not o _but 
tiTQ-completion-notes2-. i.; hich-axe pe , 
ultimately moveable: E and B. Until the eleventh century or 
thereabbuts, theorists were not disposed to refer to them by any 
Gtu-her means than the Greek terminology of-synemmenon, the old 
tetrachord with a diatonic B flat. The Medievals had distorted 
the sense of this term in giving it the meaning of a note. it 
allowed them to take'account of one moveable note, but not of 
ti-To. Once the Greek terminology had been adapted to the 
'-'It>I*---va1 scale, this note could only be the B. There thus grew 
a tendency to adopt an orthography which on the one hand 
eliminated E flats, and on the other made B the only . moveable 
note. The well known adage ýhat "gregorian chant knows no other 
alteration than B flat" is thus a misleading one that results 
from a posteriori transpositions made necessary ihrough the in- 
adeauacies of solfe'ge. Numerous examples of this appear below 
(notably in the fourth mode). 
The Structure of the Eight I-lodes. 
The fixed pentatonic notes will be written in capitals, 
and the completion notes in small letters ("sill will always be 
written Ibl, according to the English practice, and not IhI). 
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Those completion notes -výhich remain moveable. will be put in 
brackets. We will refer-to our article in the Me'langes, 
Wellesz (M. E. W. ) for detailed substantiation. The scale should 
not be read from left to rightq but from the central kernel 
indicatled by the square brackets. The scale of*. the first mode; 
notated 
C. D--e-- FGA- (b)- C- will for- example g. -be-interpreted--as- 
CDePGA (b) CD 
. 
Rzzýý 
- that 'is to say, in terms of the central kernalz a departure from 
and return to the tonic D (the-point of departure- and, final------. -- 
arrival) through the dominant A with a weak let; an occasional 
overstepping in one direction or another through a departure 
from and return to the tonic at the bottom, and the dominant at 
the top; a moveable b. 
The first mode: There is the one form D A, with a 
moveable le'. which is usually splidi. fied as a natural because 
of the danger of forming a tritone with the, dominant A. it 
hence keeps its spelling: 
CDeFGA (b) CD 
But the attraction of the tonic 1). can also give rise to 
an vel flat which, if it is strong enoughq can threaten the 
dominant A: this shape is transposed and considered as the third 
mode; we will meet it again then. 
The second mode: There are two forms AC and D F, of which 
the scales occasionally coincide and blend, the differences 
between them resulting more or less from the relative strength of 
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th. e notes. The moveable note, which is IbI for AC and le' 
for D F, and which solidifies-as a natural, gives. rise to two 
spellings, which are best used in accordance with the position 
of the "pien 
. 
Sll. - 
F-I F-7 --- I 
a) the form A C. - FG -A bC Bý CDe, PG 
b) the formDF: A (b) CDeFGA= Ef GA: b CDE 
The second mode which_is_q#d__t -be-"in. -All 
is- 
-thus-not I 
necessarily a "transposition" of an original in D, as is 
custom; ýrily thought: the two forms have parity2 and only 
classification with a view to strict enumeration would give a 
theoretical pre-eminence to the form in D. 
The third mode. 
a) One recognises here the first mode with an le' flat 
(replacing IbI flat) 
CD4FGA bý C 
This cbmge requires a cll-lc,:. - -'---. -. forcement of the IbI flat by 
reason of this note's role of attraction, which is in turn 
sustained through resistance to the tritone. In o: iýder to. 
avoid the le' flat, the mode is written under the transposed 
orm. - 
F-----l 
DEfGABcDE 
This is an archaic form, often described as the origin 
of the one that follows, which is the same3, but with-a gliding 
of the dominant B to the adjacent C. There might perhaps be 
cause to vary this description slightly. 
Among the consequences of our etymology is the weakness 
of if tj which is a transposition of the old "pien" le' flat. 
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This wealmess is not in contradiction with the frequent presence 
of I. fI at the cadential closm, and is something that has alrepýdy 
been e*mphasised by gregorian scholars-(cf. 11ameline, le C'hant 
gregorian, 9 P-73)- 
6) The kernel of the minor sixth which is generally 
adopted appears in our theory in the form: 
of which the IbI is flattened, doubtless because of the tritone 
it foims with the dominant F. The resulting shape is: 
GA bý CD (e) Fý-G 
which is, then transposed in order to change the movc. able le' into 
Ibl: 
EfGA (b) CD 
The fourth mode. - It is this mode which ha- given the most 
tTouble to traditionalists, because it does not fit easily into 
the simplistic classification based on the one range of ' Efour] 
f inals. 
We can see the result of the two forms AD and DG to be 
found in our -table. 
a) The form A Dy with a IbI flat p. 89, in 
translation, p. 05): F GA6 CD (e) F transpo 
. 
sed to 
CDEfGA (b) 'C 
b) The form DG becomes A (b) CD (1-: ) FGA (b) C 
transPosed in many different ways according to the use of flats: 
- with a. moveable 'ell the necessity of turning this lel into 
a IbI results in the following s-pelling. This in turn requires 
a flattening of the IbI above, which becomes the If' below: 
- 463 
fGA (b) C DI EfG 
ýith e natural, this spelling is. usually piýeserved, hence 
EfGAbCDEfG 
with e flat, the transposition becomes 
I 
BcDEfGAB, cD 
The same remark should be made concerning the value of 
the second degree as with the third mode. 
It can be seen that the fourth mode whichAs said to be 
11in Al"is not a derivation or a transposition of the fourth mode 
in E. Both have parity3 with frequently misleading spellings 
whose different foTms result from the normal development of the 
. same kernel. 
The fifth mode: There is but one form, P C. which is not 
transposed: 
GA (b) dDeF 
The sixth mode: One form onlyý F A2 which is not transposed: 
CDeFGA (b) CD 
The seventh mode: There are two forms C'G and G D. 
a) The form CG contains, an e 1. which is always a natural 
and a IbI which is generally a flat (M. E. W., p. 91ý in translation, 
P. +50), hence 
(bý) CDeFGA (bý) 
usually written 
fGAbCDEf 
b) In contrast, the form GD has a IbI and an le' which 
stay as naturals (M. E. W., p. 91) in translation, P. 450), and so 
there is no transposition: 
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FGAbCDeF 
The'ei th mode: There are two forms GC and CF 
a) The forii G C, without flats, is written 
I 
C-D oFGAbCD 
b) In practice the form CF coincides with the previous 
one (cf. M. E. W. )., the only difference being in the lower zone, 
which-iz not-of ten- used-. - --Hence 
FGA (b) CI DeFG 
-which is written like the previous form in cases where the 
preceding IbI is flattened: 
CDEfGAbCD 
To sum up, the normal development of the kernels which 
we have studied here gives rise to the structures set out below. 
Iiithin these structuresq the notes in small letters, which are 
th- old "piens" or moveable notes that may or may not have become 
sta'---ilised, have diminished structural importance, the essential 
pai-L of the mode being naturally the central kernel: 
1. -C DeiFGA (b) CD 
F--1 
Ii. - a) Bb CDeFG or FGAbCD 
b) A (b) CDePGA or EfGAbCDE 
III* a) DEf GABCDE transposition of CD4FGA bb CD 
b) DfGA (b) CD transposition of GA bý CD (e) FG 
IV. a) CDEfGA (b) C transposition of FGAbCD (e) P 
b) EfGAbCDEfG transposition of A bý CDeFGA bb C 
F----1 I- I 
B0DEfGABcD transposition of A býC D eb FGA bý C 
V. FGA (b CDeP 
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Vi. C De F G Ab CD 
VII. a) f GA b C DE f transposition of bý CDeFGA 
ýb 
b) F GA b C De F 
VIII. a) C' De F G Ab CD 
b) C DE f G Ab CD transposition of GA bý CDeFG 
It can thus be seen how artificial the traditional system of 
clas sif i cat ion-i E;. F- -With- this- clas sifi cati on-, 
the-eigIrt moks 
are ranged according to four finals, DEP and G9 with each 
final giving rise to an authentic and a plagal mode. The same 
can be said for the "rule of the dominant" (a fifth above the 
tonic in the case of authentic modesq and a-third below the 
dominant of the . authentic for the plagal modes, with a sliding to 
the'adjacent higher note in the case of a dominant B). These 
are mnemonic devices and no more. That they are inadequate and 
sometimes wrong takes nothing away from their pedagogical 
ý'. genuity, but it is important not to be led astray by them. 
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